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This thesis is about continuity and change in South African intergroup relations, especially 
group relations implicated in xenophobia, as new African migrants have arrived on a scene 
dominated by long-established, but also changing, South African race/class relations.  It also 
critiques social psychology’s ‘two-group paradigm’, which conceptualises intergroup 
conflicts in binary terms involving dominant and subordinate or minority and majority 
groups.  In November 2009, a community of Zimbabwean farm workers was forcibly evicted 
from the informal settlements of De Doorns, a grape-farming town in the Western Cape, by 
their South African neighbours.  South Africans accused Zimbabweans of taking their jobs by 
working for white farmers at less than the minimum wage, which Zimbabweans and farmers 
denied.  Two interview-based case studies were conducted with De Doorns residents, one in 
December 2009 (37 interviews), and the second in 2012-2013 during and after the Western 
Cape farm workers’ strikes (33 interviews).  While xenophobic violence can be seen to 
involve two parties – black South African perpetrators and foreign black victims – in 2009 
residents constructed an ‘alliance’ between farmers and Zimbabweans, excluding South 
African workers, and differently judged this alliance as legitimate or illegitimate according to 
ideological imperatives of black liberation, white responsibility, anti-xenophobia or free-
market capitalism.  The 2012-2013 interviews show that, despite the absence of xenophobic 
violence during the strike, the anti-xenophobic imperative had not necessarily triumphed, as 
Zimbabwean and South African workers interviewed both continued to level and rebut the 
same accusations about the 2009 violence while claiming that their relationship had 
improved since then because of adjustments made by the other group.  Also, a ‘new’ racial 
division appeared – between coloured and all black people irrespective of nationality.  Thus, 
the nationality category ‘South African’ workers, that appeared united in its opposition to 
the Zimbabweans in 2009, can itself be historicised as an ‘alliance’ among groups with 
different but converging interests in change.  The intersection of racism and xenophobia in 
this community is considered, as are dilemmas of taking an anti-xenophobic stance which 
problematises the Zimbabwean-South African worker relationship but does not sufficiently 
problematise the overall farmer-worker relationship.  Overall I argue for a historical 
approach to intergroup conflict discourse which treats constructions of intergroup 
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This thesis is a reflection on the simultaneous presence of social continuity and social 
change in South African intergroup relations since the end of apartheid.  In particular, it is 
concerned with those group relationships implicated in xenophobic violence, where 
relatively new African migrant communities have arrived on a scene dominated by long-
established – but also changing – South African race and class relations.  Understanding 
social change and social continuity is important both from South African history perspective 
and from a critical social psychology perspective.  From a South African history perspective, 
it is important for a critical analysis of the transition from apartheid.  I used to think of the 
transition as a complete political change of direction – from illegitimate white minority rule 
to real democracy – and then wonder why, so often, so little appeared to have changed.  
Indeed, other academic commentators on xenophobia also seem to have assumed this 
perspective: when the anti-foreigner violence of May 2008 broke out around the country, 
some observers adopted expressions of incomprehension about how such anti-black 
violence could persist when South Africa was supposed to be in a state of post-racial 
liberation (see Hassim, Kupe & Worby, 2008).  This conundrum battles to reconcile the 
assumption of political change or discontinuity – discontinuity between the divisive, 
exclusive politics of apartheid, and the supposedly inclusive politics of democracy – with 
evidence of political continuity: continuity between the anti-black discourse and violence of 
white-ruled apartheid South Africa, and the anti-black discourse and violence of black-
governed democratic South Africa (Valji, 2003; Everatt, 2011; cf Monson, 2015).   
But a superficial analysis of the transition as an abrupt national political about-face – a 
transition to democracy – lacks an appreciation of how the various institutions making up 
South African life have actually changed or not changed during this time.  Indeed, it turns 
out that there is some literature arguing that understanding where we have got to in South 
Africa involves understanding the transition at least as much in terms of continuity and 
similarity with the apartheid past as it does in terms of discontinuity and change (Bond, 
2003; Bernstein, 1996; Li, 2009; Neocosmos, 2006; Pillay, 2013; Vale, 2002; Hodes, 2016).  
Xenophobic violence as we know it in South Africa – perpetrated mainly in black South 
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African communities in townships, informal settlements, and latterly city centres against the 
black African migrant communities living among or alongside them – is evidence of social 
change, insofar as the current strong distinction between black people who are South 
African citizens and black people who are non-citizens or ‘foreigners’ is something that only 
emerged after the end of apartheid (Neocosmos, 2006).  Neocosmos argues that this 
distinction was not made during apartheid either by the state or by the anti-apartheid 
movement, because the apartheid state was attempting to ‘denationalise’ all black people 
anyway by making them citizens of separate homelands, and regulating their presence in 
‘white South Africa’ according to how it could make use of their labour (Neocosmos, 2006; 
see also Pillay, 2013).  In this way, it treated black South Africans much like it did foreign 
migrants from further afield.  In response, and as a way of challenging the ethnic divisions 
institutionalised by the state, the ideology of the ANC and the anti-apartheid movement was 
Pan-Africanist and ‘was very much conceived...as a fight of all Africans and their allies 
against the apartheid state.  The concept of “nation” thus developed tended to be inclusive 
rather than exclusive of Africans from the region’ (Neocosmos, 2006, p. 30-31).  While there 
were other forms of ‘black-on-black’ violence during especially the latter years of apartheid, 
these occurred around political, ethnic or migrant identities, such as the ANC-IFP conflict in 
Natal/KwaZulu and the Transvaal (Minnaar, 1992; Sparks, 1994); they were not framed in 
terms of a distinction between who was a South African citizen and who was not.  In this 
way, Neocosmos (2006) gives a historical backing to the popular understanding of 
xenophobia as something that only emerged after the end of apartheid, and thus, as 
evidence of change.   
But Neocosmos’s argument is that contemporary xenophobia is also simultaneously 
evidence of continuity with the apartheid past: 
Under apartheid all rural migrants whether emanating from South African territory 
or not, were interpellated as foreign through the medium of tribal identification. 
Post-apartheid, only those emanating from beyond South Africa’s borders are 
interpellated as foreign, as the Bantustans are simply struck off the map. It is no 
longer ethnic identity but national (and increasingly black African) identity which 
enables access to resources (Neocosmos, 2006, p. 19) 
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Neocosmos argues that xenophobia was not, however, an inevitable outcome for post-
apartheid South Africa, given the Pan-Africanism that had earlier prevailed in the ANC.  But, 
as the new state chose to treat its population as passive ‘subjects of state or white largesse’ 
(ibid., p. 77), a distinction then needed to be made between those living in South Africa who 
qualified for state assistance and those who did not.  The dividing line for this distinction 
was South African citizenship.  Thus, a new set of reconfigured borders delineating 
foreigners from citizens replaced the old ones; and simultaneously a new (racialised) 
category of denationalised outsiders was created amongst those living within South Africa’s 
borders (ibid)– a distinction policed and enforced with seemingly as much zeal as was put 
into policing ‘white South Africa’ under apartheid (Vale, 2002).  Thus, in Neocosmos’s view 
the transition, although not inevitably, was ‘a transition between two different forms of 
xenophobia, simultaneously with continuity between state practices’ (Neocosmos, 2006, p. 
vi).  
This thesis examines one specific incident of xenophobic violence that played out in De 
Doorns, a grape-farming town in the Hex River Valley in the Western Cape, in November 
2009.  This violence took the form of a forcible eviction of a community of Zimbabwean 
farm workers who were living in the informal settlements around the town; and it 
precipitated the first large-scale displacement of foreign nationals within South Africa after 
the widespread anti-foreigner violence of May 2008 (Misago, 2009).  About 1500 
Zimbabwean workers were evicted from their homes by South Africans living in the same 
settlements, who broke down Zimbabweans’ houses and looted their possessions, accusing 
them of taking their jobs by accepting less than the minimum wage from white farmers.  
Farmers and Zimbabweans responded to these allegations by insisting that no low wages 
had ever been paid or accepted (see Agri WesCape media statement in Appendix 3).  If the 
Zimbabweans were preferred it was because of their better ‘work ethic’ and not because 
they were cheap; but Zimbabwean workers and farmers also insisted that this preference 
was not actually costing South African workers any jobs, as the violence happened in the 
peak early summer season when farmers’ demand for labour dramatically increases (see 
Misago, 2009).  Indeed, in its media statement Agri WesCape levelled its own veiled 
counter-accusation against the ‘criminal element’ that appeared to be responsible for 
instigating the violence, and alluded to ‘political support’ for the attack, but did not 
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elaborate.  Research on the De Doorns xenophobia conducted by the Forced Migration 
Studies Program (FMSP, now the African Centre for Migration and Society or ACMS) at Wits 
University suggested that a local ward councillor had been involved in inciting the attack on 
the Zimbabweans.  The reasons ACMS suggested for this councillor’s involvement were that 
he and other committee members of Ward 2 of the Breede Valley municipality were either 
acting as labour brokers themselves, or were in cahoots with a group of other labour 
brokers in De Doorns.  It was allegedly in their financial and political interests to get rid of 
competing Zimbabwean labour brokers and workers, to increase their own bargaining 
power and to garner support ahead of upcoming local elections (Misago, 2009).  Meanwhile, 
while some of the evicted Zimbabweans left De Doorns altogether, most remained and were 
accommodated in a displaced persons’ camp that was established on a sports field in the 
town, from where they continued to be fetched by farmers for work on the farms until the 
end of the season in April 2010. About 300 others were accommodated by farmers in their 
available farm worker accommodation.1  About three weeks after this attack, I went to De 
Doorns to do fieldwork for my master’s thesis.  I spent nine days there with Gina Fourie, a 
master’s student at the University of Cape Town who agreed to act as research assistant, 
interviewing residents about these events and about the issues they raised for different 
groups in the town.  Mainly, I was interested in finding out what caused or led to the 
violence, and also how groups in the town understood the nature of their relationship with 
locally significant other groups (cf Durrheim & Dixon, 2005a).  
Thinking seriously about social continuity and social change is also important for developing 
a critical social psychological perspective on intergroup conflicts such as xenophobia and 
racism.  Until I was well into the process of writing this thesis, I did not really understand the 
persistent emphasis of critical social psychologists on the importance of understanding 
‘social change’ (e.g. Sherif, 1966; Gergen, 1973; Parker, 1989; Billig, 1991; Reicher, 2004; 
Reicher & Haslam, 2013; Parker, 2015), or why this was something we should be concerned 
to study. While I would not have disagreed that most societies, including De Doorns, are 
changing, saying so seemed nothing more than a truism.  But in time I realised why it is 
important not to take change for granted.  Critics contend that mainstream social 
psychology dehistoricises its subject matter by ignoring processes of socio-historical change 
                                                          
1 Interview with Hex River Table Grapes Association Chairperson, December 2009.  
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and searching for explanations for social phenomena in psychological universals (Reicher & 
Haslam, 2013; see also Tileaga & Byford, 2014).  Long ago, Sherif observed that  
It runs against the grain of many theorists, psychologists in particular, to include 
‘history’ in an analysis of psychological events, such as those traditionally treated 
under the labels of ‘group prejudice’, ‘social distance’, or ‘stereotypes’...*S+ome 
prefer to interpret events from a ‘psychological viewpoint’ or to leave historical 
factors to historians. ...Unfortunately, whether we like it or not, history enters into 
the very definition of the problem of intergroup attitudes and the images we have of 
our own and other groups. ...The psychology of intergroup attitudes and behaviours 
must specify contemporary events within the framework of both past relationships 
between people and their future goals and designs.  Otherwise, a large proportion of 
intergroup actions appears pathological and irrational, as indeed some psychiatrists 
and social scientists tell us they are.  (Sherif, 1966, p. 20-22, italics added) 
More recently, Reicher and Haslam have argued that ignoring historical change depoliticises 
the status quo by presenting it as something that has simply always been and thus ‘serve*s+ 
the cause of power’ (2013, p. 114). Citing Moscovici, they have argued that social 
psychology should be a ‘science of movement’ which ‘must problematise the status quo and 
focus on the way in which social stability as well as social change is actively produced’ 
(Reicher & Haslam, 2013, p. 112).  These claims that social psychology should include a 
sensitivity both to the changing historical context in which any intergroup relationship is 
embedded, and to the contingency of any status quo, have several implications for the 
social psychological approach to intergroup relations taken in this thesis, which are 
elaborated below.   
First, problematising the status quo and historicising our objects of study means that we 
must problematise the notions of ‘advantaged’ and ‘disadvantaged’, ‘dominant’ and 
‘subordinate’, ‘minority’ and ‘majority’ or ‘high’ and ‘low status’ groups which form the 
conceptual and methodological framework for most social psychological studies of 
intergroup relations (cf Subašid, Reynolds & Turner, 2008).  These terms – once used by 
Tajfel with such powerful effect in showing how minority groups respond to intransigent 
social inequality (e.g., Tajfel, 1978a; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) – have mostly lost their critical 
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edge in social psychology.  They are simply taken for granted, such that inequality and status 
differences are treated as an unremarkable part of how the social world is organised, which 
then have consequences for group members’ perceptions and behaviour.  By contrast, in 
this thesis I will start from the premise that all currently ‘advantaged’ and currently 
‘disadvantaged’ groups became so through processes of socio-historical change, and thus 
they continue to have interests in the direction their society is changing towards, as well as 
in the ways that moments of collective action or intergroup conflict could potentially divert 
these changes.  For De Doorns, this means that we must know something about recent 
historical changes in this community and how they have differently affected different 
groups (cf Sherif, 1966) – the Zimbabwean community, different groups of South African 
farm workers, and also farmers.  In multi-group contexts such as De Doorns, such interests 
will be aligned with or antithetical to those of certain other locally significant groups 
respectively.  Thus, the point is not to argue against the categories of ‘advantaged’ and 
‘disadvantaged’ groups per se, but rather to recover their critical edge by showing how 
groups’ interests in change are implicit (or explicit) in the way they talk about their 
relationships with other groups.  
This brings us to a second limitation associated with the binary advantaged-disadvantaged 
intergroup relations paradigm in social psychology, or what I have called the ‘two-group 
paradigm’ (Kerr, Durrheim & Dixon, 2016).  When social psychologists conceptualise 
intergroup relations in terms of unequal pairs, they tend to overlook the unique dynamics 
that can emerge when groups are dealing with social relations on more than one front (Kerr 
et al, 2016; Subašid, Reynolds & Turner, 2008).  When three or more groups are involved in 
an intergroup relationship, dynamics of loyalty, solidarity, favouritism, collusion, and 
betrayal can be produced which are ultimately not reducible to a simple us-versus-them 
binary logic.  The two-group paradigm in social psychology is in danger of obscuring the way 
that power works (cf Parker, 1989) through the construction of intergroup alliances, by 
overlooking the third parties that are sometimes involved in constituting conflictual 
relations between two other groups even if they are not directly or physically involved in 
this conflict themselves.  In the two-group framework, the attack by South Africans living in 
the De Doorns informal settlements on their Zimbabwean neighbours in 2009 might have 
been read clearly as ‘xenophobic violence’, with South African perpetrators and 
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Zimbabwean victims at the front lines of this conflict. It would be their attitudes, 
stereotypes and prejudices under study.  As we have already seen, however, things were 
not as simple as this.  For a start, it is difficult to determine whether Zimbabwean farm 
workers are particularly more disadvantaged and powerless than their South African 
counterparts.  Indeed, South African workers who complained about the Zimbabweans 
accepting less than minimum wage from farmers construed this as the Zimbabweans’ being 
unfairly favoured and advantaged by farmers; accusations of favouritism and of exploitation 
were often made in the same breath.  The Zimbabweans also had a clear sense of 
themselves as superior to South African farm workers; they presented themselves as 
morally superior, financially more savvy, more hardworking, more reliable and so on – not 
the language of an inferior or powerless group. Neither did the Zimbabweans construe 
themselves as being exploited, but rather as being rightly favoured by farmers who 
recognised their superior qualities.  Therefore, although the Zimbabweans were indeed a 
numerical minority of immigrants, to define them as ‘disadvantaged’ or the ‘subordinate 
minority’ simply because they were victims of violence would be a post-hoc, circular and 
ultimately unhelpful way of understanding the intergroup dynamics in this town.  
What is missing from such a two-group analysis of intergroup relations in De Doorns is a 
sense of the wider relational context in which this xenophobic violence took place (Kerr, 
Durrheim & Dixon, 2016).  We can already see that there was at least one third party which 
was neither victim nor perpetrator, but which was implicated in almost all workers’ 
explanations for why the attack had happened: the farmers, or sometimes the ‘white 
people’, ‘boere’ or ‘larneys’.  The two-group paradigm in social psychology tends to overlook 
the possibility that the meaning of any particular two-way relationship may depend on its 
location in a broader matrix of intergroup relations (Kerr et al, 2016).  We will see that many 
South African workers in De Doorns were actually complaining primarily about the 
relationship between the Zimbabweans and the farmers, which was arguably functioning as 
an intergroup alliance, because it was always premised on the exclusion of South African 
farm workers.  For farmers and Zimbabwean workers themselves, this alliance was judged 
as perfectly legitimate and justified according to the imperative of free-market capitalism, 
which necessitated the use of the most efficient workers.  They also judged the eviction 
itself as completely wrong and illegitimate according to the principle of anti-xenophobia, in 
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terms of which the Zimbabweans were victims of an inexcusable attack carried out by 
scheming South African criminals.  By contrast, for those South African workers who 
supported the eviction, it was the close Zimbabwean-farmer relationship that was judged as 
completely illegitimate according to the imperatives of white responsibility and/or black 
liberation, in terms of which farmers had an obligation to prioritise fellow South Africans 
when selecting people for employment, and Zimbabweans needed to show solidarity with 
South African workers’ wage struggles.  Indeed, farmers and those South Africans who 
supported the eviction both accused each other of using the Zimbabweans as a tool by 
which to achieve their own respective illegitimate ends.  Clearly, a more complex set of 
intergroup relationships and dynamics is implicated here than just a binary one between 
Zimbabwean and South African farm workers.    
There is a final way in which questions of change and continuity are relevant in this study of 
xenophobia in De Doorns.  If we locate intergroup relationships and alliances in a history of 
social change we start to see that groups’ sense of where their allegiance lies can itself 
change over time (cf Subašid, Reynolds & Turner, 2008).  Indeed, if, as we have said, such 
alliances are constructed strategically with an eye to group interests in change, then we 
should not be surprised when this happens, as changes appear in the conditions that first 
made a particular cooperative intergroup relationship seem appealing.  After I submitted my 
master’s thesis in November 2011, it was recommended for upgrade to a PhD.  This 
upgrading process has involved extending and contextualising the first case study of 
intergroup relations at the time of the Zimbabweans’ eviction in 2009 by looking both 
‘forwards’ and ‘backwards’ historically.  Looking forwards, after the upgrade process was 
officialised I decided to go back to De Doorns to do another round of fieldwork in November 
2012.  The aim was to follow up on what had become of the Zimbabwean community since 
2009, and whether ‘xenophobia’ and the intergroup dynamics from 2009 had changed at all.  
I did not realise until after I had made my travel arrangements that the Western Cape farm 
workers’ strike was about to explode onto the scene beginning in De Doorns. Nevertheless I 
spent four days in De Doorns during the strike, and returned again a few times in 2013 to 
finish interviewing.  Although my initial research intention – to find out about the 
Zimbabweans – was somewhat thrown by the bigger and more immediate issue of the 
strike, the addition of this second case study produced a kind of longitudinal design which 
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allows a tentative case to be made about how intergroup allegiance in the Hex Valley had 
shifted between 2009 and 2012.  Somewhat surprisingly given the substance of the 
complaints against them in 2009, there were no attacks on the Zimbabwean community – 
who were still very much a presence in De Doorns – throughout the whole process of the 
strike.  Trade unionists and other activists observed that intergroup tensions between the 
South African and foreign farm worker communities in De Doorns were at an ‘all-time low’ 
just before the strike began (Hanekom, 2012), and that workers showed ‘maximum unity’ 
and ‘zero xenophobia’ during the strike (Masemola, 2012). In this sense, some change is 
discernible in the nature of the Zimbabwean-South African worker relationship since 2009. 
However, analysing the discursive content of this reported ‘unity’ in our interviews about 
Zimbabwean workers’ participation in the strike suggests that while both groups did report 
an improvement in their relationship since 2009, they did this without bridging the 
ideological gulf that was so evident between them at that time.  That is, when Zimbabweans 
were asked to account for why there had not been any violence against them during the 
strike, they mainly said that this was because South Africans had become more tolerant and 
realised that the allegations about low wages in 2009 had been false and misguided.  But 
when South Africans were asked the same question, they said it was because Zimbabwean 
workers had changed their ways and shown greater solidarity with South Africans’ wage 
struggle during the strike. They did not say anything remotely substantiating the 
Zimbabweans’ claim that they (South Africans) had come to realise that the claims of low 
wages were false, or that this is why they had abstained from violence. Furthermore, the 
Zimbabweans reported that they had mainly joined in with the strike out of fear of violent 
retribution if they did not, rather than because they really believed in it.  In this way, 
intergroup allegiance can shift in response to events that are external or internal to the 
relationship itself; but also that both sides could report a qualified improvement in the 
relationship between their groups without either one accepting the onus to change and 
without demonstrating the emergence of a shared set of norms about what constitutes 
right conduct for farm workers. Effectively the groups were continuing to play by different 
ideological rules.  
However, the 2009 case study can also be contextualised by looking backwards historically.  
What I was only dimly aware of when I first went to De Doorns is that the ‘good 
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relationship’ between the white farming community and the Zimbabwean farm worker 
community can be contextualised in a changing matrix of farmer-worker relations dating 
back to the days of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy or CLPP (Ewert & Hamman, 1996; 
du Toit, 1993; Goldin, 1984; Theron, 1976).  The literature on the ‘paternalistic’ relations 
between coloured farm workers and white farmers in the Western Cape during apartheid 
suggests that this relationship functioned as a kind of ‘quasi-alliance’ (Ewert & Hamman, 
1996, 1999) – albeit a highly unequal one – which was intended to co-opt coloured people 
into siding with whites against the black majority (Goldin, 1984).  In the Boland, this alliance 
served to defend farm relations against ideological criticism from the outside (du Toit, 1993) 
and then, after the CLPP was repealed in the late 1980s, to exclude newly-arrived black 
workers from becoming part of the ‘farm family’ (Ewert & Hamman, 1996).  This means that 
the Zimbabweans are not the first group of workers in this community to be invested in a 
simultaneously favouring and exploitative relationship with farmers.  In fact, it seems that 
the Zimbabweans began to arrive on the scene in the Hex Valley just at the time when 
farmers were partly disinvesting from their paternalist quasi-alliance with the coloured 
community in the early 2000s, which happened through a process of evictions and 
outsourcing that constituted the ‘externalisation’ and ‘casualisation’ of farm labour (du Toit 
& Ally, 2003; Ewert & du Toit, 2005). However, this disinvestment has been far from total, as 
even during the more recent farm workers’ strikes, some farmers tried the familiar tactic of 
claiming that coloured workers had no interest in the strike, as opposed to black workers 
who did, and thus, once again, appeared to be attempting to co-opt the coloured 
community back into an alliance (see Webb, 2013; also Western Cape government media 
statement in Appendix 4).  
There are two important theoretical points to draw from this history of change and 
continuity. First, as we will see, groups that have lived through these changes have 
experienced them as real and deeply significant, and group members’ own ideas about 
where their interests lie in this changing socio-economic landscape find their way into 
constructions of their relationships with other groups.  Such constructions are thus highly 
strategic, insofar that they are geared towards rendering certain proposals for and 
evaluations of change sensible and defensible while dismissing others as unworkable or 
immoral.  Second, however, reading this history shows us that despite all this change, 
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striking similarities in the texture of intergroup relations are evident between present-day 
De Doorns – in which farmers had a clear sense that the most desirable workers were also 
those whose migrancy status was most precarious – and those produced by the coloured 
labour preference policy (CLPP) in other industries during apartheid (Goldin, 1984). Under 
the CLPP, the majority of black people were forcibly removed from the Cape to the 
homelands and allowed back on year contracts to work, thus creating a stratification 
between coloured workers who lived permanently in the Cape, ‘contract blacks’ who had 
legal migrant status, and ‘illegal blacks’ who were in the Cape but risked being deported to 
the homelands. As Goldin shows, the hierarchical system of preference in the eyes of 
employers that this system created (in opposition to what its intended effects were, with 
‘illegal blacks’ being the most preferred) – resembles  the current, reconfigured relationship 
between Zimbabwean ‘non-nationals’ (who are supposed to be excluded from citizens’ 
rights, but are nevertheless preferred by farmers) and South African citizens who are seen 
as belligerent and lazy.  Thus, one of the overall arguments I will make in this thesis is that 
deciding whether any observable ‘social changes’ constitute significant discontinuity with 
the past or mere variation on a longer continuous theme depends on the scope of one’s 
overall historical frame of reference.   
The order of the chapters that will make this case is as follows. Chapter 2 describes the 
events of November 2009, including who and what was involved in the eviction of the 
Zimbabweans, and uses research by ACMS to compare this with other episodes of 
xenophobic violence in South Africa.  (This is not the main results chapter, but describes the 
context before the empirical chapters later on.)  Chapter 3 gives a short history of socio-
economic change in Western Cape commercial farming communities like De Doorns since 
the early 1990s in order to locate the arrival of the Zimbabweans historically both in a 
process of ‘externalisation’ in which many coloured workers moved off the farms into 
informal settlements (Ewert & du Toit, 2005), and after the arrival of black work seekers 
once the influx control laws were repealed (Ewert & Hamman, 1996).  Chapters 4 and 5 turn 
to social psychology; Chapter 4 offers a critique of social psychology’s ‘two-group paradigm’, 
in which intergroup relations are mainly conceptualised in terms of binary opposition, and 
suggests some ways to move beyond thinking and researching in two-group terms.  Chapter 
5 is about social psychology and social change, and makes a case for reading discourse 
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about intergroup relations as being located in, and oriented to speakers’ interests in, a 
process of ongoing historical change that is partially constituted by the interaction among 
groups (Drury & Reicher, 2000).  Chapter 6 describes the research methods for the 2009 
fieldwork, and Chapter 7, entitled ‘Dilemmas of xenophobia and anti-xenophobia in De 
Doorns’, gives the 2009 results.  Chapter 8 narrates the aftermath of the 2009 eviction and 
the build-up to the 2012 farm workers’ strike three years later, as well as other 
commentators’ views on the status of group relations among farm workers during the 
strike.  Chapter 9 describes the 2012-2013 fieldwork, and Chapter 10, entitled ‘Towards 
solidarity?’, contains the results of the 2012-2013 fieldwork. This addresses questions of 
conflict resolution between South African and Zimbabwean workers and argues that the 
absence of xenophobic violence during the strike was not necessarily an indication of 
ideological unity among workers or a vindication of the anti-xenophobic position. Chapter 
11, the penultimate chapter, is entitled ‘The more things change the more they stay the 
same’, and makes an apparently contradictory case for reading the historically changing 
intergroup dynamics in De Doorns as but a variation on those produced by the Coloured 
Labour Preference Policy 25 years earlier.  Seeing the transition from apartheid as a 
transition between two forms of capitalism allows us not to be surprised at such 
continuities.  Finally, Chapter 12 contains conclusions and recommendations for further 
research.   
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Chapter 2: What happened in De Doorns in November 2009? 
This chapter begins with a brief description of the town of De Doorns and some of its 
community dynamics, and then draws on the findings of two research reports as well as my 
own fieldwork in De Doorns to explain how and why the forcible eviction of the 
Zimbabwean community from the informal settlements happened in November 2009 
(Misago, 2009; Robb & Davis, 2009).  Following this, other xenophobia research by the 
African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) at Wits University is used to contextualise 
these events within the pattern that has characterised xenophobic violence in South Africa, 
especially that of May 2008 and April 2015.  Finally, the chapter differentiates my research 
aims from those of these other authors.  
De Doorns in context 
De Doorns is a small town in the Hex River Valley in the Western Cape.  It is situated on the 
N1 freeway, about 140 km from Cape Town, and falls under the Breede Valley Local 
Municipality.  The layout of the older parts of De Doorns follows a typical apartheid town 
planning scheme (see Figure 1).  The town centre contains the shops, police station, 
municipal office, schools, churches, a cemetery, the Hex River Table Grapes Association 
offices, the Ledeklub (Members’ Club), and the historically white residential area.  To the 
east, separated from the town centre by a railway line, is De Doorns Oos (De Doorns East), 
the small ‘coloured location’ historically housing coloured people who did not live or work 
on farms.  Further south-east, and mostly separated from the rest of the town by the N1 
freeway, are the relatively new informal settlements and an even newer large section of 
RDP housing (low-cost, post-apartheid government housing).  There is no direct vehicle 
access between these different parts of town: to get from the middle of De Doorns to De 
Doorns Oos one must either walk across the railway line or else exit De Doorns by car, get 
back on the N1 for a few hundred metres and then enter the location by its own turnoff.  
Further, to get to Stofland (the largest of the informal settlements) and the RDP housing 
around it, one must continue through the residential streets of De Doorns Oos and then 
cross a bridge over the freeway into Stofland (see Figure 1).  At the time of our first research 
in 2009, this RDP housing did not yet exist, but there were a number of informal 
settlements: Stofland on the south side of the freeway, and Ekuphumleni, Maseru (where 
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Lesotho migrants lived), Hasie Square and Matjoks on the northern side around the edges of 
De Doorns Oos.  Ten kilometres away there is also another informal settlement called GG 
Camp, near the west end of the valley.  Being informal, these settlements are also subject to 
change and removal, and by 2012, Maseru – the former home of most Lesotho migrants – 
no longer existed, its residents having been moved into Stofland.2  The map of De Doorns in 
Figure 1 is therefore a kind of composite or time-lapse map, as it includes the informal 
settlements around the north-eastern edges of De Doorns Oos which were present in 2009 
but gone by 2012, and it also includes the RDP housing around Stofland (a section of which 
is called ‘Lubisi’) which was not yet built in 2009 but has been steadily expanding since 
about 2010.  At the time of our first fieldwork in 2009, these settlements were absolutely 
unserviced and had no piped water, electricity, sewerage system or refuse removal.  By 
2012, Stofland had been semi-formalised, as the shacks had been ordered into a grid and 
had been provided with electricity and some outside concrete toilets.    
Figure 1: Map of De Doorns, 2009-2012 
 
                                                          




De Doorns revolves around the production of export- and locally-sold table grapes.  Almost 
everyone who lives in the informal settlements and RDP housing works on grape farms for 
at least part of the year, and most of the rest of the Hex Valley is covered by vineyards and 
farm houses.  The farms are owned by white Afrikaans families or else agricultural 
companies.  Between the mid-1950s and 1986, the Western Province was designated a 
‘coloured labour preference area’ (Goldin, 1984) and so historically the labour force 
consisted overwhelmingly of coloured workers who lived permanently on the farms in 
accommodation provided by farmers in a system of ‘tied housing’ (du Toit, 1993).  However, 
for a number of reasons explained more fully in the next chapter, a large part of the 
coloured farm worker community subsequently moved off or was evicted from the farms, 
and, along with incoming local and international migrants from the Eastern Cape, 
Zimbabwe, and Lesotho, they built and occupied the informal settlements.  From these, 
workers are recruited back to work on farms on a casual and temporary basis, often sourced 
through labour brokers (Ewert & du Toit, 2005; du Toit & Ally, 2003).  Another way for 
farmers to recruit workers is simply to send a lorry and driver to the informal settlements 
with a set price per day; in the mornings and evenings De Doorns was full of lorries with 
crowds of people on the back being transported between the farms and the locations.  
The Zimbabweans are the most recent migrants to the area.  According to the Hex River 
Table Grapes Association (HTA), the first farmer in De Doorns to employ Zimbabwean 
workers did so in 2002, while according to other farmers and Zimbabweans they have 
constituted a significant and regular minority in the seasonal labour force since about 2006 
or 2007.   
A history of violent conflict in De Doorns 
How did it come about that by 2009 the Zimbabwean community were the victims of an 
attempt to forcibly evict them from De Doorns? Robb and Davis (2009) point out that this 
eviction in November 2009 was not the only recent case of violent conflict in this town or 




The context of violent protest that the host community has been subject to and 
engaged in for the past decade can be assumed to have normalized protest action 
and violence as a viable mechanism to engage government’s attention.  The effect 
on the community of Stofland could be interpreted as a siege and a battle between 
the community and the police/state (p. 16).  
Robb and Davis also note that the previous year in November 2008 a South African man was 
shot and killed by police using rubber bullets during a service delivery protest in Stofland.  
During further protests which followed this death the police continued the attack on 
Stofland using rubber bullets, breaking down people’s doors, using abusive language and 
harassing residents.   
Then, in February 2009, seven Zimbabweans were killed when they were locked in a shack 
which was then set alight.  Although these murders are much more shocking and extreme 
than the eviction of the Zimbabweans later that year, they appear not to have had the same 
‘xenophobic’ overtones, partly because they was allegedly perpetrated by other non-
nationals from Lesotho, and partly because they were the result of a personal dispute (Robb 
& Davis, 2009) rather than a community effort to make all the Zimbabweans leave the area.  
However, shortly after this event – and apparently (bizarrely) precipitated by it – the police 
carried out a night-time ‘immigration raid’ on the homes of Zimbabweans in the De Doorns 
informal settlements (Robb & Davis, 2009).  The local police were believed to have been 
involved in this raid, and it ‘was carried out with great brutality and descriptions of ensuing 
mayhem are related’ – people were reportedly pulled from their beds during the night and 
‘350 Zimbabweans were arrested on immigration charges’ (ibid., p. 17).  Robb and Davis 
suggested that  
It can be assumed that the local community when witnessing the actions of the state 
against ‘illegal aliens’ interpreted it [sic] as legally sanctioned and thus [this] 
sustained their beliefs of the non-entitlement of their immigrant neighbours to be 
living in South Africa...It could [also] be argued that this demonstration by the State 
of a violent ‘attack’ that criminalized the Zimbabwean community members may 
have instilled a sense of justification for their future actions of 17 November 2009. 
(2009, p. 17) 
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Robb and Davis have another important insight about this context of near-constant conflict 
between informal settlement residents and the state (police and municipality), and the role 
(or lack thereof) of foreign communities within it:  
protest action appears to be an important aspect of community life in the informal 
settlements and symbolic of social cohesion....*Zimbabweans’+ not partaking in this 
long existing cultural collective form of resistance is regarded as divisive to social 
cohesion and confronts and confounds local beliefs of what it is to be a community 
member (p. 20).   
Monson (2015) similarly argues that the attacks on foreign-owned shops and looting that 
often take place during service delivery protests reflect South African communities’ anger 
over migrants’ apparent political indifference to collective struggle.  Overall, this discussion 
suggests that in De Doorns the Zimbabwean community are victimised by police and fellow 
civilians respectively for protesting, for not protesting, and for simply being foreign.   
Explanations for the eviction of the Zimbabweans in November 2009 
There were also a number of more specific and immediate contributing factors that led to 
the eviction of the Zimbabwean community in November 2009, however.  The following 
section covers four reasons for this eviction offered by different researchers as well as 
participants I interviewed: competition among Zimbabwean and South African labour 
brokers; the context of bargaining for higher wages during the peak season of ‘uitkniptyd’;3 
the connivance of labour brokers and a local ANC ward councillor; and a shortage of housing 
space in the informal settlements (Davis, 2010).   
Reason 1: Competition between labour brokers   
The ACMS report on the De Doorns eviction (Misago, 2009) mainly emphasised competition 
among Zimbabwean and South African labour brokers as a reason for the eviction.  This is 
matched by the explanations of three of the De Doorns farmers we interviewed in 2009. 
Farmers explained that they use brokers to recruit workers only when demand for labour 
                                                          
3
 Uitkniptyd (literally ‘picking out time’) is the period in early summer when bunches of grapes must 
be thinned.  Small grapes must be picked out of the bunches on every vine so that the remaining 
ones can grow fat without squashing each other.  This is an extremely labour-intensive period when 
farmers’ labour demand can double for just a few weeks.   
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outweighs supply, or when workers are hard to find.  At the time, the labour brokering 
system was completely unregulated, but labour brokers in De Doorns were generally of two 
kinds: more informal labour ‘finders,’ and labour brokers proper4 (see du Toit & Ally, 2003).5 
Labour ‘finders’ would simply gather a group of people together for the farmer, charging the 
worker a portion of their wage and the farmer a price ‘per head’ – in 2009, between R2 and 
R5.  These finders did not supervise the workers or take responsibility for them after they 
had placed them, but they were supposed to pay them their wages. ‘Proper’ labour brokers 
had a more formalised system: they had their own labour force and the farmer would pay 
the broker a once-off fee for him to provide, transport, supervise and pay the labourers. The 
broker was also responsible for deducting UIF (unemployment insurance fund) 
contributions.  Using labour brokers saves farmers the administrative hassle of individually 
finding and paying large numbers of workers, especially when they are employed only for 
short periods.  At the time, there were only a few ‘proper’ labour brokers in the Hex River 
valley, perhaps fewer than five,6 but there were about 90 informal ones (Misago, 2009).  
Both kinds of brokers are referred to as contractors (in Afrikaans ‘kontrakteurs’).   
 
At the time, three factors (by my reckoning) made the informal South African labour 
brokers’ position precarious.  Firstly, there were enough seasonal Zimbabwean workers in 
De Doorns (about 15007) to make a significant difference in the labour supply and hence in 
the drop in farmers’ demand for labour finders’ services.  Secondly, there was competition 
between Zimbabwean and South African contractors, because farmers tended to prefer the 
Zimbabweans.  South Africans we interviewed also accused the Zimbabwean contractors of 
only recruiting Zimbabwean workers, which they said was unfair.  Some Zimbabwean 
workers agreed with this, presenting it as natural that farmers would want Zimbabwean 
workers since they had had good experiences of working with them. However, the 
Zimbabwean contractor we interviewed said it was not true that she was only using 
Zimbabwean workers.  Thirdly, several of these South African labour brokers had given 
themselves a bad name by walking off with labourers’ wages instead of paying them, and so 
                                                          
4 Interview with Farmer 1, December 2009 
5 Interviews with HTA Chairperson and formal labour broker (interview 34),  December 2009 
6 Interview with formal labour broker in De Doorns, December 2009 
7 Interview with Agri WesCape CEO, December 2009 
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the farmers had largely stopped using them.8  It was suggested in some of our interviews 
that the allegations of Zimbabweans working for lower wages may have originated through 
their having been being cheated out of their full wages by crooked contractors.  
 
It was agreed among the five farmers we interviewed in 2009, including the HTA 
chairperson and the Agri Wes-Cape CEO, that the Zimbabweans were well-liked because of 
their ‘good work ethic’.  Unlike South Africans workers, who were said to be often absent 
for various reasons such as being drunk or hung over, collecting social grant payouts (called 
‘All-Pay’ in De Doorns), going to the clinic, or simply not feeling like coming to work, 
Zimbabweans were described as reliable and seldom absent from work.  However, 
Zimbabwean workers and farmers both vehemently denied that this preference was costing 
South African workers any jobs.  Farmers differed slightly in their accounts of exactly what 
the level of need for labourers was at the time: the CEO of Agri Wes-Cape provided me with 
figures showing that there was too much work to be done and farmers could not find 
enough labourers to do it.  There were about 14 000 workers employed on the farms while 
the number that was needed was closer to 17 000. (The figure provided to Misago (2009) by 
Agri Wes-Cape’s media liason officer two weeks previously was that there were 14 000 
workers needed and only 13 000 working.)  Two other farmers,9 however, said that demand 
and supply were just about equal, but that the Zimbabweans’ presence put the bargaining 
power back into the hands of the farmers.  Hence, while some farmers admitted that they 
did (justifiably) prefer Zimbabwean workers, they gave figures to demonstrate that – at the 
time of the violence at least – the accusations that the Zimbabweans were ‘stealing South 
Africans’ jobs’ simply could not be true – there was ‘work for everyone’, according to the 
Agri Wes-Cape CEO.  Farmers and formal contractors said they were even fetching workers 
from other nearby towns such as Touws River and Worcester when necessary – showing 
that there was a higher demand for workers than De Doorns could satisfy.  In this way, they 
deflected the suggestion that they, as employers, were in some way responsible for the 
conditions which precipitated the eviction.   
 
Even if there were not enough workers available to work at the time, however, there were 
                                                          
8 Interviews with Farmers 1 and 3 and elderly coloured man (interview 15). 
9 Interviews with Farmers 1 and 2, December 2009. 
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still more than there would have been without the Zimbabweans.  Therefore it was likely 
that South African brokers were losing business to Zimbabwean competitors (Misago, 2009).  
These brokers were allegedly trying to force the farmers to use them and to force up the 
price they could charge ‘per head’ by inciting violence to get rid of the Zimbabweans 
(Misago, 2009).10 
 
Reason 2: The eviction as a form of wage bargaining 
Farmers explained the eviction of the Zimbabweans in a more general context of work stay-
aways and strikes that South African workers had tried to initiate at that time of year in 
previous years.  The violence happened in November, which is ‘uitkniptyd’, or time for 
thinning bunches of grapes.  Farmer 1 explained that because this work must be done 
during a short window in early summer or not at all, a small group of South Africans in the 
informal settlements were taking advantage of the desperation of the farmers during this 
crucial period to try and force up the price of labour by calling stay-aways.  He called this 
‘manipulation’ and said that just a few influential people were holding the whole valley to 
ransom by forcing people who wanted to work to stay at home so that they could force up 
the price (per bunch or per day) without having to do any harder work.  Indeed, he said that 
this routinely happened during uitkniptyd and that 2009 was not the first year it had 
happened.  Apparently threats of breaking down even South Africans’ houses, and other 
kinds of intimidation, had been used to get people to stay away from work.  Robb and Davis 
(2009) similarly reported that ‘there is great social pressure and the fear of violent 
retribution is present if calls to stay away from work are not heeded’ (p. 22).  Not 
surprisingly, however, Zimbabweans interviewed by Misago (2009) said that they did not 
know about any such stay-aways.  When I phoned farmer 1 again in 2012 to ask if I could 
interview him about the strike, the first thing he asked was whether I remembered what he 
had said in 2009 about labour upheavals happening every year at that time.  In the view of 
the farmers, then, the attack on the Zimbabweans’ houses was less an act of ‘xenophobia’ 
than a form of wage bargaining – though in their view, a highly illegitimate one.  They did 
not see the eviction as ‘xenophobia’ because they said it was not carried out for reasons of 
‘race hate’ – simply because a lot of people disliked the Zimbabweans enough to want them 
                                                          
10 Also interviews with farmers 1, 2, 3 and the HTA, December 2009 
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to go away.  Rather, they saw it as a strategic act with economic and political consequences 
for its instigators.   
Reason 3: Party politics and labour brokering intertwined 
Misago (2009) and most of our interviewees also implicated the ANC councillor for Ward 2 
of the Breede Valley local municipality in the instigation of the attack.  According to 
Zimbabweans we interviewed, this councillor had been going door to door in the informal 
settlements some time before the violence, telling Zimbabweans that they were not wanted 
and that they should not be living there.11 These actions were ascribed by farmers and 
Zimbabweans to the councillor’s need to gain popularity and garner support ahead of the 
upcoming local elections, since he had been generally unpopular.  Indeed, according to 
Robb and Davis, ‘leadership of the community is vested in an informal Committee with little 
confidence in local government representatives’ (p. 2) and which, importantly, did not 
include the local councillor (p. 14).  The councillor’s name was Mpumelelo Lubisi but he was 
more commonly referred to by his nickname Poyi or as ‘die grootkop’ (the ‘big head’).  The 
exact relationship between the labour brokers and the councillor is not entirely clear to me, 
but interviewees said that the councillor was either a labour broker himself, or was in 
cahoots with the other ward committee members who were brokers.  The brokers were a 
‘powerful pressure group’ (Misago, 2009) whose political support the councillor needed.  In 
Misago’s (2009) research,  
a number of respondents offered two reasons for their belief that the councillor and 
ward committee members were involved in organising the violence:  
i) the councillor reportedly gave in to demands by a powerful pressure group 
(contractors) in order to protect his position during the upcoming local elections;  
ii) some ward committee members have interests in protecting their jobs as 
contractors. (p. 3, emphasis in original) 
The De Doorns farmers we interviewed, as well as members of PASSOP (People Against 
Suffering, Oppression and Poverty – a refugee and immigrants’ rights activist group), all 
largely concurred with this explanation. However, the Agri Wes-Cape CEO whom I 
                                                          




interviewed located the violence in a broader party political context which he described as 
‘the battle for the soul of the Western Cape’s political future’ between the Democratic 
Alliance (DA) and the ANC, and which was instigated by as-yet unidentified ANC persons 
who had been brought in from Cape Town.  This is the familiar ANC-trying-to-take-over-the-
Western-Cape conspiracy theory that underlies most DA-aligned analysis of any protest 
events in that province, and which Agri WesCape also gives for all labour-related upheavals 
including the widespread 2012 farm workers’ strikes (see Underhill, 2013, and Agri Wes-
Cape media statement in Appendix 2).12  
Reason 4: Limited space in the informal settlements for electrification of houses  
A final contributing factor to the eviction, which was not mentioned by any of our 
participants or by Misago (2009), appears in a thesis by Davis (2010). Davis argues that 
conflict and competition among Zimbabweans and South Africans over housing space and 
electricity supply in the informal settlements was an important factor in precipitating the 
eviction.  She points out that plots in the settlements are the property of the municipality 
and are supposed to be (a) free and (b) reserved for future RDP housing recipients, which 
excludes non-citizens.  However, both Zimbabweans and South Africans had been renting 
out shacks to tenants, which is a kind of fraud since they do not own the sites.  Physical 
space limitations were also an issue: some South Africans’ homes were built in an area that 
was susceptible to flooding, and so they could not be electrified.  Thus, when moves were 
made in late 2009 to provide Stofland with electricity, some South African residents 
apparently informed Eskom (the Electricity Supply Commission) which houses to avoid 
electrifying as they were planning on ‘doing xenophobia’ there (p. 35).  Davis reports that ‘In 
interviews with community leaders, some expressed that there was a need to “make room” 
*by evicting Zimbabweans+ in the main Stofland area so these South African “brothers and 
sisters” could move their homes to areas where electricity would be provided’ (p. 36).  
The eviction 
On the evenings of Friday 13th and Monday 16th November 2009, two public meetings were 
held in which Councillor Lubisi allegedly openly expressed his intention that the 
                                                          
12
 However, the farmers themselves are not without political connections: Elza Jordaan, long-time 
DA councillor in the Breede Valley local municipality, was also the chairperson of the Hex River Table 
Grapes Association – the local farmer’s association – for several years. 
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Zimbabweans should leave or be made to leave (Misago, 2009).13  The first meeting was 
followed the next day by an attack on the homes of some Zimbabweans in the informal 
settlement of Ekuphumleni, after which 68 Zimbabweans left and took refuge at the De 
Doorns police station where they stayed for the weekend (Misago, 2009).  The second 
meeting preceded further violence on the morning of Tuesday 17th November.  That 
morning, in order to push for a stay-away, South Africans had tried to prevent some 
Zimbabweans from getting into the trucks that were sent to collect them for work (Misago, 
2009).  This apparently ended in a fight (Misago, 2009).  What happened therein and 
thereafter is not exactly clear, but a group of South Africans then went through the informal 
settlements of Hasie Square, Ekuphumleni and Stofland and tore down shacks in which 
Zimbabweans were living, both as rent-paying tenants of South African landlords, and as 
owners of their own houses.  Zimbabweans we interviewed later recounted being 
confronted by South Africans who told them to get out of their houses and then started to 
dismantle them, stealing their things and making a mess of whatever else they found there.  
Zimbabwean interviewees also expressed extreme disappointment in the police, who had 
been on the scene but had apparently not done anything to prevent the attacks, rather 
appearing to ‘escort’ the attackers while calling on them not to harm anyone.  By all 
accounts, however, and somewhat surprisingly, no Zimbabweans were physically assaulted 
in the process.  Zimbabweans who witnessed this violence estimated the number of people 
who carried it out at less than fifty;14 another man from Lesotho at less than a hundred.15 
Almost the entire Zimbabwean population – probably between 1500 and 3000 people – 
then left the informal settlements.  Most moved into a camp for ‘internally displaced 
persons’ made of UNHCR tents that were speedily erected on a rugby field in front of the 
Members’ Club in the middle of the town, and was managed by the Breede Valley 
Municipality.  Other Zimbabweans, about 300 according to the Hex Valley Table Grapes 
Association (HTA), were accommodated by farmers in on-farm accommodation. Still others 
left the area altogether.   
Responses to the violence 
Members of the police, some representatives of the HTA, the police and the mayor of the 
                                                          
13 Also interview with Owen Maromo, August 2013.  
14 Interview with first group of Zimbabwean men, December 2009 (interview 30) 
15 Interview with man from Lesotho in Stofland, December 2009 (interview 26) 
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Breede Valley Municipality, Charles Ntsomi, were all present at both the public meetings 
described above.16  Since these stakeholders had been at the meetings and knew an attack 
was imminent but did little or nothing to stop it (Misago, 2009), Zimbabweans we 
interviewed interpreted this as the police and the mayor giving support to the perpetrators.  
In fact, Braam Hanekom, then-director of the refugee rights activist group PASSOP, believed 
Councillor Lubisi to be acting under instructions from the mayor, Charles Ntsomi.17  Despite 
the police’s limited intervention and help at the scene of the attack, twenty-three people 
were later arrested for crimes committed during this violence.  Though I do not know the 
outcome of these trials, South African residents staged a solidarity protest outside the court 
in nearby Worcester demanding that they be let out.  Misago (2009) did not know whether 
this was because they supported the actions of those arrested, or because they believed 
that the wrong people had been arrested.  Misago also reports that Lubisi denied allegations 
that he himself was involved in instigating the violence.  However, our interviewees’ 
responses suggest that perhaps the role of this councillor was underplayed in Misago’s 
report.  We also interviewed Lubisi but he was not prepared to sign the informed consent 
form or have the interview recorded. However, one thing he did say was that he was ‘not 
Moses’ and was not able to stop a community from doing what it had already decided to do 
– thus placing responsibility with ‘the community’ rather than himself.  Lubisi was 
suspended by the ANC after calls for his removal (Majavu, 2010); but later he was 
reinstated,18 and the RDP housing area which was later built next to Stofland – Lubisi – is 
named after him.19  
Some South Africans we interviewed who identified themselves as those who had ‘chased 
the Zimbabweans away’ were at pains to emphasise that no violence was done to any 
persons, only to their property.  The Zimbabweans’ own accounts of the days of violence 
agreed with this superficially: the police had allegedly escorted them out of the informal 
settlements to the middle of town, while calling on the crowd not to hurt anyone,20 rather 
than actually intervening and stopping the attack.  Misago (2009) also highlighted this 
                                                          
16 Interviews with Charles Ntsomi and HTA chairperson, December 2009   
17 Interview with PASSOP members, December 2009 
18 Interview with Braam Hanekom, July 2013 
19
 Interview with Braam Hanekom, July 2013 
20 Interview with second Zimbabwean man (interview 13), December 2009 
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failure on the police’s part.  Whether the police and the mayor were actually supporting the 
perpetrators is difficult to verify, but given Robb and Davis’s (2009) report of the earlier 
police raid on Zimbabwean homes, this seems a likely possibility.21  Overall, responses from 
Misago’s interviewees about the De Doorns violence 
suggest widespread mistrust of elected and municipal officials among residents, and 
they raise the need for better oversight and investigation.  A key concern is that it is 
not clear which institution has the mandate to regularly monitor and oversee local 
political actors if they are suspected of inciting or being complicit in violence (Misago, 
2009, p. 6).  
Misago (2009) pointed out the fact that town authorities were all present in the meetings 
preceding the violence suggests that ‘early warning’ systems were not functioning as they 
should.  This corresponds with ACMS’s broader conclusion that ‘violence against foreign 
nationals and ethnic minorities is a symptom of broader challenges of legitimate and 
accountable local governance, especially in informal settlements’ (Polzer, 2010, p. 5, 
emphasis in original).  
At the time of our research there was talk of quickly ‘reintegrating’ the Zimbabweans back 
into the informal settlements.  Although a ‘reintegration committee’ was established, the 
process became ‘deadlocked *by late January 2010+ as the community is demanding 
evidence of service delivery before moving forward’ (Robb & Davis, 2009, p. 27). (This 
demand may have worked, because the Lubisi housing area was built subsequent to this.) 
The reintegration committee’s efforts were further scuppered as people who were involved 
in this committee were also among those arrested for public violence (Robb & Davis, 2009).  
In the end, reintegration did not happen that year: the camp remained full until the end of 
the season in April 2010, when the majority of Zimbabweans eventually left De Doorns 
(Burgsdorff, 2010).  About 350 people were left in the camp after the majority had moved 
on, and they remained there until October 2010 when the camp was finally closed almost a 
year after it was created.  By this time, the next season’s cohort of Zimbabwean migrants 
                                                          
21
 I also interviewed the De Doorns station commissioner but did not go through the necessary 
permission procedures with the South African Police Service.  Consequently the interview cannot be 
cited.  Part of the procedure would have involved signing an agreement that I would not say 
anything in my research that presented the police in a negative light.  
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were already starting to arrive or return to De Doorns.22  At the camp closure, most of the 
Zimbabweans who were still there (but not all, because of a technicality) were given a 
‘repatriation gratuity’ of R1500 per family member by the Breede Valley municipality,23 and 
were offered free transport home to Zimbabwe by the International Organisation for 
Migration (Burgsdorff, 2010).  Members of PASSOP, who had been working for the rights of 
the Zimbabweans in the camp since the eviction, were present at its closure to give financial 
assistance to those Zimbabweans who were not amongst those given the gratuity and were 
left with nowhere to go (Burgsdorff, 2010).24 Burgsdorff reported that the closure of the 
camp happened in a humane and peaceful manner.  
How the De Doorns violence followed the trend of May 2008: Findings from ACMS  
The African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) is a major contributor to the research 
literature on xenophobia in South Africa and their work shows how De Doorns fitted closely 
into the pattern that has characterised xenophobic violence before, during and since May 
2008.  In all its writings and reports on xenophobia, ACMS has insisted that general factors 
such as poverty, unemployment, and long-lasting community tensions are inadequate to 
explain outbreaks of anti-foreigner violence.  They have also not been satisfied with the 
popular lay justifications or accounts for violence such as ‘foreigners are taking our jobs’. 
Their research aims to go beyond these lay accounts, and identify the particular people who 
are involved in instigating or preventing violence, and to what ends.  This investigative 
thrust in ACMS research is accompanied by a conviction that  
 
[v]iolence is…a form of conflict with its own dynamics. Even where violence is clearly 
rooted in pre-existing conflict, it should not be treated as a natural, self-explanatory 
outgrowth of such conflict, something that occurs automatically when the conflict 
reaches a certain intensity, a certain temperature. (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998, cited in 
Misago, 2009, p. 13) 
 
Misago (2009) has demonstrated this clearly in the case of De Doorns.  While all the above-
                                                          
22 Interview with Owen Maromo, August 2013 
23 Interview with Braam Hanekom, July 2013 




mentioned conflicts and dynamics were present – high unemployment, poor living 
conditions, low wages, the arrival of the Zimbabweans and the perception that they were 
favoured by farmers, competition between labour brokers, and even a history of violent 
conflict in this town – it seems that it took the incitement of the ward councillor at public 
meetings to mobilize people to act on these frustrations and launch an actual attack which 
was then not prevented by the apathetic (or perhaps equally xenophobic) police.  Moreover, 
this councillor stood to gain financially and politically by getting rid of labour brokers who 
were competition for those close to him, and being seen to be effective at solving 
community problems.  One of ACMS’s most important findings in their research into the 
xenophobic violence of May 2008, eighteen months before the De Doorns attack, was that  
 
violence against foreign nationals was organised and led by local groups and 
individuals who used popular frustration as a means of mobilising people to commit 
violence.  From case study to case study, the instigators of the attacks used the 
violence as a means to appropriate localised state authority for personal political and 
economic benefits.  The report therefore concludes that the emergence of violence 
is rooted in the micro-politics of township and informal settlement life. (Misago, 
Monson, Polzer & Landau, 2010, p. 10, emphasis added)  
 
Misago, Monson, Landau and Polzer’s (2010) case studies of violence in 2008 also found 
that what made the difference between violence and no violence in each area was such 
elected or self-appointed leaders, and that ‘by comparing affected and non-affected areas, 
our research clearly shows that only a trusted, competent and committed leadership (from 
grassroots to high-level officialdom) can make a significant difference in terms of preventing 
such sentiments from turning into xenophobic violence’ (p. 11). 
 
These are perhaps the most important findings from ACMS’s xenophobia research, and they 
show how closely De Doorns followed the pattern of community-based violence against 
foreign nationals in South Africa.  The ward councillor and committee members’ financial 
and political interests seem to have been tied up with those of the labour brokers (if they 
were not the same people) and violence was incited in the service of these interests.  Also 
following the trend, the authorities – the police and the mayor – were accused of (at least) 
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failing to prevent the attacks although they had been at the meetings.  Indeed, we also 
know that the police had previously been involved in persecuting and arresting Zimbabwean 
migrants through the ‘immigration raid’ which appeared to legitimate taking action against 
immigrants.  Indeed, although Misago’s report stated an intention to put out a more 
comprehensive research report on De Doorns in January 2010, the De Doorns violence was 
judged to have followed the pattern of violent xenophobia in 2008 and elsewhere so closely 
that another report was deemed unnecessary.25 After a more recent wave of xenophobic 
violence that started in Durban in April 2015, ACMS once again re-emphasised that acts of 
violence against migrants are not an automatic outcome of general social problems: 
 
The attacks’ deep roots may be in generations of discrimination, the migrant labour 
system, or persistent poverty.  Yet many places – including many in South Africa – 
face these challenges without violence.  Outbreaks occur where governance systems 
fall short.  Part of the problem is rooted in how South Africa selects and supports 
local leaders.  Ward councillors...are the only directly elected officials and the only 
ones who must appear before constituents to win elections...Yet...[w]ith almost no 
budget or legislative authority, they are held responsible for problems they have no 
hope of resolving.  Faced with perennial shortfalls of services, dwelling, and jobs, is it 
any wonder local leadership allows and abets the scapegoating and appropriation of 
foreign owned shops, houses or goods?...That there is no evident penalty from law 
enforcement or from their political superiors only sweetens the deal.  
 Talk of institutional and technocratic reform does not stir the heart or ease 
our collective [conscience]. To those ends, people can continue marches, dialogues 
and impassioned speeches. However, seriously combatting xenophobic violence will 
mean moving beyond such appeals. It will instead require addressing the 
institutional incentives that foment conflict. (Landau, 2015, n. p.)  
 
These observations also show that the farmers’ and other residents’ descriptions of the 
eviction as ‘not xenophobia’ – but rather as a power struggle, a form of wage bargaining or a 
way of drumming up political support – do not necessarily mean that it cannot be called 
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 Personal correspondence with J. P. Misago, January 2011  
38 
 
‘xenophobia’. Indeed, we can now see these are the same features which have distinguished 
most incidents of anti-foreigner violence in South Africa (Landau, 2015).  
 
A different research agenda 
At this point it is appropriate to distinguish the main research aim of this thesis from that of 
ACMS (Misago, 2009).  Explaining who and what was involved in inciting the violence and for 
what reasons is not the main research aim – if it had been, it is unlikely that I would have 
been able to improve on the findings of Misago (2009).  Indeed, discovering his report soon 
after our 2009 fieldwork was very useful because it explained things that I left De Doorns 
without fully understanding, especially the relationship between the councillor and labour 
brokers.  As is hopefully by now very clear, the agenda of ACMS research is always to 
problematise and explain outbreaks of violence.  This is discernibly for two reasons: one 
political, and one empirical (Kerr & Durrheim, 2013).  Empirically, while ACMS acknowledges 
that instigators of xenophobia ‘use popular frustration’ (Misago, Monson, Polzer & Landau, 
2010, p. 10) to drum up support for violence against foreign nationals, it notices that 
disagreement, frustration or even conflict in a community do not automatically end up in 
violence.  Many township and informal settlement communities around South Africa did not 
experience xenophobic violence in 2008 despite having similar underlying conditions to 
those which did (Misago, Monson, Landau & Polzer, 2010; von Holdt et al, 2011).  For this 
reason, in his report on De Doorns, Misago (2009) did not place a great deal of emphasis on 
the kinds of ‘popular’ explanations for why the Zimbabweans had been evicted which were 
circulating in the media and in the South African farm worker community after the violence, 
such as that the Zimbabweans were accepting less than the minimum wage from farmers 
and thereby ‘taking our jobs’ (Kerr & Durrheim, 2013).  In ACMS’s view, to equate 
community conflict and disagreement with violence is a conceptual and empirical mistake.   
 
But there is also a political reason for not paying too much attention to the popular 
accusations that the Zimbabweans were ‘taking South Africans’ jobs’ and that farmers were 
paying them lower wages. This is that simply to report and agree with such allegations 
would have been to appear to legitimate the claims and allegations made by those who 
supported the eviction and thus to bolster a xenophobic agenda.  Like much of the academic 
South African xenophobia literature, ACMS’s work is committed to an anti-xenophobic 
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stance which serves to counter the widespread xenophobia that permeates South African 
public discourse (Kerr & Durrheim, 2013).  While Misago (2009) did acknowledge that 
farmers in De Doorns preferred Zimbabwean workers for reasons ‘which reflect prevailing 
stereotypes about South African versus foreign workers’ (p. 8) – namely the Zimbabweans’ 
‘better work ethic’ – he dealt with this simply by citing statistics provided by Agri WesCape 
to show that at the time of the eviction the demand for labour outweighed the supply and 
therefore it could not be true that any jobs were being taken.  Moreover, the allegations 
about low wages were explicitly argued to be at best a distraction from, or at worst a 
justification for, the real problem, namely the violence which was instigated by labour 
brokers and the councillor for political and financial gain.  Misago observed that  
 
Many government officials and stakeholders initially explained the violence by 
rationalising the perpetrator’s actions.  They repeatedly identified the following 
factors as the primary causes: Local farmers’ preference of foreign workers because 
they are seen as being cheap labour; labour brokers importing people from 
Zimbabwe; and the presence of a Home Affairs satellite office that attracted 
foreigners to the area.  Addressing labour issues, and specifically farmers and labour 
brokers who exploit workers and break labour laws, is undeniably important.  
However, exclusively focussing on these issues risks casting the perpetrators as 
victims in ways that legitimise or justify the attacks on Zimbabweans. (Misago, 2009, 
p. 3, emphasis in original) 
 
The leader of PASSOP argued similarly that the very people who PASSOP believed to be 
largely responsible for the violence, namely local politicians and labour brokers, were the 
same people pointing fingers at the farmers and diverting attention away from themselves, 
by ‘trying to make it a racial battle and a historic battle, instead of an issue of greed in a 
small community and political gain’26 (referring to greed on the part of the labour brokers 
and political gain for the ward councillor).  Thus, the rhetoric of job-taking and the 
possibility of farmers’ implication were all but dismissed in these accounts, because they 
simultaneously serviced a violent xenophobic agenda. 
                                                          




By contrast, my thesis takes an intergroup relations perspective on these ‘popular’ 
understandings of the relationship between groups in the town – a perspective that pays 
attention to how ordinary people collectively construe the nature of their relationships with 
significant other groups (Durrheim & Dixon, 2005a).  This is important because it reveals the 
‘moral codes’ by which perpetrators and supporters of xenophobic violence render their 
actions legitimate (Palmary, 2017, p. 79), and because incitements to violence would not be 
successful if they did not resonate with some already-existing and commonly shared 
understanding of what is problematic about the relationship between the groups.  As 
Misago (2009) pointed out, the most common layperson’s reason for the attack given by 
both supporters and victims of the eviction we interviewed was the problematic 
relationship between the Zimbabwean farm worker community and white farmers; 
especially the suspicion that farmers were paying Zimbabweans less than the minimum 
wage and that this was unfairly costing South African workers their jobs.  Many of our 
respondents thus implicated the farmers directly as playing a central part in the processes in 
the town to which the violence was construed as a response.  They accused farmers of 
playing Zimbabweans and South Africans off against each other, or removing South Africans 
from their rightful or historical places on farms and replacing them with Zimbabweans 
because they could pay the Zimbabweans less.  Others suggested that the farmers were 
being hypocritical, showing a lot of concern for the Zimbabweans and supplying them with 
jobs and accommodation but apparently not caring about ‘their own people’ – South 
Africans and especially coloured people – who were unemployed and/or had been evicted 
from these same farms.  I will argue that a fundamental problem some of these respondents 
communicated was a sense of being ‘screwed over’ more than once by farmers; farmers’ 
favouring of Zimbabweans was only one way that this had happened in the long history of 
farmer-worker relations dating back to before the end of apartheid.  My proposal is that if 
the history of problems in De Doorns – of which the violent eviction was but one part – are 
to be properly understood, then ordinary South Africans’ accounts of these problems, which 
involve farmers, should be taken more seriously, as must the farmers’ accounts of their own 
conduct and responses to accusations levelled against them.  The allegations of low wages 
and job-taking have historical and relational overtones which are more than technicalities 
about whether the Zimbabweans ever did or did not accept lower wages (this thesis does 
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not take a strong position on whether Zimbabweans were ever paid less than the minimum 
wage and if so whether this was costing South Africans jobs; Pahle (2015) has suggested that 
in fact many South African farm workers are routinely denied the minimum wage).  Rather, 
these allegations can tell us something about the texture and history of relationships 
between Zimbabwean and South African workers and farmers in this community. The 
assumption that the instigation of violence was the main or the only problem in this 
community is one I also made before I went to De Doorns; I went there because violence 
had happened and had been on the news, and I expected to arrive to find everyone loudly 
condemning the attack.  But when I got there I found that only some people were doing 
this.  For others – at least some members of the South African labouring community – the 
main problems were a sense of their own displacement from their historical places in farm 
jobs and the undercutting of their wage-bargaining power.  From this perspective, evicting 
the Zimbabweans was construed an attempt to solve these prior problems, rather than 
being the main problem itself.  Indeed, South Africans we interviewed who identified 
themselves as those who had ‘chased the Zimbabweans away’ or supported the effort to do 
so emphasised that no Zimbabweans had been physically attacked in the process, and that 
there was a difference between ‘chasing away’ and ‘fighting’, which they said they did not 
do.  These speakers thus understood themselves as exercising restraint.  While the absence 
of physical assault was true enough according to Zimbabweans we interviewed, they and 
PASSOP members used this fact to decry the failure of the police during the eviction and the 
absence of law and order in South Africa more generally.  They ridiculed the minimal level of 
‘morality’ implied in the argument that what had happened was acceptable because no one 
was physically assaulted. Misago (2009) also did not make any special mention of the fact 
that there were no assaults: understandably, as the agenda of ACMS is not to find ways of 
excusing xenophobic violence but to highlight the incentives (looted goods, houses, shops, 
and acquired political power) that drive it – incentives which were clearly present in De 
Doorns.  Nevertheless, this discussion shows the gulf between the understandings of those 
who supported or carried out the eviction and those who opposed it about where the 
problem lay and who was responsible for creating it and solving it.   
 
An example of such an intergroup relations perspective on the De Doorns conflict is given by 
Robb and Davis (2009) in their report on the eviction.  Robb and Davis pointed out that 
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before the eviction, the South African labouring community felt frustrated over what they 
saw as the ‘omnipotence of the *white+ farming community’ (p. 3) in its dealings with 
workers.  This omnipotence was exemplified by a semi-successful attempt by farmers to set 
up a Refugee Reception Office in De Doorns late in 2009 in collaboration with the 
Department of Home Affairs (the same office that was mentioned by Misago (2009) above).  
Earlier in the year, farmers had approached the Department of Home Affairs to ask for a 
Refugee Reception Office to be established in De Doorns, because of the mistreatment of 
applicants at the Nyanga Refugee Reception Office in Cape Town, and also because of 
farmers’ concern that they could be fined if caught even just transporting undocumented 
migrants to that office.  Home Affairs agreed, and established a Home Affairs ‘satellite 
office’ on private farm land.  However, the De Doorns farmers’ intentions were superseded 
when immigrants in other parts of the Western Cape ‘began to arrive in large numbers to 
access the services of the satellite centre...effectively the predictable yet unforeseen surge 
in applications “gatecrashed” the farmers’ neat arrangement with the Department of Home 
Affairs’ (Robb & Davis, 2009, p. 20).  Some De Doorns residents became so angry about this 
office that they threatened to set it alight, and it was soon closed.  Nevertheless,  
 
Although the office was short lived, it cannot be ignored as contributing to...a 
developing discourse whereby Zimbabweans were perceived as receiving ‘special 
treatment’ and preference from farmers.  The omnipotence of the farming 
community and disregard for consultative process frustrated the community. (ibid., 
p. 20) 
 
These observations suggest that an emphasis on the financial and political interests of the 
instigators of violence is but one part – albeit a very important part – of the bigger picture of 
group conflict in this community.  Robb and Davis’s research points to a three-way 
relationship between the South African farm labouring community, farmers, and 
Zimbabwean workers, and a sense among South African workers that Zimbabweans were 
receiving preferential treatment from farmers.  From ACMS’s perspective, such general or 
popular intergroup attitudes are not as important as the ‘trigger’ factors that initiate actual 
violence – and in this way, violence is prioritised and problematised.  The aim of this thesis is 
to problematise not only violence but also the discursive substance of intergroup relations 
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among farmers and workers in which the attack on the Zimbabweans was embedded, 
because this can help to explain why the ward councillor’s incitements did not fall on deaf or 
indifferent ears, but apparently struck a chord with many people. To this end, the first 
results chapter below (Chapter 7) will offer a detailed study of how South African workers, 
Zimbabwean workers and farmers understood the three-way relationship in which they 
were all participating at the time of the eviction.   
 
The dilemma inherent in proposing an intergroup relations perspective such as this, 
however, is that if one argues that the perpetrators and supporters of xenophobic violence 
need to be better understood one appears to be legitimising their actions – or at least 
entertaining their arguments – and thus implicitly supporting a xenophobic agenda (Kerr & 
Durrheim, 2013; cf Palmary, 2017).  Much of the academic xenophobia literature takes an 
explicitly anti-xenophobic stance on xenophobia by dismissing complaints about foreigners 
taking South Africans’ jobs and so on not only on the political grounds that they add fuel to 
the fire of xenophobia, but on the factual grounds that they are simply untrue (Kerr & 
Durrheim, 2013).  As we have already started to see, and as I will argue later in the 2009 
results chapter, however, the dilemma at the heart of the De Doorns case is that in this 
town xenophobia and resistance to exploitation from farmers seem to have become almost 
indistinguishable processes and discourses, so that it is no longer facts but deep moral and 
political dilemmas that are at stake.  But as we shall see, this connection is being challenged 
by (among others) PASSOP, whose members later worked to bridge divisions among farm 
workers after the eviction and were also active in the first successful farm workers’ strike 
three years later in 2012.   
 
However, the ‘good relationship’ between farmers and the Zimbabwean workers that 
pertained in 2009, and the complaint about the Zimbabweans receiving ‘special treatment’ 
from farmers, can itself be located in a longer history of preference, allegiance and 
favouritism among workers and farmers in Western Cape commercial farming dating back at 
least to the days of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy.  The following chapter provides 
some of this historical context by describing the ‘paternalistic’ relationship between white 
farmers and coloured workers under apartheid (du Toit, 1993) and then showing how this 
relationship changed in numerous ways as a result of both farmers’ and workers’ responses 
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to structural socio-economic changes brought about before and after the end of apartheid.  
Thereafter, Chapters 4 and 5 turn to social psychology theory on social change and 






Chapter 3: A brief history of recent changes and continuities in 
Western Cape commercial farming communities 
 
Introduction 
One of the claims made in the Introduction chapter was that the way participants talk about 
their relations with other groups reflects something of their interests in change, in the sense 
that constructions of group relations are closely rhetorically tied to evaluations of and 
recommendations for change in their community.  If we want to analyse discourse about 
group relations with an historical eye like this, we must know something about the kinds of 
changes that have taken place in this community and the ways they have differently 
affected different groups.  This chapter therefore offers a brief history of social, political and 
economic changes that have affected Western Cape commercial farming communities like 
De Doorns since the days of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy (CLPP), through the 
effects of the post-1994 labour and tenure legislation and up to the arrival of the 
Zimbabweans in the early to mid-2000s.  In particular, the chapter locates the ‘good 
relationship’ between Zimbabwean workers and farmers that pertained in 2009 in a longer 
history of racial divisions in the workforce that were institutionalised earlier by the CLPP.  
The ideology of paternalism served to construct farmers and coloured workers as being in a 
kind of ‘ethnic alliance’ (Ewert & Hamman, 1996) or ‘quasi-alliance’ (Ewert & Hamman, 
1999) that obscured the conflict of interests inherent in the farmer-worker relationship 
(Theron, 1976), defended farm relations against criticism from the outside (du Toit, 1993), 
and became consolidated along racial lines once black workers started to arrive in the 
Western Cape after the CLPP was repealed (Ewert & Hamman, 1996).  Thus, before 
Zimbabwean migrant workers started to arrive in De Doorns in the early 2000s, it was 
actually the coloured community who occupied a putatively ‘favoured’ – but simultaneously 
subjugated – position in the eyes of farmers, relative to black South Africans.  This chapter 
thus locates the farmer-Zimbabwean relationship in a longer history of changing intergroup 
allegiance among farmers and sections of the workforce.  It also highlights some continuities 
that have been present through this period of change.   
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Black labour migration in the Western Cape under apartheid  
Apartheid was, among other things, a form of labour control designed to ensure a supply of 
cheap, migrant black labour to white industry through a system of tight controls on the 
movements and work opportunities of black people (Legassick & Wolpe, 1976; Posel, 1991).  
In the Western Province (Western and Northern Cape), this regulation took a distinctive and 
more vigorous form than elsewhere because of the large coloured population, and the 
state’s desire to forge an alliance with coloured people against the black majority while still 
making use of their labour (Goldin, 1984).  The ‘Coloured Labour Preference Policy’ (CLPP) 
was formally introduced by Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs, in 1954. This meant that 
there would be no coloured homeland, but the Western Province was to be ‘the preserve of 
“coloured” people’, and blacks were to be ‘discouraged’ from settling there (Verwoerd, 
cited in Goldin, 1984, p. 10).  Hence, the corollary of the CLPP was the forced removal of 
thousands of black families from the Western Cape to the Transkei and Ciskei from the 
1950s.  The government announced in 1955 that ‘all foreign Natives are gradually to leave 
the Western Province and no more are to be permitted in this region’ (ibid, p. 10).   
Paternalist relations between coloured workers and white farmers  
Throughout apartheid and up until the early 1990s, the permanent and seasonal labour 
forces on fruit and wine farms in the Western Cape were therefore almost exclusively 
coloured (although there were also small numbers of black workers – e.g. see Theron, 
1976).  The relationship between white farmers and coloured workers living on these farms 
has been described as ‘paternalistic’, something of a euphemism for a system of near-total 
control over workers’ lives and labour power by farmers:  
Ever since the time of slavery, labour relations on Western Cape fruit and wine farms 
have been governed by the institutions and systems of paternalism, in terms of which 
the farmer as ‘master’ was the ultimate authority and the law of the land gave way at 
the borders of the farm to die boer se wet (the farmer’s rule). (du Toit & Ally, 2003, p. 
3) 
There were no regulations governing farm workers’ minimum wages or working conditions 
during apartheid, and ‘the powerlessness of agricultural workers and their families is largely 
the result of the extensive and direct control that farmers have over most aspects of their 
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lives’ (van Ryneveld, 1986, p. 73).  Workers were usually dependent on farmers for almost 
every material and social need, including money, housing, transport, water and electricity, 
sometimes food, a social life, and access to medical services, and the ‘tied housing’ system 
meant that if a worker lost their job they also lost their home on the farm (van Ryneveld, 
1986; Theron, 1976; du Toit, 1993).  Farmers even had control over ‘the labour power of 
male workers’ wives and children’ (du Toit, 1993, p. 316). At worst, workers were practically 
enslaved to the farms through debt, incurred at farm shops or through loans from farmers, 
and alcoholism produced by the ‘dop’ system, by which some farmers paid a portion of their 
workers’ wages in alcohol (Theron, 1976; van Ryneveld, 1986).  Not all farmers used the dop 
system, but alcoholism was so widespread and so entrenched that many farmers worried 
that they would not be able to attract workers if they did not offer dop (Theron, 1976; van 
Ryneveld, 1986).  While the Hex Valley is not a wine-growing region, van Ryneveld (1986) 
claimed that Western Cape farm workers were consuming 3% of the region’s total annual 
wine crop.  The effects of the dop system continue until the present day in the form of 
widespread alcoholism among Western Cape farm workers (London, 2000).   
However, this control also went hand in hand with a kind of familial intimacy between 
workers and farmers.  Often, several generations of farmer’s and workers’ families grew up 
closely together on the same farms, and farmers assumed the position of ‘father’ in the 
‘farm family’ (du Toit, 1993). A farmer interviewed by Wilderman (2014) recalled that ‘when 
my mother and father took over in 1970 they would buy the staff underpants and decide 
the colour’ (p. 25). This interviewee went on to note that ‘not all paternalism is completely 
bad – it has an element of care and interest in their lives but ideally we want to move away 
from it and give people more responsibility and freedom’ (p. 25).  The wife of one of the 
farmers we interviewed in 2009 joked that she even acted as marriage counsellor to their 
workers.  
At best, then, paternalism enabled relationships of trust and loyalty among highly unequal 
parties.  In such a system, ‘obligations between farmers and workers extend far beyond the 
wage-labour nexus’ (du Toit, 1993, p. 314).  Farmers and workers were bound together in a 
supposedly two-way relationship of mutual help, responsibility and understanding – 
although in practice these obligations were highly asymmetrical.  For workers, they mainly 
involved obedience and submission to farmers’ authority, and in exchange, they could 
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expect farmers to ‘help’ them with expenses they were unable to afford on the wages 
farmers paid them (du Toit & Ally, 2003).  Any claims workers made on farmers were 
construed as claims on the farmer’s generosity and beneficence, which could not be 
demanded by appeals to rights; so workers ultimately had no recourse if farmers failed to 
keep to their side of the paternalistic bargain (du Toit, 1993). Workers could also be fired 
and evicted at the farmers’ will if the ‘good understanding’ between them collapsed.  Du 
Toit explains how the notion of the farm as a ‘family’ went hand in hand in with a fear for 
workers of losing their place in this family: 
In paternalist discourse, a yawning gap opens between the inside and the outside of 
this community...the breakdown of this relationship is traumatic.  To know that you 
and the farmer no longer ‘understand one another’ is to feel like a vreemdeling (a 
stranger), an indringer or an inkommer [sic] – an outsider, a trouble-maker’ (1993, p. 
320-321). 
Indeed, one of the main reasons why trade unions never took off in Western Cape 
agriculture during and even after apartheid – another one being the physical isolation of 
workers on widely-spaced farms (Wilderman, 2014) – was that paternalism was so 
successful at making workers dependent on farmers, obscuring the conflict of interests 
between farmers and workers and thus suffocating worker resistance (du Toit, 1993; 
Theron, 1976).  Du Toit (1993) observes how paternalism discourse construed farmer-
worker relations as a kind of alliance of the farm against trouble-causers and outsiders:  
In a paternalist world-view, it simply does not make sense to think of workers or 
farmers as two significantly separate groups, nor to ask whether someone is on the 
one group’s side or on the other’s.  In its terms one cannot be for or against the 
workers; only for or against the farm. ...Paternalism conceives of the farm as a 
crucially threatened community.  It denies systematic antagonism within the farm, but 
asserts an antagonism between the potentially harmonious farm as community and 
that which threatens its harmony: the lazy, irresponsible or drunken worker, with the 
thief, the city lawyer, the trade unionist (du Toit, 1993, p. 322).  
Change and continuity: Paternalism adapts to new circumstances  
Du Toit (1993) goes on to describe some changes that were brought to Western Cape fruit 
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and wine farming communities and to the institutions of paternalism by both the farmer-led 
Rural Foundation reform movement and the worker-led beginnings of trade unionism in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s (although, as mentioned, trade unions never took off and even at 
the time of the strike in 2012, only about 5% of workers or less were members of formal 
traditional trade unions).  The Rural Foundation implemented social upliftment programs for 
farm workers, and also encouraged farmers to ‘modernise’ away from the racism of old-
school paternalism, towards an at least superficially more egalitarian approach to farming 
that used the discourse of ‘human resources management’ rather than emphasising the 
absolute rule of the farmer.  Rural Foundation farmers tried to implement a more 
impersonal approach to labour relations which included educating workers about how the 
farm made money:  
Workers were shown how the farm (rather than the farmer) makes a profit and how 
that profit depends on care and speed in their work....[T]he workers were thus given 
to understand that the farmers’ personal power to determine their conditions had 
been replaced by the ‘market’ and that the success of the farm in the ‘market’ 
depended on workers’ productivity (Mayson, 1990, cited in du Toit, 1993, p. 326) 
By substituting these abstract concepts for the personal figure of the farmer, 
‘[m]anagement discourse works to render the operation of power increasingly impersonal’ 
(du Toit, 1993, p. 326).  In the results chapters below we will see that impersonal abstract 
entities like ‘the market’ still appear in farmers’ discourse and serve to take the place of 
their own agency in accounting for their choice of workers as well as the inequality of the 
farming system more generally (see also Kerr, Durrheim & Dixon, 2016).   
Early trade unionism also began to challenge paternalism in some important ways (du Toit, 
1993).  For instance, unions and farm worker committees challenged the notion that 
workers and farmers on the farm were ‘one family’ and advocated for the two to be seen as 
separate groups with a more openly adversarial relationship between them. Union 
members also stopped seeing ‘fringe benefits’ (‘free’ housing, transport etc) as evidence of 
the farmer’s benevolent generosity but as something they had a right to expect.  Unions 
also provided a forum for workers to air their grievances in ways that politicised them, 
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rather than experiencing them as isolated personal problems in their individual relationship 
to the farmer (du Toit, 1993).  
However, du Toit also shows that in some ways both of these changes continued to mirror 
aspects of paternalist discourse even while they were challenging it.  Neither the discourse 
of the farm management movement nor the trade unions and workers’ committees 
constituted an absolute break with the discourses of paternalism, and in this way, aspects of 
continuity were evident even in processes of change (cf Billig et al, 1988; Billig, 1991).  It was 
‘impossible for the Farm Management Movement to make a clean break with the past 
*because+ it acts in a context where paternalism is still a living tradition’ (du Toit, 1993, p. 
327).  For example, farms that subscribed to liberal reform involved some workers being 
appointed to middle management positions.  In some ways, this was a radical break with the 
past, as under traditional paternalism no workers occupied management positions. But in 
fact this new arrangement retained aspects of the older one, as farmers still had ultimate 
authority over workers and any right they had to speak was still given them by the farmer.  
Moreover, workers appointed to management positions risked being seen by other workers 
as ‘piempers’ or farmers’ favourites – informers, suck-ups – just as they had under 
paternalism, and du Toit reported how on one farm a group of such appointees went so far 
as to deliberately break into a wine store and steal a quantity of wine so that they would not 
be seen as piempers trying to curry favour with the farmer.  He noted that workers were 
‘intensely resentful of the way in which *management discourse+ pays lip service to some of 
the ideals of rural reform, while surreptitiously insisting on *farmers’+ “paternal” authority 
(p. 332).  In this way, some dynamics from the old regime continued into the new.   
Similarly, while some aspects of the early trade unions made significant breaks with 
paternalism, du Toit shows how they, too, continued to make use of aspects of both 
paternalist and management discourses in articulating their demands and working out what 
the role of the union should be (du Toit, 1993).  For example, despite insisting on 
democratically elected representatives, workers articulated that the reason why such a 
democratic system was necessary was so that they could feel ‘deel van die plaas’ or part of 
the farm – rehearsing once again the notion of the farm as a family to which everyone 
wanted to feel they belonged.  Workers also expected unions to address a wide range of 
issues beyond representing workers’ interests at work – for example, organising social 
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events and tackling alcoholism.  In this thinking, an all-encompassing workplace (the farm) 
would be replaced by an all-encompassing union, so that again, not much space was 
conceptualised in which to have an independent social life apart from the farm.  In other 
words,  
It seems that workers, when they made the case for a union, did not suddenly start 
articulating some radically new discourse, some ideology systematically separate 
from corporatist management discourse.  The basic concepts in terms of which they 
justified their mobilisation were precisely those that form the basic building blocks of 
paternalism. The metaphor of being deel van die plaas (part of the farm), the notion 
of worker and farmer alike sharing a common commitment to the success of the 
farm as enterprise, the belief that they therefore had an overriding moral 
commitment to protect the farm – all these seem to have been taken up wholesale 
into their discourse, and enlisted on the side of the union. (du Toit, 1993, p. 330-331) 
In these ways, du Toit shows how change – even dramatic change – can be made out of old 
or familiar elements.  
Paternalism as a ‘quasi-alliance’ between workers and farmers  
We have seen how the paternalist farmer-worker relationship was construed as a kind of 
alliance between farmers and coloured workers, and farms as communities threatened by 
outsiders and trouble-causers, and that this served to defend the farms against any 
ideological criticism (du Toit, 1993). Another way that continuity and change in this 
relationship were simultaneously present is in how elements of this ‘quasi-alliance’ took on 
a more explicitly intergroup aspect in response to the arrival of black work-seekers from the 
former homelands after the Coloured Labour Preference Policy was repealed in 1986 (Ewert 
& Hamman, 1996).  In Ewert and Hamman’s survey of 42 farms in six Western Cape fruit and 
wine farming districts (excluding the Hex Valley) in the mid-1990s, ‘one finding that stands 
out...is that Africans have not even begun to penetrate the core of permanent workers on 
these farms’ (p. 159).  While the coloured workforce had its own internal divisions such as 
skill hierarchies, gendered divisions of labour, and inequalities in pay,  
[w]hatever divisions exist between (coloured) men and women, these are largely set 
aside when it comes to maintaining solidarity vis-à-vis “outsiders”, that is, Africans.  
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Almost without exception the coloured workers interviewed did not regard Africans 
as part of the “farm family”...[and] many of the observations and reservations of 
coloured workers corresponded to the views of farmers themselves.  Stressing the 
importance of communication, and the feelings of coloured workers, farmers said it 
would be “inviting trouble” to employ a substantial number of African men living 
permanently with their wives and children on the farm.  Not only would it result in 
ethnic friction, but it could also mean inviting the union vanguard onto the farm, as 
African workers are often perceived as more militant and inclined towards collective 
action.  The upshot of this shared consciousness between white owner and coloured 
farmworker is that Africans, where they are employed, are mostly hired on a 
seasonal basis, work in separate gangs, are housed separately and live separate 
social lives (Ewert & Hamman, 1996, p. 159, emphasis added).  
The tropes of paternalism are all present here: the farm as a threatened family community, 
the inkomer or outsider as trouble-maker, and white farmers and coloured workers as being 
on the same side (du Toit, 1993).  But Ewert and Hamman show how these tropes are 
adapted and applied here to the emergence of an intergroup labour context. It was now not 
just troublesome individuals, but black people as a group, who were the outsiders.   
This is an important piece of contextual history for understanding the intergroup dynamics 
that had emerged in the Hex Valley by 2009.  When I first went to De Doorns, I took it for 
granted that the Zimbabweans were the favoured group in the eyes of farmers. Even though 
they did not mainly live on the farms, they clearly had a ‘shared consciousness’ with farmers 
about their own superior work ethic compared to that of South African workers.  Since I was 
initially approaching the Zimbabweans’ eviction in De Doorns as an instance of 
‘xenophobia’, I also took it for granted that the Zimbabweans being non-citizens was the 
basis on which the ‘preferential treatment’ shown to them was deemed by South African 
workers to be unfair.  And indeed, empirically, grievances about the Zimbabweans’ unfairly 
favoured position came equally in our interviews from all South African workers – coloured 
and black.  But Ewert and Hamman show that in the not too distant past, before the 
Zimbabweans were present, it was in fact the coloured community who occupied this 
putatively favoured position relative to black workers, and so racial, rather than national, 
divisions in the workforce were to the fore (cf Neocosmos, 2006).  Indeed, we shall see in 
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the results section that racial identities continue to crop up.  For many coloured workers 
who used to live on the farms but no longer do, the memory of their erstwhile paternalistic 
relationships with farmers is strong, and continues to inform expectations of good or 
preferential treatment from farmers – expectations which are often disappointed by a sense 
of having been displaced by newer (black) workers from ‘outside’.  
The paternalist quasi-alliance comes partially undone: Effects of labour law  
How did it happen that by 2009, the relatively recently arrived Zimbabwean community had 
taken up the position of favoured workers in the eyes of farmers, to the point of forming a 
new ‘quasi-alliance’?  To answer this we must first know something of how the paternalist 
quasi-alliance had started to come undone by the early 2000s, and why the Zimbabweans, 
who began to arrive at this time, were suited to partially filling farmers’ demand for a 
disposable seasonal labour force, a need that was created as a result of these same 
processes.   
The reforms of the Rural Foundation in the 1980s (du Toit, 1993) were presumably 
overtaken by bigger changes that followed the introduction of labour legislation and the 
deregulation of commercial agriculture in the 1990s and early 2000s.  As we know, during 
apartheid there were no laws regulating farm workers’ wages, hours or conditions of 
employment, leave or sick leave, and workers’ labour power was entirely at the disposal of 
the farmer (du Toit, 1993; du Toit & Ally, 2003).  The Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 
which regulated all these things, was extended to agriculture in 1993 (Ewert & Hamman, 
1996) and the Labour Relations Act of 1995 legalised collective bargaining (Theron, 2014).  
Also, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) of 1997 put limits on who could and 
could not be evicted from farm housing and under what conditions (Theron, 2010), 
supposedly limiting the extent to which farm workers’ and dwellers’ housing security was 
dependent on the whim of the farm owner (Ewert & Hamman, 1999).  
However, the intentions behind these laws did not translate straightforwardly into 
improved conditions for and less exploitation of farm workers (Rutherford & Addison, 2007; 
du Toit & Ally, 2003; Ewert & du Toit, 2005).  Instead, they produced a series of unintended 
consequences, partly because of the way farmers responded to them.  One of these 
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consequences was a renegotiation of the terms of the farmer-worker relationship. 
According to du Toit and Ally (2003),  
If farmers are no longer allowed to be ‘masters’, then they will be ‘employers’, but on 
new and different terms.  If permanent employees are now to be the bearers of rights, 
able to make demands, and able to challenge farmers’ power, then the pros and cons 
of engaging a large body of permanent workers need to be reassessed (p. 46).  
Many farmers also perceived ESTA as giving farm dwellers – sometimes people who were 
not actually working on the farms they lived on – permanent rights to their land (Jacobs, 
2008) and so, ESTA notwithstanding, many farmers either simply bulldozed their worker 
housing and evicted the workers, or found other ways of avoiding ESTA’s implications 
(Wegerif, Russell & Grundlingh, 2005; Ewert & du Toit, 2005; Ewert and Hamman, 1999). 
The result has been a large-scale move of workers off farms, with only a tiny fraction of 
these following due process (Wegerif et al., 2005).  A national survey of evicted farm 
workers published in 2005 suggests that the number of evictions nationally spiked precisely 
at the time of the 1994 elections, at the passing of ESTA, and at the passing of the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act (Wegerif et al., 2005).  The ‘dumping’ of evicted farm 
workers and the resultant appearance of rural informal settlements such those around De 
Doorns is part of a similar trend across the whole of South Africa since at least the early 
1990s (Wegerif et al., 2005).  Consequently, the total number of farm evictions in the first 
ten years after the end of apartheid did not decrease at all compared to the ten previous 
years (Wegerif et al, 2005).  An evicted worker interviewed by Du Toit and Ally (2003) 
summed things up thus:  
Farmers don’t want to bother with people on their farms. This is because farmers 
have fewer rights on the farms.  If I do something that the white man doesn’t like, he 
will have to leave me alone, because I have too many rights...the farmers would 
rather get contractors than have to deal with people on the farms (2003, p. 39).   
This means that, where previously many farm workers were employed in permanent, year-
round jobs and supplied with on-farm housing, this is no longer the norm.  On many farms, 
gone are the days of generations of farmers and workers living and working together. 
Rather, farmers mainly now employ a small core of permanent staff and make up the 
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difference with temporary and casual workers who live off the farms in informal settlements 
and new townships, and are fetched back to work on the farms on a short-term and casual 
basis as fits the farmer’s seasonal requirements, often sourced through labour brokers 
(Ewert & du Toit, 2005; Webb, 2013).  In this way, farm work has been both ‘casualised’ and 
‘externalised’ (du Toit & Ally, 2003).  Ewert and Hamman (2005) showed how the process 
produced a ‘deepening divide’ between workers who stayed on the farms and those who 
did not. The few remaining permanent workers, ‘though often still living on the farm and 
caught in the web of paternalism, are on the whole...[better off than] the seasonal, casual 
and contract workers: a rural lumpen-proletariat, often residing in rural, peri-urban or 
metropolitan shanty towns’ (Ewert & Du Toit, 2005, p. 317).  In my experience, workers who 
still live on the farms tend to retain such a ‘shared consciousness’ with farmers, which is not 
evident among workers who live in the ‘locations’.  As we will see in the results chapters, 
many coloured workers who used to live on the farms but now live in the informal 
settlements and RDP housing have experienced this ‘externalisation’ as a process of 
enormous loss (cf du Toit, 1993; cf Ewert & Hamman, 1996), and for them in particular, 
farmers’ apparent shift of favour to the Zimbabweans was a real kick in the teeth.  
Moreover, because of the government’s incapacity to monitor or enforce compliance with 
labour law (Munakamwe & Jinnah, 2014), and because there is almost no organised 
collective bargaining capacity among farm workers such as trade unions (Pahle, 2015), the 
conditions that prevail on farms are in practice still largely up to the individual farmer, 
leading to a high degree of variation in the extent to which farms adhere to minimum wages 
and working conditions (Munakamwe & Jinnah, 2014).  From their interviews with 
Zimbabwean and South African farm labourers in the Western Cape and Mpumalanga, 
Munakamwe and Jinnah conclude that ‘the power and resolve of employers – to subvert or 
comply with national legislation – determines actual outcomes for workers’ (2014, p. 35).  
Indeed, many of the workers they interviewed had only the vaguest idea of what their 
labour rights meant, and even those who had a better idea ‘stated that labour legislation 
meant very little to them due to poor implementation and enforcement’ (p. 56).  Despite a 
progressive labour rights regime on paper, in practice ‘farm workers’ freedom of association 
and right to bargain collectively are hardly realised at all’ (Pahle, 2015, p. 121).  In these 
ways, once again, continuity with the past – worker disempowerment under the authority of 
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farmers – is evident even in the midst of processes of change.  Indeed, Ewert and du Toit 
observed that  
labour law has significantly disrupted the institutional order of paternalist labour 
management but has not decisively transformed it.  The state is far away and lacks 
the ability to enforce its own laws.  Farm workers find that insisting on their rights 
can be a dangerous strategy, and know that maintaining patronage relationships 
may be as important. The result on the ground is a palimpsest in which labour 
relationships are simultaneously governed both by the formal codes of legislation 
and by the personal relationships and implicit contracts of paternalist practices. 
(2005, p. 325) 
  
Deregulation of commercial agriculture  
A second factor contributing to the move towards casual and externalised labour is the 
deregulation of South African commercial agriculture on the side of capital that took place 
in parallel with labour regulation (Kritzinger, Barrientos & Roussouw, 2004; Rutherford & 
Addison, 2007; Ewert & Hamman, 1999).  During apartheid, the state had intervened heavily 
to protect white commercial agriculture through the provision of land, cheap labour, 
subsidies and highly regulated internal and export markets (Genis, 2012; Bernstein, 1996).  
After 2000, commercial agriculture became deregulated, ‘evidenced by the dismantling of 
apartheid-era marketing boards, privatisation of cooperatives and removal of practically all 
direct subsidies for (white) farmers’ (Rutherford  & Addison, 2007, p. 624).  South African 
fruit farmers thus became incorporated, without state protection, into highly competitive 
international markets dominated by European and UK supermarkets, which ‘determin*e+ the 
specifications of supply on a pre-programmed basis to meet their requirements.  They insist 
on high technical, environmental and employment standards, but ultimately provide little 
surety of purchase and allow market conditions to govern prices’ (Kritzinger, Barrientos & 
Roussouw, 2004, p. 17).  In this climate of risk and few protections for farmers, reducing the 
permanent work force lets farmers ‘reduce labour costs, avoid the effects of more stringent 
labour legislation, and importantly helps them to vary their labour requirements at short 
notice to meet the flexible but tight production schedules set by global buyers’ (ibid., p. 17).  
Farmers also use labour brokers to source and take responsibility for these workers, which is 
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a ‘winning situation’ for farmers (Jacobs, 2008), as farmers do not need to pay workers 
during winter when there is little work to be done, and they can outsource the 
administrative burden of dealing with a large number of short-term workers.  
 
Overall, the consequences of this externalisation and casualisation for workers’ livelihood 
and job security have mainly been disastrous.  Risk and the burden of social reproduction 
have been transferred from farmers’ to workers’ households (Kritzinger, Barrientos & 
Roussouw, 2004).  Many seasonal and casual farm workers are employed for half the year or 
less, and do not receive any income on days when they do not work, for example when it is 
raining or on public holidays.27  There is supposed to be a minimum wage for agricultural 
workers (at the time of my first research in 2009 this was R57 a day, in 2012 it was R69, and 
after the strike it was raised to R105), and on some farms, higher wages than this are paid. 
However, even if the minimum wage were implemented on all farms – which several 
authors, as well as workers we interviewed after the strike, have suggested it is not, even 
for South African workers (Munakamwe & Jinnah, 2014; Pahle, 2015; Rutherford & Addison, 
2007) – it would be insufficient for a worker’s family’s basic nutritional requirements 
(Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy, 2012).  But the dilemma is that many farms would 
not to be able to afford to continue running if the wage bill were significantly increased 
(Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy, 2012).  In this way, it appears that farm workers 
are subsidising the fruit farming industry with their own livelihoods. 
However, the ‘deepening divide’ (Ewert and du Toit, 2005) applies also to farmers, and 
increased inequality among farmers has been another consequence of labour regulation and 
capital deregulation. Those farmers who were not able to stay afloat in the new competitive 
climate sold out to bigger farmers or companies, while others were able to capitalise on the 
new conditions (Ewert & du Toit, 2005; Theron, 2010). In the Hex Valley, a consolidation 
process is evident as the same or a larger area of grapes is being cultivated but the number 
of farmers has decreased; one farmer explained that in the old days the norm was for 
farmers to own one or two farms each whereas by 2009 the norm had become three or four 
farms, as it is increasingly difficult to be profitable on a small area of grapes.  A PASSOP 
member we interviewed suggested there are a few farmers in the Hex Valley who own more 
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 Interview with Owen Maromo, August 2013 
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than ten farms each.  The consolidation trend is also evident nationally, as the number of 
farming units in South Africa decreased from around 60 000 in 1995 to around 40 000 in 
2007 (Pahle, 2015).  
Further change: International labour migration to De Doorns 
These changes coincided with the beginnings of another wave of migrant work seekers 
arriving in De Doorns, this time from Zimbabwe.  As we know from Ewert and Hamman 
(1996), black work-seekers from the Eastern Cape began to arrive in the Western Cape from 
the late 1980s after the end of the influx control laws.28  Then from the early 2000s 
Zimbabweans started to arrive, shortly after the start of Zimbabwe’s own political and 
economic crises and subsequent diaspora.  The very first Zimbabweans were employed on a 
farm in the Hex Valley in 2002,29 and by 2006 or 2007 they had become an established 
minority in the seasonal labour force.30  There is also a smaller number of workers from 
Lesotho (according to our interview with the Agri WesCape CEO, about 800 workers during 
peak season in late 2009).  These groups have joined the longer-established coloured farm 
worker community who also now live predominantly in the informal settlements and RDP 
housing around De Doorns. Thus, the workforce has become much more heterogeneous 
than it was in the early 1990s.  
The narrative in this chapter so far suggests that different groups have somewhat different 
interests in the processes of change that led them to be part of the externalised farm 
workforce in De Doorns. Change has worked more in favour of some workers and farmers 
than others (Ewert & du Toit, 2005).  Our interviews suggest on one hand that many 
coloured people who used to be part of farm communities, but are no longer, have 
experienced the arrival of the Zimbabweans onto these same farms as a process of 
displacement.  On the other hand, some workers were never incorporated into close-knit 
farm communities anyway (Ewert & Hamman, 1996); and it is possible that South African 
workers who had no particular investment in a ‘farm community’ were more concerned by 
2009 about the Zimbabweans’ over-willingness to comply with farmers and how this was 
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 I do not know how appropriate it is to keep calling these workers ‘migrants’, which assumes their 
primary home attachments are still in the Eastern Cape. 
29 Interview with HTA chairperson, December 2009. 
30 Interview with Zimbabwean worker, December 2009 (interview 13). 
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undercutting their own power to negotiate with farmers than about a sense of personal loss 
of place.  The Zimbabweans themselves, migrating from a context of mass unemployment 
and livelihood and food insecurity, came to De Doorns out of necessity, looking for work, 
sometimes to save and send money back to their families.  They had no history in this 
community, but were quickly snapped up by farmers.   
Based on their research with Zimbabwean workers on farms in northern Limpopo province, 
Rutherford and Addison (2007) have argued that the incorporation of Zimbabwean migrant 
workers into South African farm labour forces is the reverse side of the same externalisation 
and casualisation process which saw the coloured farm worker community ejected. The 
same conditions encouraging farmers to move towards ‘flexible’ casual labour are also those 
making Zimbabweans an attractive alternative, for a number of reasons.31  First, most 
Zimbabweans are already migrants who arrive in De Doorns in spring and leave in autumn 
and in this way match the farmers’ requirements for an ‘easily disposable’ seasonal 
workforce (cf Rutherford & Addison, 2007).  Second, farmers we interviewed all spoke about 
the Zimbabweans’ ‘good work ethic’ (as did the Zimbabweans themselves), and how their 
reliability, sobriety and agreeableness as workers (cf Ewert & Hamman, 1996) made them 
more attractive than their South African counterparts.  Thirdly, international migrants may 
be attractive to farmers precisely because they cannot make claims for tenure rights and are 
also less likely to make demands based on labour rights (cf Pahle, 2015; cf Munakamwe & 
Jinnah, 2014; Johnston, 2007).  Indeed, ‘in the absence of enforcement mechanisms, the 
minimum wage laws have merely encouraged farmers [in Limpopo] to seek out 
undocumented migrants’ (Rutherford & Addison, 2007, p. 626).  Pahle (2015) also 
researched Zimbabwean workers on farms in Limpopo, and found, against the general trend 
of ‘externalisation’, that many Zimbabwean workers are now being offered permanent jobs 
and accommodation on farms:  
Present evictions need not spell the end to tied housing: farmers [in Limpopo] are 
primarily bent on removing those yesteryear tenants who have lived so long on the 
farm as to be on the brink of earning legal titles to their land.  Once such claims are 
                                                          
31
 Zimbabweans working in De Doorns in late 2009 constituted only around ten percent of the peak 
season workforce, whereas in parts of Limpopo (Rutherford and Addison’s research context) they 
made up as much as 80% of the work force.  
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pre-empted, farmers may offer on-farm dwellings to new and temporarily employed 
workers. (Pahle, 2015, p. 138) 
Pahle (2015) and Rutherford and Addison’s (2007) farm research was conducted in a 
different province at the other end of the country, but according to workers we interviewed 
in De Doorns during the strike in 2012 a similar process is happening on at least some farms 
in the Hex Valley.  These interviewees said that some Zimbabwean workers to whom 
farmers offered temporary accommodation after they were evicted in 2009 ended up 
staying on indefinitely and taking up permanent farm positions. Although it is difficult to 
quantify this process, and bearing in mind that in 2009 Zimbabweans in the Hex Valley were 
only a small minority in the peak season workforce (unlike in Limpopo, which is on the 
Zimbabwe border), it may be true that Zimbabweans are in some cases replacing older 
workers in permanent farm positions.  In this way, continuity is again evident even in 
processes of change.  The process has come full circle: we are back to tied housing, albeit 
with new workers this time round who are less likely to cause farmers trouble.  
Conclusion: Intergroup relations, change and continuity 
This chapter has tried to locate the intergroup scenario that pertained at the time of the 
attack on the Zimbabweans’ houses in 2009 – in which the Zimbabweans were perceived by 
many South African workers as being unfairly favoured by farmers but were simultaneously 
also accused of accepting less than the minimum wage from them – in its historical 
intergroup context. This is a context of selective and strategic favouritism by farmers 
towards sections of the workforce and a partial reconfiguration of these lines of allegiance 
as part of a process of socio-economic change since the latter years of apartheid.  The 
chapter has also tried to show how different groups in the Hex Valley have been differently 
affected by these changes; and how, within this multi-group scenario, some groups’ 
interests have aligned while others are opposed.  In particular, Zimbabwean work-seekers, 
leaving Zimbabwe at a time of economic collapse in search of other livelihoods, arrived 
when changes in the old paternalist relationship between farmers and coloured workers 
produced a space which the Zimbabweans were able to fill by being willing, reliable and 
uncomplaining workers who were quickly snapped up by farmers.  As Sherif (1966) 
recommended, constructing this history helps us to understand ‘contemporary events 
within the framework of both past relationships between people and their future goals and 
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designs’.  Certainly, we will see that many De Doorns residents drew on their own different 
histories when talking of what was problematic or wonderful about their current 
relationships with one another, although ignoring history was also a strategy used in 
levelling criticisms and making justifications.  I will argue in this thesis that the way groups 
construct their relationships with significant others is oriented to their interests in change, 
in that these constructions are tied rhetorically to particular recommendations for and 
evaluations of change in their community.  The next two chapters turn to social psychology 
theory and make this argument first through a critique of social psychology’s ‘two-group 
paradigm’, and secondly in a chapter about change and continuity and the place of 




Chapter 4: A two-group paradigm in the social psychology of 
intergroup relations 
 
One of the overall claims that is being made in this thesis is that the intergroup relationship 
between Zimbabwean and South African workers that culminated in the xenophobic attack 
of November 2009 in De Doorns cannot be understood outside of these groups’ relationship 
to a third party – their employers, the farmers.  But social psychology tends to conceptualise 
intergroup relations precisely in terms of unequal pairs of groups – such as dominant and 
subordinate, advantaged and disadvantaged, black and white or minority and majority 
groups (Subašid, Reynolds & Turner, 2008).  The following extracts from some influential 
theorists in social psychology illustrate this tendency to think about intergroup relations in 
two-group terms:  
Prejudice...may be reduced by equal status contact between minority and majority 
groups in the pursuit of common goals. (Allport, 1958, p. 267) 
An unequal distribution of objective resources promotes antagonism between 
dominant and subordinate groups, provided the latter group rejects its previously 
accepted...negative self-image...and starts working toward the development of a 
positive group identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 38)  
Just as the system-justification perspective does not assume that underprivileged 
groups will be stereotyped negatively, neither does it assume that privileged groups 
will always be stereotyped in positive terms. (Jost & Banaji, 1994, p. 19) 
[W]hen confronted with an issue as complex as racial prejudice, researchers cannot 
afford to limit themselves to studying prejudice from the perspective of 
Whites...*Researchers should+ examine how Blacks’ racial attitudes and behaviours 
influence intergroup dynamics between Blacks and Whites. (Shelton, 2000, p. 374)  
High levels of SDO should...be associated with increased ingroup identification among 
dominants and decreased ingroup identification among subordinates. (Sidanius, 
Pratto, Van Laar & Levin, 2004, p. 865) 
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Prejudice reduction research could assist in creating positive attitudes and reducing 
discrimination by the advantaged group, while collective action research informs 
efforts to initiate and sustain social movements designed to improve the status of 
disadvantaged groups. (Wright & Lubensky, 2009, p. 293)  
 
[T]he collective action of subordinated groups inevitably takes place in a context 
where dominant groups act and react to such collective action.  It is our contention 
that such reactions occur and are given legitimacy on the basis of both prejudicial 
representations of the subordinate group and the interpretations and discourses that 
surround the subordinate group’s collective actions (Stott, Drury & Reicher, 2012, p. 
287).  
 
This chapter considers in detail some social psychology studies in which a two-group 
analytic framework has been used to study intergroup relations among three or more 
parties, and argues that the application of the two-group framework sometimes means we 
overlook the way power is exercised and contested through the construction of intergroup 
alliances and exclusions among three or more parties.  In this way, the chapter develops a 
critique first made by Billig (1976) in his reinterpretation of Sherif’s famous boys’ camp 
studies and the role of the experimenters in constituting the relationships between the two 
groups of boys.  
 
A two-group paradigm in Sherif’s realistic conflict theory  
Sherif’s Realistic Conflict Theory was developed on the basis of his three well-known holiday 
camp studies (Sherif, 1966; Sherif & Sherif, 1969).  Sherif considered these as situations 
involving two groups of boys: Red Devils and Bulldogs; Pythons and Panthers; Rattlers and 
Eagles.  The effects of the competition and co-operation that were induced between them 
by the experimenters were examined in terms of the boys’ intergroup behaviour (Sherif, 
1966).  Sherif used these studies to show that prejudiced behaviour and conflict could be 
induced in individuals as a product of competitive relations between groups at a group level, 




In his re-reading of these studies, however, Billig (1976) wondered what would have 
happened if the boys had found out they were being set up by the experimenters; that the 
organised competitions between them were deliberately designed for the experimenters to 
study their effects, and that in some cases the experimenters were covertly intervening to 
‘frustrate’ one of the groups but ascribing this intervention to the other group (Sherif, 
1966).  Billig saw these studies as an analogy of real-world situations where a group in a 
position of greater power helps to constitute, and has vested interests in, the relations 
between two other group. ‘This third group,’ he wrote, ‘the group of experimenters, is the 
social group which creates the other two groups – giving them their social meaning and 
their social reality’ (p. 307).  Billig saw the ensuing intergroup conflict as ‘false 
consciousness,’ where the two groups believed each other to be the source of their troubles 
when in fact the real source was a third party.  But he concluded that what would have 
happened if the boys had found this out was ‘an empirical question for which there is no 
immediate data’ (1976, p. 318), since he found no evidence that this ever happened in the 
experiments.  
In fact, however, Cherry (1995) found one obscure reference to the fact that the boys did 
find this out in the second study, a reference which Billig appeared not to have read:  
in the 1953 study, this stage [planned frustration] was not completed.  In a frustration 
episode, the subjects attributed the plan to the camp administration. Since testing 
hypotheses required that the source of frustration be attributed to the experimental 
outgroup, the 1953 study was terminated at this stage. (Sherif, 1956, in Cherry, 1995, p. 
109) 
Thus, Sherif ended the study too early to see how group relations among the boys, and 
between the boys and the experimenters, would develop once they became aware of the 
experimenters’ designs (Reicher & Haslam, 2013).  In this way, Sherif took the 
experimenter’s role for granted, treating it as transparent, instead of analysing the setup as 
a case where two groups were having their relationship manipulated by a third party, and 
letting it play out long enough so that questions could be asked about what effects this 
would have on the boys’ intergroup relations – whether they would have forged an alliance 
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against the experimenters, say, or whether they would have lost interest in the 
competitions altogether.  
A two-group paradigm in the contact hypothesis 
Another classic example of third party involvement in the intergroup relations literature is 
the concept of ‘institutional support’ which Allport (1958) identified as an essential 
condition for intergroup contact interventions to be effective in reducing prejudice.  
However, despite this early recognition of the important role that third parties can play in 
intergroup relations, a two-groups-at-a-time approach to intergroup contact still 
predominates in the contact literature (Van Laar, Levin, Sinclair & Sidanius, 2004).  The 
contact hypothesis has generated research on contact/prejudice between a wide variety of 
kinds of groups – for example, right from the start, Allport’s (1958) The Nature of Prejudice 
mentioned ‘Negroes’, whites, Catholics, Jews, Italians, Irish, Yankees, Southerners, Greeks, 
and Chinese.  Some of the studies in Pettigrew and Tropp’s  (2006) meta-analysis also went 
‘beyond a focus on racial and ethnic groups...*I+nvestigators have tested the theory with 
participants of varying ages and with target groups as diverse as elderly, physically disabled 
and mentally ill participants’ (p. 752).  But in contact research, this multiplicity is usually 
operationalised as a series of pairs.  This includes some studies in which relations between 
three or more groups are re-construed in two-group terms so as to fit the predictions of 
contact theory.  Some work on contact between minority groups has been inspired by 
Pettigrew and Tropp’s (2006) meta-analytic finding that the effects of contact are smaller 
for minorities than for majorities but greater for higher-status minorities than lower-status 
ones (Bikmen, 2011; Shelton & Richeson, 2006; Van Laar, Levin, Sinclair & Sidanius, 2004).  
Bikmen (2011) examined the effects of intergroup contact between two different-status 
student minority groups, blacks and Asians, in a majority white American university.  Her 
main hypothesis is that since Asians are a ‘higher status’ minority than blacks, the effects of 
contact between them ought to resemble those between a majority (high status) and a 
minority (low status) group.  That is, she tested the hypothesis that the prejudice-reducing 
effects of contact would be greater for Asians than for blacks, and found this to be the case.  
A secondary hypothesis was also proposed, that, since Asians are viewed as ‘honorary 
whites’, the effects of contact with Asians on black students ought to be greater for those 
blacks who already had favourable attitudes towards whites. This hypothesis was also not 
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disconfirmed.  In this way, relations among minorities are reconceptualised in terms of a 
minority-majority framework, with the relations between black and Asian students to the 
fore.  
 
Bikmen’s approach shows how a two-group framework can be used to analyse what she 
gives clues to suggest is in fact a more complex multi-group situation. Already we know that 
the university was majority white, and thus, in a literal sense, the actual majority (as well as 
‘the institution’) has been omitted from the analytic framework, which is concerned with 
the relations between black and Asian students.  However, this majority has not been 
completely omitted, as the status of the two minority groups is defined in the following way:   
Asian students, compared to Black students, reported having more White friends, 
were more favourable toward Whites, reported experiencing less discrimination, and 
were more trusting of the college authorities.  Underlying these differences were 
perceptions of acceptance of and respect for their group; that is, public regard (p. 191, 
italics added).  
Bikmen then considers how such differences in status may affect college campus politics: 
 
Differences in status and the associated differences in college experiences [of blacks 
and Asians] may make articulating a common ingroup identity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 
2000), for example as ‘students of color,’ harder, and arguably, present a major 
obstacle to multicultural solidarity (Greenwood, 2008) among Black and Asian 
students in college campuses. (p. 192) 
 
However, different implications of this ‘status difference’ can be drawn if we more explicitly 
consider this university as (at least) a three-way intergroup situation rather than focusing on 
these two minorities alone and treating them as a minority and a majority.  First, as we have 
seen above, the ‘status’ of the two minorities was actually operationalised as how well they 
got on with, and were viewed by, whites.  But instead of making this explicit, white regard is 
described as ‘public regard’ or ‘status’.  In this way, status’ is universalised, and the role of 
whites is rendered transparent. Thus, the relations between black and Asian students are 
problematised, instead of the whole group hierarchy with whites (students and university 
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administration) at the top.  When viewed in this way, the Asians’ ‘higher status’ can be 
contextualised and relativised in a local group hierarchy; and once this is done, the relations 
between Asians and blacks can be interpreted in a different way.  Instead of asking whether 
differences in ‘status’ and in college experiences are in and of themselves a potential barrier 
to inter-minority solidarity, we can ask whether articulating a common identity among all 
students of colour would be difficult because the Asian students were invested in their good 
relations with whites and thus in the current hierarchy among minorities.  If this were the 
case, they might indeed stand to lose something by demonstrating solidarity with black 
students, as this might mean letting go of their honorary-white status in order to embrace a 
Black identity.  In minority-majority terms, the Asian students’ unique middle-status position 
is lost, because they are either treated as equivalent to a majority (in Bikmen’s research), or 
grouped together with black students as ‘students of colour’.  
This alternative interpretation of Bikmen’s college campus dynamics is supported by Bonilla-
Silva (2004) who has argued precisely that a tri-racial order has emerged in the US, with 
whites at the top, ‘honorary whites’ in the middle – including certain higher-status Asians 
and lighter skinned Latinos – and a ‘collective black’ at the bottom, including African 
Americans, darker skinned Latinos and lower-status Asians.  In Bonilla-Silva’s analysis, it is 
imperative to understand the dynamics of these two ‘lower-status’ groups in terms of an 
overall racial order that maintains white privilege.  He also suggests that particular dilemmas 
are produced for the ‘honorary whites’ in this hierarchy, who must decide whether to seek 
acceptance and relative privileges from whites – despite the fact that they are unlikely to be 
fully accepted by them – or throw in their lot with the ‘collective black’.  Bikmen’s 
application of the two-group framework blots out these dilemmas, which imply that whites 
are an actual participant group in the university’s intergroup relations.  
But the supposedly favourable relationship between Asians and whites in Bikmen’s 
university must also be read in light of the high degree of racism from whites which, Bikmen 
acknowledges, Asians in America continue to experience – ‘public regard’ and ‘status’ 
notwithstanding (c.f. Bonilla-Silva, 2004).  This raises questions about the instrumentality of 
favourable intergroup representations – in this case of Asians by whites.  When do groups 
have an interest in maintaining and proclaiming good relations with certain others and 
when do they not?  It is possible that the intergroup dynamics at this university represented 
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a kind of Asian-white alliance from which blacks were excluded – an alliance which 
presumably served some purpose in this context but does not mean that ‘honorary whites’ 
in America can always expect good treatment from whites. In South Africa, likewise, white 
racism towards coloureds and Indians is alive and well, and yet there are times when 
coloureds and whites or Indians and whites ‘band together’ against blacks.  Representative 
sample attitude surveys have found similar levels of xenophobia towards foreigners in South 
Africa across all race and class groups (Crush, 2000, 2008; Crush & Ramachandran, 2014), 
and yet, in De Doorns for example, there was a clear difference between the attitudes of 
South African workers and those of farmers towards the Zimbabwean farm worker 
community.  On what occasions, and for what purposes, then, are ‘good relations’ between 
groups invoked or ignored?  Such questions cannot be addressed from within a two-group 
framework, because if we simply examined the coloured-white or the Asian-white 
relationship in isolation, noting that it was either positive or negative, this would not tell us 
how this particular two-way relationship derived its meaning and function from its particular 
location in a wider web of group relationships (Kerr, Durrheim & Dixon, 2016).   
However, another study of inter-minority relations in America by Glasford and Calcagno 
(2011) moved beyond the two-group paradigm by specifically conceptualising the 
relationship between black and Latino Americans in terms of how this was mediated by 
each group’s relationship to whites. The authors investigated whether a message of 
commonality between Latino-Americans and African American participants had an effect on 
these groups’ sense of political solidarity, and secondly, whether this solidarity effect was 
moderated by contact with whites.  Indeed, Latino-Americans who expressed ‘common 
identification’ with African Americans also expressed a greater sense of common political 
solidarity, but this was diminished by Latino-Americans’ self-reported experiences of 
positive contact with whites. This is an example of how including a third party explicitly in 
the overall analytic framework of intergroup relations studies can begin to capture the 
dynamics of intergroup relations which are produced in situations of multiplicity and which 
cannot be reduced to binary opposition (Kerr, Dixon & Durrheim, 2016).   
A two-group paradigm in social identity theory 
A third and final example of the two-group paradigm in action comes from Tajfel’s (1978b) 
analysis of Hutu-Tutsi intergroup relations in Rwanda, which he used as a supposedly real-
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world illustration of the ‘positive distinctiveness’ hypothesis with which he explained the 
results of the early minimal groups studies (Tajfel, 1978b; Turner, Oakes, Hogg, Reicher & 
Wetherell, 1987).  Tajfel argued that the intergroup situation in Rwanda was 
[i]nteresting because it comes from a fairly closed-in society which has had until 
recently very few contacts with the outside world...The society in question is Ruanda 
[sic], where one of the two very nearly impermeable ethnic groups, the Tutsi, has 
consistently dominated the other, the Hutu, since the Tutsi conquest four centuries 
ago (Tajfel, 1978b, p. 84-85).  
The research Tajfel used to illustrate positive distinctiveness in Rwanda was undertaken by 
anthropologist Macquet in the 1960s (in Tajfel, 1978b). According to Macquet’s account, the 
Tutsi maintained distinctions with the Hutu by which to emphasise their own superiority.  
For example, the Tutsi ate hardly any solid food, to distinguish themselves from the Hutu 
who did; they also did not show emotion, considering this to be a Hutu characteristic. There 
are more examples, which supposedly illustrate Tajfel’s point about the need for intergroup 
differentiation.  But the main point is that Macquet and Tajfel failed to notice the part that 
the Belgian colonists had played in politicising and concretising Hutu and Tutsi identities, 
especially during a period of administrative reform in Rwanda between 1926 and 1931 
(Mamdani, 2001).  Mamdani (2001) shows how, though the identities of Hutu and Tutsi 
certainly pre-existed the colonial era, they took on particular nuances and meanings during 
the Belgian colonial period.  Mamdani suggests that the labels of Hutu and Tutsi were in fact 
far more ambiguous and fluid in the pre-colonial era.  They more closely resembled class 
distinctions, with the Hutu traditionally crop farmers and Tutsi the more wealthy cattle 
farmers.  There were even ceremonies that marked a person’s move from one group to 
another, though Tajfel understood the groups to have been ‘very nearly impermeable’ for 
the last four centuries. Under the Belgian regime, Tutsi superiority was entrenched by the 
‘Hamitic myth,’ whose colonizer proponents claimed that the Tutsi were descended from a 
superior, non-African race somewhere in the Middle East – the Hamites. The Hutu-Tutsi 
distinction was thus racialised and rendered inflexible, with the Tutsi seen as the non-
indigenous, and superior, settlers.  Identity cards were introduced which contained the 
bearer’s ‘ethnic’ identity and rendered this identity fixed (Mamdani, 2001).   
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The racial superiority supported by the Hamitic myth both justified and was re-inscribed by 
various bureaucratic practices in the colonial administration of Rwanda.  For example, it was 
the Tutsi who were made petty government officials; Tutsi children alone were sent to 
missionary schools; and Hutu chiefs were done away with.  Opposition to this Tutsi privilege 
was later to become a central aspect of the Hutu Power movement which played a crucial 
role in the instigation of the genocide in 1994 (Mamdani, 2001).  According to Mamdani, 
pre-colonial identity narratives – in which ‘Tutsi’ was indeed associated with power and with 
privilege – interacted with and were used in the politics of the colonial and post-colonial 
eras.  Understanding the binary form that these groups’ relationship took thus requires 
understanding how a third group helped to constitute them in the first place (cf Billig, 1976) 
– a fact which Tajfel seems not to have noticed.  
This brings us to an important way that these examples of third-party politics are unlike 
Sherif’s summer camp experiments. Although Billig rightly saw the role of the experimenters 
for what it was, he did not say anything about the fact that the studies were set up in such a 
way that neither of the groups of boys was systematically favoured by the experimenters.  
Although they competed, a stable hierarchy did not develop among them, and neither did 
either group develop an alliance with the experimenters.  In the USA, in Rwanda, and in De 
Doorns, however, the intergroup dynamics among the ‘less powerful’ or ‘minority’ groups 
were not constituted like this.  Rather, they were differently positioned in a social hierarchy 
of proximity to whites.  Mamdani (2001) has called the Tutsi an example of a ‘subject race’.  
Subject races in European colonies in Africa were caught somewhere between the lowest 
groups in the social hierarchy and the white colonists way up at the top, often given petty 
privileges, but also denied full citizenship.  These subject races were placed in the unique 
position of looking in two directions to their supposed racial superiors and inferiors (Fanon, 
1985).  In apartheid South Africa, the coloured and Indian communities were subject races 
(Mamdani, 2001).  Adhikari (2005) has argued that a distinctive feature of the coloured 
community over the 20th century was its assimilationist aspirations: the desire to be 
absorbed into, or at least affirmed by, white society, and to accept small relative 
‘advantages’ in order to avoid being lumped together with blacks (see also Goldin, 1984).  In 
the French empire, Fanon (1985) described the predicament of Creole-speaking black 
people in Martinique (West Indies), who aspired to be like French Europeans and disparaged 
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black Africans who were ‘more black’ than themselves – this sense of superiority supposedly 
being based on having greater cultural proximity to white Europeans.  Arguably the De 
Doorns farmers’ favouritism towards the Zimbabweans over South African workers is yet 
another manifestation of this same phenomenon – overlaying the earlier variant in the 
Western Cape, which was the Coloured Labour Preference Policy (Goldin, 1984; Ewert & 
Hamman, 1996).   
Beyond the two-group paradigm in self-categorisation and social identity theory  
There is some work in social psychology on collective action and social change from a self-
categorisation perspective which goes beyond the terms of the two-group paradigm.  
Subašid, Reynolds and Turner (2008) have proposed a model of ‘political solidarity’ which 
seeks to specify the conditions under which members of majority groups will act in solidarity 
with a minority group to challenge an authority group like the government.  When minority 
groups direct collective actions towards an authority group to express a grievance in the 
hope of effecting some change, there is a contest between these two groups for the support 
and allegiance of a third party, namely the majority group, the ‘general population’ or ‘silent 
majority’, which may initially be neutral towards the minority but can potentially be won 
over to support their cause.  Subašid et al describe this as a process of forging ‘political 
solidarity’.  Their self categorisation-based explanation for when this happens is that 
majority groups will act in solidarity with the minority once they stop seeing themselves as 
sharing a common group identity with the authority, and rather develop a sense of shared 
superordinate identity with the minority group.  Incidentally this explanation is not 
convincing because it is circular: developing a shared superordinate identity may describe 
what solidarity looks or feels like, but this is not an adequate explanation for solidarity 
because solidarity has already been defined as having a shared superordinate identity. 
Nevertheless, Subašid and colleagues’ basic point is an important one: that there can be a 
contest between parties for the allegiance of a third group, and that sometimes the 
outcome of this contest is actually to change the configuration of intergroup allegiance in a 
society.  In De Doorns, we will see that at the time of our first research in 2009 there was 
little question of where the Zimbabwean community’s allegiance lay, but by the time of the 
farm workers’ strike three years later, at least some Zimbabweans had realised the 
importance of trying to forge a kind of political solidarity among all farm workers as farm 
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workers that cut across national and racial divides.  There was no xenophobic attack on the 
Zimbabweans during the strike, and some South Africans we interviewed ascribed this to 
how, since 2009, the Zimbabweans had changed their behaviour and ‘done better things 
that showed that they were with us’.  It is possible that this was partly due to the intentional 
efforts of groups like PASSOP to forge a shared superordinate worker identity among all 
farm workers, rather than playing up ethnic, national and racial identities into which 
workers have historically been divided.  However, in other cases, it appears that the 
Zimbabweans were simply remembering what had happened to them in 2009, and were 
fearful of what could easily happen again if they failed to show solidarity with South African 
workers’ wage protests.  In such cases, it does not appear that any meaningful 
superordinate identity had developed – Zimbabwean workers did not now think of 
themselves more as ‘workers’ than ‘Zimbabweans’ – even though a form of political 
solidarity was, indeed, achieved in the strike.   
Third parties in the South African xenophobia literature 
While many cases of xenophobic violence in South Africa do not so directly implicate a third 
party of (white) employers in the way that the De Doorns violence did (e.g. Misago, 
Monson, Landau & Polzer, 2009; von Holdt et al, 2011; Steinberg, 2015; Monson, 2015), the 
issue of white favouritism and white employers as significant third parties has appeared in 
the xenophobia literature in a few places.  First, Pillay (2010) discussed the role of whites 
who tried to help victims and potential victims of xenophobic violence in Hout Bay and 
Imizamo Yethu during the 2008 xenophobia by coming into Imizamo Yethu and holding a 
‘say no to xenophobia’ march, in some cases taking their foreign employees away to safety. 
Pillay (also Mngxitama, 2008; Landau, 2008) asked why a similar activism and engagement is 
not present among this sector in response to everyday structural violence: ‘why is it that the 
structural violence...that condemns many unemployed, those lacking in formal education or 
job prospects, a violence that assaults dignity, imagination and hope, why is that violence 
not the scandal that mobilizes the middle classes, the suburbs, the bulk of NGO’s, the media 
into action?’ (n.p.).  Secondly and more recently, black South Africans interviewed in a thesis 
by Eliastam (2015) discussed how white South Africans seem to treat black ‘foreigners’ 
better than black South Africans.  They, too, remembered the way whites mobilised to help 
foreigners after the xenophobic violence of May 2008 but are apparently blind to the 
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ongoing suffering of many black South Africans all the time.  One of Eliastam’s participants 
had this to say:  
I encounter lots of white people who compare black people, and I think it comes 
from Apartheid as well, where they basically say that Zulus are better, or these 
people are better, and anyone who is not a black South African is a better black...I 
think the favouritism and the better treatment shown by white South Africans that 
are shown to non-South African blacks, it is I think something that makes black South 
Africans resent those, you know, foreigners...it just strikes deeper: you’re worthless.  
(cited in Eliastam, 2015, p. 112).  
From the perspective of African migrants themselves, however, Sichone (2008) notes that 
the xenophobic treatment they receive from black South Africans is typically worse than 
racism from white South Africans.  
A third place that white employers appeared in the relationship between black South 
Africans and black foreigners was in my honours project (Kerr, 2009).  We interviewed black 
and Indian South Africans in Pietermaritzburg about their experiences of living, working and 
interacting with African ‘foreigners’.  Some participants problematised the relationship 
between African foreigners and white employers as a process by which their own continued 
struggle as black people to resist white exploitation was being undermined.  A security 
guard explained thus: “He *the foreigner+ just says *to his foreign friend+ ‘no come there is a 
job here for you’. Then all of a sudden...he’s talked to the boss and there’s someone from 
his country here who doesn’t...they don’t have a problem earning a small amount of money; 
we want bigger payment, but they don’t have a problem. Like for example I’ll say I want R50 
a day and he’ll say R20 is better. ...So that’s why now the white people here in South Africa 
say ‘hold on. They’re better because they are cheap’.”  Similarly, another participant had 
this to say: “Indeed they do take them [jobs], why? Because they agree with everything the 
white person says...whereas we black people don’t agree with just anything. Everything that 
is said by the employer a black person can see, no, they cannot stand for this, and disagrees. 
Whereas they [foreigners] have come to South Africa to look for money, so they want 
anything that will get them some money; they agree to everything.” In these accounts, 
whites as employers are inextricably implicated in what the speakers find so problematic 
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about the presence of ‘foreigners’.  Notably, in the second quote above, ‘foreigners’ are not 
even counted as black people because they do not engage in black people’s resistance to 
whites. A third participant claimed that ‘We must fight the employers and report them that 
“no, he employed us and then he doesn’t want to give us money, he’s saying these 
things”...I think that’s the best thing we must do not fighting each other’. But when he was 
asked ‘what if they *foreigners+ do not want to engage in that process?’ he replied ‘We call 
them now, amagundanes (rats)...and then they get beaten’. What is dilemmatic about these 
extracts is that justifications for xenophobia become inextricable from a discourse of black 
liberation and resistance to white exploitation.  From this perspective, ‘xenophobia’ does 
not implicate only two groups – black South Africans and black ‘foreigners’.  Rather, African 
migrants are a third group whose meaning for black South Africans is derived from how they 
intervene in and affect the already-extant race and class relationships among South 
Africans.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered some ways that the default application of a binary or two-group 
analytic approach to intergroup relations in multi-group contexts can overlook the unique 
kinds of social relations and subjectivities that are produced in situations involving three or 
more parties, and in particular, the way power can be exerted and contested through 
intergroup ‘alliances’ – often exploitative ones – between a powerful or dominant group 
and one of two less powerful groups.  It has also considered some literature from within and 
outside of social psychology which has moved beyond the two-group paradigm to explicitly 
theorise intergroup relationships involving three or more unequal parties.  We could have 
understood the attack on the Zimbabweans’ homes in the Hex Valley in 2009 simply as 
xenophobia that implicated a group of perpetrators and a group of victims; but as we have 
seen and will continue to see, residents in De Doorns commonly constructed a three-way 
relationship between Zimbabwean and South African and workers and farmers. Both 
farmers and members of the South African farm worker community accused each other of 
using the Zimbabweans as a pawn in the pursuit of their respective illegitimate agendas.  It 
is thus possible to read this eviction as a kind of ‘proxy-attack’ that was nested inside a more 
longstanding conflict between farmers and the South African farm labouring community.   
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The following chapter, on social psychology and social change, will make a case that 
discourse about group relationships is oriented to group interests in change, and that there 
is a rhetorical relationship between the way speakers construct their relationship with 
significant other groups with whom they interact on the one hand, and the way they 
recommend and evaluate change in their community on the other.  
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Chapter 5: Social psychology and social change 
 
The first principle for innovative discursive research is that in place of fixed method 
abstracted from context, we are concerned from the beginning of our work with the 
phenomena we study as historically constituted.  This means that even before the 
analysis begins we are oriented to noticing how the phenomenon has come into 
being and how it changes (Parker, 2015, p. 3). 
Introduction 
This chapter is about developing a theoretical approach to an empirical study of intergroup 
relations and social change when working with sets of interviews which were mostly not 
generated with questions of social change in mind.  That is, I did not initially go to De Doorns 
to find out about historical social change in the Hex Valley; I went there to find out about 
xenophobia and intergroup conflict.  But in due course I came to realise that the eviction of 
the Zimbabwean community in 2009 by South African informal settlements residents and 
the intergroup conflict and controversy in which this was embedded could be seen as a 
point of convergence of several strands of history (cf Rutherford, 2008) – the Zimbabweans’ 
own history of displacement, the history of changing relations between farmers and 
workers in the Hex Valley, and the broader history of economic, legal and political changes 
in South Africa and internationally that have affected commercial agricultural communities 
from the outside.  Some of these changes were described in previous chapters.  
Since the main empirical and theoretical contribution of this thesis is a social psychological 
one, this chapter offers a social psychological perspective that can inform a study of 
historical change and continuity in intergroup relations.  The chapter first discusses three 
kinds of discourse analysis in (or alongside) social psychology, which have each offered a 
different perspective on how social change and social continuity can be studied empirically 
or operationally in discourse.  The first is Billig’s style of ideological discourse analysis (Billig, 
1988, 1991, Billig et al, 1988).  Billig sees common-sense discourse as historical and 
ideological: that is, social continuity is displayed in ordinary common-sense talk about 
everyday issues, as this talk contains ideological traces and overtones that are the legacy of 
earlier historical moments. However, change is possible too, as major events occur which 
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change the rhetorical context and thus shift the meaning of previous attitudes and positions 
(Billig, 1991, 1996).   
The second kind of discourse analysis that (inadvertently) studies history and social change 
is conversation analysis (CA). This may sound a strange claim, as conversation analysts 
themselves do not say they are producing a study of historical social change.  Moreover, 
Billig (1991, 1996, 1999) accused CA of being overly focussed on interactional form (such as 
turn-taking, repair and so on) at the expense of an appreciation of the historical overtones 
of the content of what people say when they talk to each other. Nevertheless, I will argue 
that the emphasis of CA on turn-taking and consequentiality – how speakers interact to 
collaboratively arrive at some conversational achievement such as the opening of a phone 
call or the conclusion of a medical diagnosis – gives a view of conversation as a kind of 
micro-history playing out in real time in an open-ended way (Maynard & Heritage, 2005; 
Schegloff, 1986).  
A third way that social change has been studied through discourse in social psychology is in 
the work of Reicher, Drury and Stott, who have studied processes of change more directly 
through observations of group interactions at crowd events (Reicher, 1984, 1996; Drury & 
Reicher, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998; Stott, Drury & Reicher, 2012).  In this view, historical 
social change is a collaborative and often unexpected outcome of interaction between 
groups who have incompatible ideas about what constitutes legitimate social conduct and 
about who is upholding or violating these norms. I will suggest that Billig’s approach and 
conversation analysis differ in the extent to which they emphasise the form or the content 
of discourse, but that Reicher and colleagues’ work shows that social change cannot be 
understood without understanding both form and content.  While my empirical contribution 
in the data chapters below is not a straightforward replication of any of these approaches or 
methods, they provide the groundwork for a discursive intergroup relations approach which 
examines the rhetorical relationship between groups’ constructions of their relationships 
with one another and their recommendations for and evaluations of change in their 
community. 
Commonsense discourse is historical and ideological 
In Billig’s view, history is made apparent in the traces it leaves in contemporary discourse 
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(Billig, 1988, 1991; Billig et al, 1988).  In his critique of individualistic cognitive social 
psychology, Billig (1991) argued that ‘*s+ocial psychology should reach out from the study of 
the individual, in order to see how wider patterns of society and of history are reflected in 
the thinking of individuals’ (p. 2).  He stressed that 
The very contents of everyday thinking – the values, maxims, and opinions which are 
commonly held, etc. – are themselves cultural products. In ordinary thinking, people 
use a common sense, which they do not themselves invent, but which has a history... 
Common sense is a form of ideology.  This means that common sense not only has a 
wider history, but that it also possesses present functions, which relate to patterns 
of domination and power....In this way, the continuing history of domination flows 
through the patterns of commonsensical thinking. (Billig, 1991, p. 1) 
Billig et al’s (1988) book ‘Ideological dilemmas: A social psychology of everyday thinking’ 
contains a set of chapters each showing how the philosophical legacy of the Enlightenment 
permeated late 20th century British discourse about a range of topics, including education, 
health, race, immigration, and gender.  Speakers discussing these issues in their own lives 
drew on concepts of freedom, tolerance, rationality, individuality, and egalitarianism that 
are part of the liberal ideological legacy of the Enlightenment.  For example, the chapter on 
‘Prejudice and tolerance’ shows how the very concept of ‘prejudice’ emerged during the 
Enlightenment and came to refer to opinions formed and held without sufficient 
consideration of the facts.  In this sense it reflected a turn towards values of rationality and 
observation over prejudging or making decisions based on received wisdom from the 
established Church (Billig et al, 1988).  In modern use, the term ‘prejudice’ has come to 
mean negative attitudes towards particular social groups as opposed to irrational 
judgements in general, but it retains traces of these Enlightenment roots in the continued 
implication, especially in psychology, that such attitudes are by definition irrational, 
unexamined, false, a faulty generalization, and so on. In Billig et al’s examples, these 
Enlightenment values were so deeply rooted that even supporters of overtly racist and 
fascist British political parties accepted the norm against being prejudiced and distanced 
themselves from it, either by arguing that their arguments were actually based on ‘fact’ and 
were thus true rather than ‘mere prejudice’, or else that it was their opponents – liberals or 
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black people – who were in fact guilty of prejudice in making the accusation that the racists 
were prejudiced.   
Billig et al. (1988) thus illustrate how contemporary common-sense thinking continues to be 
informed by ideological imperatives whose roots are in earlier eras.  Viewed in this way, 
ordinary talk about contemporary issues and institutions becomes like a palimpsest (to 
borrow Ewert and du Toit’s (2005) metaphor), containing traces of the different historical 
periods through which it has passed:  
The history of ideology affects contemporary thoughts and routines, and thus this 
history is daily continued in everyday life.  It is this historical dimension which 
distinguishes our analysis from most other social psychological analyses. ...[W]e have 
sought to draw attention to the continuing ideological history of liberalism, in the 
comments of our respondents. (Billig et al, 1988, p. 145) 
Thus, contemporary discourse is a historical record of both change and continuity: 
discourses from previous eras continue into the present, but they become adapted and 
changed as they are applied to new historical circumstances (Durrheim, 2014).  A similar 
view is taken in this thesis insofar as the results chapters show the different ideological and 
economic imperatives by which groups in De Doorns continue to judge their own and one 
another’s actions as legitimate or illegitimate.  Of course, in the Hex Valley it was not only 
the liberal ideology of the Enlightenment that was present in discussions about xenophobia, 
although such themes are discernible too.  The aim of the previous chapters has been to 
establish some of the ideological history of nationalism, race, and economics in South Africa, 
so that with this background in mind, we will be able to see that the interviews with De 
Doorns residents are saturated with the ‘echoes of the past’ (Billig, 1991, p. 17) – echoes of 
ideologies about race, nationality, apartheid, labour, business, farming, migrancy, and 
expectations about the nature of the farmer-worker relationship, which were developed in 
earlier times and, in a changing post-apartheid context, coalesce into contemporary 
imperatives such as black liberation, white responsibility, free-market capitalism and anti-
xenophobia.  
However, Billig’s view is that not only is commonsense discourse historical, but it is also 
rhetorical and dilemmatic.  This means that ‘ordinary people do not necessarily have simple 
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views about their social worlds and about their places in these worlds. Instead, their 
thinking is frequently characterized by the presence of opposing themes’ (Billig et al, 1988, 
p. 143).  One of the central arguments of ‘Ideological dilemmas’ is that when people express 
their opinions on an issue (such as the presence of foreigners in ‘their’ country), they usually 
know that there is more than one widely-shared discourse in circulation on the matter, in 
light of which they have to justify their arguments.  In the chapter on the dilemma between 
‘Prejudice and tolerance,’ Billig et al. point out that when people in democratic, post-
Enlightenment societies express dislike for certain kinds of people, they usually do so in 
relation to the cultural/historical imperatives of tolerance, equality and rationality which 
exist in these societies.  The example above of the fascists appropriating the norm against 
prejudice to turn the accusation back on their opponents is an example of how everyday 
discourse is rhetorical, that is, geared towards rebutting potential or actual criticism and 
levelling accusations of one’s own (Billig, 1996; Edwards & Potter, 1992).  Moreover, these 
rebuttals presume the overall imperative to be rational and tolerant without an accusation 
of irrational racism even needing to be said aloud.  In this sense, people’s expressions and 
opinions are argumentative and rhetorical by nature, because they are already positioning 
and justifying themselves in relation to potential criticism.  
Although Billig was interested in how history is made continuously re-present in ideology 
and discourse (albeit dilemmatic discourse), he also knew that significant changes in society 
can occur so that the ideologies and dilemmas of a present society are not exactly the same 
as those of earlier periods.  Billig et al (1988, p. 14) observed that 
 
Dilemmas may be constant within society, but our present dilemmas will reflect our 
present society. That being so, it becomes entirely feasible to change the basis of 
society, not in order that dilemmas will be removed tout court, but so present 
dilemmas may be replaced by others.   
 
How, then, are societies and their dilemmas changed? Although Billig’s work does not 
address change in as much detail as his arguments about continuity, an illustration of how 
change happens and alters local dilemmas is given in his (1991) analysis of the rhetorical 
strategy of ‘taking the side of the other’.  Billig (1991) was developing a critique of the 
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traditional psychological concept of ‘attitudes’ as mental states directed towards objects, 
and making an alternative case that attitudes are positions taken in arguments or on 
matters of controversy. Hence, the meaning of an ‘attitude’ depends on the rhetorical 
context in which it is uttered (Billig, 1996).  Using historical records of the work of satirical 
British political cartoonist James Gillray in the late 1700s, Billig (1991) shows how an 
apparent change in the cartoonist’s attitude towards the monarchy between 1792 and 1793 
– reflected in the changed tone of the cartoons he drew about the British Royal Family in 
these years – could be attributed to a significant change in the local rhetorical context 
during this period.  Gillray’s initially highly critical stance towards the Royal Family became 
attenuated after the execution of the king in neighbouring France in 1792.  Billig argued that 
criticising the monarch in a climate of general support for the monarchy meant something 
very different to criticising the monarch in a climate of serious republicanism; and thus, the 
cartoonist had not simply ‘changed his attitude’ and become more sympathetic to the 
monarchy between 1792 and 1793, but had made apparent the limits of his critique by 
appearing to take the side of the other in a changed rhetorical context.  This is an example 
of how major events that change the local rhetorical context are a part of the process of 
socio-psychological change (cf Durrheim, 2014).   
 
Form and content: A critique of conversation analysis 
By his own admission, Billig’s style of historical discourse analysis tends to be ‘cavalier’ with 
the details of natural spoken language (1996, p. 21).  He is not very concerned with 
conversational forms or with how any utterance functions locally in a particular 
conversational exchange.  For instance, the chapter on ‘Prejudice and tolerance’ in 
Ideological Dilemmas begins with a short, two-line quote from a schoolgirl talking about 
race and prejudice, which is extracted from its conversational origins (we are not told who 
she was talking to and what was said by her or others before this), and which is then 
analysed extensively in terms of the historical overtones of the language and ideology of 
prejudice and tolerance contained in these two lines.  Indeed, we are not even certain if 
these are the exact words the schoolgirl spoke (cf Billig, 1996).   
 
Billig compared his style of discourse analysis to that of conversation analysis (CA).  CA is 
concerned precisely with conversation as a form of social interaction which, on close 
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inspection, can be shown to be a highly sophisticated collaborative accomplishment 
between speakers in which each utterance is both dependent on what came before it, and 
consequential for what comes after it (Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 1986; Maynard & Heritage, 
2005).  However, Billig critiqued conversation analysis for being overly focussed on the 
minutiae of interaction and conversational forms, such as turn-taking, at the expense of an 
appreciation of the historical and ideological resonances of what speakers are actually 
talking about: 
By and large conversation analysts have not been concerned with critical issues of 
ideology.  In fact, the selection of the ‘trivial’ conversations encourages the wider 
themes of ideological critique to slip from the theoretical agenda. ...[C]onversation 
analysts have been developing the sociological microscope, examining how the tasks 
of interaction are accomplished...[T]he metaphorical microscope of sociology might 
magnify the details of present interactions, but it does not suggest that these 
interactions fit into a historical pattern.  The echoes of the past are absent in 
conversation analysis. (1991, p. 17) 
Billig’s critique is in some ways confirmed by Schegloff (2006, p. 73), who argues that  
Talking about things—“doing topic talk”—is surely one observable feature of talk in 
interaction.  But it is only one of the things people do...We would do well to open 
inquiry to the full range of things that people do in their talking in interaction—
asking, requesting, inviting, offering, complaining, reporting...and so forth. 
...Proceeding in this way treats action and courses of action as the more general tack 
and doing topic talk as one of its varieties.  
According to Billig, however, this preoccupation with conversational form and activity 
means that the conversation analyst routinely ‘disattends’ to the issues the speakers are 
actually talking about (Sharrock & Anderson, 1987, in Billig, 1999, p. 548).  For example, in 
Schegloff’s (1997) analysis of a phone conversation between two separated parents talking 
about their son who is supposed to be on his way between their homes – with it becoming 
evident that neither parent knows exactly where the son is at present – Billig (1999) points 
out that a critical feminist analyst ‘might wish to use Schegloff’s...example to talk of patterns 
of child supervision, rather than of second assessments’ (p. 548).  In this way, Billig has 
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accused CA of ignoring content in favour of form, in rather the opposite way to how Billig 
focuses on conversational content without much concern for its form or functions in a 
particular conversational exchange (Billig, 1991, 1996).   
 
Conversation analysis as micro-history 
Indeed, conversation analysis has from its beginnings paid more attention to the form of 
spoken discourse than to its content (e.g. Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, Sacks & Jefferson, 1974; 
Schegloff, 1986; Schegloff, 2006). However, I will argue in this section that CA nevertheless 
gives a view of conversation as a kind of ‘micro-history’ unfolding unpredictably in real time 
in the interaction between speakers.  As far as I know, conversation analysts do not claim to 
be producing a study of history or of social change.  Rather, they claim to be producing a 
study of interaction, which is treated as the foundation of all sociality and institutions 
(Schegloff, 2006).  However, I will argue that its very preoccupation with conversational 
forms, especially turn-taking and sequencing, can teach us something important about the 
mechanics of historical social change that is produced in interactions between parties.   
 
Analyses of turn-taking have shown that any turn in a conversation is both ‘context-shaped’ 
and ‘context-renewing’ (Maynard & Heritage, 2005).  A turn being context-shaped means 
that what is said at any point in a conversation is contingent on – but not wholly determined 
by – what preceded it. Being context-renewing means that it also in turn provides the 
context for the next utterance to be made (usually as a coherent response). Consider this 
example from Sacks (1992, p. 4):  
 
A: Hope you have a good time 
B: Why? 
 
In this exchange, the response ‘Why?’ is clearly and understandably related to the 
statement that preceded it – thus, it is context-shaped or contingent – but is also not 
absolutely determined by the prior turn.  ‘Hope you have a good time’ could also have been 
followed coherently by ‘thanks’, ‘you too’, ‘mm’, silence, or any number of other related, 
sensible utterances. It was not entirely possible to predict ahead of time which one would 
be said.  In this way, conversation is open-ended.  But ‘Why?’ is also context-renewing 
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because it produces a new, unanticipated context in which A must now decide how to 
respond.  It could not be known in advance, or in the split second after A says ‘Hope you 
have a good time’ but before B replies, that A’s seemingly banal utterance was going to 
become something for which she or he was called to account (Sacks, 1992). Sacks 
concludes, ‘Others can, by virtue of their return, cast your activity into something other than 
what it was produced to be – or...they can by virtue of their return cast it into what you 
thought it was’ (p. 5).  Thus, one emphasis in analyses of turn-taking has been on the way 
speakers interpret each other’s utterances: ‘speakers can look to the next turn after their 
own to find an analysis of what they have just said’ (Maynard & Heritage, 2005, p. 430).   
 
In this way, while perhaps not paying sustained attention to the historical resonances of 
particular words or ideologies in conversation, conversation analysts have gestured towards 
the relationship between the content and the form of discourse by showing that 
participants’ interpretations of the content of what their interlocutors are saying are 
embedded in conversational forms such as turn-taking.  The mutual embeddedness of form 
and content is illustrated well in conversation analytic studies of doctor-patient 
consultations, which have shown that what a doctor says or does not say while examining a 
patient is consequential for whether the patient resists or accepts the doctor’s eventual 
diagnosis that there is nothing wrong (Heritage & Stivers, 1999, cited in Drew, Chatwin & 
Collins, 2001).  Heritage and Stivers found that when doctors verbalised what they were 
seeing and feeling as they examined the patient (gave ‘online commentary’), it was much 
more likely that patients would accept the doctor’s subsequent diagnosis that there was 
nothing wrong, than when doctors were silent as they made their examination (made no 
such commentary).  Thus, giving such online commentary was shown to be an effective way 
for doctors to resist patient expectations of being prescribed antibiotics.  Hence, ‘Turn 
design has consequences for the subsequent sequential development of the talk and the 
part which the patient plays in it’ (Drew et al, 2001, p. 64).  Thus, while the echoes of the 
ideological past may be absent from conversation analysis, the echoes of the immediate 
past are very present: indeed, they are shown to have an abiding influence on what is said 
now and for the rest of the conversation – in the case of doctor-patient consultations, even 
what diagnosis is eventually reached and what prescription is made.  In this way, 
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conversation analytic studies give a view of interaction between speakers as a micro-
historical process in which change is both a process and an outcome of the interaction.   
 
Another conversation analysis study which shows the relationship between the form and 
the content of discourse and how social change is a product of this is given by Durrheim, 
Greener and Whitehead (2015). They show how a discussion among South African 
academics in an online forum about student protests at their university started out without 
any explicit references to race but became more and more explicitly racialised as the 
discussion progressed.  A reference to disruptive protesting students as ‘savages’ by one 
participant in the discussion was later interpreted by other participants as a racialised 
reference to black students, and eventually led to accusations and denials of racism and 
partial concessions later in the discussion. Certainly, this discussion could be analysed as a 
series of actions, as Schegloff (2006) suggests: participants were accusing, blaming, counter-
accusing, denying, conceding, partially retracting, and so on; and we could also analyse how 
the online platform shaped the form of the participants’ contributions, such as the length of 
their turns, the lack of opportunity for interruptions, and so on.  But what the participants 
were doing all these actions about was the word ‘savages’ and its ideologically loaded 
meaning as an evidently racialised and arguably racist way of talking about protesting black 
students. This suggests that in order to understand how the conversation ultimately got to 
its conclusion, and the changes that occurred in the process, the form and the content of 
discourse cannot be understood apart from one another.  Reading Durrheim et al’s analysis 
of this online exchange shows how a small piece of ‘social change’ happened in the course 
of the interaction.  By the end of it, participants had realised the consequences of making 
particular kinds of racialised statements in public, had realised that statements in which 
racial references were covert would nevertheless be read as racist, and done a host of other 
things which made them as individuals, as well as the surrounding rhetorical context, slightly 
different to how they were before the conversation started.  Conversation analysis thus 
gives a view of conversation producing a kind of micro-history that is unfolding in front of 
our eyes in real time.  Although we as the readers of the transcripts can look into the future 
(the end of the extract) to gain a ‘God’s-eye view’ of what ended up being said, the whole 
point of conversation analysis is to show that the speakers themselves cannot do this, as 
they are collaboratively and in a turn-by-turn fashion producing a conversation which could 
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at any point be diverted, interrupted or derailed by an unexpected utterance – hence ‘the 
routine as achievement’ (Schegloff, 1986).  I will argue below that a similar view of social 
change has been suggested by Drury and Reicher (2000), albeit at the level of interaction 
between groups rather than individual speakers.  
 
So far, this chapter has described two kinds of discourse analysis which have different ways 
of operationalising ‘history’ or ‘social change’.  The first is Billig’s approach, which is to treat 
words and discourse as bearing the traces of the earlier historical periods that they 
originated in.  In this way, the history of ideology is passed down and is used in making 
sense of contemporary events. However, change also occurs as new events shift the 
rhetorical context and thus change the meaning of previous positions. The other approach, 
conversation analysis, has something of an opposite emphasis: while not claiming to be a 
study of social change or history, and while paying less attention to the ideological and 
historical resonances of spoken discourse, it can be read as an illustration of how micro-
history unfolds contingently and open-endedly when people interact and talk to each other.  
However, neither of these approaches is concerned directly with relationships between 
groups. Thus, the third and last approach discussed is Reicher, Drury and Stott’s elaborated 
social identity model of crowd interaction or ESIM (Reicher, 1984, 1996; Drury & Reicher, 
2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998; Stott, Drury & Reicher, 2012).  Drury and Reicher (2000) see 
social change as both the process and outcome of ‘a historically developing interaction 
between collective subjects’ (p. 582). In their analysis, the form of intergroup interaction in 
crowd events – also a kind of turn-taking, but on a group scale between the police and 
protestors – turns crucially on the content of how these groups construct their own and one 
other’s identities.  
 
The ESIM and crowd interaction 
The elaborated social identity model of crowd interaction or ESIM has its roots in an 
attempt to use social identity theory principles to explain the form and the limits of a 
crowd’s action in a ‘riot’ event in London in 1980 (Reicher, 1984).  However, it developed 
into a theory of social change by observing some changes that typically happen in crowd 
events and trying to account for these changes (Reicher, 1984, 1996).  The first change is 
how violence is initiated, spread and escalated among crowds which do not start out as 
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violent and in some cases have an explicit commitment to non-violence (e.g. Drury & 
Reicher, 2000).  An illustration and explanation for the spread and escalation of violence is 
given in a study by Reicher (1996) of a student protest in London in 1988 which turned into 
a violent confrontation between university students and the police that became known as 
the Battle of Westminster.  Students marched to the Houses of Parliament to protest 
against the Conservative government policy of converting student grants to student loans.  
Reicher observed that there were two aspects of the escalation of violence that occurred by 
the end of the day and required explanation: the initiation of violence in what started as a 
peaceful march, and once conflict with the police started in a small sub-section of the 
crowd, how it then spread to other sections.  Reicher’s answer turns on the fact that 
protestors and police had incompatible notions about what constituted legitimate social 
practice and about who was upholding or violating this practice.  The students wanted to 
get to the Houses of Parliament to stage their demonstration, which they considered to be a 
legitimate democratic right.  However, in the police’s view, the students’ efforts to get to 
Parliament were illegitimate as there was a law disallowing demonstrations within a one 
mile radius of Westminster Palace while Parliament was in session.  Thus, when the police, 
on horseback and in riot gear, tried to prevent students from getting to Parliament, the 
students saw this as preventing them from exercising their democratic rights to protest.  
Initially, there was a minority of ‘radical’ students who were calling for confrontation with 
the police, but most of the students initially distanced themselves from this (Drury & 
Reicher, 2000).  The police’s belief in the illegitimacy of the students’ attempts to get to 
Parliament legitimated their own use of force to start driving the crowd back, while the 
students perceived this as the police’s illegitimate use of unprovoked and indiscriminate 
violence, which legitimated their own efforts to start pushing back against the police.  
Furthermore, since the police saw all crowd members – not only the initially aggressive or 
confrontational ones – as potentially dangerous and thus treated them with the same 
degree of indiscriminate force (cf Stott & Reicher, 1998), initially non-confrontational 
students became drawn into this conflict too, as they saw themselves being treated roughly 
by the police for no apparent reason.  Thus the conflict escalated as each party reacted to 
what they saw as the other’s illegitimate actions; the fighting became intense and the police 
eventually dispersed the crowd with a mounted police charge – which further outraged 
students as yet another instance of unprovoked and unnecessary violence.  In this way, 
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Reicher and colleagues argued that crowd events between protestors and the police are ‘a 
historically developing interaction between collective subjects and must be analysed as 
such’ (Drury & Reicher, 2000, p. 582).  
 
The second kind of change that Reicher and colleagues observed and tried to explain in 
crowd events is the change that occurs in participants’ social identity: how people who join 
crowds acting in terms of one social identity can come out of a crowd event with that 
identity transformed (Reicher, 1984, 1996; Drury & Reicher, 2000; Drury, Reicher & Stott, 
2003).  ‘Social identity’ in this work is understood as 
 
a model of one’s position in a set of social relations along with the actions that are 
possible and proper (legitimate) given such a position. Social identity is therefore 
understood as tied to action in the world. It is therefore amenable to change as 
actions and the social relations that frame them also change (Drury & Reicher, 2000, 
p. 581).  
In their analysis of another conflict between the police and protestors that developed 
during an anti-roads environmental protest in London in the 1990s, Drury and Reicher 
(2000) showed how protest participants underwent a process of change in the way they saw 
themselves and their relationship to the police.  This initially non-violent direct-action 
protest again developed into a fight between protesters and police when the protesters, 
who were attempting to prevent the felling of a large tree on a green in a London suburb 
that was to make way for a new road by occupying a tree-house in it, were evicted and the 
tree cut down. Supporters who had been tipped off about the planned eviction of the tree 
house showed up and surrounded the tree, and one man handcuffed himself to the 
hydraulic platform that was going to be used in cutting it down. Some of the protestors, 
believing in their democratic right to protest and that the police would respect this right, 
started off with an explicit commitment to non-violence and passive resistance, expecting 
that if they refused to move away from the tree when police told them to, at most the 
police would simply drag them away.  They also expected police to distinguish between 
obstructive and compliant protestors.  However, for the police, ‘the very fact that protestors 
had gathered to impede bailiffs from executing their lawful duty [felling the tree] meant 
that they were acting in defiance of the democratic system’ (Drury & Reicher, 2000, p. 588).  
89 
 
Thus, no matter whether participants saw themselves as actively confrontational, offered 
passive resistance, or simply moved out of the way when asked, the police saw them all as 
equally in breach of the peace and thus treated them all in the same unexpectedly rough 
manner.  Participants were dismayed at the way they were being treated like ‘football 
hooligans’ (p. 591). The driver of the vehicle with the mechanized platform continued to 
operate it even while the man was still handcuffed to it, provoking outrage in other 
protestors who saw this as putting the man’s life at risk.   
Thus, in similar manner to the Westminster student protest, the environmental protestors 
found themselves drawn into a conflict with the police beyond what they had anticipated 
when they went out to protest that morning.  For those who had initially expected the 
police to respect their rights to protest, the event produced a profound shift in their social 
identity – that is, in their views of themselves and of the police and the relationship 
between the two (Drury & Reicher, 2000).  Their experience of what they perceived as 
unnecessarily heavy-handed police violence towards all participants no matter how 
compliant they were eroded their trust in and respect for the police and ‘the system’ they 
represented.  Many participants reported coming to see the police as a partisan force on the 
side of the state rather than neutral keepers of the peace.  Indeed, for such participants, 
opposing the police in subsequent anti-roads and environmental protests started to become 
an end in itself.  In this way, protest participants experienced an unexpected transformation 
of their social identity – their sense of location in a set of social relationships, as well as the 
actions that they saw as proper given that location.  Thus, once again, Drury, Reicher and 
Stott’s explanation for why participants who act in terms of one social identity (decent 
citizens with a respectful relationship to the police) can end up with a different identity 
(being suspicious of and oppositional to the police) is because of the intergroup interaction 
that takes place in crowd events (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; 
Reicher, 1996).  
In making this point, the ESIM authors echo the point made by Sacks (1992) and Maynard 
and Heritage (2005) above about conversation: that in the course of an intergroup 
interaction, one party’s action can be treated by the other as something other than what it 
was intended to be: ‘*o+thers can, by virtue of their return, cast your activity into something 
other than what it was produced to be – or...they can by virtue of their return cast it into 
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what you thought it was’ (Sacks, 1992, p. 5).  When the student protestors set out for 
Parliament, or the environmental protestors occupied the tree on the green, they did not 
see these acts as being something illegitimate; but the police treated them as such. Thus 
there is an element of unpredictability and open-endedness in intergroup events such as 
protests – just as there is in conversation – because it cannot be known in advance how the 
other group will respond to one’s own actions:  
Whatever the intentions of one group, their acts may be reinterpreted by the other 
group which then reacts in unanticipated ways and creates new contexts within 
which the original group subsequently exists.  Acts may be intentional, but in a 
differentiated social world, intentions are not always realized.  Acts often have 
unintended consequences. (Drury & Reicher, 2000, p. 582) 
 
Thus, in this view, change is a collective and often unpredictable outcome of intergroup 
interaction.  Where the ESIM’s understanding of change differs from most conversation 
analysis, however, is that the form of the interaction in crowd conflicts – the exchange of 
actions leading to the initiation of violence in a sequence similar to turn-taking on a 
collective scale – is shown to be absolutely dependent on the contents of group discourse 
about themselves and each other.  For example, the Battle of Westminster turned on the 
fact that the police and the protestors had differing ideas about what constitutes legitimate 
action for citizens of a democratic country and for the police force in such a country.  If 
protestors and police had been in agreement about what constituted right behaviour and 
saw each other as abiding by such norms, then there would have been no escalating 
violence because there would be no retaliatory turn-taking on a collective scale.  In this way, 
we cannot understand the ‘form’ of an interaction without also understanding the 
ideological content (Billig, 1991, Billig et al, 1988) of what the participants are arguing about.  
This is where Drury and Reicher’s (2000, also Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) definition of social 
identity as linked to action is central.  Groups only ‘do disagreement’ if there is something to 
disagree about; they only complain or accuse or protest or react aggressively if something 
has happened that they find wrong or unacceptable.  What groups find wrong or 
unacceptable comes from a long history of collective understandings and representations 
both of their own moral and political ‘rules’ or imperatives as well as their perceptions of 
91 
 
what one another’s intentions are with respect to these rules (cf Billig, 1991, Billig et al, 
1988).  If the escalation of violence begins with differences in beliefs about what constitutes 
proper social practice and about who is violating or upholding this practice, these beliefs are 
essentially ideological ones – about the rights and obligations of the police, the state and 
the public in a democracy – with their own historical roots.  It would not make sense to 
analyse these conflicts using empty verb categories such as ‘marching’, ‘shoving’ and 
‘hitting’, or even more interpretive ones such as ‘protesting’, ‘protecting’, or ‘reacting’, 
without having an idea of what was at stake in the overall interaction.  For this reason, a 
close analysis of how groups understand the nature of the relationship between themselves 
and their opponents is essential for understanding the direction in which change is 
unfolding:  
the collective action of subordinated groups inevitably takes place in a context where 
dominant groups [such as the police] act and react to such collective action.  It is our 
contention that such reactions occur and are given legitimacy on the basis of both 
prejudicial representations of the subordinate group and the interpretations and 
discourses that surround the subordinate group’s collective actions...*Thus+ the 
collective action of subordinate groups...can only be adequately understood when 
theory takes into account dynamic interactions between powerful and subordinated 
groups – interactions which do or do not serve to restructure the material reality of 
behavioural relations between those groups. (Stott, Drury & Reicher, 2012, p. 287)  
 
Beyond two groups: Alliances in the ESIM 
Part of the ESIM’s theory of identity change in crowd events depends on a model of group 
interaction that goes beyond the two-group paradigm.  Although Stott, Drury and Reicher’s 
(2012) formulation above illustrates a binary conceptualisation of intergroup conflict in 
crowd events, several of the ESIM studies show that what ends up as ‘the crowd’ in protest 
events is actually often made up of initially disparate groups, sometimes with slightly 
different interests in the issues being protested (e.g. Drury & Reicher, 2000). Being treated 
as all potentially equally dangerous by the police (Stott & Reicher, 1998) is what leads to a 
more united identity among all protestors (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Drury, Reicher & Stott, 
2003). For example, Drury, Reicher and Stott (2003) showed that people who turned out for 
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the anti-roads protest initially consisted of relatively wealthy local residents of the suburb in 
which the green and proposed road were situated (Wansworth), as well as environmental 
activists who came from further afield.  The Wansworth residents had an image of 
themselves as the elderly upper-middle class, whereas the activists were described by one 
such resident as ‘people straggling round the town in dreadlocks and very very tatty boots 
and very very tatty anoraks and all the other bits and pieces of the lifestyle which to most of 
these people is a total anathema’ (p. 196).  The interests of these two groups in opposing 
the road-building were also initially somewhat different: the motivations of some 
Wansworth residents were seen by some activists as relatively parochial and as ‘NIMBYism’ 
(‘Not In My Back Yard’) – trying to maintain the green and pleasant, and thus exclusive, feel 
of their area – whereas those who were self-defined environmental activists came from 
round the country and had a broader concern with the harmful environmental and social 
consequences of the international oil and motor industries and of road-building. Drury et al 
(2003) show how at least some members of these two groups developed a greater sense of 
unification and a more inclusive shared group identity as a result of their participation in the 
protest.  This was in part due to an intentional effort by the activists to co-opt the 
Wansworth residents’ concerns about the spoiling of their green and pleasant area into the 
bigger concerns of the anti-roads movement, and in part a consequence of residents’ and 
activists’ shared experiences of police violence – because the police typically did not make 
distinctions between subsections of the crowd when they intervened (Stott & Reicher, 1998; 
Reicher, 1996).  Initially disparate groups experiencing a process of unification as a result of 
violent confrontation with police – and thus the spread of violence from a small section of 
the crowd to the crowd in general – is central to the ESIM’s theory of identity change in 
crowd events (Reicher, 1996; Drury & Reicher, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998; Drury, Stott & 
Reicher, 2003; Stott, Drury & Reicher, 2012).  Their work thus shows how crowd and protest 
situations often resolve to two-group scenarios – the police and ‘the crowd’ – even though 
they do not typically start off as such.   
Qualifications and implications  
Just as the empirical analysis in the results chapters below is not going to be a conversation 
analysis, it is also not going to be a straightforward replication of the ethnographic methods 
of Drury, Reicher and Stott’s crowd studies applied to De Doorns. Methodologically, the 
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ESIM studies have made efforts to capture the way interaction unfolds in the course of a 
protest by using longitudinal methods and sources such as participant observation, video 
recordings, in-situ interviews, and letters from protestors to newspapers and to the police 
(e.g. Drury & Reicher, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998), rather than depending only on 
retrospective and post-hoc interviews with participants.  In this way, they have tried to use 
‘diachronic’ data to plot the way change unfolds in real time over the course of a day.  The 
data I have to work with are different in that they are mainly retrospective interviews, and 
were not conducted with the intention of tracking identity change over time.  The last 
section of this chapter spells out what can be taken from the kinds of discourse analysis 
discussed in this chapter – Billig, conversation analysis, and the ESIM – and then makes a 
case for an approach that reads the rhetorical relationship between groups’ interests in 
change and the way they construct their relations with significant other groups.   
History is made present in discourse 
First, following Billig, this thesis emphasises that the discourse of De Doorns residents is 
ideological and historical.  In talking about the controversies of their time, people in the Hex 
Valley are using forms of ‘common sense, which they *did+ not themselves invent, but which 
*have+ a history’ (Billig, 1991, p. 2).  Farmers defend the running of their businesses 
according to the imperative of free-market capitalism (cf Bernstein, 2013), in terms of which 
‘the market’ serves an important rhetorical function, and the need for productivity and 
efficiency justify any choice of workers.  The De Doorns farmers of today did not invent this 
language; as du Toit (1993) showed, farmers started to change the way they talked about 
farming – from ‘farming as a way of life’ to ‘farming as business’ – in the 1980s at least. 
Possibly they borrowed this concept from earlier, liberal, ‘modernising’ ideas about how 
apartheid was hampering economic growth by artificially constraining labour markets (cf 
Legassick & Innes, 1976). By contrast, South African workers mainly operate according to 
the rules of black liberation and/or white responsibility. In terms of the former, it is 
expected that farmers are out to exploit and manipulate workers and this should be resisted 
in every possible way.  In terms of the latter, it is assumed that farmers have a responsibility 
towards their South African workers because of a shared history and because South African 
(and especially coloured) workers are ‘their own people’.  Again, farm workers in De Doorns 
did not invent these imperatives themselves; they are drawing on a black perspective on the 
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history of race relations in South Africa that goes back decades if not centuries.  
Zimbabweans were largely playing by the rules of anti-xenophobia, an imperative which 
comes closest to the liberal imperative of rationality over prejudice discussed by Billig et al 
(1988).  In these terms, the Zimbabweans read what happened to them in 2009 not as being 
part of a racialised labour conflict but as a direct outcome of South Africans’ xenophobic 
tendencies, inaccurate judgements and moral failings.  While not attempting as rigorous a 
historical analysis of the roots of these ideological imperatives as Billig did for the concept of 
‘prejudice’ (Billig, 1988, Billig et al, 1988), the analysis nevertheless tries to show that ‘wider 
patterns of society and of history are reflected in the thinking of individuals’ (Billig, 1991, p. 
2). Groups in De Doorns are making sense of their relations with others in terms of an 
accumulated history of common sense – common sense which does not make any sense to 
the groups with whom they are in conflict.  In this way, history is made present in the 
ideological traces that continue to inform participants’ understandings of their current 
predicament.  Discourse is therefore like a historical record or palimpsest in which traces 
and artefacts from different ideological periods are all brought to bear simultaneously on 
the present.   
Constructions of group relations as hinges on which change turns 
However, Billig’s historical ideological analysis is not necessarily an intergroup analysis.  My 
interviews, while being ideologically saturated, capture groups’ current misrecognition of 
one another’s social identities, a misrecognition which, according to Reicher and colleagues 
(Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998; Drury & Reicher, 2000), seems to be a precondition 
for conflict during moments of group interaction.  Our interviews reflect a slice or moment 
in an ongoing process of change which similarly turns on the contents of how groups 
differently understand the relationship between themselves, and in this way, they are 
turning points in a process of intergroup interaction similar to that described by Drury and 
Reicher (2000) as ‘a historically developing interaction between collective subjects’. In order 
to understand the direction in which change turns – that is, the nature of each subsequent 
action in a sequence of interactions – one must know the contents of how groups 
understand the nature of the relations between themselves at that moment (Durrheim & 
Dixon, 2005a). In this way, I hope that my analysis will go a step beyond the historical 
analysis of Billig, so as to show not just that any group ideology has historical roots, but also 
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that this ideology has implications for the way change is playing out through intergroup 
interaction in the present and may continue to play out in future.  Our interviews thus 
capture moments that are located historically in an ongoing process of socio-historical 
change.  
Historical scale  
Stott, Drury and Reicher have studied are changes that happen over the course of a single 
day – changes at the level of social identity as well as in the increasingly violent nature of 
protests.  Thus, the scale of their analysis and mine are different.  My focus is not on the 
conflicts between crowds and the police in De Doorns in 2009 or during the strike, although 
such conflicts were numerous and could undoubtedly have been the subject of study in 
their own right.  The ESIM work zooms in on moments of crowd conflict and does not go to 
great lengths to explain how these moments of protest fit into a broader trend of socio-
economic change in the UK.  Understandably, this has been because the researchers have 
aimed to understand the changes in social identity and group interaction that occur within 
the course of a single day, which requires a detailed and fine-grained analysis of change 
unfolding hour by hour.  But we are not told much, for example, about the Conservative 
government’s decision to cut university funding in the 1980s and how this formed part of a 
trend of socio-economic change in the UK to which the Battle of Westminster protest was 
presumably just one response.  In my thesis, some attempt has been made in Chapters 1 
and 2 to provide such a historical context to the events of December 2009 in De Doorns, 
suggesting how intergroup relations have been configured and reconfigured over the last 
two decades, and how interactions between groups in De Doorns, as well as the 
interventions of the state, have produced change in sometimes unanticipated ways that 
seems to be leading deeper and deeper into crisis.  For example, from du Toit and Ally 
(2003) we saw how farmers reacted to the political and legislative changes that made them 
no longer ‘masters’ but ‘employers’: ‘If permanent employees are now to be the bearers of 
rights, able to make demands, and able to challenge farmers’ power, then the pros and cons 
of engaging a large body of permanent workers need to be reassessed’ (Du Toit & Ally, 
2003, p. 46).  Indeed, every round of legislation or protest seems to lead to more 
retrenchments (interview with farmer 4, February 2013).  Another example from some 
years later is the hiring of an armed private security company during and after the strike in 
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response to workers’ burning of vineyards, which is a step towards the militarising of 
agriculture in this community.  As we will see, the farm workers’ uprising of 2012 was itself 
in part a response to or outcome of the changes that were described in Chapter 2, but also 
produced its own unintended consequences, many of which were negative for workers 
(Wilderman, 2014).  In short, the way farmers and workers respond to one another’s actions 
– as well as to the actions of other parties such as the state – is producing changes in the 
way commercial agriculture is done that were probably not foreseeable 25 years ago (cf du 
Toit, 1993).  This means that a close analysis of the content of group discourse at moments 
of protest and upheaval is a crucial part of understanding the mechanics and direction of 
social change, as these are the discourses that legitimate groups’ reactions (Stott, Drury & 
Reicher, 2012), and thus are the hinge or fulcrum on which action, and the direction of 
change, turns.  The results chapters will demonstrate that since groups have interests in the 
direction their society is changing towards – interests which are aligned with or opposed to 
those of other groups – their constructions of relations with other groups are strategic in 
that they serve to justify certain recommendations for change while dismissing others as 
unworkable or immoral.  
Power 
The quote from Stott, Drury and Reicher (2012) above – that ‘the collective action of 
subordinated groups takes place in a context where dominant groups act and react to such 
collective action’, and that these reactions are given legitimacy on the basis of ‘prejudicial 
representations and discourses’ about the subordinate group and its actions – suggests an 
asymmetry of intergroup power. In the ESIM, the powerful group is typically defined as the 
one which has the power to enact its views of the other group onto that group.  In their 
studies, this group is the police: likely because of their superior organisation and equipment, 
the police have a greater ability to enact their views of the crowd than the crowd have to 
enact their views of the police.  For example, even if crowd participants see themselves as 
being made up of different sub-groupings – such as those who are being deliberately 
antagonistic to the police and those who are not, or those who are committed to non-
violence and those who are willing to use violence – the police typically treat crowds as 
being composed of members who are all equally potentially dangerous (Stott & Reicher, 
1998).  Crowd members, by contrast, do not typically have the power to enact their views of 
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the police onto the police in the same way (c.f. Stott & Reicher, 1998).  Thus, the power of 
the police is that they 
do not just perceive the social position of the collective differently to the way 
participants perceive it themselves, but they are also able to re-position participants in 
practice.  Such police action will therefore impact on the self-definition and 
subsequent action of the participants (Drury, Reicher & Stott, 2003, p. 193).  
 
More basically, these formulations assume that the subordinate group is the one doing 
collective action, not the dominant one (which in these studies is always the police); and 
that it is the ‘dominant’ group which has ‘prejudicial representations and discourses’ about 
the subordinate group and its actions, not the other way around.  
But my assumption is that all groups act and react to one another in ways that are given 
legitimacy by how they understand one another’s group and its actions. Farm workers in the 
Hex Valley also act towards other groups – both Zimbabwean workers and farmers – on the 
basis of ‘representations and discourses’ that they have about these groups and their 
actions, and it is not helpful to start arguing about which ones are prejudicial and which 
ones are not (Durrheim, Quayle & Dixon, 2016).  The question of how to define a powerful 
group is not mainly to do with which group is ‘prejudiced’, or which one undertakes 
collective action and which one responds to collective action.  Farmers also act collectively, 
although they do not engage in protest in the traditional sense.  Also, as discussed above, it 
is not helpful to identify the dominant/advantaged and subordinate/disadvantaged groups 
in De Doorns simply by observing who were the victims and perpetrators of violence.  South 
African farm workers are both perpetrators and victims of violence, as they are often in the 
position of being unable to escape from the terms dictated by farmers or the violence of the 
police and private security, but they also have the power to visit violence on other workers, 
such as the Zimbabweans, and on farmers’ property, during the strike.  Rather, thinking in 
interactional terms, we can ask a related but slightly different question about power: who 
has the ability, by their response, to make the initially unforeseeable consequences of 
interaction work in their favour?  This is similar to the ESIM’s understanding of a powerful 
group as the one which has the power to enact its views on the other in a way which has 
material consequences.  But a view of power as being able to control outcomes is important 
98 
 
because, while all groups are agents who act on the basis of their understanding of who the 
other group is and whether its actions are legitimate or not, workers are not in a position to 
‘escape’ the consequences of farmers’ actions in the same way that farmers are able to 
escape the consequences of workers’ actions.  Some groups have a greater ability to act on 
their view of the opposition in a way that ends up ‘restructur*ing+ the material reality of 
behavioural relations between *these+ groups’ – either in a way that best serves their 
interests, or else in a way that nullifies the attempts of other groups to restructure this 
reality in a way which would have served their interests.  In 2009, South African informal 
settlement dwellers managed to evict the entire Zimbabwean community from the informal 
settlements.  During the farm workers’ strike, they exerted an enormous amount of agency 
and power by enforcing a valley- and then province-wide strike and forcing the government 
to intervene to raise the minimum wage to R105 a day.  In this way, power is not solely 
about who has agency, because workers themselves do exercise agency.  However, during 
the strike workers never managed to tactically force farmers into a position where their only 
option was to negotiate (Wilderman, 2014).  Rather, the strikes on most farms came to an 
end only once the state intervened to impose the raised wage on farmers, which meant that 
farmers themselves never agreed to the new wage and thus had no incentive to maintain it, 
or to keep employing the whole of their old workforce at this rate, once the heat of the 
moment had passed. Rather, workers were left to rely on ineffective state mechanisms to 
ensure that the new wage and the spirit of the strike’s gains would be upheld, whereas 
many of our interviewees, as well as other academics (Wilderman, 2014; Webb, 2013; 
Kleinbooi, 2013), suggested that this was not done.  Farmers were able to circumvent the 
negative consequences of the state’s intervention for themselves either by applying for 
exemption from the raised wage; changing workers’ contracts or terms of service to cancel 
out the increased wage cost; or by simply refusing to pay the new wage (e.g. see Kleinbooi, 
2013).  They also enacted large-scale retrenchments after the strike (Fogel, 2013). Overall, 
workers felt that ‘[many] employers have become even more arrogant since the protests’ 
(Kleinbooi, 2013, p. 3).  Thus, power can be defined not by who has agency or who is 
prejudiced, but by who has the ‘last word’ in a series of intergroup interactions.  It appears 
that farmers essentially ‘won’ the strike, even if they did pay some short-term costs for that.  
We will see that there was one farm, however, where workers’ own tactical striking did 
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force the farm management to enter into an agreement on raised wages from which they 
could not later escape.   
A view of power as having the last word or being able to escape the consequences of 
another’s actions also has the advantage of seeing power relations as at least potentially 
contestable and changeable.  Because there is never actually a last word (Billig, 1996) – that 
is, history is open-ended, and something further can always be said, or done, or attempted – 
there is always the possibility that something may happen to shift the balance of power 
again in future.  Thus, power and weakness are contingent: they are things that are being 
maintained or challenged, rather than being an inherent property of any group or 
intergroup situation.  
Third parties and alliances  
When we bring the Zimbabwean community back into the picture, it becomes apparent that 
there are layers of power relations and not simply a binary farmer-worker relationship.  
South African farm workers and informal settlement residents in 2009 were able to evict an 
entire community of Zimbabwean workers from these settlements, an eviction which was 
also justified and legitimated on the basis of ‘prejudicial understandings and discourses’ 
about the Zimbabweans – this is a form of power.  But the Zimbabweans did not leave, 
partly because they continued to be employed and accommodated by farmers, and partly 
because they had PASSOP and other groups who helped to set up the camp and to advocate 
for their rights for the duration of its existence.  However, the Zimbabweans are not entirely 
able to escape the consequences of violence.  Although we will see that the Zimbabweans 
were skilled rhetorically at neutralising the accusations that South African farm workers 
levelled at them at the time of the eviction, and even turning the blame for whatever 
problems were raised back onto South Africans, this rhetorical avoidance of blame was not 
sufficient to prevent or escape actual violence. The Zimbabweans ‘escaped’ to the displaced 
persons’ camp and onto the farms only after violence had happened, although having these 
places did, at least, give them some refuge and enable them to continue working on the 
farms.   However, the fear of being unable to escape violence becomes evident three years 
later in the 2012-2013 findings, where we will see that the memory of the 2009 eviction, as 
well as other threats of violence, were exerting an influence on the Zimbabweans’ decision 
about how to respond to the strike – to join in even though they said did not really want to 
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and did not believe in it, but knew that this was a way of avoiding further violence.  In this 
way, it becomes clear that the Zimbabweans also had no means of ‘escape’ from violence or 
the threat of violence except to respond on the terms of those South African workers who 
have used it against them in the past.  Thus the Zimbabweans are in a doubly constrained 
position: first they are black workers in a position of being simultaneously ‘favoured’ and 







Chapter 6: Research methods for 2009 fieldwork 
 
Research aims 
My honours project was also about xenophobia, and formed one half of a pair of studies 
which investigated how black South Africans and black African foreigners in 
Pietermaritzburg construed relations between themselves (Kerr, 2009; Singh, 2010).  Also 
having started out in a ‘two group paradigm’, however, we did not think to ask what role 
employers or other third parties may play in these relationships, and interviewing such 
people occurred to me as a possible topic for a master’s thesis.  When the De Doorns 
violence appeared in the news at the end of that year, my supervisor suggested that I go to 
De Doorns and carry out fieldwork for my master’s thesis.  I went there with very little 
knowledge about the town beyond that it had been the site of a xenophobic attack; I did not 
know anything about most of the relevant contextual issues and institutions such as the 
labour recruitment system, municipal and informal settlement politics, the history of 
paternalism, and the history of labour migrancy.  In this sense the research process has been 
inductive, because the focus and direction was refined and narrowed after arrived in De 
Doorns, in the course of deciding who to interview and what to ask them, and also once the 
data had already been generated.  
Research design and sampling  
The research was qualitative. In 2009, Gina Fourie and I spent nine days in De Doorns during 
which time we conducted 37 unstructured interviews involving 65 people. The number of 
people per interview ranged from one to eight.  The initial sampling aim was to have ten 
interviews each with South African workers, Zimbabwean workers, farmers, and NGO and 
government officials.  I had made only two contacts before arriving in De Doorns (Braam 
Hanekom and Farmer 1); otherwise the sample had to be generated from scratch.  We were 
guided in our search for participants by what we learned from interviewees, and from our 
own observations about the town.  This has been called ‘conceptually-driven sequential 
sampling’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994), a label which touches on both the purposive and the 
evolving nature of the choice of participants.  In practice the ways we found people to 
interview can be divided into three strategies.  One was to contact directly, by phone or 
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email, public figures or people whom I knew of in advance or heard about while in De 
Doorns.  In 2009 this included farmer 1, PASSOP members, the Agri Wes-Cape CEO, the 
ward councillor, and the police superintendent. A second strategy was snowball sampling 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994), in which we were put in touch with potential participants by 
others we had already interviewed.  On our first evening in De Doorns, our host 
recommended we speak to the chairperson of the Hex River Table Grapes Association (HTA), 
so we went to the HTA the next day and at that interview we were given the phone 
numbers of two other farmers whom we later interviewed.  Snowball sampling thus yielded 
interviews with the HTA chairperson, two farmers, one farm manager, one (white) labour 
broker and one farm employee in a supervisory position. A third strategy was to go door-to-
door in areas of the town where we expected to find people representing certain groups but 
did not have particular individuals in mind.  On our first evening, our host kindly gave us a 
short tour of De Doorns, pointing out the informal settlements, the ‘coloured location’, the 
Zimbabweans’ camp, and the HTA offices.  This helped us to know where to start the next 
day.  This was theoretical (Silverman, 2005) or stratified purposeful (Miles & Huberman, 
1994) sampling.  In 2009 areas sampled in this way were the Zimbabweans’ camp, the 
informal settlements of Stofland and Maseru, a street in the predominantly white suburb 
adjoining the rugby field that housed the Zimbabweans’ camp, and the coloured ‘location’ 
of De Doorns Oos.  Within this third strategy of sampling by geographical area, the actual 
people we spoke to in each location was largely on a convenience basis.  We approached 
people who were within view of where we were walking, either on the street or in their 
yards.  Some people turned down our requests to interview them, but I did not keep a 
record of how many people declined or the reasons they gave (if any). 
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Date Number of 
participants 
Description of participants Location Interviewers 
present (order 
indicates who 




1* Monday 7 
December 
2 Chairperson of Hex Valley Table 
Grapes Association (HTA) 
HTA offices, De Doorns 
town centre  
Philippa and Gina English 
2* Monday 7 
December 
3 One black South African labour 
broker and two other black 
South African men 
Stofland informal 
settlement  
Philippa and Gina English and 
Afrikaans 
3 Monday 7 
December 




Gina and Philippa Afrikaans 
4* Monday 7 
December 
3 The woman from interview 3, her 
brother, and one other man  
Stofland informal 
settlement 
Philippa and Gina Afrikaans and 
English  
5* Tuesday 8 
December 
1 An elderly black man who 
described himself as a liberation 
struggle veteran 
On the man’s front stoep 
in De Doorns Oos 
Philippa and Gina English 
6* Tuesday 8 
December 
8 Members of PASSOP: leader and 
international students at UCT  
In a coffee shop in the 
town centre 
Philippa and Gina English 
7* Wednesday 
9 December 
1 First Zimbabwean man, living in 
the camp and working on the 
farms  
In our car on the side of 
the road between the 
Zimbabweans’ camp and 
Philippa and Gina English 
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the town centre  
8* Wednesday 
9 December 
1 Farmer 1 – white middle aged 
man 
In the farmer’s sitting 
room  
Philippa and Gina English 
9 Wednesday 
9 December 
1 Farmer 1’s employee (coloured 
man) 
On a bench in the farm 
yard 
Gina and Philippa Afrikaans 
10 Wednesday 
9 December 
1 Young woman from Lesotho, 
working on a farm 
Maseru informal 
settlement  





Sotho-speaking man  Maseru informal 
settlement 
Philippa English (mostly 
incomprehensible) 
12* Thursday 10 
December 
1 Second Zimbabwean man living 
in the camp and working on a 
farm 
On the side of the road 
between the camp and 
the middle of town 
Philippa English 
13* Thursday 10 
December 
1  Third Zimbabwean man living in 
the camp and working on farms  
As above Philippa English 
14 Thursday 10 
December 
1 White shop owner (man) In his shop in the middle 
of town 
Gina Afrikaans 
15 Thursday 10 
December 
1 Elderly coloured man Unknown Gina Afrikaans 
16 Thursday 10 
December 
1 White businessman  In the middle of town Gina Afrikaans 
17* Thursday 10 
December 
1 Young coloured man, employed 
on farm 
Unknown Gina Afrikaans 
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18* Thursday 10 
December 
3 Zimbabwean women living in the 
camp and working on farms 
Outside a tent inside the 
Zimbabweans’ camp 
Philippa and Gina English 
19* Thursday 10 
December 
1 Zimbabwean labour broker 
(woman) 
On the grass inside the 
Zimbabweans’ camp 
Philippa and Gina English 
20* Friday 11 
December 
3 A coloured family (a middle-aged 
couple, and their elderly 
father/in-law) in De Doorns Oos 
On the family’s front 
veranda  
Philippa English and a bit 
of Afrikaans 
21* Friday 11 
December 
3 Three young coloured women De Doorns Oos Gina Afrikaans  
22* Friday 11 
December 
2 Two elderly coloured women De Doorns Oos Gina Afrikaans 
23 Friday 11 
December 
1 Station commissioner 
(policeman) 
De Doorns police station, 
middle of town 
Philippa and Gina English 
(permission to use 
this interview was 
not obtained) 
24* Monday 14 
December 
1 Farmer 2 - white middle-aged 
man 
Veranda of Farmer 2’s 
house 
Philippa and Gina English 
25 Monday 14 
December 
1 Farmer 2’s manager, a coloured 
man 
Veranda of Farmer 2’s 
house 
Gina and Philippa Afrikaans 
26 Monday 14 
December 
1 Man from Lesotho who owned a 
tuck shop in Stofland 
Inside the shop in 
Stofland 
Gina English 
27* Monday 14 
December 
5 Group of black and coloured 
people in Stofland (one of the 
men in this group was also 




present in interview 4) 
28* Monday 14 
December 
1 Farmer 3 – white middle aged 
man 
Farmer’s office Philippa and Gina English 
29* Tuesday 15 
December 
1 CEO of Agri Wes-Cape Agri Wes-Cape offices, 
Paarl 
Philippa  English 
30 Tuesday 15 
December 
3 First group of Zimbabwean men In the Zimbabweans’ 
camp 
Gina English 
31* Tuesday 15 
December 
4 Second group of Zimbabwean 
men 






1 Elderly white woman living in the 
‘white’ suburb near the 
Zimbabweans’ camp  
In the woman’s sitting 
room 





1 Middle-aged white woman living 
in the ‘white’ suburb near the 
Zimbabweans’ camp 
In the woman’s sitting 
room 





1 Formal labour broker (white 
man) 




1 Elderly coloured woman living in 
farm accommodation near the 
farm where we were staying 
In the woman’s house Gina Afrikaans 
36 Thursday 17 
December 
1 Mayor of Breede Valley 
Municipality 
Municipal offices in 
Worcester 
Philippa and Gina English 
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37 Thursday 17 
December 
1 ANC Councillor for Ward 2 of 
Breede Municipality 
Municipal offices in De 
Doorns 
Philippa and Gina English (this 
interview was not 
recorded) 




Gaps and biases in the sample 
There are two main gaps in the 2009 sample.  One is that we interviewed very few farm-
dwelling general workers.  We did interview a number of senior administrative or 
managerial staff, but almost all the ordinary worker interviews were with workers living in 
the informal settlements and Lubisi.  Although in 2009 one of the farmers agreed that we 
could interview employees working on his farm, we decided not to because the work they 
were doing was piece-work and we would have been taking up their time.  Also, although 
we visited the informal settlements, we could have interviewed more farm workers living 
there.  A second gap is that other than the PASSOP director and the ward councillor – who 
refused to have the interview recorded – we did not interview any influential community 
leaders or representatives of farm workers’ organisations.   
Generalisability 
There are two levels at which issues of generalisability can be addressed.  The first is at the 
level of the sample of individuals we interviewed among the whole population of De 
Doorns, and what the characteristics of this sample mean for the kinds of answers we 
received. This has already been discussed above in the ‘gaps’ section. The second level is 
about De Doorns as a whole town, or a case, and how it is comparable to other towns, and 
other events, of violent xenophobia- or labour-related conflict.  This is an issue of 
‘transferability’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1984, cited in Babbie & Mouton, 2005).   
According to Lincoln and Guba, transferability means that the researcher should provide 
enough description of the research context that readers can decide how applicable the 
research is to their own situation. Hammersley (1992, in Silverman, 2005) also recommends 
comparing your case with other published cases of the same phenomenon.  If we treat the 
De Doorns violence as a case of ‘xenophobia’, then this comparison has been done in 
Chapter 1.  Misago (2009) pointed out that De Doorns bucked the trend of large-scale 
xenophobic violence because it was a small rural town, whereas the 2008 violence 
happened in urban centres; but, in other ways, the political and economic processes 
through which the De Doorns violence was incited closely followed the trend of other 
violent xenophobia around the country.   
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However, transferability also means that what the De Doorns violence is assumed to be a 
case of – xenophobia, labour conflict, political-ethnic conflict – needs to be considered and 
not simply presumed.  At least four other masters theses written about the attack on the 
Zimbabweans in 2009 (Arends 2011; Mukwena, 2011; Botha, 2012; Hagenson, 2014) all 
started from the assumption that what happened in De Doorns was ‘xenophobia’ or 
ethnic/political violence, and approached it using literature on xenophobia, without locating 
this event in the specific history of agricultural and social change in the Hex Valley and the 
Western Cape over the last 30 years (an exception is the thesis by Davis, 2010).  De Doorns 
being a rural farming community is not an incidental deviation from the norm of xenophobic 
violence in urban areas, but a central issue, and it is an example of how xenophobic violence 
as a widespread and repetitive phenomenon with recognisable patterns and forms 
intersects with local politics and dynamics to take on particular forms in particular places.  
For this reason, the De Doorns violence was probably unique in its combination of factors – 
its location in a particular moment of transition in Western Cape commercial agriculture’s 
history, its dynamics of labour migration, and its local politics – even while it followed in 
numerous ways the familiar pattern of local leaders inciting violence for their own political 
and financial ends (Misago, 2009; Landau, 2015; Misago, Monson, Polzer & Landau, 2010).   
Data generation: Interviewing and questions 
In 2009 data generation was initiated by me and Gina, and the interviews were audio-
recorded.  Languages used were English, Afrikaans and Xhosa, and interviews were later 
transcribed and translated into English where necessary.  In 2009, there were a few 
questions we repeatedly asked in order to initiate discussion in the interviews, but these by 
no means constituted a fixed schedule, so questions and conversation topics varied 
considerably within and across interviews.  We asked some but not all participants to 
explain what ‘caused’ or started the violence or to explain why it happened; others we 
simply asked what they thought about ‘this stuff that happened with the Zimbabweans.’ 
Henry (1998) has argued that ‘predesigned and structured instruments blind the researcher 
to the site.  If the most important phenomena...at work in the field are not in the 
instruments, they will be overlooked or misrepresented’ (p. 35).  For this reason the lack of 
a fixed set of questions was useful.  A high degree of flexibility in the interviews enabled 
participants to talk about things which were important to them which we would not have 
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known to ask about.  However, it also meant a lot of discussion was generated which was 
costly to transcribe and translate but was not ultimately used in the analysis.  
In interviews 2, 4, 9 and 27, some parts of the interviews were inaudible because they 
happened outside when the wind was blowing. Also, the translator battled to understand 
some of the conversation because of the speakers’ accents. This amounted to a loss of 
potentially useful data.    
Data analysis: Listening, transcribing and thematic analysis  
Analysis of the 2009 interviews progressed in different stages. The first was listening to and 
transcribing the recorded interviews and reading the transcripts produced by paid 
transcribers.  This process began a few months after being in De Doorns.  It was not ideal to 
wait this long before getting back into the interviews (Silverman, 2005), and some details of 
the interviewing contexts were consequently lost.  It was only during this processes of 
listening, transcribing and reading the interviews that I really began to make sense of what 
we had heard in De Doorns, to see how these accounts were similar or different to the 
findings of Misago (2009), and to see ‘themes’ in the explanations for violence given by 
different participants.  I narrowed these down to five different themes of ‘causes of 
violence’, which were: Local ANC politicians as trouble-causers; labour brokers as trouble-
causers; white farmers as trouble-causers; South African workers’ laziness and jealousy; and 
Zimbabweans bringing it on themselves. There were also some explanations which were 
‘deviant cases’ because they did not fit into any of these categories.  Thematic analysis was 
an important step in getting to grips with what was in the interview set. Ultimately, 
however, I decided it was inappropriate to present results along purely thematic lines, for 
reasons explained below.  
 
Rhetorical analysis 
After battling for a long time to find something useful to say about the five causal themes I 
had come up with, I remembered that the central lesson of discursive psychology is that 
when people speak they are doing things (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).  I also remembered 
Billig’s emphasis on conversational rhetoric, and particularly on the two rhetorical tasks of 
criticism and justification (Billig, 1996; Billig et al. 1988).  The interviews did indeed take 
place in a context of controversy in which accusations, blame, denials, justifications and 
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counter-accusations were circulating in the town and in the media in the wake of the 
violence (see the introduction and Chapter 1).  Edwards and Potter (1992) have argued that 
‘factual reports of events appear in contexts of disputes, dialogues and conflicts of one kind 
or another,’ and that they ‘are designed for their adequacy in undermining alternative 
versions and, at the same time, resisting attempts, actual or potential, to undermine them 
as false, partial or interested’ (p. 165). The implication of this is that the aim of the analysis 
then becomes to show how people made use of the interview as an opportunity to offer 
their own agenda or argue with alternatives.  Realising the importance of this rhetorical 
context forced me to interrogate the initial ‘favoured analytic story’ (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987, p. 42) which was a thematic taxonomy of different causes of violence.  The result was 
that I overhauled the 2009 results chapter and, informed by Billig (1988, 1996), divided the 
accounts into those that were criticising and those that were justifying.  This was the origin 
of the 2009 results chapter as it now appears.  It takes the general form of a conversation, in 
which groups take turns to blame others, and to justify themselves in response to 
accusations that were circulating.  Explanations for the ‘causes of violence’ still feature, but 
they now feature for their rhetorical value rather than for their realist or descriptive value.  
 
I have especially used Edwards and Potter’s (1992) arguments about the nature of ‘factual 
reports’ in demonstrating how interviewees’ talk was strategically put together to 
undermine ‘actual or potential’ efforts to make their accounts seem ‘false, partial or 
interested’ (ibid).  In the analysis of these interviews, demonstrating how different speakers’ 
accounts of the violence and issues surrounding it managed to pre-empt alternatives and 
make them seem implausible is a central concern. 
 
Reliability  
Reliability of qualitative data relates mainly to the quality of the transcriptions (Silverman, 
2005) and translations.  If the conversation is poorly transcribed, the transcript cannot be 
relied upon to give an accurate account of what was said.  Out of the 35 usable interviews 
from 2009, I transcribed 13 in full and smaller sections of two others.  The rest of the English 
interviews were transcribed by a paid undergraduate student and the Afrikaans and Xhosa 
interviews were translated by a paid mother-tongue Afrikaans-speaking undergraduate 
student and a Xhosa-speaking master’s student respectively.  Of the 2012-2013 interviews I 
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transcribed all the English ones. The Afrikaans interviews were transcribed in Afrikaans by a 
paid undergraduate student but translated to English by me with the help of dictionaries 
and mother-tongue speakers.  The Xhosa interviews were translated directly into English by 
a paid Xhosa-speaking PhD student. The translators were not trained in translating, 
however, and neither was there a back-translation process. There were some instances 
where translations were difficult to understand with the effect that some meaning was ‘lost 
in translation’.  Interviews transcribed by me had a higher degree of detail and accuracy, 
including overlapping speech, emphases, untimed pauses, some intonations of speech, run-
on lines, and voice volume, which were indicated using a simplified version of the Jefferson 
transcribing conventions (given in Appendix 1). Those transcribed by the other transcribers 
mostly included roughly overlapping speech but otherwise included only spoken words.  
They were less detailed and sometimes less accurate; but if extracts were to be included in 
the results section, I went over them again adding more detail, correcting errors, and 
sometimes asking for clarifications from the translators.  These extracts are now more 
accurate, and include subtleties of speech denoted by the Jefferson transcribing 
conventions.   
 
Validity  
For Silverman (2005), a main threat to the validity of qualitative research is ‘anecdotalism.’ 
Silverman asks, ‘how are they *qualitative researchers] to convince themselves (and their 
audience) that their “findings” are genuinely based on critical investigation of all their data 
and do not depend on a few well-chosen “examples”?’ (2005, p. 211).  At the same time, 
however, a defence of selectivity is necessary because of the very large volume of interview 
data that was generated, and the word-count limitations for this PhD thesis.  Out of the 35 
usable interviews from 2009, 21 have been quoted from in the results chapter. The ones 
that have been left out include business owners, white suburb residents, Sotho-speaking 
participants in the informal settlements and some other people in the middle of town of 
unknown occupation.  In each section of the results chapters, two ways of countering 
anecdotalism have been employed.  One, which contributed to ‘comprehensive data 
treatment’ (Silverman, 2005), is that deciding on the focus in each section of the results was 
an iterative process which involved going back and forth between different interviews and 
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comparing new sections of text.  Once the focus was narrowed down, transcripts were re-
inspected to see whether there were other instances of the same phenomenon or cases 
which contradicted it.  The other way, then, is that ‘deviant cases’ are included which 
demonstrate variation in opinions within the ‘same group’, and give an indication of the 
extent to which a particular construction of group relationships was reflected throughout 
the data.  For example, there were South African workers in 2009 who did not support the 
eviction of the Zimbabweans, and said that on their farms all workers were paid the same.  
It is important to include this variation to avoid giving an artificial impression of uniformity 
within a group’s response.  
Related to ‘anecdotalism’ is what Potter and Wetherell (1987) call ‘selective reading’, where 
the analyst chooses to focus on those sections of text that ‘simply mirror his or her prior 
expectation.  In this situation the data can be used to...buttress the favoured analytic story 
rather than being used to critically evaluate it’ (p. 42).  This challenge is answered by the 
process of changing the way I approached the 2009 interviews.  The favoured analytic story 
in that chapter is no longer a taxonomy of ‘causes of violence.’  The turn to understanding 
the interviews as rhetorical was the outcome of a process of critical engagement with the 
data and resources from discursive psychology. 
 
Ethics in the research process 
Informed consent 
In 2009, informed consent forms in either English or Afrikaans (whichever language the 
interviewees were more fluent in) were used for all conversations except those that took 
place in Stofland and Maseru, although I was given clearance to do this research on the 
understanding that these forms would be used in all cases. I did not use them partly 
because I was concerned that people in the informal settlements might be not be literate, 
and therefore asking them to read a long form –sometimes in a language which was not 
their mother tongue – would cause embarrassment and/or be impossible.  Of course, I 
should have considered this before going to De Doorns. Also, I was concerned that 
producing forms and asking people to sign them might rouse suspicions, since the violence 
of 2009 was still relatively recent and people might have felt coerced into signing something 
that they were not entirely sure of. This concern was confirmed on the second day of data 
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collection. On the first day, I went to Stofland and did not use forms for conversations 3, 4 
and 5.  After this, considering that I had not done so, I resolved to use them in our next 
informal settlement interviews.  But the next place we went to was Maseru, the informal 
settlement where mostly Sotho speakers lived.  We approached a woman there and I asked 
her if I could speak in English and she replied ‘yes’.  After explaining who we were and what 
we were about, I brought out the form, but it became increasingly clear that woman did not 
speak English or Afrikaans sufficiently to read the form or to understand our purpose. 
Neither did we speak Sesotho to be able to explain it.  Although I think she knew we were 
interested in the recent violence involving the Zimbabweans, she eventually wrote ‘I don’t 
like it’ in the signing space.  I think she thought we were asking her to write her own opinion 
on the violence and whether she supported it.  We attempted an interview and recorded it, 
but later I deleted it because the communication between us did not yield anything 
comprehensible.  After this incident, I was put off using the forms in the informal 
settlements because of the embarrassment and it had caused (me) and the possible sense 
of coercion that the woman might have felt in being asked to commit herself in writing to 
something that she was not sure of.  
In the four cases where forms were not used, then, I introduced us and said that we were 
from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, that I was doing research for my master’s project at 
university, that we wanted to find out about the violence against the Zimbabweans, and 
asked if participants would be prepared to talk to us about it.  I said that the interview 
would be recorded and that we may quote participants’ words in a newspaper article or 
publication but would not ask for or use their names.  The problem with not using forms is 
that these people do not have my contact details should they ever have wished to withdraw 
their data from the study.  No participants who did take away a form have contacted me 
asking to withdraw their interviews.  In 2012 and 2013, informed consent forms were used 
in all interviews.  
Public disturbance 
One problem with research that is not done within an ongoing ‘collaborative partnership’ 
with members of the research community (Emmanuel, Wendler & Grady, 2008) is that one 
does not know the effects one’s intervention has had on the people involved after one 
leaves.  One interview in the informal settlements was conducted in a main thoroughfare 
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into Maseru leading from the place where the trucks were dropping people off at the end of 
the day. The speaker was virulently anti-Zimbabweans and a small crowd grew around us 
because I was conspicuously white and he was vociferous.  I did not understand much of 
what this man was saying but nevertheless I ended the interview after a short time, as I was 
uncomfortable with the level of the man’s antagonism and the way the people around us 
were agreeing with him. I was glad that there were no Zimbabweans left in the informal 
settlements because this situation had the feeling as if something could have happened had 
they been there. We actually drove past this man the next day in town and he greeted us 
enthusiastically. I do not know, however, what further effects that conversation may have 
had.  This shows how doing research can itself change the research context.  
Remuneration 
I did not pay or compensate participants in either round of fieldwork, except for one woman 
we interviewed in Stofland in 2009 who asked if we would buy her bread and milk after the 
interview, which we did.  
Anonymity and voluntariness 
We approached potential participants by introducing ourselves and our aims and then 
asking them if they were interested in being interviewed but also telling them that if they 
did not want to this was no problem. Several people declined to participate, though I did not 
keep a record of how many.  In interviews with official representatives of organisations (e.g. 
PASSOP, Agri Wes-Cape), the informed consent forms gave participants the option to 
indicate whether they wanted to speak as individuals and remain anonymous or whether 
they wanted to speak in their official capacity which would probably make them identifiable.  
In all other interviews we did not ask for names or details, and participants were assured of 
their anonymity.  The participant names in the results section are all pseudonyms, with the 
exception of Owen Maromo, who indicated that he was happy to have his name mentioned.  
However, some of these interviews were conducted out in the open (for example, in the 
Zimbabweans’ camp and in the streets of Stofland and Maseru) and consequently 
participants were not always anonymous to their neighbours at the time of the interviews.  
On the other hand, it could be argued that anonymity is not necessarily a good thing, 
because the people who provide the empirical substance of this thesis are unable to take 
credit for what they contributed.  
116 
 
Participation in racial fields and hierarchies  
Gina and I are white and were both called ‘mevrou’ by several coloured participants 
irrespective of their being older, in spite of having no contacts or history of previous 
relationships in the town, and in spite of introducing ourselves by our first names.  Our 
whiteness was highly salient in such cases.  A ‘good’ thing about this was that it showed me 
the extent to which race is still blatantly salient in De Doorns, and gave away something of 
the history and tone of racial relationships even though farmers’ discourse in our interviews 
was largely non-racial. Also, my being white probably facilitated access to some participants, 
in the sense that, although I am English (not Afrikaans), the white Afrikaans people from 
whom I rented a garden flat in the Hex Valley in both 2009 and 2012 were very hospitable 
and they offered some help with introducing me to a few potential participants as well as 
with showing me around town.  It is possible that this hospitality depended on my being 
white.  This hospitality became somewhat problematic during the strike in 2012 (see 
chapter 8 below), and with hindsight it may have been better to stay in a more neutral 
venue such as a hotel.   
Feedback 
Silverman (2005) says that one’s job is not finished until one has made some effort to give 
feedback to the people who participated in one’s project.  However, I have not offered any 
feedback to participants in De Doorns so far.  This is mainly because of a sense of being out 
of my depth and because I have not forged any long-term connections with participants or 
stakeholders there.  It is thus difficult to judge what feedback would be appropriate or 
helpful.  Since workers and farmers so obviously play by such massively different rules, for a 
time it seemed that it might be valuable to get farmers and workers together to listen to 
one another’s side of the conflict.  But some participants mentioned that they had already 
been interviewed by journalists and that this had not led to any visible intervention or 
improvement in their circumstances.  I also later read in Wilderman’s (2014) thesis that 
there had already had a big meeting back in 2008 attended by farmers, workers, 
representatives of the relevant government departments, the HTA, Agri WesCape and 
unions, but workers felt that nothing had come of it despite having made their grievances 
clearly known.  The lack of a serious response to this was part of the reason some workers 
interviewed by Wilderman gave for deciding to protest in the way they did in 2012.  Also, it 
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is possible that discussing these issues could set in motion processes whose direction would 




Chapter 7: Dilemmas of xenophobia and anti-xenophobia in De 
Doorns – Results of 2009 fieldwork   
This chapter takes the form of a conversation on the topic of the eviction of the 
Zimbabweans, in which groups of speakers take turns to blame others, and also to respond 
to allegations that had been said about themselves (Billig, 1996).  This chapter structure is 
intended to reflect the rhetorical context in which the interviews took place, and which 
speakers themselves (including interviewers) variously reconstructed and oriented to in 
their conversation.  In particular, it shows how speakers ascribed dubious motives and 
interests to other actors and constructed themselves as having no such interests (cf Edward 
& Potter, 1992; Whittle & Mueller, 2010). As we saw in Chapter 1, one of the central 
criticisms which received the most publicity in the media was that farmers were employing 
Zimbabweans for less than the minimum wage.  This was used as an explanation or 
justification for why South Africans in the informal settlements had tried to chase the 
Zimbabweans out.  Farmers denied this outright.  On the other hand, we also heard 
Misago’s (2009) respondents accuse labour brokers and the ward councillor of actually 
inciting the violence for their own political and financial gain, while using complaints about 
exploitation to present themselves as victims.  From the outset, then, blame was being 
apportioned in (at least) two different directions.  
A rhetorical analysis of these two sets of contrary accusations, as well as responses from the 
Zimbabweans themselves, forms the backbone of this chapter.  I will argue that, in their 
discussions about the violence and how it came about, black and coloured South Africans 
who were sympathetic to the violence accused farmers of using the Zimbabweans as a pawn 
or a tool for purposes which they construed as highly illegitimate.  However, farmers 
accused (black) labour brokers and politicians, particularly, of exactly the same thing: using 
the Zimbabweans as a pawn in the service of their own highly illegitimate agenda.  By 
contrast, farmers argued that their own relationship with the Zimbabweans was morally 
unproblematic because it was based on free-market principles.  The Zimbabweans’ position 
with respect to these two sides was not simply neutral or ‘in the middle’, however. They 
largely aligned themselves with farmers, and used many of the same stereotypes about 
South Africans to justify the farmers’ preference for themselves (Zimbabweans) as the 
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farmers used.  This is an example of the way power is struggled over through the 
construction and contestation of intergroup alliances.   
However, as Billig himself pointed out, when people talk they are not only doing things – 
apportioning and deflecting blame, making counteraccusations and so on. Discourse also 
has contents, and thus, following the framework for studying intergroup relations and social 
change that was outlined in Chapter 4 above, this empirical chapter examines how 
participants construct the meaning of their relationship to other groups (cf Durrheim & 
Dixon, 2005a) in terms of their recommendations for and evaluations of change in their 
community.  Thus, while the chapter does not itself plot change unfolding over time (unlike 
for example Drury & Reicher, 2000), the ideological imperatives by which groups judged 
their own and others’ actions to be legitimate or not, and the actions and recommendations 
for future change that they consequently found to be necessary according to these 
imperatives, supply a key link in the unfolding history of change through intergroup 
interaction.  
Part 1 contains farmers’ explanations for how the violence came about.  They explained it 
with reference to the ‘rabble-rousing’ and intimidation tactics of highly suspect or criminal 
labour brokers and politicians, and thereby wrote it off as an illegitimate project.  Farmers 
and Zimbabweans featured only in passive roles in these accounts, with Zimbabweans as an 
almost incidental means by which the brokers could manipulate the market to get what 
they wanted.  Part 2 provides an alternative account from black and coloured South Africans 
who accused farmers of using the Zimbabweans as a tool for their own gain: that is, getting 
out of paying their workers properly.  The consequences for South Africans of this 
relationship were either the displacement of South Africans from their rightful places on the 
farms and in jobs, or the undermining of their bargaining power vis-a-vis farmers.  The 
former was judged as illegitimate according to the imperative of white responsibility and the 
latter according to the imperative of black liberation.  Speakers located this displacement in 
the context of a longer history of town relations that predated the arrival of the 
Zimbabweans.  The displacement of South Africans by Zimbabweans was construed as only 
one way by which South African workers had been ‘screwed over’ by farmers during and 
since apartheid.  This section also contains some ‘deviant cases’ of South African workers 
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who argued that evicting the Zimbabweans was wrong, and/or that as far as they knew, the 
Zimbabweans were earning the same wages as everyone else.  
Part 3 contains responses of Zimbabweans to the accusations levelled against them in Part 
2.  In particular it focuses on how almost all Zimbabweans located the origin of South 
Africans’ problems within South Africans themselves as morally and intellectually inferior 
people.  In this way they essentialised South Africans’ problems and justified the farmers’ 
preference for themselves (Zimbabweans) as the logical choice given that they were more 
hard-working and reliable.  Finally, Part 4 contains farmers’ responses to some of the 
accusations levelled against them in Part 2.  Farmers largely oriented to these accusations as 
if they were legal technicalities, which they could easily dismiss by citing audit procedures 
and statistics proving the high demand for labour.  In doing so, however, they avoided 
addressing the moral and political meanings that these acts (paying of low wages etc.) had 
for the South African labouring community.  When asked to respond to some of these 
meanings, farmers defended their preference for Zimbabweans as completely legitimate 
according to the imperative of free-market capitalism.  As did the Zimbabweans, they also 
blamed black and coloured South Africans for being the cause of many of their own 
problems, and distanced themselves from responsibility for these groups.  In this way they 
avoided having to question the foundations of the farming system and justified maintaining 
the status quo.  
Part 1: Farmers’ explanations for violence  
Farmers’ explanations for how the violence came about serve to apportion blame and to 
pre-empt alternative explanations in which farmers were implicated.  They centre on labour 
brokers and politicians who found themselves in a precarious financial and political position 
in De Doorns, and who instigated the violence as response to this situation. (These 
explanations emphasise the role of the labour brokers more than the role of the councillor 
and municipal council members in inciting the violence.)  The analysis focuses on three ways 
by which farmers construed this violence as part of a project which was fundamentally 
illegitimate both in its means (violence) and its ends (personal political and financial gain for 
the instigators). Firstly, they characterised the instigators as a bunch of criminals, whose 
complaints and criticisms of farmers therefore need not be taken seriously.  This included 
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references to criminal records and to collusion between politicians and labour brokers, 
which implied corruption or an abuse of political position for personal financial gain. This is 
unacceptable in a liberal democracy, but is a common trope in white discourse about black 
politics (Steyn & Foster, 2008).  Secondly, in their explanations for the violence, farmers 
made use of labour market logic, by which they construed the violence as a result of labour 
brokers’ efforts to manipulate farmers and the demand and supply of labour.  Importantly, 
however, farmers construed their own role in this market as an almost entirely passive one. 
‘The market’ was invoked to explain their role, which did not require accounting for, 
whereas the brokers were construed as active agents ‘manipulating’ the market.  This 
second point is important because it contrasts strongly with how black and coloured South 
Africans construed the agency of farmers, which will be seen in part 2 below.  Finally, 
farmers explicitly said that the violence was ‘not a whole community thing.’ In other words, 
they argued that it was a top-down or ‘elite’ project and did not represent a popular or 
wide-spread community grievance which might require farmers’ remedial action or 
attention.   
Extract 1: Farmer 2 (interview 24) 
1 Philippa:  So, first question, in your opinion, what do you think, I mean, we, we’ve   
2  heard a lot of answers, but in your opinion what do you think started this,  
3  this violence. 
4 Danie:  Well, what, violence is technically::, (.)  
5 Philippa:  j[a,]  
6 Danie:        [ja+ but I mean the, (.) .hh It’s basically, u:h, seems to be, a power struggle,  
7  >to a certain extent< or, people, losing power,=  
8 Philippa: =ja, [ja 
9 Danie:                   *you know it’s all abou:t, u::m, money, ’s number one, and I think uh the 
10  main thing behind this is there’s um, there’s this what you know the, what  
11  we, they, like to call them labour brokers,  
12 Philippa:   ja ja, 
13 Danie: a:nd, a lot of the labour brokers are, kind of community leaders,  
14 Philippa:  ja, 
15 Danie:  and also some of them are even on the council. On, on the municipal   
16  [council.  
17 Philippa:  [okay, okay 
18 Danie: But a lot of them, also caused a lot of problems in the past, so a lot of them 
19  are persona non grata on farms. So the, people, a lot of them are struggling 
20  to find work on farms, for people, so they can earn money.=  
21 Philippa:  =okay. 
22 Danie:  U::m, especially with the Zimbabweans here there’s not as much use for   
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23  labour brokers, because um you you can find work. 
24 Philippa:  oka:::y 
25 Danie:  But, u:m if they could get rid of Zimbabweans, they create a labour  
26  shortage= 
27 Philippa:  =ja kay 
28 Danie:  which would first of all mean that they will be employed again by   
29  growers, which they have to, and secondly obviously for higher wages.   
30  (Philippa: =mm) you know if you can create a shortage, .hh u::m then  
31  [      you        can       push       the   ] then, then you have bargaining 
32 Philippa:  [then you have bargaining power] 
33 Danie:  power then you can push the wage.   
 
 
Extract 2: Farmer 1 (interview 8) 
 
1 Francois:  so I think there’s contractors, there’s a few, a, the policeman told me the   
2  head of the police told me here that, there’s a few contractors that’s got   
3  criminal records that’s *coming out of the+ jails and they are the ones that, 
4 Philippa:        [mm:::                     ] 
5 Francois: that’s instigating this whole thing, u::m, because they not getting, firstly  
6   the-, we don’t want to use them because they steal the peop-, the people’s  
7   [money],  
8 Philippa: [money] ja 
9 Francois:  and uh, and now they not getting jobs because there is enough, labour   
10  around. When there’s too little labour around then they can manipulate the, 
11  whole situation. And that’s what this thing is about. *So they+, so they, wanna  
12 Philippa:               [okay     ] 
13 Francois:  get the Zims out, so then there’s too little labour, and then they can control 
14  the whole situation. 
  ... 
15 Francois:  so then you kind of, as a farmer as a employer you more desperate for, for  
16  labour, (Philippa: ja,) and then, then you would, if you can’t find labour, a-, 
17  then, you start to look for labour brokers [to] 
18 Philippa:                                                                                [ o]kay okay 
19 Francois:     you know what *I’m saying+ 
20 Philippa:                   [okay          ] okay 
21Francois:  and they, and then they know ‘okay I can ask, I can ask ten Rand now  
22  *per head’+  
23 Philippa:  [okay         ] 
  ... 
24 Francois:  so it’s a market, it’s a market-related situation. So, so, to try and manipulate 
25  this whole thing by trying to chase out a lot of people, e::y, man that’s, that’s 
26  criminal man. 
27 Philippa:  ja ja ja 




Extract 3: Farmer 3 (interview 28) 
1 Gert:  my personal view [is that] my personal view is that, up until two years  
2 Philippa:          [ja        ] 
3 Gert:  ago, there was a labour shortage.  
4 Philippa:  mhm,  
5 Gert:  and, labour brokers, uh, w- were the, (.) basically, had control of the labour  
6  market.= 
7 Philippa:  =m. 
8 Gert:  And farmers were dependent on, [labour] brokers f-, in order to get, labour. 
9 Philippa:                          [them  ] 
10 Gert:  Um, which was insufficient. And they, were therefore also able to                
11  manipulate, the market, by playing off one, farmer against the other 
12 Philippa:  okay 
13 Gert:  to pay higher wages, because there was a shortage.  
14 Philippa:  okay 
15 Gert:  (.) Then the Zimbabweans came and filled that vacuum.  So that there was 
16  enough labour,= 
17 Philippa:  =mm[m 
18 Gert:                      [around. Um in the meantime the labour brokers had, basically   
19  worked themselves started working themselves out of the system, cos, um, 
20  the::y, applied bad labour practices.  
21 Philippa:  okay, 
22 Gert:  in other words, the::y, not all labour brokers, certain labour brokers. 
23 Philippa:  ja 
24 Gert:  Um certain labour brokers would underpay, their, um, their employees,=  
25 Philippa:  =mm, mm 
26 Gert:  they would u:m, (.)  
27 Philippa:  take more than their 
28 Gert:  take more than their fair cut. 
29 Philippa:  m 
30 Gert: U:m, not pay them overtime, that was due. And at, at the end of the day, the 
31  farmer, became or was responsible then,  
32 Philippa:  for that 
33 Gert:  to s- to to:, face the flack 
34 Philippa:  m 
35 Gert:  from the individual concerned.   
36 Philippa:  okay 
37 Gert:  So the, the the, individual employee, didn’t go running back to his broker,  
38 Philippa:  ja, 
39 Gert:  he, would then come to the farmer and say listen I’ve been underpaid, or I  
40  haven’t been paid for this and that. 
41 Philippa:  ((wants to ask a question)) Is there= 
42 Gert:  ((interrupts)) =So, 
43 Philippa:  ja 
44 Gert: to continue, wi- the Zimbos then came in, farmers were tired of using labour 
45  brokers, they, (.) basically, destroyed their credibility,  
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46 Philippa:  m 
47 Gert:  farmers then went directly to the labour market and employed people   
48  directly.  
49 Philippa:  m  
50 Gert:  So, y’know if, what was found was a lot of disgruntled, labour brokers= 
51 Philippa:  =m, 
52 Gert:  who were generally or are generally the, leaders in the community.   
53 Philippa:  m 
54 Gert: and they, then, rabble-roused, um, and caused the problem that we now   
55  sitting with. Or that we now faced with.   
 
One way that farmers presented the violence as part of an illegitimate project is by 
presenting the instigators as highly suspect individuals if not outright criminals. Farmer 1 
explains that some of the labour brokers had criminal records and were ‘coming out of the 
jails’ (extract 2 line 3).  Farmer 2 says they were ‘persona non grata’ on the farms (extract 1 
line 19).  Also, farmers 2 and 3 show that these (black) labour brokers are prepared to cheat 
other (black) South African labourers out of their full pay by ‘taking more than their fair cut’ 
(extract 3 line 27-28), ‘steal*ing+ the...people’s money’ (extract 2 lines 6-7) and not paying 
them for overtime (extract 3 line 30).  These are presumably the same instigators who, as 
we saw in Chapter 1, were using complaints about exploitation, racism and low wages from 
farmers to justify the violence, but the farmers show that these labour brokers cannot be 
taken seriously as really having the interests of the South African labouring community at 
heart.  Having received this picture of the labour brokers as dishonest, as being prepared to 
cheat other informal settlement residents out of their pay, as recently having been in jail, as 
applying ‘bad labour practices’ (extract 3, line 20) and as being prepared to use ‘criminal’ 
means to chase after money and political power, we hardly need to wonder whether this 
crew might be the vanguard of a legitimate community complaint that anybody with a 
conscience need take seriously.  Instead, it is the farmers themselves who are being shown 
to have their workers’ interests at heart.  These accounts pre-empt and effectively dismiss 
the kinds of accusations against farmers which are coming in part 2 below. This is an 
example of Edwards and Potter’s (1992) argument that factual accounts are ‘designed for 
their adequacy in undermining alternative versions and at the same time, resisting 
attempts, both actual and potential, to undermine them as false, partial or interested’ (p. 
164).   
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A second way these accounts construe the violence as an illegitimate project is to present 
the labour brokers and politicians as the primary agents in the processes that led to the 
violence, and the farmers as relatively passive.  It is the brokers who wanted to create a 
labour shortage (extract 1, line 25-26); who were engaged in a ‘power struggle’ (extract 1 
line 6); who were looking for bargaining power in order to ‘push the wage’ (extract 1 line 
33); were playing one farmer off against the other in order to manipulate the market 
(extract 3, line 11); worked themselves out of the system by applying bad labour practices 
(extract 3, line 19-20); were losing power (extract 1 line 6-7); and who consequently want to 
‘get the Zims out...and then they know, I can ask R10 now per head’ (extract 2 line 13-22).  It 
is they who finally ‘rabble-roused’ and ‘caused the problem that we now sitting with’ 
(extract 3, line 54-55).  By contrast there are relatively few instances of farmer agency.  
Where farmers are mentioned at all, they are passive in two cases – ‘desperate’ for labour 
(extract 2, 15-16) and ‘dependent’ on labour brokers (extract 3, line 8).  In two other cases 
farmers exercise agency: ‘we don’t want to use them anymore because they steal...the 
people’s money’ (extract 3, line 6), and ‘farmers then went directly to the labour market and 
employed people directly’ (extract 3 line 47-48).  Both of these actions are still shown to be 
responses to or constrained by the labour brokers’ acts, rather than determined by self-
interest: we don’t use them because they steal, (extract 1) and, we went directly to the 
labour market because they were taking more than their fair cut (extract 3).  In this way the 
farmers explain the whole situation that led up to the violence in terms of the actions of the 
labour brokers, and not themselves.  This construction assumes that the ‘normal’ (non-
criminal) way that things happen does not require the actions of the farmers to be 
accounted for – indeed, farmers are hardly even presented as acting.  For example, farmer 2 
says ‘especially with the Zimbabweans here there’s not as much use for labour brokers’ 
(extract 1, line 22).  He does not say something like, ‘we choose not to use labour brokers 
when the Zimbabweans are here so that we can lower our costs and maximise our profits’.  
Thus, the way the ‘market’ normally works (e.g. ‘there’s not as much use for labour brokers’ 
when the Zimbabweans are around) is not presented as being constituted by the actions of 
farmers, whereas the things that the labour brokers did to manipulate the market are 
counted as intentional (and therefore potentially blameworthy) actions.  In the next section 
we shall see how differently black and coloured South Africans construed the agency of 
farmers and instigators in these processes.  
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The Zimbabweans also barely feature in the farmers’ accounts of the emergence of violence.  
They feature only as a passive pawn in the power struggles of the criminal labour brokers: 
‘they wanna get the Zims out, so then there’s too little labour, and then they can control the 
whole situation’ (extract 2 lines 13-14).  Like the farmers they are not presented as agents, 
but simply as victims of the conniving brokers.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, all the farmers, 
with the exception of famer 3, explicitly said that the violence was not ‘xenophobia’ because 
it was done not out of a specific dislike for Zimbabweans per se. Rather, it was done for 
‘market-related’ reasons.  In barely mentioning the Zimbabweans in their explanations for 
the violence, and in arguing that the violence was not due to a dislike for Zimbabweans 
particularly, they deflected the possibility that there was anything particularly problematic 
in their relationship with their Zimbabwean employees.  They were simply a group who 
filled a labour vacuum (extract 3 line 15). 
The last two extracts in this section demonstrate a final aspect of the farmers’ explanations 
for the violence.  So far we have seen that labour brokers took most of the blame in these 
accounts.  In the extracts below farmers explicitly argued that the violence was not an 
expression of the sentiments of most of ‘the community.’ Extract 4 below begins in the 
middle of a discussion about the court case which was opened when twenty-four people 
were arrested for crimes committed in the course of the violence. Farmer 1 located the 
violence against the Zimbabweans in a wider context of stayaways and intimidation tactics 
used in the town:  
Extract 4: Farmer 1 (interview 8) 
1 Francois:  and then they toyi-toyied to get out the twenty-four, now no one must go to 
2  work, the case is in Worcester the, ja but now it must be solidarity [so,]   
3 Philippa:                 [ja ] ja ja 
4 Francois:  so no one is allowed to work, .hh it’s ↑criminal! You know what I’m saying.  
5  And it’s it’s, and it’s n-, at the end, (.) I mean the guy- I mean you would, as  
6  well if you stay in such a c-, I mean a- and you know you, you stand a chance 
7  of losing your ↓house, ↑you would just, what *would you do!+ 
8 Philippa:                                                 [toe the line     ] ja 
9 Francois:  ↑ja, you mos ja. ↓Okay so you stay at home then.= 
10 Philippa:  =ja 
11 Francois:  So fifteen thousand people stay at home, one thousand march down   
12  maybe  to the, police station to, deliver something, but the, fifteen thousand 
13  is:::, ↑captive 
14 Philippa:  ((whispering)) hyew (.)[okay ]  
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15 Francois:                 *if you+ hear what I’m say*ing  + 
16 Philippa:                              [ja ja] ja 
17 Francois:   and that’s what’s happening. It’s not a, it’s not a, if I take if, my labourers, the 
18  seventy here and the fifty or, down::, thereso probably, or, ja. But none of  
19  them, they all wanna work. None of them are part of these, they if there’s a 
20  vergadering ((meeting)) they don’t even want to go  
21 Philippa: okay 
22 Francois:  but they get forced to go if y- because then you not part of the=  
23 Philippa: =ja= 
24 Francois: =and it’s it’s, (.) it’s sad it’s sad it’s like ten per cent of the whole, I don’t even 
25  think it’s ten percent it’s= 
26 Philippa: =exerting this, power over everyone else.= 
27 Francois: =ja ja ja.  
28 Philippa:  okay 
29 Francois:  that’s the point so it’s not a, it’s not a whole, community thing=  
30 Philippa:  =okay 
 
Extract 5: Farmer 3 (interview 28) 
1 Gert:  someone said to me the other day, someone quo- said to me the other day,  
2  u:h when I asked the person, reintegration would, 
3 Philippa:  ja be possible 
4 Gert:   possible or not. And he said, twenty percent of the community, don’t want  
5  the Zimbabweans back, eighty percent do.  
6 Philippa:  m 
7 Gert:  and that’s twenty percent of the community that are keeping them out 
 
Both these accounts from farmers present a powerful minority exerting influence over the 
rest of ‘the community.’ In extract 4, farmer 1 is explaining the violence against the 
Zimbabweans with reference to a wider context of intimidation tactics that operated in De 
Doorns.  It was partially on this basis that he could argue that the violence was not really 
‘xenophobia’ in the sense that threats of destroying houses had been used on South 
Africans as well.  Farmer 1 undermines the legitimacy of these tactics by constructing the 
psychology of those who stay at home and, in a different way, those who exert power over 
them.  First, he asks us to put ourselves in these victims’ shoes (lines 5-7): ‘I mean you 
would, as well if you stay in such a c-, I mean a- and you know you, you stand a chance of 
losing your ↓house, ↑you would just, what would you do!’ Both of us provide an answer: 
‘toe the line’ (line 8) and ‘okay so you stay at home then’ (line 9). This appeal to 
intersubjectivity or a common understanding about what we would do in the same position 
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is striking because of the unlikelihood of either this farmer or Gina and I, the interviewers, 
ever being in a situation in which someone might destroy our houses if we didn’t stay away 
from work. Understanding invites sympathy.  In this way the farmer demonstrates that he 
has had empathy with these workers, in spite of the massive class/race divide between 
himself on his farm and them in the informal settlements.  He further demonstrates his 
empathy with his workers by showing he knows exactly how they feel about this state of 
affairs: ‘none of them are part of these, they if there’s a vergadering they don’t even want 
to go...but then they get forced to go’ (lines 19-22). By contrast, the acts of those who make 
them stay are not empathised with in the same way.  Indeed we are not even told who 
these people are – farmer 1 uses vagueness and passive voice and thereby avoids reference 
to any particular actors: ‘but now it must be solidarity... so no one is allowed to work’ (line 
2-4).  Also, we are not asked to empathise with the instigators’ situation.  Rather, their acts 
are described as of questionable value: ‘one thousand march down maybe to the, police 
station to, deliver something’ (lines 11-12).  This is a subtle way of undermining the value 
and comprehensibleness of what the one thousand are up to.  They do not definitely march 
down to the police station, they maybe march down and deliver ‘something’ (if that).  This 
suggests that stayaways such as this are not even always accompanied by some kind of 
constructive activity (if ‘delivering something’ – a memorandum, say – is understood as an 
act which might render such a demonstration or stayaway meaningful).  Also, what exactly 
they deliver is not specified.  This helps to further undermine the value of what they are 
doing because the contents of what they deliver – and hence the statement that they might 
be making – are presented as not really even being worth trying to understand. However, 
the consequences of their actions are serious: ‘the fifteen thousand is captive’ (line 13).  The 
contrast between the vagueness of what the one thousand are doing and their nevertheless 
very serious consequences underlines how illegitimate it is for such a small minority with no 
clear agenda to be exerting such uncorrespondingly large influence over the whole town.  In 
this extract farmer 1 does not actually make any reference to the Zimbabweans specifically, 
though in the first line he refers to the case in Worcester which was opened after the 
violence against them.  But by constructing the psychology of the captive majority and the 
‘criminal’ minority in these ways, the farmer undermines the legitimacy of the way power is 




In extract 5 above, ‘reintegration’ refers to the possibility that the Zimbabweans were going 
to move from the camp on the rugby field back into the informal settlements (which they 
did not do).  Farmer 3 gets his knowledge that it is only a small minority who don’t want the 
Zimbabweans back from ‘someone’.  He does not specify who this someone is, but it could 
be read as someone with inside information, perhaps someone who actually lives in the 
informal settlement.  He said, twenty percent of the community don’t want the 
Zimbabweans back, eighty percent do.  In both these extracts the farmers show that they 
get their knowledge from someone else other than themselves.  In this way their accounts 
of the situation are likely to be valid and to reflect opinion ‘on the ground’ rather than being 
constructed to serve the farmers’ argument and therefore potentially uncredible.  
Running through the farmers’ explanations of how the labour brokers were attempting to 
‘manipulate’ the market, and also the last two extracts on the violence not being a ‘whole 
community thing’, is an implicit claim that in fact it is farmers, rather than the instigators of 
violence who were making accusations about farmer exploitation, who have the interests of 
all their South African and Zimbabwean workers at heart. Though length limitations 
preclude a thorough analysis of the Agri Wes-Cape media release which was cited in Chapter 
1 (see Appendix 2), this document similarly pronounced that ‘the attacks on innocent 
people and the destruction of their personal belongings and property is inexcusable’.  Such 
moralising helps to demonstrate farmers’ concern for the labouring community and to 
counter possible accusations of racism against themselves.  At the end of this chapter we 
shall see how this moral imperative was selectively applied when farmers discussed the 
instigators and perpetrators of the violence but not when they were accused of failing to 
take responsibility for the wellbeing of their workers.  
So far we have seen three ways by which the farmers undermined the legitimacy of the 
violence. Firstly, they showed that the instigators were a criminal and corrupt lot who 
cheated workers themselves, and therefore would not be likely to be genuine 
representatives of a legitimate community grievance.  Secondly farmers showed themselves 
and Zimbabweans to be relatively passive victims on the receiving end of these instigators’ 
efforts to manipulate the market.  Finally, they showed that the violence was not a ‘whole 
community thing.’  These explanations had rhetorical weight because they were all very 
similar and provided a watertight, logical narrative which could account completely for the 
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origins of the violence (as they had constructed them).  Of those quoted, only one farmer 
(farmer 2, extract 1) was asked directly to explain what caused the violence; the others 
provided such explanations – which turned out to be very similar – in the course of the 
conversation without being asked.  This shows that they shared a common version of what 
had happened, which makes sense when one considers that all the farmers in De Doorns 
knew each other personally and were in some capacity involved with the HTA.  It also shows 
that the point of the interviews was understood to be about explaining who instigated the 
violence.  Also, in these accounts farmers demonstrated concern for their workers by 
emphasising the wrongness of violence and of the climate of intimidation in which it took 
place.  In part 2, we hear another side of the story, which comes from black and coloured 
South Africans in the informal settlements, including labourers, unemployed people and a 
labour broker, and also an elderly black man and a coloured family living in De Doorns Oos 
(the ‘coloured location’).  
Part 2: Constructions of the Zimbabwean-farmer relationship and its 
consequences for South African workers 
The black and coloured South Africans quoted in this section provide a challenge to the 
ways farmers presented themselves when they explained the violence, i.e., as playing a 
passive role in the processes which preceded it.  However, Part 2 is not just a different 
explanation for how the violence came about; the origins of violence were not necessarily 
what these speakers were most concerned to account for.  They do not provide an all-
encompassing logic by which to explain the origins of the violence as the farmers’ accounts 
did.  Rather, the focus is on how speakers construed the relationship between farmers and 
Zimbabweans, and the meanings and consequences this relationship, by turns exploitative 
and unfairly advantaging, had for the South African labouring community. We have seen 
how farmers construed the labour brokers as the primary agents and as bearing most 
responsibility for the violence.  In Part 2, it is farmers who take primary responsibility: not 
for causing the violence, but for using the Zimbabweans as a tool by which to achieve their 
own illegitimate agenda.  (This shows how different constituencies had different ideas about 
what the main problem in their community actually was.) This exploitative, abusive or 
collusive Zimbabwean-farmer relationship was shown to have two kinds of bad 
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consequences for South African workers.  One is their displacement by Zimbabweans from 
their historical and rightful places on farms and in jobs (Part 2A), and another is that their 
bargaining power vis-a-vis the farmers was being undermined (Part 2B).  These two 
consequences were judged as illegitimate by the imperatives of white responsibility and 
black liberation respectively.  Whereas the farmers’ explanations above served purposes of 
blame, these explanations serve purposes of justification, in that speakers construed the 
violence as a response or a solution to the two abovementioned problems, which were 
construed as the main problems in the town.  This is a contrasting understanding of what 
constituted ‘the problem’ than in the farmers’ accounts, in which violence or the resulting 
displacement of Zimbabweans was assumed to be the main problem.   
Part 2A: South Africans’ displacement as a result of the farmer-Zimbabwean 
relationship  
The first extract comes from a discussion with a coloured family (not farm labourers) who 
lived in De Doorns Oos.  The opening question was posed in the context of discussion about 
the violence and can be read as a probe for suggestions about what should be done in its 
aftermath. 
 
Extract 6: Coloured family (interview 20) 
1 Philippa:  So what do you think, what do you think should be done then 
2 Wendy:  I think that people must go back to their, to their homelands man,=  
3 Philippa: =okay 
4 Wendy:  go back to their countries 
5 Marco:  ((interrupts)) and, and the thing 
6 Wendy: ((carries on)) we, we took, we are also very poor here=  
7 Philippa: =ja= 
8 Wendy: =here in De Doorns, we very very poor. Now they coming and take our jobs.  
9  Most of the coloured people here don’t have jobs here, the the farmers= 
10 Philippa: =so you believe that 
11 Wendy: ((loudly)) I believe that, I know that I be↑lieve ↓that!= 
12 Philippa: =okay 
13 Wendy: Before before, um, this whole xenophobia,  
14 Philippa: ja ja ja 
15 Wendy: the (        ) the workers here, they were just full of Zimbabweans, during the 
16   year, from January to January.= 
17 Philippa: =ja 
18 Wendy: they, it’s season workers here, the coloureds.  
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19 Philippa: ja 
20 Wendy:  Now the coloureds don’t get get get work because, there’s there’s always  
21  workers on the farms,  
22 Philippa:  okay 
23 Wendy: [the Zimbabweans always there   ] 
24 Marco: *and the famers don’t have to put+ uh-, they don’t have to put their hands  
25  deep in their pockets, because it’s a (exscape gite32) for them, because 
26  of where they was paying eighty, uh, eighty bucks for someone, uh on a daily 
27  base, they have, they they have to pay they pay now forty bucks for the 
28  Zimbabwean people [because they working for a lower rate.  And 
29 Philippa:                   [ja 
30 Philippa: I’ve ne-, I’ve spoken to some farmers and some Zimbabweans and they s::ay 
31  that that is absolutely not true [hey] 
32 Marco:           [the] the white people here I’m just telling you 
33  straightly, 
34 Philippa: mm,= 
35 Marco: =the white people here are all the same, I’m just telling you, they are  
36  all the same. As long as= 
37 Wendy: =they f-, they for instance they feel sorry now for the Zimbabweans but what 
38  about their own, the [people of their country 
39 Philippa:               [mm okay 
40 Wendy: they don’t feel anything, because people are jobless here,  
41 Philippa: [ja] 
42 Marco:  [ja] 
43 Wendy: there’s no work for for for me, for the coloureds, [but] for the Zimbabweans  
44 Philippa:                [ ja  ]  
45 Wendy: there is work 
 
Wendy gives an account of how before ‘this whole xenophobia,’ the seasonal jobs were all 
being filled up by Zimbabweans.  In this account, coloureds are ‘very very poor’ (line 8) and 
this is the basis for why wanting to keep their jobs is a legitimate interest.  However, she 
does not address why it is particularly wrong for Zimbabweans, who presumably also need 
jobs, to get them ahead of coloureds.  In the next turn, Marco does this by constructing the 
intentions of the farmers (lines 24-28).  The reason it is illegitimate is because farmers use 
the Zimbabweans to make money out of them: ‘the farmers don’t have to put their hands 
deep in their pockets’. My response to Marco’s statement was to repeat an earlier challenge 
to this familiar accusation of low wages (‘so you believe that’), though this time more 
explicitly, by citing my own conversations with both farmers and Zimbabweans in which 
                                                          
32
 These words were unclear but ‘excape gite’ is the closest I could get to making them out. Perhaps Marco 




they had denied the accusations of low wages (coming in Parts 3 and 4 below).  However, 
Wendy and Marco both respond to this with reference to the psychology of whites only, 
rather than the Zimbabweans: ‘The white people here I’m just telling you straightly…the 
white people here they are all the same’ (lines 32-36). Marco does not say, ‘the 
Zimbabweans here they are all the same’.  Wendy then provides an instance of how the 
white people are all the same: ‘for instance, they feel sorry now for the Zimbabweans but 
what about their own, the people of their country…they don’t feel anything, because people 
are jobless here’ (line 37). The farmers’ integrity and responsibility, not the Zimbabweans’, is 
in question here.  That the Zimbabweans work for a lower rate is not the basis for 
indignation and accusations of being uncaring:  rather it is the farmers’ lack of sympathy for 
their own people. Farmers’ apparent sympathy for the Zimbabweans (which on its own 
could be interpreted as a display of genuine concern and a demonstration of their being 
good people) is undermined here because it is shown to be inconsistent – they do not feel 
similar pity for the coloureds, even though the coloureds are ‘their own people’ and are 
‘jobless here’ (line 40).  Furthermore the possibility is raised that the farmers are actually 
keeping the coloureds in a state of unemployment: ‘There’s no work for for for me, for the 
coloureds, but for the Zimbabweans there is work’ (line 43-45).  This suggests that there is 
not actually a shortage of jobs in general, but that somehow coloureds do not get them – 
the reason already having been provided by Marco (‘the farmers don’t have to put their 
hands deep in their pockets’). Wendy assumes whites/farmers to have a responsibility to 
the coloureds as their failure to act on this produces her indignation.  
In this piece of conversation the farmers are said to be exploiting and feeling sorry for the 
Zimbabweans.  This should not be taken as proof that Wendy and Marco are in 
disagreement about what the farmer-Zimbabwean relationship is really like.  Rather, 
variation in the content of talk should be analysed for the ‘situated action it performs’ 
(Edwards, 2003, p. 33). Saying that the farmers pay the Zimbabweans low wages and also 
that they feel sorry for them are discursive resources which Wendy and Marco put to use 
for particular rhetorical purposes.  Showing that farmers pay the Zimbabweans less than 
what they pay South Africans is used to de-legitimise the farmers’ preference for 
Zimbabweans and the resulting state of affairs (as described by Wendy) in which 
Zimbabweans have filled up all the seasonal jobs; whereas saying that the farmers feel sorry 
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for them but not for their own people is a way of showing that the farmers have failed in 
their responsibility to the coloureds.  Ultimately, then, these two apparently contradictory 
states of affairs are both deployed to de-legitimise the farmers’ preference for 
Zimbabweans and to show that they (farmers) are responsible for the displacement of 
coloureds from their places on the farms in De Doorns.  Thus, Wendy and Marco construe 
the whites/farmers, rather than the Zimbabweans, as having primary responsibility for this 
displacement, even though it is the Zimbabweans to whom Wendy’s suggestions for 
remedial action are directed (‘people must got back to their homelands’), and even though 
the Zimbabweans do also exercise a degree of agency in ‘working for a lower rate’ (line 28).  
It is noteworthy that several people we interviewed who primarily held farmers responsible 
for the problems in De Doorns still directed their suggestions for how to deal with this 
towards the Zimbabweans.   
The next extract comes from a conversation which took place during the day with a group of 
people in Stofland, the largest informal settlement:  
Extract 7: Group of black South Africans (interview 27) 
1 Thabo: The farmers they are cheating them. [They  ] 
2 Philippa:                    [Cheat]ing them 
3 Thabo:  They are cheating [them] they give them, eh less money. 
4 Philippa:           [ja      ] 
  ...((5 lines omitted)) 
5 Thabo:  Only, that, with the Zimbabweans [that,] why we want don’t, want them. 
6 Philippa:              [okay] 
7 Philippa:  Okay, okay 
8 Thabo:  We we we chase them away 
9 Philippa:  Okay.  
10 Thabo:  Yes= 
11 Philippa:  =So do you agree with that stuff that happened. 
12 Thabo:  Ja! I- I agree! 
13 Philippa:  Yoh 
14 Thabo:  I I I agree 
15 Philippa:  yoh [yoh yoh.] Kay 
16 Thabo:                [I agree   ] 
17 Thabo:  I agree. With that.  
18  (.) 
19 Philippa:  So you= 
20 Thabo:  =That’s why we chase them away. 
21 Philippa:  okay. So, so you believe these stories. 
22 Thabo:  ini? ((what?)) 
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23 Philippa:  .hh Have you s-, do you know for yourself for a fact that they take small   
24  wages 
25 Thabo:  I know! [I work] with them. 
26 Philippa:            [okay  ] 
27 Philippa:  okay. [Okay    ] 
28 Thabo:                   [I know.] 
29 Philippa:  Alright. ((to Mveleli)) Ja? 
30 Mveleli:  ((speaking in Xhosa)) For myself, my problem is that I’m not working. 
31 Philippa:  ja, 
32 Mveleli:  At the farm I was working on, 
33 Philippa:  ja, 
34 Mveleli:   I was fired from work and then Zimbabweans were put in. 
35 Philippa: oka::y 
36 Mveleli:  mm 
 
Three similarities between this account and the previous one from Wendy and Marco are 
highlighted.  The first is how farmers are the primary agents in the farmer-Zimbabwean 
relationship (‘the farmers are cheating them’, line 1, rather than, say, ‘the Zimbabweans are 
cheating us’).  Thabo then elaborates, ‘they give them eh, less money’ (line 3).  Giving 
Zimbabweans less money could be construed in various amoral ways, for example, cutting 
farmers’ costs, but in this case it is given as an example of ‘cheating’.  Cheating is an 
explicitly (im)moral act rather than an amoral (that is, morally neutral) one. This will prove 
to be a crucial difference from how the farmers construed their own actions with regard to 
employing Zimbabweans in Part 4 below.   
The second similarity with the previous extract is that although the farmers are construed as 
the primary actors in this relationship, directing remedial action to the Zimbabweans is 
presented as an obvious solution to this problem: ‘Only, that, with the Zimbabweans that, 
why we want don’t, want them... we chase them away’ (lines 5-8); and again, ‘that’s why we 
chase them away’ (line 20, emphasis added).  Thabo does not provide any further 
explanation for why the Zimbabweans should be chased away when it was the farmers who 
were cheating them.  
The third similarity is that jobs lost to the Zimbabweans is provided as an illustration of the 
consequences of this relationship for South Africans, in particular for Mveleli, the second 
speaker: ‘I was fired from work and then Zimbabweans were put in’ (line 35). Mveleli has 
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provided an ‘ostensibly disinterested factual report which allows others to follow through 
the upshot or implications of the report’ (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p. 158).  The implications 
are that this is a wrong act because it is unfair: no other explanation for his being fired from 
work is given, such as him doing things that justified his sacking, say, or because the farmer 
had gone bankrupt (the fact that Zimbabweans were put in afterwards shows that the 
farmer had not) which would have made it morally justifiable.  If there is no sound reason 
for why he had been fired, the possibility is left open that it was for suspect reasons, which 
Thabo had already provided at the start of the extract when he said that the farmers pay the 
Zimbabweans less money.  The emphasis on lost jobs and on demanding them back will be a 
common thread throughout many of these interview extracts, and will provide a crucial 
contrast to the ways farmers construed their own actions and their responsibilities (or lack 
thereof) to the South African labouring community.   
The third extract is from the same interview that took place in Stofland but with another 
speaker. Here a link between South African workers’ displacement by Zimbabweans, and 
the hypocrisy of farmers, is made more explicitly.  At the start of the extract we were talking 
about the dopstelsel, the apartheid-era system in which farmers paid their coloured workers 
in alcohol:  
Extract 8: unemployed black man in Stofland (interview 27, translated from Afrikaans) 
1 Philippa:  So they paid them in wine=  
2 Dawid:  =Ja.  
3 Philippa:  the dop thing 
4 Dawid:  ja. (       ) money. Friday, and the people Mo- every Monday, a litre on   
5  Monday Tuesday Wednesday 
6 Philippa: a litre= 
7 Dawid:  =ja a litre of wine. 
8 Philippa:  sjoewh 
9 Dawid:  These white people who say today that we are bad ((sleg)), 
10 Philippa:  Oka::::y >okay okay okay okay.< [Okay. 
11 Dawid:           [Today they say we are bad, but during that 
12  time,= 
13 Philippa:  =m= 
14 Dawid:  =in Apartheid, they gave us drink and so on.   
13 Philippa: o[kay   
14 Dawid:     [We, we made them great, 
15 Philippa:  hyew=  
16 Dawid:  but today they say we are bad. 
17 Philippa:  Sjoewfh::!  
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18 Dawid:  ja 
19 Philippa:  mm 
20 Dawid:  We can’t work. Why do they then say today because these people are  
21  here, we can’t work.  But all those years, we worked under them drunk. 
22 Philippa:  okay 
23 Dawid:  Then they take us ((wind blowing: 7 seconds inaudible)) not work. What  
24  about today? 
25 Philippa:  ja 
26 Dawid:  ja 
27  (.) 
28 Philippa:  So do you think .hh= 
29 Dawid:  =They chased us off the farms so that today we are sitting in squatter   
30  camps. 
31 Philippa:  Sorry? 
32 Dawid:  The white people chased us off the farms [so] that we are now sitting in  
33 Philippa:                [ja ] 
34 Dawid:  squatter camps. 
35 Philippa:  okay 
36 Dawid:  and now they want to put other people from other countries in our place.  
 
Here the hypocrisy of farmers is discussed explicitly.  The extract reads like a historical list of 
the ways farmers have abused their workers, to which their recent displacement by 
Zimbabweans is added as a kind of last straw.  These abuses are, in order: (1) the fact that 
farmers paid their workers in wine; (2) the fact that ‘we’ made them great, by working 
under them drunk for all those years, but now they do not repay the favour, and accuse ‘us’ 
of being poor workers; (3) consequently, we can’t work; (4) they have chased us off the 
farms so that we are now sitting in squatter camps; and (5) finally, they want to put other 
people from other countries in our places. Dawid has highlighted the hypocrisy in this state 
of affairs: it is in fact partly the farmers’ own fault that South African workers have an 
alcohol problem. Moreover, he points out that it was these very same workers who made 
farmers great by working for them all those years even though they were drunk, and that 
this drunkenness was apparently not a problem at the time (lines 14-21). Now, however, it 
has somehow become a problem: ‘today they say we are bad’ (line 16). The implication is 
that it is being used as an excuse to employ the ostensibly more reliable, but actually more 
exploitable, Zimbabweans. Furthermore, the implication is that farmers owe coloured 
workers something because of how they ‘screwed’ them in the old days (lines 20-21). But 
they are failing to make good on this responsibility, and instead ‘they chased us off the 
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farms so that we are now living in squatter camps (line 21).  Thus the kinds of thanks that 
workers can expect for years of service from their erstwhile ‘fathers’, the farmers.  Though 
no interviewees used this exact phrase, I will argue that this displacement – being chased off 
the farms – is presented as having been a huge kick in the teeth for South Africans; and that 
being replaced by Zimbabweans adds further insult to injury.  
The next extract comes from interview 21 with three women in De Doorns Oos, the 
coloured location.  They are explaining why they don’t want the Zimbabweans here:  
Extract 9: Young coloured women (interview 21, translated from Afrikaans) 
1 Sanna:  We don’t want them here. 
2 Gina:  Why don’t you want them here? 
3 Sanna:  We don’t want them here because we want to work. 
4 Gina:  Tell me, do you work= 
5 Sanna:  =The farmers don’t want to pay us as much as they used to. And those   
6  people are work-, taking our places.  
7 Gina:  mm 
8 Sanna: And last year Christmas, those people worked, but we didn’t. We enjoyed  
9  ourselves, got drunk, we didn’t want to have anything to do with other   
10  people.  We didn’t want to have anything to do with the farmers, we (    ) 
11 Maria: Because they work for R5 and R10, that’s enough for them, and that’s why  
12  we can’t get our day’s wage. 
 
As Dawid did with his historical narrative in the previous extract, Sanna invokes a historical 
context by saying ‘the farmers don’t want to pay us as much as they used to’ (line 5).  
Though she does not further spell out the sins of the farmers as Dawid did, Sanna explicitly 
says that ‘those people *Zimbabweans+ are...taking our places’.  Jobs on farms are thus 
construed as places belonging to ‘us’ (coloureds or South Africans), but which are being 
usurped by ‘those people’ (Zimbabweans).  As in other interviews, this is explained by Maria 
in the final lines: ‘Because they work for R5 and R10, that’s enough for them, and that’s why 
we can’t get our day’s wage’ (lines 11-12). Again, this is a narrative of displacement, but it 
also relates to the extracts in the next part of this section, in which the farmers’ employing 
of Zimbabweans was construed as a means by which South Africans’ bargaining power was 
being undermined.  
The final extract in this section comes from interview 2 which took place in Stofland with a 
black South African contractor (labour broker).  In the first paragraph, though it is not very 
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clear because of the inaudible speech in line 6, Vuyo describes how, on the farms, South 
African and Sotho workers slowly get replaced/displaced by Zimbabweans:  
Extract 11: South African Labour broker and his companion (interview 2) 
1 Vuyo:  Ja::, you see, you see the (    ) the other problem is that uh, sometimes, there 
2  are six  uh Zimbabweans, six Xhosa or six Sesothos. (Philippa: ja,) you see. But 
3  at the end of the day or at the end of the week or at the end of:, the month  
4  (Philippa: ja) you will  see there’s nine, ha nc ((tiny laugh and clicks tongue as 
5  if he made a mistake)) there’s maybe twenty Zimbabweans, some of the   
6  Sothos, or some of the Xhosas or some of the coloureds, they do (     ). (.) That 
7  is what is happening in our place. (Philippa: okay) You see. Nothing, that is  
8  just the only excuse that eh, Zimbabweans is hard work, they are hard work  
9  hard, .hh you know that is just an excuse. 
10 Philippa:  What is the real reason then, if that’s not the real reason then what is the  
11  real reason. 
12 Vuyo:  No, the real reason is that the, the reason why they love Zimbabweans  
13 Philippa:  ja  
14 Vuyo:  is that, they they want to pay, out of Zimbabweans,  
15  (.) ((tiny pause)) 
16 Philippa:  okay 
17 Vuyo:  ((becoming intense and louder)): They gain, every month maybe sometimes 
18  fifteen  thousand, they gain!  
19  (.) 
20 Philippa:  o[kay 
21 Vuyo:             [JOEW!  
22 Philippa:  kay 
23 Vuyo:  They gain a lot of money. (Philippa: kay) See. So they know they can’t gain  
24  out of a Sotho or Xhosa, they can’t gain  
25 Philippa:  ((interrupts)) cos you won’t agree,  
26 Vuyo:  because I’m getting straight and say, ((Itumeleng laughs)) ‘I want my fifty  
27   Rand or uh uh my UIF’ or,  
28 Philippa:   o[kay  ] 
29 Vuyo:             *you  + see, ‘I want my, my blue card or my UIF, I want it I want to go’. You 
30  see  
31  ((several seconds inaudible – wind blowing))  
32 Philippa:  O::h, kay 
33 Vuyo:  So Zimbabweans they can’t, uh, you see there’s a, uh, permit, that work   
34  permit, there was a word, but I forget about that.   
35 Philippa:  mm? 
36 Vuyo: And one day, I’m asking a Zimbabwean, ‘what is the meaning of this word’. 
37  He say, ‘the meaning of the word is, if you come in South Africa as a   
38  Zimbabwean, you must shut up you must close your mouth, you don’t have 
39  complaints, you must just close your mouth.’ So that’s why the white people 
40  make, they abuse the Zimbabweans.  Because, they know they must close  
41  their mouth, they can’t complaining,  
42 Philippa:  kay.  
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43 Vuyo: you see. 
44 Philippa:  ↓ja::: 
45 Vuyo:  It was a Zim↑babwean ↓telling me= 
46 Philippa:  =told you that. 
47 Vuyo: Three, three of them. 
 
At the same time as apportioning blame to the farmers, Vuyo’s account addresses the 
‘dilemma of stake or interest: how to produce accounts which attend to interests without 
being undermined as interested’ (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p. 158).  As Wendy and Marco 
did, Vuyo accuses the farmers of using – in fact abusing – the Zimbabweans in the service of 
their illegitimate project, that is, to make money out of their workers: ‘every month, maybe 
fifteen thousand, they gain!’ (line 17-18).  Furthermore, in Vuyo’s account of how the 
Zimbabweans explained to him what the name of the work permit meant (probably ‘asylum’ 
or ‘aslam’ as it is known in De Doorns), farmers are shown to do this gaining by taking 
advantage of the Zimbabweans’ especially precarious position as immigrants: ‘When you 
come in South Africa as a Zimbabwean, you must shut up you must close your mouth, you 
don’t have complaints...So that’s why the white people make, they abuse the Zimbabweans.  
Because, they know they must close their mouth, they can’t complaining’ (line 37-41).  By 
making these scathing accusations of farmers and showing concern for the way they take 
advantage of the Zimbabweans, Vuyo’s account also pre-empts accounts we heard from 
farmers, who accused the labour brokers of doing exactly the same thing: cheating workers 
out of their full pay (extract 1), using Zimbabweans as a tool by which to ‘manipulate’ the 
market (extracts 2 and 3) and ‘push the wage’ (extract 1), in the service of an agenda which 
was first and foremost ‘all about money’ (extract 1).  We had already established near the 
beginning of this interview that this speaker was a labour broker, but after that he barely 
mentioned his role as a broker and largely identified with other South African farm workers.  
An obvious alternative reason why Vuyo might be concerned about Zimbabweans getting 
jobs before South Africans is because brokers largely brokered for people of their own group 
(Xhosas, Zimbabweans, Sothos and coloureds – Misago, 2009) and since farmers were 
starting to prefer Zimbabwean brokers and workers (Misago, 2009), it may be that Vuyo’s 
job was on the line.  His accusations of farmer abuse and exploitation can be read as 
deflecting this interpretation of his concern.  Someone who shows that they are this 
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concerned about exploitation is presumably unlikely to be doing it himself.  Furthermore, 
citing three Zimbabweans who told him about how farmers treat them is another way of 
‘resisting attempts, both actual and potential, to undermine *this account+ as false, partial or 
interested’ (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p. 164).  If it came from three Zimbabweans 
themselves, then (a) it demonstrates that he is friends with Zimbabweans to the extent that 
they would confide in him with something like this – deflecting the possibility that he is 
‘xenophobic’ – and (b) it is likely to be a credible version of the relationship between 
farmers and Zimbabweans and not merely one that he made up to serve his own agenda.  It 
is difficult to rebut this version because to do so would amount to accusing him or the three 
Zimbabweans of lying.  In the final lines Vuyo successfully co-opted my support for his 
version by saying ‘you see,’ to which I responded with a sympathetic ‘↓ja:::’ (lines 43-44).  
Ultimately, this thorough account of how farmers manage to make money out of their 
Zimbabwean workers (by referencing the Zimbabweans’ precarious position) provides a 
plausible explanation of Vuyo’s initial description of how a team made up of workers of 
several different nationalities and groups is eventually replaced by Zimbabweans only (lines 
1-6).  
So far, all these extracts which dealt with the displacement of South Africans by 
Zimbabweans have depended upon a construction of the relationship between 
Zimbabweans and farmers as in some way exploitative or unfair, involving accusations of 
low pay, or cheating, exploitation or abuse.  The farmers were construed as the main 
exercisers of agency in this uneven relationship, but directing action towards the 
Zimbabweans was construed as an obvious way of trying to fix this state of affairs (‘people 
should go back to their countries’, ‘we don’t want them here’, ‘that’s why we chase them 
away’).  In the next section, a similar farmer-Zimbabwean relationship is invoked, but here, 
the consequence for South Africans is that their bargaining power is undermined.  
Part 2B: the Zimbabwean-farmer relationship undermines South Africans’ 
bargaining power 
Extract 12: Black South African labour broker (Interview 2) 
1  Philippa:  Um, so, can you tell us, in Afrikaans or Engels or Xhosa ((small laugh)), uh,  
2   what-, what do you think, like what do you think about this stuff that  
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3  happened, why did it happen, who was invo:lved, and what do you think? (.) 
4  Ja 
5  Vuyo:  (.) uh can I start? 
6  Philippa:  (.) Ja 
7 Vuyo: ((conversation changes to Afrikaans)) Okay, (can I) speak Afrikaans?= 
8 Philippa: =ja= 
9 Gina: =ja 
10 Philippa: that’s fine 
11 Vuyo: I also feel very sorry fo:r, the people s- from Zimbabwe who now have to live 
12  there, u:h, and the reason why it happened, u:h, is because they never stood 
13  with us.= 
14 Philippa: =a:[:h 
15 Vuyo:       [if we, if we as South Africans have problems here in, in De Doorns, then, 
16  then they never, stood with us. So, that’s why the, the the the commu:nity  
17  decided, there must be further steps taken.  Uh, also so that people can lead 
18  our [lives].  
19 Philippa:        [ka::y] 
20 Gina: Um, tell me you say, um, they never stood with you in the past.  
21 Vuyo: mm= 
22 Gina: =with the problems.  What kinds of problems have you had in the past. 
23 Vuyo: Like I say, we are farm workers here in De Doorns, we all agree whenever  
24  prices need to be raised.  Well, true, the state also raises its prices.  But we  
25  felt, if we as, um, workers ((wind blowing – 9 seconds inaudible)) 
26 Gina:  mm 
27 Vuyo: But now that- at the end of the day if we go there, then then they d- they  
28  won’t stand together with us, farm workers, when we go to the farms and 
29  go talk to the people to hear whether they can’t give us a raise. 
30 Philippa: okay, I think I understood that= 
31 Gina: =Are you, are you a farm worker? 
32 Vuyo:  No, not here. I’m a contractor. 
33 Gina: Oh are you? 
34 Vuyo: (ja) 
 
Two features of this labour broker’s explanation of why the violence happened are 
highlighted.  Firstly, though he did not use the word, the fact that Zimbabweans ‘never 
stood with us’ invokes a sweetened or softened version of the discourse of igundane, the 
‘rat’ or scab who is a sell-out and undermines bargaining processes or even, at a broader 
level, the liberation struggle (Dlamini, 2010).  This soft invocation of the ‘igundane’ trope is 
given in such a way as to present the perpetrators of violence in the best, most reasonable 
light and to deflect a possible accusation that they (and Vuyo, the speaker) were 
‘xenophobic’ or otherwise on morally shaky ground.  Vuyo prefaces his explanation for why 
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it happened by saying how sorry he also feels for the people from Zimbabwe who now have 
to live in the camp (lines 11-12).  By saying he ‘also’ feels sorry for them he constructs a 
rhetorical context, invoking a stance taken by people other than himself who feel sorry for 
them as well, to which he is adding his voice.  This other group may have been us, the white 
interviewers, whom he assumed to be on the side of the Zimbabweans; or farmers, who had 
already made a display of what could be ‘feeling sorry’ for the Zimbabweans by having them 
to stay on their farms.  In this way Vuyo assures us that he is on our side and that the 
explanation he is about to give us for why the Zimbabweans were chased away did not 
come from malicious intent. With this preamble, the explanation which follows can even be 
read as an expression of regret over an unpleasant but necessary circumstance: ‘I also feel 
very sorry fo:r, the people s- from Zimbabwe who now have to live there, u:h, and the 
reason why it happened, u:h, is because they never stood with us’ (lines 11-13).  Vuyo also 
manages to present the process of wage bargaining not as a racially charged and violent 
power struggle (as the farmers did, calling it ‘manipulation’) but as a mild event in which 
workers would ‘go to the farms to go and talk to the people and listen whether they 
couldn’t give us a raise’ (lines 29-32).  Presenting this as such a gentle and polite process 
then serves to render questionable why the Zimbabweans would not want to join in this 
process.  This is left to the listeners to conclude for themselves.  The answer which was 
ready to hand in De Doorns, and which we have already seen was circulating widely, was 
that it suited the Zimbabweans to accept less than the minimum wage and therefore they 
had no interest in taking a firm stance against the farmers.  In this way Vuyo constructs the 
honest South African workers as having the moral high ground vis-a-vis the Zimbabweans 
who would not show solidarity by standing with them.  
The second important feature of the extract is the way Vuyo presents the violence as a 
community response to the Zimbabweans’ failure to show solidarity with South African farm 
labourers: ‘that’s why the, the the commu:nity decided further steps needed to be taken’ 
(lines 16-18) and again ‘we felt, as, um, community...’ (line 26).  This is in direct contrast to 
the way farmers presented the violence in Part 1, as ‘not a whole community thing’, the 
result of a criminal element minority exerting power over the rest of the community and 
intimidating them into doing what they wanted.  Vuyo himself identifies with South African 
farm workers, and in doing so he completely edits out the role of labour brokers as a 
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separate group of instigators in the violence.  All the way through this account, he identifies 
with South African farm-workers: ‘they never stood with us’ (lines 12-13 and again in 16); 
‘we as South Africans’ (line 15); ‘like I say, we are farm workers here in De Doorns, we all 
agree when prices must be raised’ (lines 23-25).  By speaking as one of the workers, he can 
present the violence as a response to a legitimate or genuine community grievance, as 
opposed to a matter of the acts of a few greedy or criminal labour brokers for their own 
gain, accusations we heard in the literature as well as in the farmers’ explanations.  The 
editing out of labour brokers turned out to have been highly strategic when Gina asked him 
if he himself was a farm worker (line 34) and he replied that he was actually a ‘kontrakteur’ 
(contractor or labour broker, line 35).   
The extract constitutes a deviant case in the sense that the emphasis is on Zimbabweans’ 
actions, or failure to act, and not on the role of farmers, who were barely mentioned except 
as people to go and talk to and ‘listen whether they can’t give us a raise’.  Later on in the 
interview, however, Vuyo went on to say that in fact it was not the Zimbabweans but the 
white people who were the main problem in De Doorns. One of these extracts (extract 11) 
has already been examined above. The other is examined below.  
Extract 13: South African labour broker (interview 2) 
1 Vuyo: But uh, I’m asking, so, I’m thinking that why the Zimbabweans don’t want to 
2  go back to Zimbabwe, you see. If they can go back, I think, the problem will  
3  be getting solved here. 
4 Philippa:  you do 
5 Vuyo:  I think so. Because now, uh, the farmers use, white- ag they use uh, uh   
6  Zimbabweans against us. Zimbabweans now, it’s like a remote controller 
7 Philippa:  ((smiling)) ja 
8 Vuyo:  you see, so, ‘if you don’t do that, we have people to do that’. *You see+  
9 Philippa:                                                                                                                      [oka:::   ]y 
10 Vuyo   ((forcefully)): But if they are gone, they [(       ) 
11 Philippa:                                                               [they have no other, bargaining 
12  [tool 
13 Vuyo:  [Ye::s. Because, because here they they they, the grapes must be  
14  getting ripe, they must fix everything,  
15 Philippa:  mm  
16 Vuyo:  for, Januar-, January, the grapes will be ripe and then they must,  
17 Philippa:  okay 
18 Vuyo:  you see, so now, they know, ‘ayi, if they don’t want to go- to come to job,  
19  I take my truck, go the play[ground,] fifty Zimbabweans ((clicks fingers once))  
20 Philippa:                                                      [ja          ] 
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21 Vuyo:  my job is finished.  So now, they, they, they abuse, they abuse the   
22  Zimbabweans against us, you see. The problem is not the Zimbabweans the 
23  problem is the white people. 
24 Philippa:  ah haa, okay 
25 Vuyo:  So they they are not the problem the problem is the white people. 
26 Philippa:  okay= 
27 Vuyo:  =Because they they abuse the (the the Zimbabweans against us.)  
 
Here Vuyo provides the perspective of someone at the other end of the bargaining table on 
the same issues that were raised by farmers in Part 1, that is, the way labour brokers 
‘manipulated’ the market to get what they wanted.  As the farmers did for themselves in 
their versions, Vuyo construes the part of brokers (his own group) in creating ‘the market’ as 
hardly even being actions; whereas the actions of farmers he construes not only as agentic 
but as deeply morally problematic.  It is farmers who say, ‘if you don’t do that, we have 
people to do that’ (line 8); who can go to the camp and hire Zimbabweans instead (line 18-
20); who use the Zimbabweans ‘like a remote controller’ (line 6); and finally who ‘abuse the 
Zimbabweans against us’ (line 21-22 and 26-27).  Labour brokers and South African workers 
do not actually do anything in this extract.  All three farmers quoted previously argued that 
the labour brokers were manipulating the market by trying to chase out the Zimbabweans 
(extracts 1, 2 and 3) and playing one farmer off against the other (extracts 2 and 3).  Here, 
Vuyo accuses the farmers of doing exactly the same thing: playing off one group of workers 
(South Africans) against another (Zimbabweans).  In fact, the acts he describes could be 
seen as perfectly normal: if South African workers will not come to work, the farmers can go 
to the camp on the sports field (‘playground’) and hire Zimbabweans instead.  (The farmers 
did not mention this fetching of Zimbabweans from the field, presumably because they did 
not see the need to account for their own actions.)  In Vuyo’s account, the labour brokers do 
not feature in the explanation, while the farmers’ action of fetching Zimbabweans from the 
camp is construed as ‘abusing the Zimbabweans against us’ (line 21-22).  As Wendy and 
Marco also did, Vuyo thus constructs the farmers as the primary trouble-causers: ‘The 
problem is not the Zimbabweans the problem is the white people’ (lines 22-23 and 25).  
The next extract is from an interview with an elderly Xhosa-speaking man living in De 
Doorns Oos: 




1 Philippa:  do you think, like people call, people said this is xenophobia, and other   
2  people said it’s not xenophobia. What do you think? 
3 Old man:  This this is not a xenophobia because it’s a negotiations. 
4 Philippa:  Okay ((laughing slightly)) 
5 Old man:  yes 
 
The opening question here was posed after hearing farmers argue for why the violence was 
not xenophobia. This man also agreed that it was not xenophobia.  By ‘negotiation’ I 
understood him to mean a form of wage bargaining with farmers.  Farmers argued that it 
was not xenophobia because it was a fundamentally about jobs, wages, (bargaining) power 
and ‘the market’.  As Vuyo’s account did in the previous extract, then, this man’s 
construction of the violence as ‘negotiation’ instead of xenophobia provides the point of 
view of someone on the other side of the bargaining table to the farmers on the same issue.  
‘Negotiation’ is a venerable word, however, much more respectable than ‘manipulation’ 
(extract 2) or a ‘power struggle’ (extract 1) or ‘rabble-rousing’ (extract 3) which is how 
farmers construed it.  Also, ‘negotiation’ locates it as part of a historical and political 
struggle.  This extract and also the labour broker’s account above can be read as examples 
of what the PASSOP leader referred to in Chapter 1 as ‘trying to make it a racial battle and a 
historic battle instead of an issue of greed in a small community and political gain’.  
 
Extract 15: Group of black South Africans in Stofland (interview 27) 
1 Philippa:  So do you think, do you think the farmers have changed? Is there, is there a  
2  difference between these farmers, and, fifteen years ago? 
3  ... 
4 Dawid: >How can I say<, there are some of them from that time who (   ), they are  
5  still here.  
6 Philippa:  okay= 
7 Dawid:  =ja. But the other bunch is also, there’s a big difference (    ) >how can I say<, 
8  between them, but the (    ) worked under their parents. 
9 Philippa:  okay. How can you, can you describe this difference? 
10 Dawid:  The difference is that today they take those people, né,=  
11 Philippa: =okay= 
12 Dawid:  =Ja, and pay those people under the belt. 
13 Philippa:  okay. 
14 Dawid: ja 
15 Philippa: okay 
16 Dawid: If we ask for so much money, then they say we are too expensive 
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17 Philippa:  hyewh:= 
19 Dawid: =ja, we are too expensive, they say.  
20  (.)  
21 Philippa: mhh 
  ... 
22 Dawid: They must, they, they must now take us and give us jobs.  
23  (.) 
24 Philippa: .hh °ja:° hh (.) 
 
In this extract Dawid touches on both issues that have been raised in Part 2: displacement 
and the undermining of South Africans’ bargaining power.  The question about whether the 
farmers had changed over the last 15 years was asked in the context of our earlier 
discussion about the dopstelsel (extract 8). The difference, says Dawid, is that now ‘they 
take those people’ (Zimbabweans) and ‘pay them under the belt’ (onder die belt).  I am not 
exactly sure what ‘under the belt’ means but I assume that it means that farmers pay 
Zimbabweans in a way which is ‘shady’ – implying low wages, but also through dishonesty or 
processes which are not above board.  The consequence of these shady dealings for South 
Africans is that now ‘they say we are too expensive’ (line 16). Dawid is being ironic when he 
repeats ‘ja, we are too expensive, they say’ (line 19).  This is shown once again to be a kick in 
the teeth for South Africans because such a conclusion (South Africans being too expensive) 
is not even based on proper open bargaining processes and adherence to the minimum 
wage.  If it were, South Africans’ requests for ‘so much money’ might be construed as too 
high, but at least honestly or reasonably so.  But if the farmers have been paying the 
Zimbabweans ‘under the belt’ then the likelihood is that in fact the South Africans’ demands 
are entirely reasonable and it is the farmers who are ‘screwing them over’, rather than the 
South Africans who are being unreasonable. Dawid concluded this discussion with a demand 
that ‘they must now take us and give us jobs’ (line 22).   
Extract 16: Elderly black man in De Doorns Oos (Interview 5) 
1  Philippa:  What do you think can be, can be done [from now on?] 
2  Old man:                                                                             [can be done   ] Ja. Maybe yes. 
3    Those who have permission to stay, they must be employed,  
4  Philippa:  okay, 
5  Old man:  but, the farmers must follow the law. [Labour] law                              
6  Philippa:                     [Ja         ]            
7  Philippa:  ja ja ja of mini[mum wage] you mean?= 
8  Old man:               [they mu-    ]   
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9  Old man:  =Ja they must not cause, they must not violating the democracy of this  
10           country. 
11 Philippa:  Okay, 
12 Old man:  Farmers, by so doing, cla- uh causing clash among the people, Africans, they  
13   are, violating the democracy of this country. 
14 Philippa:  °okay.° So you’re saying they *cau-  ja     ] 
15 Old man:                                                         [ We don’t] want blood among our children   
16   [we are] (charitising) our children here. (.) °What was your question?°  
17 Philippa:     [  ja:      ] 
18 Philippa:   Um when you say they,...((1 line omitted)) when you say they um, they’re  
19  violating democracy and they, causing troubles between, Africans are you  
20  saying because they pay people low-, they pay some people lower wages  
21  than others? How are they doing it=                            
22 Old man:   =Yes I can explain eh [by say]ing [vio]lating the democracy [of] this country,   
23 Philippa:                                           [ja        ]       [ja  ]                                       [ja] 
24 Old man:   e::m, paying, people, Africans, as a subworker, you are violating the country, 
25  eh, the the the democracy. Because, you are sending back where we come 
26  from. 
27 Philippa:  °O::h° hh 
28 Old man:  >You see?<= 
29 Philippa:  =Okay. You’re going back to, u- to how it was before? you mean 
30 Old man:  The oppression was signed not to be done again here in this [land here] 
31 Philippa:                                                  [Okay       ] okay. 
32 Old man:  Now, cla- causing clash among the people=  
33 Philippa:  =Ja, 
34 Old man:  of this country 
35 Philippa:  Ja, 
36  Old man:  you are violating the democracy of this country 
37  Philippa:  Okay but what I want to know is, how are they causing this clash? 
38 Old man:  by causing this clash,= 
39 Philippa:  =Ja, 
40 Old man:  people of De Doorns were complaining= 
41 Philippa:  =Ja 
42 Old man:  that farmers are employing only Zimbabwean people because they need,   
43  lesser [Philippa: okay] less money  
 
 
This speaker produces an extended version of the ‘racial’ and ‘historic’ narrative with which 
the violence was justified.  Again it is farmers who are the primary agents in the town’s 
troubles: they are ‘causing clash amongst the people, Africans’ (line 12).  This is followed by 
an assertion from the old man that ‘we don’t want blood among our children’ (line 15). The 
implication here seems to be that if there is bloodshed then this will have been the fault of 
the farmers, who caused the clash initially, rather than of the people who actually carried 
out the violence.  This is in contrast to the farmers and PASSOP members who laid 
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responsibility squarely with the people who planned, instigated and incited the violence, 
which farmers had nothing to do with.  Secondly, and most importantly, is the way this 
speaker construes the farmers’ not following the law.  This is described as ‘violating the 
democracy of this country’ (lines 9-10, 24-25 and 36) and as ‘sending *us+ back where we 
come from’ (line 25-26).  He goes on to say that ‘the oppression was signed not to be done 
again here in this land’ (line 30).  Thus the speaker construes the farmers’ present-day 
actions as reviving the oppression of the apartheid era.  This will prove to be the crucial 
difference between how members of the South African labouring community, quoted in this 
section, and farmers in Part 4 below, construed the hiring of Zimbabwean and South African 
labourers.  We shall see that for farmers, the issues about the payment of low wages were 
mere technicalities or else simply rumours which had been spread on purpose, which they 
were easily able to rebut.  For this man, however, farmers’ dealings with their South African 
and Zimbabwean workers are an extremely highly politicised issue. (We did not find out 
what this man’s occupation was – doing so may have helped to explain his stance on the 
violence.)  
 
In the extracts in this section we have seen how the farmers, rather than Zimbabweans, 
were construed as the main agents in their relationship and also the main cause of the bad 
consequences this relationship had for South Africans. This gives an alternative view of 
farmers to the one we saw them give of themselves in Part 1.  Their part in the processes 
that could have led to violence was construed as non-actions because their explanations 
depended on the workings of ‘the market’ – an entity presented as (a) not in need of 
particular explanation and (b) independent of themselves – and thereby their agency was 
edited out of these processes.  The accounts given in this section, by contrast, construct 
their role in De Doorns as agents. Also, they construe farmers’ preference for Zimbabweans 
as a morally and politically loaded matter.  Farmers’ paying Zimbabweans less than they 
would have had to pay South Africans was construed as ‘cheating’ them, as ‘abusing the 
Zimbabweans against us’, as an example of farmers’ hypocrisy, as a way by which they had 
‘screwed over’ the South African labouring community or ‘kicked them in the teeth’ (my 
terms), as violating the democracy of this country and as reviving the oppression of the 
apartheid days.  Also, farmers construed the violence as most definitely not a community or 
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popular project. By contrast, Vuyo the labour broker construed it as very much a community 
initiative and thus legitimated it.   
Part 2C: Deviant cases from South African workers who did not support the 
eviction 
There were, however, also farm workers who did not agree with the allegations against the 
Zimbabweans, who did not support the effort to evict them, and who said that on the farms 
where they worked everyone was being paid the same wage.  Some of these views are 
presented below.  
Extract 17: Elderly woman living on a farm (interview 35, translated from Afrikaans) 
1 Gina: What- how do you feel about the fact that they are sitting in the tents and that? 
2 Ina:  I also feel sorry for them, because I (        ) because it can happen to us as well,  
3 because we are all people.  Now, because, the majority of the others want them out 
4 of South Africa, so they can return to their places. 
5 Gina: Do you think, uhm- who do you think are the people who want them to get out? 
6 Ina:  Because they don’t want to- majority of the Bantus doesn’t want the Zimbabweans  
7 in Stofland.  That’s why they’re carrying on like that. 
8 Gina: Why do you think they don’t want them there? 
9 Ina: Because they say that the Zimbabweans are taking our money here.  But it’s not like 
10 that. 
   
Extract 18: Young coloured man (interview 17, translated from Afrikaans) 
1 Piet:  Like I heard once there in the meeting, I heard them, just so out of my mouth, I  
2 heard another girl saying, that the farmers  are paying the Zimbabweans R50.  And  
3 that’s what I don’t believe. 
4 Gina: You don’t believe it? 
5 Piet:  I don’t believe it.  Because another lady told me, our farm people and the  
6 Zimbabweans are paid the same.  If I get paid R400 ((a week)), then he gets paid  
7 R400.  He can’t get paid R50 more than me, or less than me.  He gets paid the same  
8 money that I get paid. (.) 
9 Gina: You think it’s just a story? 
10 Piet: It’s a story. That they are making up. 
11 Gina: Why are they making up this story? 
12 Piet: Because they want the people out, out of our country.  That’s why. 
13 Gina: What do you think, what do you think will happen now? What do you think? 
14 Piet: They still want the people to be gone, I can’t say anything. 
15 Gina: Mm.  You are sad about your friends? 
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16 Piet: Yes, all my friends who I’ve met, yes. (.) I actually broke my heart for their parts. (.) 
17 Look, because they are also God’s children, why do they chase, why do they chase- 
18 we are one nation. They are also suffering. (.) We are one people.  
 
Extract 19: Two old women (interview 22, translated from Afrikaans)  
1 Gina: Mmm. (.) So the people- it’s just stories that are going around- are people talking  
2 like that, that they are asking too little money, or working for too little money? 
3 Sara: I don’t know! 
4 Mari: Uh-uh, we have (        ) 
5 Gina: You haven’t heard something like this? Mm  
6 Mari: Our people are saying so, who, who want them to go away. 
7 Gina: Who are ‘our people’?  
8 Mari: The coloureds here, and those who were born here, the Bantus.  They say that they  
9 are working for little money  
((5 lines omitted)) 
10 Gina: let’s say it is like that. Let’s say that they, they are working for less money.  Do you  
11 think it’s right? 
12 Mari: I don’t believe it.  Man, everyone is paying everyone through the bank. One price. 
 
There are two ways that these extracts constitute deviant cases. The first is that the 
speakers oppose trying to evict the Zimbabweans, either on moral grounds or on grounds of 
not believing the allegations that the Zimbabweans were working for low wages.  On moral 
grounds, Ina in extract 17 says that ‘I also feel sorry for them, because I (     ) because it can 
happen to us as well, because we are all people’.  In extract 18, Piet says ‘I actually broke my 
heart for their parts. (.) Look, because they are also God’s children, why do they chase, why 
do they chase- we are one nation. They are also suffering. We are one people’.  All the 
speakers also question or oppose the allegations of the Zimbabweans working for low 
wages. Ina also says, ‘they say that the Zimbabweans are taking our money here.  But it’s 
not like that’. Piet in extract 18 says that ‘I heard another girl saying, that the farmers are 
paying the Zimbabweans R50.  And that’s what I don’t believe...Because another lady told 
me, our farm people and the Zimbabweans are paid the same.  If I get paid R400, then he 
gets paid R400’. Finally, one of the two elderly ladies in extract 19 also says ‘I don’t believe 
it.  Man, everyone is paying everyone through the bank. One price’. In this way, it is clear 
that not every member of the South African farm worker community believed the 
accusations about low wages or was in support of trying to get the Zimbabweans to leave.  
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The second way that extracts 17 and 19 in particular constitute deviant cases is that the 
interviewer (Gina) asks the participants to spell out who exactly they think are making the 
accusations about the Zimbabweans working for low wages. One woman says it was the 
‘majority of the Bantus *who+ doesn’t want the Zimbabweans in Stofland’ (extract 17, line 
6), whereas the speaker in extract 19 says that it was ‘The coloureds here, and those who 
were born here, the Bantus’ (line 8).  Interestingly, neither of these speakers actually uses 
the designation ‘South Africans’, or makes reference to national identity, when describing 
who it was that wanted to make the Zimbabweans leave.  Rather, both refer to race groups 
instead – black and coloured people.  Thus, not only do these accounts oppose the evicting 
of the Zimbabweans; they also raise the question about the extent to which ‘South African’ 
is a meaningful identity category for farm workers in this context, and complicate the three-
group analysis presented so far.  While we have seen that there were certainly coloured 
people who supported the eviction (e.g. Wendy and Marco above), all the participants who 
opposed the eviction in our interviews were coloured (that is, there were no black 
interviewees who opposed the eviction, although the small sample sizes limit what 
inferences we can draw from this).  The two different accounts in extracts 17 and 19 above 
– the first claiming that it was the ‘majority of the Bantus *who+ doesn’t want the 
Zimbabweans in Stofland’ and the second claiming that it was both ‘the coloureds here, and 
those who were born here, the Bantus’ – suggests that residents themselves are not in 
absolute agreement about whether coloured and black South Africans were united in their 
opposition to the Zimbabweans.  This question of divisions and groups within the ‘South 
African’ work force will be addressed further in the 2012 follow-up case study below.  
In the next section, we hear how Zimbabwean participants constructed and responded to 
the accusations of low wages which were used to justify the attempt to expel them. 
Part 3: Zimbabweans’ responses to eviction rhetoric 
Even though farmers were construed as the main agents in the accounts in Part 2 above, it 
was the Zimbabweans who were the target of violence aimed at getting them to leave.  Like 
Misago (2009), several Zimbabweans we interviewed highlighted the role of the ward 
councillor in instigating the violence.  However, this will not be the focus here.  Rather, Part 
3 shows how Zimbabweans responded to the popular rhetoric which accompanied the 
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attempt to get rid of them – namely the accusations about taking South Africans’ jobs by 
accepting low wages – by reconstruing and then ‘neutralising’ them.  They did this by using 
commonly-circulating and crudely-expressed stereotypes of black and coloured South 
Africans as inferior (see also Singh, 2010), such as being uneducated, ignorant, often drunk 
and absent from work, dishonest, lazy, jealous and full of excuses for why they were losing 
jobs to Zimbabweans. By contrast, Zimbabweans presented themselves as reliable, 
educated and hardworking. Importantly, in almost every case it was the farmers’ or the 
white people’s opinion of Zimbabweans which was invoked as confirmation of this 
favourable comparison.  Zimbabweans thus presented it as perfectly reasonable that 
farmers would want to employ them ahead of South Africans.  They acknowledged South 
Africans’ complaints, but ‘neutralised’ these by presenting them either as excuses, or as 
personal, psychologised responses born of jealousy, frustration or feeling left out (rather 
than, say, as meaningful critiques of the social basis of the farming system).  (To some 
extent, this ‘psychologised’ construction of South Africans’ responses to the three-way 
relationship between themselves, farmers, and Zimbabweans matches the way some South 
Africans themselves presented the effects of the Zimbabweans’ presence in Part 2.  
However, in this case it also works to counter the ‘politicised’ or historical version, in which 
Zimbabweans and farmers were presented as colluding or participating in an exploitative or 
suspect relationship, the effect of which was the unjust treatment of South African workers 
by farmers.)  Overall, then, the Zimbabweans showed that, far from having a legitimate 
grievance, South Africans really had only themselves to blame for whatever losses and 
problems they claimed to be experiencing in De Doorns.  
The first four extracts demonstrate this ‘neutralising’ of the accusations of low wages. 
Zimbabweans agreed that they were being employed ahead of South Africans, but denied 
that this was because they accepted lower wages. The next three deal more directly with 
relationships between Zimbabweans and farmers.   
Extract 17: Zimbabwean man (interview 13) 
1 Tinashe:  those were, real xenophobic attacks.  
2 Philippa:  ↓ja::: 
3 Tinashe:  And they say they don’t like us. Why? Because they saying, since two   
4  thousand and, eh six, two thousand and seven, when::: many Zimbabweans  
5  eh started to come in Stofland,=  
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6 Philippa:  =ja,= 
7 Tinashe:  =they say that the money didn’t go up. 
8 Philippa:  Which money. 
9 Tinashe:  From the farms. 
10 Philippa: okay.  
11 Tinashe:  And they are saying we are the ones who are causing that, even the prices  
12  from the town, they are saying we are the ones Zimbabweans who used to  
13  stock so many things like, to buy bulk,  
14 Philippa:  so that, the prices go up. 
15 Tinashe:  That is what they say.  
16 Philippa:  Do you think it’s true? 
17 Tinashe:  It’s not true.  
18 Philippa:  okay  
19 Tinashe:  Because they don’t know the definition of inflation. 
20 Philippa:  ((laughing)) oka:::y 
21 Tinashe:  they don’t know!= 
22 Philippa:  =okay 
23 Tinashe:  you see.  
24 Philippa:  So they *think it’s you guys+, meanwhile it’s just *inflation. + 
25 Tinashe:                  [we know,               ]                  [Especially] f::rom, the   
26  experience of what happened in our country. (Philippa: mm) we know when 
27  things are like this, things will be like this. (Philippa: m) Like right now, if   
28  you::, you have a thousand Rand in your pocket, you ↑can’t buy, ten, ten  
29  plastic ↓bags from Shoprite full of, w-, groceries. It’s no longer like that.= 
30 Philippa:  =°ja.°  
31 Tinashe:  It is inflation.  But they don’t know they say=  
32 Philippa:  =o[ka:::y      ]   
33 Tinashe:           *‘you are+ the Zimbabweans who are causing this.’ (Philippa: okay.) That is 
34  why they chase us there by the location.  
35 Philippa:  oka::y. 
36 Tinashe:  you see? 
37 Philippa:  ja ja ja 
38 Tinashe:  But the main reason,  
39 Philippa:  ja 
40 Tinashe: they don’t want to work for themselves. They are lazy.  
41 Philippa:  ((whispered)) Hyew 
42 Tinashe:  So, we are hard workers,  
43 Philippa:  mm 
44 Tinashe: they say that we are working for (sick) money.  
45 Philippa:  For what money?  
46 Tinashe:  (.) fo:r cheap labour.= 
47 Philippa:  =Oh oh. [Oh]  
48 Tinashe:                  [Ja  ] cheap labour. They, [they]  
49 Philippa:                                     *ja     + that’s what we hear a lot. 
50 Tinashe:  There is nothing like that.= 
51 Philippa:  =↓ja 
52 Tinashe:  I’m telling you I’ve been here, since, two thousand and five December. When 
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53  I come here, in::, two thousand and five, they were getting paid forty-five  
54  Rands. Per day. By that time. And then by, two:: thousand, and, six, season:: 
55  starting from October, they started to get paid fifty-five, fifty-two Rand. Right 
56  now the (gazetted) which I know, it is about fifty-five Rands.  So, that sixty  
57  Rand, which we are getting from these white people, it’s their own, wish to 
58  put, five Rand up. (Philippa: ja) So that it will be sixty. But there are some  
59  who are still giving their workers fifty-five Rand.  
60 Philippa:  oka::[:y 
61 Tinashe:               [But, there is no Zimbabwean, who has been working for forty Rand= 
62 Philippa:  =↓ja= 
63 Tinashe:  =here.  
 
Extract 18: Zimbabwean women (interview 18) 
1 Philippa:  okay the the r- the common thing that we hear is that, South Africans are  
2  jealous of Zimbabweans?  [Is that t-  ] 
3 Thelma:                                                        [ye::::::s                                             yes           ] 
4 Margaret:                                                    [[Ye:s        ] The the most important thing is] that  
5  Zimbabweans are very hardworking people you know. So when we we came 
6  here it was, we came here just because our economy was not right  
7  *in Zimbabwe+ that’s why we came here in d- in thousands.   
8 Philippa:       [    Ja   ja   ja   ] 
9 Thelma:  m hm 
10 Margaret:  You know, so when the when we came here the, the white people, they liked 
11  us so much. More than, the South Africans. So, the South Africans were   
12  jealous that maybe we are mm, e::h, we are taking their jobs, 
13 Philippa:  ja 
15 Margaret:  we are being offered less money than they were being offered before we  
16  came.  But that’s not the case. 
17 Philippa:  mm 
18 Margaret:  We are we are being offered the same amount of money. But the thing is  
19  that when they paid on Friday eh Saturday, Sunday they get drunk. [Monday]  
20 Philippa:           ((whispered)) [hyew     ] 
21 Margaret: they don’t go to work. 
22 Philippa:  Okay ((laughing)) 
23 Margaret:  Tuesday they don’t go to *work.+           
24 Thelma:                                                    [Ja      ] They [don’t go to (      )+  
25 Margaret:                      [They only go to ] work on Wednesday 
26  and Thursday and Friday. 
27 Philippa:  Okay 
28 Margaret:  So the white people don’t like them because of that they are lazy. So the the 
29  the job there, it i- no one would be working just because they, they would be 
30  sleeping at home they say they’ve got babalaas ((a hangover)). 
 
Extract 19: Young Zimbabwean man (interview 12) 
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1 Philippa:   So do you think it’s, do you think (.) most people don’t like Zimbabweans or  
2  only a few  
3 Farai:  a:h it’s only few, those young guys *especially+ (.) eh, school boys  
4 Philippa:                            [okay         ]     
5 Philippa:  okay 
6 Farai:  Mm. Mm mm, some of the old mm, old people they say, we must stay with  
7  them (.) but [eh ]  
8 Philippa:             [oh!] ja, 
9 Farai:  the young ones they say ‘we don’t like them because we, all the  
10  Zimbabweans we are used to go to work, we we are eh not even employed.’  
11  [Because,] eh some of the white men say those people they are used to,  
12 Philippa:  [a::h          ]  
13 Farai:  drunk, 
14 Philippa:  mm  
15 Farai:  on Monday they don’t come to work,  
16 Philippa:   ja,  
17 Farai:  Tuesday they just work for only two days or three days per week=  
18 Philippa:  =okay   
19 Farai:  mm 
 
Extract 20: Zimbabwean man (interview 7) 
1 Tendai:   (Worse still) now it’s like, eh, e- even Zimbabwean people we are also getting 
2  I mean, that opportunity of being labour brokers,  
3 Philippa:  Okay  
4 Tendai:  you see.  
5 Philippa:  okay,  
6 Tendai:  So, eh, if I’m a labour broker the first preference if I’m recruiting people to  
7  work here I take Zimbabweans. (Philippa: Okay)  You see, leaving out the   
8  local people. You see.  And eh, because, I mean by by virtue of I don’t know  
9  why but, a Zimbabwean I can tell you they are very hard-working. (Philippa: 
10  Ja) So if you are a farmer today, you are c- you you have this contract I mean 
11  which is, (mainly) consists of Zimbabweans, .hh they work very hard. The next 
12  thing is you’re going to tell the other farmer. Now if that farmer is contracting 
13  a coloured guy who is bringing in coloured people or a Xhosa person who is 
14  bringing in Xhosa people, .hh now the next thing he doesn’t like that person. 
15 Philippa:  ah  
16 Tendai: He’s looking again for another Zimbabwean.  
17 Philippa:  Okay 
18 Tendai: So, that was where the the whole s- thing st- started.  
19 Philippa:  Okay 
20 Tendai: So it was the first preference especially this season, it was us Zimbabweans 
21  who were getting spe-, I mean the the the preference of getting [the jobs.] 
22 Philippa:                        [Oka:::y  ]  
23  okay okay [okay        ] 
24 Tendai:          [you see?]  
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25 Philippa:  ja 
26 Tendai:  So these people they end up getting frustrated. 
 
Three aspects of these pieces of conversation are highlighted. Firstly, they all make use of 
pejorative stereotypes of South Africans as jealous, lazy, ignorant, or unreliable because of 
drunkenness, which serve as explanations for their bad behaviour. In extract 17, Tinashe 
provides two reasons that South Africans gave for trying to chase Zimbabweans away and 
then writes them off as emanating from such ignorance and laziness.  The first reason, that 
Zimbabweans make shop prices rise, he explains away as ‘they don’t know the definition of 
inflation’ (line 19 – unlike the relatively knowledgeable Zimbabweans who do understand 
this ‘f::rom the experience of what happened in our country’).  The other main reason, 
which is that ‘they say we are working for (sick) money...for, cheap labour,’ he writes off as 
an excuse for their own laziness: ‘they don’t want to work for themselves. They are lazy...so, 
we are hard workers,...they say we are working for (sick) money’ (lines 38-44).   
Similar stereotypes are present in extract 18. I (the interviewer) suggested that South 
Africans were jealous of Zimbabweans. Margaret agreed and offered a reason for this 
jealousy: ‘Zimbabweans are very hardworking people...so the white people, they liked us so 
much.  More than, the South Africans.  So, the South Africans were jealous that maybe we 
are mm, e::h, we are taking their jobs,...we are being offered less money than they were 
being offered before we came’ (lines 10-16).  However, like Tinashe, she deals with this by 
showing that such feelings can be traced to South Africans’ own shortcomings: ‘but that’s 
not the case.  We are being offered the same amount of money. But the thing is that when 
they paid on Friday eh Saturday, Sunday they get drunk. Monday...they don’t go to work’ 
(lines 16-21).  Exactly the same stereotype is offered by Farai in extract 19: ‘some of the 
white men say those people they are used to... drunk...on Monday they don’t come to 
work...they just work for only two days or three days per week’ (lines 9-17).  The recycling of 
such stereotypes of unreliable South Africans serves to show that the origin of their 
problems is within themselves (rather than being a structural problem). 
Out of all the interviews, there was just one instance when a Zimbabwean explained South 
Africans’ problems and complaints as having their origins in structural issues outside of 
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themselves.  This was Tendai, the speaker in interview 20.  It is not quoted here, but he 
acknowledged that South Africans had also become ‘frustrated’ because the influx of large 
numbers of Zimbabweans into the informal settlement had ‘more or less suffocated’ these 
settlements, including the already barely-existent health and sewage systems.  Notably, 
however, this exception did not have anything to do with relationships with farmers either.   
A second and related feature of these accounts is that they psychologise the responses of 
South Africans who feel left out and whose responses thus emanate from feelings of 
exclusion or jealousy.  We have already seen how Margaret, Thelma and I called South 
Africans ‘jealous’ in extract 18.  Farai’s construction of ‘the young ones *who+ say “we don’t 
like them because we, all the Zimbabweans we are used to go to work, we we are not even 
employed”’ (extract 19 lines 9-10) resembles the excluded and envious state described by 
Margaret and Thelma.  Similarly, in the fourth extract Tendai constructs the psychology of 
the left-out South Africans: ‘these people end up getting frustrated’ (extract 20, line 26).  
This psychologising of the South Africans’ responses serves to take the sting out of the 
accusations by depoliticising them.  
A third aspect of these extracts is that it is the white people’s or farmers’ opinion which is 
invoked as the standard by which the inferiority of South Africans and the superiority of 
Zimbabweans is confirmed.  Margaret and Thelma state that Zimbabweans are very hard-
working and that ‘when we came here, the white people liked us so much. More than, the 
South Africans’ (extract 18 lines 10-11).  Farai also says that ‘some of the white men say 
those people they are used to, drunk’ (extract 19 lines 11-13, emphasis added).  In extract 
20, Tendai argues that ‘the whole thing started’ because farmers preferred to use 
contractors who contract Zimbabwean workers, rather than ‘the local people’ (lines 6-18).  
(Interestingly, his account in lines 10-14 of how farmers who have had good experiences of 
working with Zimbabweans will gradually stop using coloureds and Xhosas matches with 
Vuyo’s account of this same process in extract  11 above). Finally, Tinashe in extract 17 
shows that ‘that R60 which we are getting from these white people, it’s their own wish, to 
put R5 up, so that it will be sixty’ (extract 17 line 57-58).  In all these cases it is the white 
people’s opinion or action which is presented as the final word by which Zimbabweans can 
confirm their own superiority.  This opinion is also the point on which intergroup relations 
turn in all extracts except extract 17, where Tinashe explained that South Africans were 
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ignorant of inflation, and did not understand that this is why shop prices rise.  This is a 
deviant case as it did not have anything to do with farmers’ opinions.  
In extract 17, Tinashe goes further than blaming South Africans for their own exclusion. He 
actually turns the allegation of low wages on its head to imply that if South Africans are not 
getting the wages they want perhaps this is their own fault.  First, he constructs a history of 
wages since he first arrived in 2005, which has the weight of personal experience behind it: 
‘I’m telling you I’ve been here, since, 2005 December’ (line 52).  This was before the time 
when South Africans began to say that wages were not going up – 2006 or 2007 (lines 3-4).  
Then, he shows that they did go up between the time he arrived, when the wage was about 
R45 per day (line 53), and the time when these accusations began, when they were at R55 
or R52. Now, he says, ‘these white people’ are actually paying Zimbabweans at R5 more 
than the minimum wage: ‘that sixty Rand, which we are getting from these white people, 
it’s their own, wish to put, five Rand up.’  This construction of the whites as wanting to pay 
Zimbabweans above the minimum wage, possibly without even being asked to, suggests 
that they do this simply because they like Zimbabweans; it is not thanks to the South 
Africans’ bargaining or negotiation efforts.  This undermines the whole argument that was 
given by Vuyo (the South African labour broker) in Part 2, whose problem with the 
Zimbabweans was that they would not stand with the South Africans in asking the farmers 
for a raise.  If farmers’ actions are not even determined by bargaining efforts, then Vuyo’s 
complaint is obsolete and loses its rhetorical weight.  
So far, in all these accounts, the tensions between Zimbabweans and South Africans have 
revolved primarily around their relationships with the farmers.  In the following three 
extracts we hear from Zimbabweans who were asked specifically about their relationships 
with the farmers.  A stereotypical positive relationship makes an appearance in all of them, 
but is also problematised.  
Extract 21: Zimbabwean labour broker (interview 19) 
1  Philippa:  I wanted to ask what’s your relationship with the farmers like? How do th-,  
2  how are things between you? 
3  (.) ((short pause)) 
4  Constance:  a, a good relationship.= 
5  Philippa:  =Okay= 
6  Constance:  =Ja. We have got a very good relationship with the farmers. 
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7  Philippa:  okay= 
8  Constance:  =ja  
9  (.)  
10  Philippa:  ((smiling)) hm, that’s all you have to say  
11 Constance: Ja ((laughs)) 
12 Philippa:  Okay ((laughing)) 
13 Constance: Ja:, the farmers we have got a very good relationship with the farmers,   
14  because eh if I give them people to work, (.) [they] will be happy. And, 
15 Philippa:                                                   [mm ]  
16 Constance: only the thing, they want an honest people. 
17 Philippa:  Mm:::                                                                          
18 Constance: If they pay you you must pay the people cor[rec]tly.= 
19 Philippa:                    [ja  ]        =ja ja ja 
20 Constance: ja  
 
This account from a Zimbabwean labour broker of the relationship between brokers and 
farmers could hardly be more of a contrast with the account given by Vuyo, the South 
African labour broker who was quoted in extracts 11 and 13 above.  In Vuyo’s account, 
farmers were ‘abusing the Zimbabweans against us’.  In this account, Zimbabwean brokers 
‘have got a very good relationship with the farmers’ (lines 6 and 13). Like the extracts 
discussed above, Constance also makes use of an implicit comparison between superior 
Zimbabweans and inferior South Africans: ‘And, only the thing, they want an honest 
people....If they pay you you must pay the people correctly’ (lines 15-18). This is a reference 
to the crooked South African contractors whom the farmers implicated in Part 1. They had 
become ‘persona non grata on farms’ for not paying the people correctly.  There is an 
implicit comparison here between the honest Zimbabweans, and the dishonest South 
Africans.  Also, once again, it is the farmers’ requirements which are invoked as the judge of 
Zimbabwean superiority: ‘they want an honest people’ (line 16, emphasis added). Hence, 
Zimbabwean superiority is equated with or operationalised as fulfilling what the farmers 
want.   
The next extract in this section demonstrates how the Zimbabwean women quoted above 
depoliticised their relationship with white farmers in order to maintain the common 
representation of Zimbabweans as the farmers’ favourites. It was a deviant case in the sense 
that no other speakers had the opportunity to make this kind of comparison between white 
farmers in South Africa and those in Zimbabwe.  
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Extract 22: Zimbabwean women (interview 18) 
1 Philippa:  we talk about the terrible things that South Africans have done to foreigners 
2  like this like last year and stuff but then I remember like, remember what all  
3  the stuff that Zimbabweans did to white farmers (.) in two thousand you   
4  know those years  
5 Thelma:  A- a- actually the white farmers were resisting. It’s not that th- it was a bad  
6  thing.  You’d find that someone would own five six farms  
7 Gina:  mm 
  ...((13 lines omitted)) 
8 Thelma:  Actually they wouldn’t have been driven away but they were resisting that  
9  force ‘please hand over’ what what, they didn’t like it. They wanted  
10  compensation when actually th- when they took I mean [soil ] that  
11 Elizabeth:                 [land]       
12 Thelma:  land from our forefa[thers] they never paid them [any] compensation.  
13 Elizabeth:              [  Ja   ] 
14 Philippa:                                                                                              [  Ja ]                               
15 Philippa:  ja 
16 Thelma:  They just grabbed the land and they were ploughing the land they really   
17  wanted and [ih    definitely       ] 
18 Elizabeth:            [They made profit] ja.  
19 Thelma:  They wanted compensation from us but to our forefa[thers]             [ they]  
20 Gina:                                                                                                            [They] never [paid ]  
21 Thelma:  never paid anything 
22 Philippa:  ja 
23 Thelma:  to get that land you know. So it was unfair. It wasn’t fair for us.  
24 Philippa:  ja  
25 Thelma:  ja definitely. So actually i- i- it wasn’t really that we did a bad thing they   
26  were doing also a bad thing. We appreciate what they were doing. Definitely 
27  th- th- they were productive but they didn’t like to share 
28 Philippa:  [okay] 
29 Gina:         [mm ] 
30 Thelma:  with us the black ones. 
31 Philippa:  Okay  
32 Thelma:  *They didn’t want to share.+  
33 Philippa:  [         Like what do you,       ] what do you think about the white farmers here. 
34  How are the white farmers here 
35 Thelma:  Ah they’re o- okay. 
36 Margaret:  Very [okay.]  
37 Women:               [ They] they love us. 
38 Thelma:  They [appreciate] our work. 
39 Margaret:            [Very okay.] 
40 Philippa:  Okay 
41 Margaret:  They like eh even if you walk in the street      
42 Thelma:   ja  
43 Margaret: they stop their cars, ‘Hey Zimbabwean *how+ are you?’                   
44 Thelma:                                            [   ja ]                 
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45 Margaret:  They just [they appreciate us.] 
46 Thelma:       *  ‘How   are    you,  + are you alright?’ 
47 Margaret:  ‘Are things okay?’ They like us very much. 
48 Philippa:  okay 
49 Margaret:  If you go to to to to a farm looking for a job the first question they ask is that 
50  ‘are you a Zimbabwean?’  
51 Philippa:  okay  
52 Elizabeth:  If it’s a yes *they say+ 
53 Margaret:                      *‘Are you] a Zimbabwean?’ 
54 Elizabeth:  ‘I want Zimbabwean workers’. *Even] that farmer didn’t want people that 
55 Philippa:                 [Okay] 
56 Margaret: time but if you say you are a Zimbabwean definitely *he’ll take you.+ 
57 Elizabeth:                                *You’ll get job.+ 
 
These Zimbabwean women present the relationship between black Zimbabweans and white 
farmers in Zimbabwe as highly politicised, whereas their relationship with white farmers in 
South Africa is completely depoliticised. The political argument is that those who evicted 
white farmers from their farms in Zimbabwe were not doing anything wrong; rather it was 
the whites who were wrong to want compensation for their farms because land was first 
expropriated by white colonists without compensation to black people (lines 19-23). They 
were then at fault for resisting, and did not want to share with ‘us the black ones’ (line 30). 
But when asked, ‘what do you think about the white farmers here... How are the white 
farmers here’ (line 33), the women produce a sharply contrasting and depoliticised account 
of this relationship.  Indeed they provide a caricature, showing just how friendly their 
relationship with the farmers is: they’re ‘very okay’ (line 36); ‘they love us’ (line 37); ‘they 
appreciate our work’ (lines 38 and 45) and then an example of how the farmers stop in the 
street and talk nicely to them (line 41-43).  Exactly the same arguments about land 
expropriation, ‘sharing’, and compensation could be applied to white South African farmers 
as those that have just been applied to Zimbabwean farmers; but here these Zimbabwean 
workers strategically do not locate their own relationship with South African farmers in the 
same political history.  This is because, as we have seen, the Zimbabweans’ own eviction 
was accompanied by this same kind of highly politicised historical racism discourse (what 
PASSOP described as ‘trying to make it a racial battle and a historic battle’).  It is therefore in 
the Zimbabweans’ own interests not to apply the same lens when viewing their own 
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relationship with the farmers, in order to maintain the image of friendly relations between 
them.   
The penultimate extract in this section constitutes a deviant case in that it was the only time 
any of the Zimbabweans we interviewed entertained the accusations of low wages, and 
dealt with them as if they may have been true, rather than denying them outright.  
Extract 23: Group of Zimbabwean men (Interview 31) 
1 Thomas:  Even if it was the c- the the case of the money that we were chased from   
2  Stofland, even if it was, you would you think that South Africans né, if they  
3  go to Zimbabwe there, when they get to Zimbabwe n- maybe they’ll be   
4  working in the farms as we are doing right now né, then they’ll be, they’ll  
5  get there, they’ll, w- w- where would they get the powers to be in front of  
6  Zimbabweans so that they can talk to the white man that ‘you have to raise  
7  the money’? Where would they get that powers from? Isn’t it they would be 
8  foreigners? 
9 Gina:  mm 
 
Here Thomas constructs it as a commonplace that Zimbabweans are relatively powerless 
because of their status as foreigners and thus defends them against a criticism of not joining 
in with wage bargaining.  Zimbabweans lack ‘powers’ because of this foreigner status and 
consequently do not go and ‘talk to the white man that “you have to raise the money”’ (line 
6-7). This is a similar state of affairs to what Vuyo the labour broker described in Part 2, 
when he said that the farmers ‘abuse’ the Zimbabweans because ‘they know they can’t 
complain’ and they have to ‘shut their mouth’.  However, that accusation served to put 
blame on farmers, and also to demonstrate that Vuyo’s own explanation of the violence was 
not entirely selfish: he demonstrated that he too was concerned for the Zimbabweans.  
Thomas’s account similarly constructs Zimbabweans as being at a disadvantage or in a 
powerless position, but this is because of their structural position as foreigners, and the 
same would apply to South Africans if they were working in Zimbabwe (line 2-3, 7-8).  This 
account thus also serves to undermine the allegations of collusion or an alliance between 
Zimbabweans and farmers, rather than to bolster them.  In Vuyo’s account, the fact that 
Zimbabweans did not go along with the South Africans to engage in wage bargaining was 
the main reason for their eviction (extract 12).  In this account, Thomas asks South Africans 
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to consider that not going to talk to the ‘white man’ is a reflection of their disadvantaged, 
rather than their advantaged, structural position.  
The final extract in this section explicitly problematises the good relationship between 
farmers and Zimbabweans.  As we have seen, Zimbabweans acknowledged that the farmers 
preferred them because they were hard workers. This good relationship was thus explicitly 
based on their own usefulness. The speaker in the final extract below was the only 
Zimbabwean who reflected critically on this in relation to the farmers’ ‘generosity’ towards 
the Zimbabweans after they left the informal settlements.  He made a distinction between 
whether their support was genuine or whether it was only offered because farmers needed 
the Zimbabweans’ labour: 
Extract 24: Zimbabwean engineer (interview 7) 
1  Philippa:  how do the f-, how do the f- white farmers treated you as a worker? 
2  Tendai: Ja that’s another thing. You know, you know these things they’ve got both  
3  sides of the coin. 
4  Philippa:  ja 
5  Tendai:  The, like I told you Zimbabweans they’re hard-working. Farmers wouldn’t  
6  like to lose someone who’s as hard-working as a Zimbabwean. hh And eh of  
7  course they’ve been supportive, and again you can ask whether it was   
8  genuine support because (Philippa: mm) because he’s now that’s the pick of 
9  of of of the harvest whatever of the of [the] of (     ) so so the whole thing is, 
10  Philippa:            [ja  ]  
11  (.) 
12  Philippa:  ja 
13  Tendai:  You can’t really tell whether someone is liking you or not ...((2 lines omitted)) 
14  or they want your labour, [you see?]  
15  Philippa:                           [   Ja    ja  ] okay. Oh ja your la- money if it’s in   
16  [Stofland or labour] 
17  Tendai:     *  it’s  or  labour     + if it’s in the farm.  
18  Philippa:  ja  
19  Tendai:  You see so, you can’t really tell but overall you’ve got to make your own, you 
20  know 
21  Philippa:  decision or 
22  Tendai:  your own ja [  decision  ]  
23  Philippa:                          [judgement] 
24  Tendai:  or g- your ow- acc- exactly your own judgement according to what you are  
25  seeing.  
26  Philippa:  ja   
28  Tendai:  So, so far from what I’ve seen, they’ve been very very supportive. 
29  Philippa:  okay. Like taking people onto their farms to [stay and that stuff] 
30  Tendai:                                                                                      *        Yeah      ja       + they’ve 
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31  been taking people some of, some of them taking people to their farms and, 
32  actually providing food.  
33  Philippa:  okay  
34  Tendai:  For them. For example at where where I’m working, they couldn’t provide eh 
35  you know eh, accommodation because really there’s no accommodation I  
36  mean  
37  Philippa:  okay ja  
38  Tendai:  but ee, you could s- you know clock there, then maybe when you finish  
39  working then they provide, they provide you food. .hh You go and eh provide 
40  you wat- water for bathing and every[thing] 
41  Philippa:                                                                      [   Ja  ] 
  ... ((7 lines omitted)) 
42  Tendai:  So I can t- some of ya they’ve been very very supportive. *And I think-] That  
43  Philippa:                                                                                                          [ Okay          ] 
44  Tendai:  is, if it’s so genuine.  
 
Here Tendai reflects explicitly on the possibility that the display of generosity from farmers 
towards their Zimbabwean workers was self-interested.  This is important because it relates 
to the way farmers, in their own interviews, had to manage the tension between two 
imperatives: on one hand, showing care and concern for their workers, and on the other, 
also running profitable businesses.  It will be demonstrated in section 4 below that this 
tension or dilemma was resolved by the trumping of the former imperative by the latter. 
Significantly, however, in the case described here by Tendai, these two imperatives are not 
mutually exclusive.  The implications of this will be considered below.  
In this section we have heard how, in responding to complaints and accusations against 
them, several Zimbabweans justified the farmers’ preference for themselves as completely 
legitimate.  They did this by showing that South Africans were the source of their own 
problems. This served to undermine the accusations that Zimbabweans were preferred 
because they were exploitable or were colluding with farmers.  Also, they provide a contrast 
to the farmers’ explanations for the violence, which made minimal reference to the role of 
the Zimbabweans in the affairs that led up to it, rather presenting them as almost incidental 
victims or pawns.  Here, however, the Zimbabweans present themselves and their position, 
wedged between farmers and the South African labouring community, as an absolutely 
central part of the conflict to which the violence was a response. In the next section, we 
hear how farmers constructed and responded to allegations levelled against them in Part 2 
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above, including the accusations of low wages and that their relationship with the 
Zimbabweans was costing South Africans jobs. We also hear their version of their 
relationships with their Zimbabwean and South African workers.  
Part 4:  Farmers’ responses to criticisms against them  
This section has two focuses, each on a different way by which farmers constructed the 
origins and nature of the accusations against themselves. Firstly, they constructed these 
accusations as propaganda coming from the same people who instigated the violence, and 
as consisting of contraventions of technicalities over the minimum wage and job losses for 
South Africans.  Farmers were then able to dismiss these easily in two corresponding ways: 
by showing that they were highly interested and therefore un-credible rumours that were 
being circulated in order to further certain malevolent agendas; and secondly by citing audit 
procedures, statistics, and personal experience of labour shortages to prove that no low 
wages were being paid and no jobs were being taken.  This makes sense in light of the local 
rhetorical function of farmers’ responses to the job-taking accusations, which was to 
demonstrate that at that particular time of the year (uitkniptyd) there was a shortage of 
labour, and therefore that it could not be true that South Africans’ losing jobs to 
Zimbabweans was a real immediate reason for the eviction.  However, by constructing their 
answers to address this particular and immediate concern, the farmers did not address the 
deeper relational significance and meaning that issues of low wages and job losses had for 
South Africans as expressed in Part 2 above, such as that farmers were failing to fulfil their 
responsibilities to the South African labouring community.  
The second emphasis, then, is on how farmers responded when they were asked directly to 
consider complaints that were constructed as coming from ordinary members of the South 
African labouring community (rather than the instigators of the violence).  On the whole, 
farmers acknowledged these complaints, but still justified their preference for Zimbabweans 
by appealing to the imperative of free-market capitalism and stereotypes about South 
African workers.  These stereotypes were largely the same as those used by the 
Zimbabweans.  Farmers used both these justifications to argue that, despite feeling concern 
for their workers, ultimately they did not have any responsibility to the South African 
labouring community, and that their preference for Zimbabweans was totally justified given 
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that they were more productive and reliable.  Issues involved in running a business (such as 
who is employed) were thus not construed as politicised or moral matters, since they were 
dictated by the impersonal ‘market’.  As we saw in Part 1, ‘the market’ was not construed as 
something constituted by the actions of farmers.   
Part 4A: Accusations construed as coming from interested parties with a 
malevolent agenda 
The first four extracts come from farmers who showed that the accusations against them 
originated with the ‘minority grouping’ mentioned in Part 1.  They cited statistics, audit 
procedures and personal experience to show that it was not the case that their preference 
for Zimbabweans was (a) due to being able to exploit them or (b) costing South Africans any 
jobs.   
Extract 25: HTA Chairperson  
1  HTA:  And then the story started walking in the m-, newspapers. [And] they  
2  Philippa:                               [ja   ] 
3  HTA: attacked us viciously. 
4  Philippa:  ja? What did they say 
5  HTA:  because, we underpay. 
6  Philippa:  mhmm 
7  HTA:  we pay Zimbabweans less::, so that’s why we used the Zimbabweans,   
8  because we can pay them less.  Than the, minimum wage= 
9  Philippa:  =mm, that’s what we read ja. *Or I read 
10  HTA:                                                        *and uh, it’s cheap la*bour. That is so, un tru::e,  
11  Philippa:                                                                                              [mm  
12  HTA:  you are not allowed by law to do that you have to give in your books, you get 
13  audits all the time. Then said what we underpay all the people. And um, so I 
14  phoned the Minister... ((name)), I said Minister... ((name)), please. Come, the  
15  Department of Labour and Department of, Agriculture.  Come out and do a  
16  financial audit on all my farms. (.) .hh On ALL my farms. Now I guarantee you, 
17  that not one person, not one farmer will be caught not paying, not complying 
18  with the law. 
 
Extract 26: Farmer 2 
1 Danie:  It’s such a joke when everybody’s *going up] about this:: [um   
2 Philippa:                         [°mm°     ]                       [minimum wage  
3  thing. 
4 Danie: Minimum wage thing, because I mean, I don’t know if you saw there was a,  
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5  .hhh some(thing) from UCT, there was a very good article in the Cape Times  
6  it’s a, he’s it’s it’s a guy from UCT, I can=  
7 Philippa: ((to Gina)) =did you read it? 
8 Danie: I can actually get you the, the ar- we have the article somewhere  
9  [on the farm] 
10 Philippa: [okay             ] okay 
11 Danie: They basically stated that, last year I didn’t even know about it they did a   
12  study...and, he actually wrote that he’s actually he comes from he’s got a  
13  background in, in in unions, and they did a study here and they said you know 
14  it’s very surprising that the statement was made because they did the study 
15  last year and they found that when it comes to seasonal labour, the pay last 
16  year already was, on average ten Rand more than minimum wage.  
17 Philippa: huh! 
18 Danie: So I mean this thing is:, 
19 Philippa:  Ja. So do you think that’s, I mean, do you think that’s a story which is cooked 
20  up deliberately, I mean, 
21 Danie: Definitely, yes.= 
22 Philippa:  =okay.  
23 Danie: No definitely. And it was a story that, I mean the municipality everybody was 
24  on that thing, and uh now they suddenly retracting and, u:m, cos we were  
25  taking a lot of abuse,  
26 Philippa:  mm, 
27 Danie:  and uh we threatened, and we said we will not we will um, move away  
28   from the process, we will leave the municipality and uh police on their own, 
29  *we wouldn’t care, we, you know  
30 Philippa:  [mm 
31: Danie: to be of any insistence whatever,= 
32: Philippa:   =oka::y 
33: Danie: you know they continue, and suddenly, there there’s apologies and  
34: Philippa: ah haa 
35: Danie: u::m, everything because they’ve got a seriously hot tomato, u::h, uh that  
36   they sitting with here.  
37 Philippa: °Ja:° 
 
Extract 27: Agri Wes-Cape CEO  
1 AWC: I’ll show you we did a count  
2 Philippa: m hm 
3 AWC: the people we ((noises of paper shuffling, then silence)) what have I done  
4  with it, (here’s it) permanent workers, in De Doorns, 5337.  
5 Philippa:  ja, 
6 AWC: Seasonal workers Zimbabweans, 1558. 
7 Philippa:  uh huh, 
8 AWC: Locals, 5701.  Sothos 630. Other. 894 that is local towns like uh, Touw’s River,  
9   [Worcester] 
10 Philippa:  [mm            ] 
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11 AWC: and those. Total seasonal workers, 8783. 14120 ((the total with permanent 
12   workers)). We need about seventeen thousand people. 
13 Philippa:  Yoh. So where, at the moment, where are the other people coming from,  
14   other towns? 
15 AWC: There’s a, there’s a *shortage+ there’s a shortage. 
16 Philippa:            *it’s short+  
17 Philippa:  okay 
18 AWC: we’re trying to get hold of this of the labour brokers but we believe the   
19  labour brokers cannot have more than maximum one thousand seven   
20  hundred. 
21 Philippa:  okay 
22 AWC: maximum. 
23 Philippa:  okay  
24  (.) 
25 AWC: Now, who’s taking whose job here 
26 Philippa: Ja ((laughing quietly)) 
27 AWC: It’s the intimidation,  
28 Philippa:  mhm 
29 AWC: selling a story, sitting in the shebeen buying a beer for somebody. 
30 Philippa:  mm 
 
Extract 28: Farmer 3 
1 Philippa:  we were, Stofland we’ve been in Stofland, and, like the, I mean Gina   
2  and I split up so we didn’t, we weren’t talking to the same people and Gina  
3  had a different, talked to different people but like, the overwhelming kind of 
4  sense among the little group that I of guys that I talked to was just like, ‘they  
5  are taking our jobs, they are taking our jobs.’ Like, at the end of the day,   
6  there’s n- there’s, ja. I mean, 
7 Gert:  And are these people, do you interview during working hours? Or after   
8  working hours because I’m short of labour at the moment, and I’d quite, like 
9  to know who that those individuals are co- cos, *I’ve got,  
10 Philippa:        ((smiling)) [that they can come and  
11  work 
12 Gert:  I’ve got about fifty positions open 
13 Philippa:  Ja I, I also wonder about that because these places are mostly empty,   
14  during the day= 
15 Gert:  ja= 
16 Philippa: =I mean Stofland is, pretty empty, so it’s not like, it’s not like a lot of people 
17  are sitting around, 
18 Gert:  Whose jobs are being taken, that’s what I wanna know.   
19 Philippa: [ja] 
20 Gina:  [m] 
21 Philippa: Well, hh (.) ja, what is, wha- what’s 
22 Gert: It’s a conception that’s been, built, or established by this minority grouping,= 
23 Philippa: =m hm, 
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24 Gert: saying, [they s-, ]   
25 Philippa:               [they wo]rk for [lower wages               ] or 
26 Gert:                  [they spread rumours] 
27 Philippa: m 
28 Gert: and said, ‘ja these people are prepared to work for lower than minimum   
29  wage.’= 
30 Philippa: =ja.  
31 Gert: ‘These people, are taking your jobs.’=  
32 Philippa:  =ja ja kay 
33 Gert:  everyone gets, all, in a in a panic  
 
These accounts successfully deal with the accusations (as the speakers have constructed 
them) as interested and therefore un-credible, by suggesting that they were rumours 
started by the same people who had vested interests in instigating the violence.  In extract 
26, farmer 2 answers my question about whether they were a story ‘cooked up deliberately’ 
with an emphatic ‘Definitely yes...No definitely’.  The Agri Wes-Cape CEO writes them off as 
started by people who wanted to ‘sell a story,’ and/or were (more vaguely) the result of 
‘intimidation’ (extract 27).  Farmer 3 said they were ‘a conception that’s been, built, or 
established by this minority grouping’ (extract 28). The result of this conception and the 
spreading of ‘rumours’ (line 26) is that ‘everyone gets all, in a in a panic’ (line 33).  In this 
way farmer 3 is able to write off all the accusations we heard in Part 2 simply as everyone 
getting all in a panic, and therefore not reflecting a rational evaluation of the real state of 
affairs.  The speakers in Part 2 also cited their personal experience of being fired and 
replaced by Zimbabweans (extract 7); they expressed indignation over the farmers’ lack of 
care for ‘their own people’ while showing concern for the Zimbabweans instead (extract 6); 
Dawid in extract 7 argued that the farmers were guilty of hypocrisy; and the elderly man in 
extract 16 went so far as to accuse the farmers of ‘violating the democracy of this country.’ 
In these accounts from farmers, however, invoking the influential but suspect minority as an 
explanation for where these ideas come from constructs ordinary South Africans as not 
being able to discern the accuracy of the situation for themselves.  If all these accounts can 
be written off simply as ‘everyone getting all in a panic’ or as ‘a story cooked up 
deliberately’ or as ‘selling a story, sitting in the shebeen buying a beer for somebody’ 
(extract 27) then the farmers are off the hook.   
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Farmers successfully constructed their own accounts as factual by producing detailed 
statistics (extract 27); or by stating the hard fact of personal experience of having ‘fifty 
positions open’ (extract 28); or citing corroboration from external, neutral sources – the 
‘guy at UCT’ with a ‘background in unions’ (extract 26 – likely referring to Theron (2010)) 
and the Department of Labour (extract 25) – thereby demonstrating that the accusations of 
low wages and of South Africans losing jobs to Zimbabweans had no basis in fact.  Having a 
‘background in unions’ means that even someone who could be expected to side with the 
workers has in fact found in the farmers’ favour.  The HTA chairperson also argued that the 
accusations of low wages were false by saying that (a) farmers were regularly audited and 
(b) none of them would ever not abide by the law anyway (extract 25).  Edwards and Potter 
observed that 
 reports will successfully manage the dilemma of stake only if they are either 
accepted to be factual or have a rhetorical organisation which makes them difficult 
to rebut or undermine. Indeed, in analytical terms, being accepted and being difficult 
to rebut will often amount to precisely the same thing. (1992, p. 160)  
The accounts above are extremely difficult to undermine because the options open to the 
listener for trying to do this would basically be non-options. One would be to tell the 
farmers that their statistics were incorrect; or the study done by the ‘guy at UCT’ was flawed 
or its results inaccurate; or, in the last case, to tell the farmer that he did not really have a 
labour shortage.  None of these are options are available to someone who does not have an 
insider’s knowledge of the farming situation.  ‘Whose jobs are being taken, that’s what I 
wanna know’ (extract 27) and ‘Now, who’s taking whose job here’ (extract 28) are strong 
rhetorical questions given the facts with which they have been prefaced.  In extract 28 I 
even agreed with farmer 3 – we had been in the informal settlements during the day and 
indeed they were relatively empty – though not so empty that we did not find some 
unemployed people to interview (interviews 2, 3, 4 and 27).  The farmers’ accounts were 
thus successful in constructing and then undermining an accusation against themselves that 
their preference for Zimbabwean workers was costing South Africans jobs.  Of course, the 
very high demand for labour at this time of the year was not going to last more than a few 
weeks, and so the state of supply and demand would have changed later in the season.   
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Another look at extract 25 from the HTA interview gives a clue about how these accounts, 
though rhetorically strong, bypassed the substance of the complaints that came from 
speakers in Part 2 about displacement, lost jobs, and the undermining of South Africans’ 
bargaining power.  The HTA chairperson says in the last three lines, ‘Now I guarantee you, 
that not one person, not one farmer will be caught not paying, not complying with the law’ 
(extract 18, lines 16-18).  She makes the issue to be about whether farmers are law-abiding 
or not, and she is prepared to back up her claim that none of them will be found not to be 
law-abiding by inviting the Departments of Labour and Agriculture to come and do an audit.  
The central issue is reduced to a legal technicality: whether farmers are law-abiding or not.  
In fact she abstracts the accusation, midway through constructing it, from ‘not paying-’ to 
‘not complying with the law’ (line 18).  This abstraction helps to divert attention away from 
the substance of the complaints (Wetherell & Potter, 1989).  All the farmers’ facts and 
figures also ‘proved’ that they had not done anything technically wrong.  In Part 2, however, 
we saw that the issue of low wages was construed as much more than a mere legal 
technicality.  It was bound up with accusations of unfair favouritism, changed loyalties, 
hypocrisy, abuse, cheating, a sense of being ‘kicked in the teeth’ (my term), and even a 
revival of the oppression of the apartheid era.  The responses from farmers avoid almost all 
these meanings which were ascribed to ‘low wages,’ and reduce the accusations against 
them to technicalities which they were then easily able to rebut.  This is perhaps because 
these accounts were geared towards undermining the accusation from interested parties 
that farmers had some responsibility for the violence, whereas not all the accounts in Part 2 
were explanations for violence per se.  In constructing their responses in this way, farmers 
were able to respond to the accusations without needing to revise anything fundamental 
about the farming system or their relationships with their various workers.   
Part 4B: Farmers’ responses to accusations which were constructed as 
coming from ordinary members of the South African labouring community 
Part 4B shows how farmers responded when accusations or complaints were offered and 
constructed in the interviews as coming from ‘ordinary’ members of the South African 
labouring community rather than the instigators of violence. Some of these were cases 
where I presented farmers with other interpretations of the farmer-Zimbabwean 
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relationship, and then asked them to comment on them.  With the exception of farmer 3, all 
the farmers conceded or agreed that they did prefer Zimbabweans.  They justified this 
preference by invoking the requirements of running a successful business, and then showing 
that, within such a system, if South African workers were being passed over in favour of 
Zimbabweans it was their own fault for being belligerent and unreliable.  Their reasons for 
preferring Zimbabweans were thus very similar to those given by the Zimbabweans 
themselves.  Their choice of workers was thus rendered amoral and apolitical by the 
dictates of the market and the necessities of running a business.  In these ways we see that 
the imperative of free-market capitalism was a powerful justifier of the status quo.   
Extract 29: Agri Wes-Cape CEO 
1  Philippa:  um, another thing that we, hear, which, people, which some people have said 
2  aloud and other people have said, quietly, is that the South Africans, the   
3  farmers really do prefer Zimbabwean workers because, they, for whatever  
4  reasons they, better educated, they well-spoken in English, they more   
5  hardworking, or whatever. Whe-, you know, whether individuals agree with  
6  that or not, whatever, but that’s what some people have said. So, and then  
7  this one guy we spoke to in Stofland, said, he made a very interesting  
8  comment. He said, the farmers, have treated us, so badly, in like the whole  
9  history of South African, S-, South Africa, not particularly now but just in   
10  general, they, you know, peo-, you know farmers have beaten their workers, 
11  treated them badly, paid them by dop system, and now suddenly when we 
12  stand up, it’s us who are like the bad criminals. You know what I mean. I mea- 
13  do you have a response to that.  
14    (.)  
15  CEO:  ((strongly)) Nobody forces them to work on the farm.  
16  Philippa:  mhm, 
17  CEO:  Is there a law that to say they’ve gotta work there. 
18  Philippa:  But they’re stuck. 
19  CEO:  Now wait a minute! 
20  Philippa:  okay,=  
21  CEO:  =They stuck. [Is it, is it of- is it agriculture’s problem that they stuck?  
22  Philippa:                           [mhm 
23  (.) 
24  Philippa:  °There’s no law *to keep them there.° 
25  CEO:                                        *There’s no law. So, nobody says is forcing him to work,  
26  [there.] 
27  Philippa: [mm    ] 
28  CEO:  The second thing is why, why would we work with, with the Zimbabweans. 
29  Because the Zimbabweans, is there, every day, for the whole time that  
30   they’ve got to work.  
31  Philippa:   m 
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32  CEO:  I cannot af- I cannot employ people, that is maybe not there on a Monday, 
33  still babalaas on a Tuesday, and, by Friday if it was a if it was a All-Pay that 
34  week you don’t see them that week. 
35  Philippa:  m. 
36  CEO:  I’ve got to, put my cold chain going, the ships is in the port, the space that  
37  I’ve bought, at Tesco, cannot be empty. 
38  Philippa:   Hmm. 
39  CEO:  So now I must say, to Tesco, ‘just keep the space empty, because these guys 
40  didn’t come to work.’  
 
Extract 30: Farmer 2 
1 Danie: to be quite honest, there’s a work ethic issue. I *mean    + you have problems  
2 Philippa:                                                         [°Mmm°] 
3 Danie:  on Mondays you have problems on Fridays, you have problems when  
4  there’s All-Pay being paid, u:m whereas the Zimbabweans that doesn’t exist. 
5 Philippa: ((low and quiet)) ja 
6 Danie:  so, ↑ja ↓to a certain extent I think Zimbabweans, I mean, uh were,   
7  preferred.  
8 Philippa: okay. [Ja. 
9 Danie:            [in in  a lot of cases I mean, to give you an example, um the first time I, I 
10  I had the Zimbabweans it was so funny I mean u:m, I was my my my lunch  
11  hour is twelve-thirty to one-thirty, and I was sitting in my office in the shed 
12  and they were working and I was doing emails and stuff, and I was looking  
13  and it was, quarter to one, and I, and they were still working. And I went up 
14  and say to George I said ‘George what’s going on here’ ((adopts generic  
15  ‘black’ accent)) ‘No boss you didn’t tell us to go.’ ((accent ends)) You know  
16   that kind of, u:h, [(       ) 
17 Philippa:                    [like a little, s- 
18 Danie:  Yes. Normally, they’d, the rest of you would be out by, twenty-five minutes 
19  past if you don’t stop them.  
20 Philippa: okay= 
21 Danie: =so, ja, they are tremendous and they’re very nice people. 
 
Extract 31: Farmer 1  
1 Francois: ja it’s a difficult situation because the Zimbabweans are, it seems like they, (.) 
2  they better, they are on the job, they there so the farmers started to [prefer ] 
3 Philippa:                                   [ja ja     ] 
4 Francois: them,=  
5 Philippa:  =ja 
6 Francois:  You see [what I] mean, an- and now, and there might be some of the others  
7 Philippa:                      [ja        ] 
8 Francois:  that’s not finding work, and, I can understand their grieviance-, grievances  
9  coming from that, .hh u::m  
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10  (.) 
11 Philippa:  ((quietly)) ja= 
12 Francois:  =ja but like I said I mean it’s:::, if-, i- it’s, very much some of:: their own   
13  making in a sense also because, in the past you’ve um= 
14 Philippa:  =whose own making sorry? 
15 Francois:  I mean some of the um, (.) the: the: Xhosa group= 
16 Philippa:  =ja, 
17 Francois:   I mean they, ey::::, they want the money but they don’t wanna do the work.=  
18 Philippa:  =okay 
19 Francois:  You know what I’m saying  
  ... ((8 lines omitted))   
20 Francois: they quickly run through the block and now they want pay for, want pay for 
21  it, and it’s:::, not done well= 
22 Philippa:  =okay= 
23 Francois:  =and it-, you know what I’m saying  
 
These extracts show how farmers constructed reasonable requirements of running 
businesses and then showed how South Africans were not able to fulfil these.  Each of these 
requirements is slightly different. The Agri Wes-Cape CEO shows the systems that are 
necessary to get the grapes to Tesco (a British supermarket): ships are waiting in the port 
and the cold chain is ready (extract 30). The hypothetical example he gives of saying to 
Tesco, ‘just keep the space empty, because these guys didn’t come to work’ is powerful 
because it is absurd to the point of being amusing. We all know that business simply does 
not work that way. In such circumstances it is perfectly reasonable to work with the 
Zimbabweans instead, if South Africans sometimes do not show up for work.  
In extract 32, the requirement which is presented as reasonable is that workers have a good 
‘work ethic’ and do not try and skive off during working hours.  Farmer 3 shows that ‘you 
have problems on Mondays you have problems on Fridays, you have problems when there’s 
All-Pay ((social grants)) being paid’ (line 6-8).  As we have seen, these common stereotypes 
about South Africans’ recurrent failure to show up for work were also used by Zimbabweans 
to justify their own place on the farms.  In telling the story about how the Zimbabwean team 
was still on the job five minutes into their lunch hour, farmer 3 constructs this event as an 
amazing and story-worthy event and thus heightens the contrast between Zimbabwean and 
South African workers.  
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Farmer 2 in extract 33 was the only farmer who acknowledged that farmers’ preference for 
Zimbabweans may have been costing South Africans jobs: ‘there might be some of the 
others that’s not finding work...and I can understand their...grievance’.  However, he 
immediately goes on to show why this is their own fault: ‘it’s very much some of::: their own 
making’ (line 12-13).  The thing which is invoked as a reasonable requirement for running a 
business is that the work that labourers do needs to be done thoroughly. Farmer 2 shows 
that some of the ‘Xhosa group’ do not do this; they ‘quickly run through the block’ (line 29) 
but then want pay for it (lines 17 & 30). The acknowledgement of South Africans’ grievances 
is prevented from having too many serious implications by the argument that South Africans 
partly have themselves to blame for these very grievances.  
The three requirements discussed above (getting grapes to Tesco in time, workers being 
present at work for the full day, and doing the job thoroughly) are all entirely reasonable 
given that they are paid employees in a business.  Farmers do not construct themselves as 
asking things from their workers which are unreasonable (or exploitative). An exception to 
this is the account of farmer 2 when he showed that the Zimbabweans worked 15 minutes 
into their lunch break (extract 32). However, they are compared to South Africans who 
would try and get off five minutes early (line 23-24). In such a case it is reasonable to prefer 
workers who stay 15 minutes into their lunch break than workers who try and get off five 
minutes early.  
On the whole, farmers acknowledged grievances from South Africans but responded to 
these by justifying their preference for Zimbabweans as perfectly legitimate given the 
shortcomings of South Africans and the necessities of running a business. In particular, in 
the interviews with Farmer 2 and the Agri Wes-Cape CEO, quoted above (extracts 30 and 
33), this justification was given after I (the interviewer) asked them to comment on things 
we had heard other participants say which have been reproduced in Part 2 above. These 
complaints about the meanings that the farmers’ preference for the Zimbabweans had for 
South Africans were not mere technicalities, but related to fundamental issues such as 
poverty and unemployment and the position of power which farmers occupied to allocate 
jobs to certain people and not others.  In Part 4 we have seen how farmers argued (1) that if 
South Africans were losing out on jobs it was their own fault (‘it’s very much some of::: their 
own making’ – extract 31) and (2) if they did not like the way they were being treated on the 
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farms, there was nothing forcing them to stay and work there (extract 29). When I offered a 
counter-argument to this – ‘but they’re stuck’ – the Agri Wes-Cape CEO responded by 
asking, ‘is it agriculture’s problem that they stuck?’ (line 21).  The implied answer is ‘no.’  In 
this way he removed responsibility from farmers or ‘agriculture’ for the state in which South 
African informal settlement residents or workers found themselves.  Of course, an historical 
argument could be made for why it was indeed partly agriculture’s problem that they were 
stuck; but this also reflects the dilemma of farmers being simultaneously interpellated by 
the government as businesses operating without assistance in a competitive capitalist 
system, while also being held responsible for rural unemployment.  This refusal of 
responsibility by farmers is in direct contrast to the demands for jobs that black and 
coloured South Africans made of farmers in Part 2, and to the version which construed 
farmers’ relationship to the Zimbabweans as a way of failing to make good on their 
responsibilities to the South African labouring community.  
The last two extracts in this section show how farmers responded when asked to comment 
directly on the poverty of the South African labouring community and the inequality of the 
farming system in which they participated.  Once again, both of them used ‘the market’ and 
‘business’ rhetoric to justify the status quo.  At the beginning of the first extract, I was 
repeating something that Vuyo, the labour broker, had said to us previously, and then asked 
farmer 1 to comment on it:  
Extract 32: Farmer 1 
1 Philippa:  Um he was basically saying like, at the end of the day the farmers don’t care 
2  about us because like, wh- what can you, how can you live on R300 a week or 
3  whatever, when you’ve got *like a+ whole family and you live in a [shack] 
4 Francois:              [mm  ]                [mm   ] 
5 Philippa:  and like he was saying, .hh at the end of the day it comes down to money,  
6  the whites don’t, they’re not interested in our problems they don’t want to  
7  know how we live, they don’t wanna know how terrible it is, *um,+ and, he  
8 Francois:                 [mm] 
9 Philippa:  said, if we if, if we all earned, if we if we earned a better wage, none of this 
10  stuff::, would ever have happened. But the whi[tes  + don’t care. *I mean+  
11 Francois:                                   [mm]            [mm     ] 
12 Philippa:  what do you say to that. 
13 Francois: Ja ja I understand that people would feel like that, um, but there is a, there is 
14  a market related thing in, in that be*cause+ I mean, there’s, I mean people  
15 Philippa:                                           [mm   ] 
16 Francois: from the whole of Africa come, [here] to work, and for the Zimbabweans, this 
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17 Philippa:         [here] 
18 Francois: is, (.) fantastic. If you’ve got nothing then, something’s, if you know what I’m 
19  saying...and if it’s, if it’s, so low, um, I mean why don’t you work  
20  then, to get a full pay at least, y- *if you know+ what I’m saying.= 
21 Philippa:                      [ja                 ]                 
22 Philippa:  =ja 
 
Though it has not been quoted in this thesis, the explanation that ‘if we all earned, if we if 
we earned a better wage, none of this stuff::, would ever have happened’ (line 9-10) was an 
explanation we had heard from Vuyo the labour broker in which he had related the violence 
against the Zimbabweans to poverty, and how the dissatisfaction of South African workers 
contributed to making it possible.  Though the ACMS literature has demonstrated that 
poverty is never a sufficient condition for xenophobic violence, Vuyo was arguing that it is a 
necessary one; and that there would be no need for violence such as this if South Africans 
earned a decent wage.  However, Vuyo said, farmers do not appear to care about the 
poverty of their workers.  Farmer 1 responds by acknowledging this: ‘Ja ja I understand that 
people would feel like that’ but immediately goes on to qualify the limit of his 
understanding: ‘but there is a, there is a market related thing in, in that because...people 
from the whole of Africa come, here to work, and for the Zimbabweans, this is (.) fantastic’ 
(line 13-18). The implication is that Zimbabweans, who ‘have nothing’, have contributed to a 
‘market’ where they would not object to R300 a week.  It is presented as self-evident that 
prices are to some extent dictated by the market, and that this market renders the paying of 
workers at R300 a week morally unproblematic. Invoking ‘the market’ trumps other 
concerns such as farmers’ caring for their workers, and pulls the carpet out from under the 
complaints of South African workers who would argue that this amount is too low.   
To close this section, a discussion with farmer 2 is cited below at length because it 
demonstrates how this farmer responded to a proposition about the vast inequality of the 
system in which he participated and a question about whether ‘another way of doing life 
would be possible.’  The long discussion which follows this shows that his answer to this 
question is ‘no’.  Again, this is in sharp contrast to the demands which were made by 
speakers in Part 2 about how farmers should give them jobs, and shows the difference 
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between the expectations of workers and of farmers about the extent of farmers’ 
responsibility.  
Extract 33: Farmer 2 
1 Philippa:  Um, >now I wanna ask< like sort of, more, broad-, like, take our minds out of 
2  this particular situation that’s happened in De Doorns and just think about  
3  like, I mean you’re a farmer,  
4 Danie:  yes 
5 Philippa:  you have a nice place,  
6 Danie:  yes 
7 Philippa:  and you, own a farm or two farms or, more than that, 
8 Danie:  yes 
9 Philippa:  and others as well like, (.) ((having trouble getting the words out:)) and then 
10  you like, there’s people living in Stofland, in their shacks, like do you think, for 
11  you, I mean obviously, obviously this suits, this system suits you fine, do you 
12  ever think of like, another, way of doing, life would be possible. I mean, prac- 
13  I mean practically, [and not          ] practically.= 
15 Danie:                                 [I understand,]                          
16 Danie:  =I understand what you’re saying 
  ... ((20 lines omitted)) 
17 Danie:  hh as you say I mean there’s a situation’s not ideal and that’s the problem  
18  with any country like ours.  
19 Philippa:  Mmm. 
20 Danie:  I mean yes I have a nice life. Yes I live on a nice farm but yes I have a shitload 
21  of stress. 
22 Philippa:  mm. 
23 Danie:  Yes I try and pay my workers as much as is physically possible. But I’m still a 
24  business, 
25 Philippa:  ja 
26 Danie:  I’m not a charity.  
27 Philippa:  ja ja, 
28 Danie:  Um, and, the problem is, I don’t need a hell of a lot of highly skilled people. I 
29  mean um, you you what you basically need skilled is administrative staff, and 
30  and and your managers.  And then maybe, supervisors 
31 Philippa:  ja, sjoe hey 
32 Danie:  Ja and tractor drivers and if you think about chemical uh operators and your, 
33  truck drivers. But, the rest 90% are just people who can do, handwork. 
34 Philippa:  °ja°. Okay 
35 Danie:  so um, it’s always go- there’s always gonna be social problems here. 
36 Philippa:  mm= 
37 Danie:  =I mean u:m, by the nature of people, want to earn, they want a nice life, I  
38  mean they see that you’ve got a nice car and they say shit I’d like one like  
39  that. I mean, that’s just, uh nature. I mean, I also go to Hermanus and I look 
40  at some of those guys’ houses and I think I’d want one as well but it’s, you  
41  know, that’s life. 
42 Philippa:  ((laughing quietly)) ja 
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  ... ((10 lines omitted)) 
43 Danie:  But, yes they still do not earn a hell of a lot of money, and I think the the   
44  people who are the worst off are the people staying in Stofland,  
45 Philippa:     mm   
46 Danie:  who are not permanent workers, who are just working when there’s work  
47  available.  And they definitely want, better.      
48 Philippa:  mm 
49 Danie:  But, they’re not gonna find it here that is the problem...you’ll find that the  
50  work, on the farms, the amount of work opportunities will become less and 
51  less in the::, in the, foreseeable future, cos we are all looking, there’s, I mean 
52  there’s new varieties of grapes coming in the whole time and one of the   
53  biggest premises of those grapes if you plant it’s gotta be something that’s  
54  not labour-intensive. 
55 Philippa:  o::kay. [Sjoewfh! 
56 Danie:                      *The whole valley’s switching over to seedless, uh seeded grapes, we 
57  used to be seeded, uh, lot of work. U:m seedless grapes you can use chemical 
58  means to, pre-thin it cos a lot of the work has to be done, when you take a  
59  bunch of grapes:: it’s tight, it’s got *too many berries on you+ have  to pull out 
60 Philippa:                 [you have to pull out the ] 
61 Danie: and that’s where most of the work was....Yes we’ll always need labour to   
62  pack and whatever but you will find that, I mean I myself used to, bring in,  
63  hhh I used to have about four hundred people in in in s-, in pre-thinning   
64  times, now I prob’ly work with probably about a hundred and fifty.= 
65 Philippa:  =mm::: 
66 Danie:  And that will get even less.=  
67 Philippa:  =Hyew. 
68 Danie:  So the situation is there will be less work here,  
69  (.) 
70 Philippa:  more and more.  
71 Danie:  More and more, [ja.] You know. So,  
72 Philippa:                                   [ja ] 
73 Philippa:  So do you like, I mean, that sounds like disaster for this place.  
74 Danie:  I don’t think it’s disaster for this place, it’s going to be I mean that’s why you 
75  have people migrating to where there’s work I mean, these Zimbabweans,  
76  they call themselves asylum seekers but at the moment they’re just looking 
77  for work. (Philippa: mm) Cos there’s nothing, I mean yes there’s persecution 
78  going on in Zimbabwe but I think the main problem is not, uh physical   
79  persecution I think it’s economic, persecution. (Philippa: mhm,) There’s  
80  just no work there’s just no money there’s no food there. That’s why they’re 
81  coming here. And that you’ll see more and more, I mean especially with the, 
82  uh porous borders we’ve got,  
83 Philippa:  ja ja 
84 Danie:  people can move.  
85 Philippa:  ja. 
86 Danie:  And you’ll see people move I mean this people if there’s no work here they’ll 




In this conversation, farmer 2 constructs an ‘ideological dilemma’ (Billig et al., 1988) in lines 
22-26 between the moral imperative to care for one’s workers and the amoral imperative of 
running a profitable business. The latter imperative ultimately trumps the former: ‘Yes I try 
and pay my workers as much as is physically possible.  But I’m still a business,...I’m not a 
charity.’  This dilemma is produced and resolved in much the same way in lines 42-49. The 
farmer expresses his sorrow for those who only get work when it is available and shows he 
understands that ‘they definitely want better’.  However, the fact that ‘they’re not gonna 
find it here’ is shown to be for reasons of profit such as the necessity of planting varieties of 
grapes which are not labour-intensive.  There follows a justification of inequality (lines 28-
41) and a removal of responsibility from farmers for the South African labouring community 
(lines 43-49 & 86-87).  This dilemma was evident also in extract 32 above, where farmer 1 
responded to my account of what the labour broker had said about farmers not caring 
about their workers. Farmer 1 responded thus: ‘ja ja I understand that people would feel 
like that, um, but there is a market related thing in, in that, because I mean, there’s, people 
from the whole of Africa come, here to work, and for the Zimbabweans, this is, fantastic’ 
(lines 13-15).  In the first part of this utterance the farmer shows his sympathy with workers: 
‘ja ja I understand that people would feel like that’ – but ultimately ‘there is a market 
related thing in, in that’ (line 15).  What ‘the market’ renders acceptable trumps what might 
be construed as acceptable by other kinds of acceptability yardsticks, such as a sense of 
responsibility for workers’ wellbeing.  
The accounts in this section demonstrate the enormous gulf between the expectations that 
farmers and the South African labouring community had about the responsibility of farmers 
to provide workers with jobs.  The accounts in Part 2B revolved around a construction of the 
Zimbabwean-farmer relationship as a process by which South Africans were being displaced 
from their jobs and their places on farms.  In particular, Wendy (extract 6) and Dawid 
(extracts 8 and 15) implied or demanded that farmers should have a responsibility to 
provide jobs for South African workers. Though it has not been cited, Vuyo the labour 
broker also made this demand in the course of his interview.  Also, narratives of 
displacement and resulting demands for jobs were based on constructions of dishonesty or 
a suspect relationship between Zimbabweans and farmers.  Thabo in extract 7 said that 
182 
 
farmers were ‘cheating’ the Zimbabweans, and Dawid demanded jobs from farmers after 
showing that the farmers were paying the Zimbabweans ‘under the belt’ or ‘onder die belt’.  
In extract 6, Wendy and Marco showed that South Africans and in particular coloureds being 
‘jobless’ was questionable when there were apparently so many jobs available for 
Zimbabweans. The women in extract 9 construed the Zimbabweans as ‘taking our places’ 
which implied a sense of historic entitlement to these jobs.  Vuyo the labour broker argued 
that farmers were ‘abusing’ the Zimbabweans’ precarious position as immigrants, and the 
elderly man in extract 16 argued that farmers’ actions were ‘violating the democracy of this 
country’.  We have seen that this moral element and sense of historically-derived 
responsibility were not present in farmers’ accounts of their choice of workers.  They 
defended this choice by appealing to the imperative of free-market capitalism, which was an 
amoral imperative.  Employing the more efficient Zimbabweans was simply one of the 
necessities of running a good business (maximising productivity).  This comparison shows 
that farmers and South African workers had very different expectations about the nature of 
their relationship, and about where responsibility for jobs lay – indeed, they were playing by 
two different sets of rules, which have very few shared premises.  Ultimately, the farmers’ 
appeal to free-market capitalism served to justify the status quo not only of their use of 
Zimbabwean workers but also inequality in South Africa more generally.  Overall, none of 
the farmers interviewed in 2009 who, when presented with some of the grievances South 
Africans expressed in Part 2, considered whether there was something fundamentally wrong 
with the farming system which might require revising.  
Discussion 
So far, this thesis has engaged with what I have called the ‘two-group paradigm’ in social 
psychology and its conceptualisation of group relations as involving unequal pairs of groups 
– one advantaged or powerful and one disadvantaged or subordinate. Chapter 4 showed 
how Social Identity Theory, the Contact Hypothesis and other fields of intergroup relations 
studies lean towards thinking about group relationships in these binary terms, sometimes 
even going to far as to re-construe relations among multiple groups in two-group terms 
(Billig, 1976; Van Laar, Levine, Sinclair & Sidanius, 2004; Bikmen, 2011).  What we have seen 
in De Doorns is that none of the accounts of the xenophobic violence of November 2009 
construed it as simply a binary conflict between Zimbabwean and South African workers 
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only. Rather, it was the Zimbabwean-farmer relationship and its consequences for South 
African workers which were at the heart of this controversy. In almost every explanation for 
the eviction, farmers made an appearance as the authority who had the power to select and 
adjudicate between Zimbabwean and South African workers, and in this way, they helped to 
constitute ‘the social meaning and social reality’ of the other two groups (Billig, 1976).  In 
this way, Drury and Reicher’s (2000) understanding of social identity as a model of one’s 
position in a set of social relations, along with the actions that are construed as proper or 
necessary given that position, is once again illustrated. Understanding why farmers and 
South African workers responded so differently to the arrival of the Zimbabweans also 
requires first understanding the meanings that these two groups ascribed to their own 
relationship.  We have seen that for at least some South Africans, labouring on white farms 
was a political act viewed through a historical lens, sometimes with deep relational 
overtones, and they therefore expected farmers to take some responsibility for their 
interests. And since South African workers construed their relationship with farmers in 
terms of a mixture of resistance and responsibility, the hiring of the allegedly compliant 
Zimbabweans and their accommodation on the farms after the eviction were construed as a 
way of undermining South Africans’ efforts to bargain with and to resist whites.  It was also 
construed as a way by which farmers were reneging on their responsibilities to their fellow 
South Africans (sometimes, particularly coloured South Africans), and thus as a kick in the 
teeth or a betrayal given the already long history of exploitative relations between farmers 
and South African workers. Getting rid of the Zimbabweans was construed as a response to 
this problem, rather than being the main problem itself.  By contrast, farmers construed 
their relationship with South African workers in the ahistorical and amoral terms of 
employing workers in a business that simply ran according to the dictates of the free 
market.  They showed that, up to a point, they cared about the wellbeing of their workers, 
but ultimately distanced themselves from taking responsibility for the jobs or poverty of 
South African workers.  Running a business was construed as an apolitical enterprise in 
which pursuit of profits was treated as an axiomatic objective.  Thus, for farmers, employing 
Zimbabweans in such a system was not construed as a particularly problematic moral or 
political issue.  Rather it was simply a matter of good business. These two enormously 
different constructions of the Zimbabwean-farmer alliance, and the imperatives by which it 
was judged as legitimate or illegitimate respectively, can thus be understood first in terms of 
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the two incompatible constructions of the relationship that already pertained between 
farmers and the South African farm worker community.  Indeed, it may be more appropriate 
to consider the eviction as a ‘proxy attack’ nested within a broader conflict between South 
African farmers and workers.  
The two-group paradigm constrains what we can think and say about intergroup conflict in 
social psychology as it closes off the possibility that there can be conflicts producing subject 
positions that transcend the binary categories of dominant/subordinate or 
advantaged/disadvantaged.  The point of this analysis of xenophobia in De Doorns has not 
been to adjudicate between the Zimbabwean or South African farm labouring communities 
about who is the more advantaged or powerful group and then to study this group’s 
stereotypes and prejudices of the other.  Moreover, it would be circular and unhelpful to 
assume that because the Zimbabweans in De Doorns were the victims of the eviction, they 
are therefore the disadvantaged, powerless group.  The Zimbabweans in De Doorns 
appeared to consider themselves superior rather than inferior to their South African 
counterparts, and in fact this was one of the reasons they gave for being victims of violence 
– that the South Africans were resentful of the farmers’ preference for Zimbabweans. Some 
Zimbabwean farm workers had left skilled and semi-skilled occupations after their country’s 
economic collapse (among those we interviewed were a former teacher, hairdresser, 
builder and metallurgist or mining engineer), and appeared proud of the narrative of their 
own superior work ethic.  This is not merely an anomalous deviation from the two-group 
paradigm’s assumption that groups who are victims of discrimination or hate crimes must 
necessarily also be those who are disadvantaged materially and economically.  Rather, the 
ambiguity about whether the Zimbabweans were more exploited or more advantaged than 
their South African counterparts gestures towards the conditions of current capitalism, in 
which ‘the only thing worse than being exploited is not being exploited’ (Denning, 2010, p. 
79).  To have a low-paying farm job is to be simultaneously blessed with employment and 
cursed with poverty wages and exploitation, and as we have seen, this paradox manifests in 
the two seemingly contradictory complaints of many South African workers that the 
Zimbabweans were being unfairly favoured by farmers while at the same time being even 
more exploited by them.  In fact, opposite claims to those of low wages were also made: the 
Zimbabwean man in extract 17 above claimed that farmers were voluntarily paying 
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Zimbabwean workers better wages than South Africans, and we will see below that some 
South African workers claimed this too during the strike, complaining that farmers were 
paying the Zimbabweans as much as R100 a day and then wondering why they did not want 
to pay South Africans the same wage – even while they repeated the more common 
complaint about the Zimbabweans working for low wages in the same breath.  We should 
not try and resolve this apparent confusion of exploitation and favouritism, or advantage 
and disadvantage, so as to be able to clearly decide who is really the more disadvantaged or 
advantaged group of workers and thus apply our social psychology models with greater 
accuracy.  Rather, we should be on the lookout for the intergroup subjectivities that are 
attendant on the prevailing economic and political forms in our respective contexts (Billig, 
1991).  
In Chapter 5 above it was also argued that the two-group paradigm tends to import views of 
conflict which can edit out the role of third parties and naturalise a view of conflict which 
overlooks their agency.  This argument can be applied to the ACMS report on the eviction of 
the Zimbabweans (Misago, 2009), which was used in Chapter 1 to construct a narrative of 
the events that took place in De Doorns in November 2009.  This report took an anti-
xenophobic position, which, in this context, had significant consequences for the way the 
intergroup dynamics implicated in the eviction of the Zimbabweans were analysed.  First, 
the role of the farmers in the issues leading up to the violence was downplayed. The reasons 
Misago gave for minimizing the farmers’ part were fairly explicit.  One was that competition 
for jobs (which is how the tension between South African and Zimbabwean workers and 
brokers was construed), and ‘longstanding social tensions’ (ibid., p. 12) related to this, were 
shown to be inadequate as explanations for why violence actually occurred.  ACMS’s 
xenophobia research always emphasizes the role of the instigators who tip a situation over 
from conflict into violence, as well as the ‘institutional incentives’ which encourage this 
(Landau, 2015).  A distinction is made between ‘popular frustrations’ (Misago, Monson, 
Landau & Polzer, 2010, p. 10) or ‘long-lasting social tensions’ (Misago, 2009, p. 12) – which 
are not emphasized as much because they cannot actually account for why violence breaks 
out in particular places and not others even though they share these same longstanding 
problems (Landau, 2015; Polzer, 2010) – and those ‘critical causal factors’ (ibid., p. 2) or 
‘immediate causes/triggers of violence’ (ibid., p. 12), which have been the focus of ACMS 
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research.  Thus, in Misago’s report the emphasis was on the role of the labour brokers and 
the ward councillor who actually incited the violence for their own ends, rather than on the 
preceding intergroup tensions or surrounding discourse which problematised the farmer-
Zimbabwean relationship.  Farmers may have contributed to such tensions in their capacity 
as employers and adjudicators of South African and Zimbabwean workers, but did not have 
anything directly to do with instigating violence.  
A second, more overtly political reason why Misago (2009) minimized the farmers’ role in 
this conflict was that arguments which drew attention to farmers were the same arguments 
with which the expulsion of the Zimbabweans was justified or rationalised.  Misago (2009) 
argued that 
 [a]ddressing labour issues, and specifically farmers and labour brokers who exploit 
workers and break labour laws, is undeniably important.  However, exclusively 
focussing on these issues risks casting the perpetrators as victims in ways that 
legitimise or justify the attacks on Zimbabweans. (p. 3) 
 
Here, the problems presented are exploitation and breaking of laws.  However, this 
concession risks missing the point of the complaints of those South Africans who had an 
objection to the Zimbabwean-farmer relationship.  Of course, if the issues at hand are 
‘exploitation’ and breaking of laws, then they can be universally condemned. As we have 
already seen, however, De Doorns residents themselves did not all agree on whether the 
Zimbabweans were being exploited.  Thus, by not scrutinising lay explanations for violence 
which involved farmers, nor farmers’ responses to these, and naming ‘the problem’ as 
exploitation, Misago (2009) thus risks misconstruing some of the central dilemmas of the De 
Doorns violence. 
One of these dilemmas can be demonstrated by close analysis of the farmers’ accusations 
and justifications in Parts 1 and 4.  These showed that farmers took sides with the 
Zimbabweans, condemning the violence and making a display of generosity or goodwill in its 
aftermath by taking them onto their farms.  When push came to shove in Part 4, however, 
they explicitly argued for the maintenance of an economic system that arguably reproduces 
the conditions for violent xenophobia (cf Kerr & Durrheim, 2013).  Recall the words of 
187 
 
farmer 2, in extract 33.  On being asked whether he thought an alternative social and 
economic system was possible, farmer 2 argued that inequality was inevitable because 
farms simply do not require many highly skilled workers; and consequently ‘there’s always 
gonna be social problems here’ (line 35).  I understand ‘social problems’ to include episodes 
such as the violence against the Zimbabweans (which the farmers did not call ‘xenophobia’). 
Admittedly farmer 2 was the only farmer who made such an explicit connection between his 
own labour practices, inequality, and ‘social problems’ such as the violence against the 
Zimbabweans. (Not all farmers made this link, and farmer 2 was also not one of the farmers 
who took a strong moral stance against the violence – unlike, for example, farmers 1 and 3, 
or the Agri Wes-Cape media statement). Also, in extract 32, when farmer 1 was asked for his 
response on whether the violence was partially made possible by the fact that all labourers 
generally earn such low wages, he responded by rendering such wages inevitable because of 
the dictates of the market: ‘ja I understand that people would feel like that, um but there is 
a, there is market-related thing in, in that, because…people from the whole of Africa come, 
here to work, and for the Zimbabweans, this is, fantastic’ (lines 13-15).  Thus, the ‘alliance’ 
between farmers and Zimbabweans was rendered completely legitimate by the imperative 
of free-market capitalism, but at the same time it was acknowledged that this very system 
produced fertile conditions for violence (see also Kerr & Durrheim, 2013).   
A second and related reason why the anti-xenophobic position is dilemmatic in this instance 
is that farmers and Zimbabwean workers singing each others’ praises and their stories of 
mutual appreciation – which were mobilized to rhetorically counter xenophobia – arguably 
help to gloss over or divert attention from the racism and racial hierarchy that still structure 
this community (and others in South Africa) and the inequality and black poverty that are 
normalised in it (c.f. Dixon, Levine, Reicher & Durrheim, 2012).  Indeed, rather than being an 
exception to this racism, the farmer-Zimbabwean relationship is arguably one part of it, as 
we know now that favouritism among different groups of black people has always been a 
central feature of the white racism of apartheid race relations.  This is a difficult argument 
to make, because it risks blaming the Zimbabweans for their own predicament.  Indeed, the 
farmers, PASSOP members, ACMS, Zimbabweans themselves and other commentators who 
spoke out against this xenophobic violence are right to do so.  The opposite danger is to end 
up blaming the Zimbabweans for the violence of which they were victims and, as Misago 
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(2009) was so aware, to treat the perpetrators as if they are victims in ways that simply 
legitimate xenophobic violence.  But also right are those who would point out that while 
farmers no longer have the racial language of apartheid to justify inequality, they have the 
morally ‘neutral’ language and practise of free-market capitalism to do this work instead.  
Those who sympathised with the eviction have a point about the farmers’ employment of 
Zimbabweans being experienced as yet another way by which farmers have managed to 
‘screw over’ South African farm workers, even if everything they did was perfectly legal.  
This is why it is necessary to be cautious of the moral tone of the anti-xenophobic position, 
and to interrogate the alliances through which other parties show support for the victims. 
Commentators with a commitment to a human rights, peace-building or anti-xenophobic 
agenda must take an anti-xenophobic stance, and condemn the violence. But in doing so, 
they would be taking sides with farmers, who also condemned it; but it was these same 
farmers who were centrally implicated in South African workers’ complaints about the 
Zimbabwean-farmer relationship and its consequences for South African farm workers 
which justified the forcible eviction.  Thus, the ACMS report taking an anti-xenophobic 
position in this instance came at the cost of a deeper critical analysis of the farmer-
Zimbabwean relationship and what was achieved and obscured by it (cf. Kerr & Durrheim, 
2013).  This is why I have called this chapter ‘Dilemmas of xenophobia and anti-xenophobia 
in De Doorns.’  In the following chapters, which describe the methods and findings of the 
second case study conducted during and after the farm workers’ strike that began in De 
Doorns three years later in November 2012, we will see that this dilemma continues, as the 
absence of xenophobic violence against the Zimbabweans during the strike does not seem 
to be conclusive evidence that the anti-xenophobic imperative won the day in this 
community.    
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Chapter 8: The aftermath of the 2009 eviction and intergroup 
relations during the 2012-2013 farm workers’ strike 
 
Introduction 
This chapter briefly describes the aftermath of the xenophobic violence of 2009, between 
the closure of the camp housing the Zimbabweans in October 2010 and the early isolated 
farm strikes that took place in the Hex Valley in late 2012 and then spread around the whole 
valley and then the Western Cape before coming to an end in January 2013.  The chapter 
starts by describing my own experience of arriving and staying in the Hex Valley during the 
early days of the strike.  Second, it outlines some of the conditions that enabled the strike – 
both at a broad structural level, and in terms of the immediate events which set it off 
(Wilderman, 2014).  This includes some ways that the aftermath of the eviction in 2009 
actually contributed to the conditions of possibility for the strike (Wilderman, 2014).  
Thirdly, the chapter addresses what other observers have said about intergroup relations 
between the Zimbabwean and South African labouring communities during the strike.  
Finally, it outlines the contribution that the following results chapter will make.   
A perspective on being in the Hex Valley during the farm workers’ strike 
My experience of being in the Hex Valley during the early days of the farm workers’ strike in 
November 2012 is recounted here because in writing an academic thesis on intergroup 
conflict it is easy to lose touch with the physical and emotional experiences of being in a 
place that is in the middle of conflict.  On the drive to De Doorns from Cape Town, I was in 
phone contact with the man whose guest flat I was again going to be renting for the 
duration of my stay (the same man I rented from in 2009). From Worcester, police road 
blocks appeared, diverting traffic off the N1 because the freeway was blocked with stones at 
De Doorns.  I can’t remember now how I got through the first few roadblocks, but at the last 
one, closest to De Doorns, my host told me by phone to tell the police that I was going to De 
Wet. I did not know what De Wet was – I thought it might be the name of a farm – and I felt 
uneasy about being asked to lie to the police. A cop came to my window and shouted at me 
for talking on the phone while driving, and then asked where I was going.  I told him De Wet.  
He looked a bit surprised at this and repeated ‘De Wet?’ as if to make sure. I said yes, trying 
to look confident. He waved me on.  Whew.  When I passed the De Wet signboard a short 
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while later, I remembered it is a small district just on the Worcester side of De Doorns, 
which means that to get there one would not have to pass the road blockades at De Doorns.  
Then, as I was driving, I looked in the rear view mirror and saw that my host was already 
following me in his CW bakkie.  This was both touching and slightly sinister – he had come 
out to make sure I got into the valley all right, but had managed to get behind me and follow 
me without my noticing.   
The sense of foreboding created by the roadblocks continued as I came over a rise and saw 
the spectacular Hex Valley unfolding ahead.  A sinister stillness hung over the picturesque 
farm houses and green vineyards, a stillness belied by marks of recently burnt tyres on the 
tar, police vehicles at every intersection and smoke still rising off piles of ash in the middle 
of destroyed vineyards.  In the distance a heat haze shimmered off the roofs of Stofland. My 
hosts’ house was on this side of the stones blocking the freeway, so we could turn off the N1 
and get there without any further obstacle.   
Although I was renting an outside flat with its own kitchen, my hosts saw that I was alone on 
the first night and so invited me to have supper with them.  During supper, a man whom I 
assumed to be their employee came to the kitchen window and passed on a message that a 
group of protesting workers were on their way to the farms in that part of the valley.  At 
that point my hosts went into battle stations mode.  First they called their neighbours from 
the next door farm, who came over to wait with us.  At some point I walked into the kitchen 
to discover two rifles and a revolver lying on the counter (I later discovered the neighbours 
had brought them).  It was then that I became properly frightened.  What made these 
firearms even more sinister was that no one ever mentioned them or said anything about 
what kind of a night they implied the farmers were anticipating.  Also, nobody discussed 
what would be done if any protestors actually came to the house. When I asked my host 
about this, he said ‘if they try to get into this house I will shoot them through the front 
door’. I thought that by that stage it would be too late to try and convince anyone about 
whose side I was on.  The revolver then moved with us to the lounge and lay there on the 
coffee table as we sat anxiously waiting for something to happen. Wine was drunk, the news 
– including news of the strike – was watched, and regular phone updates were received 
from one of the neighbour’s workers on the progress of the group of strikers supposedly 
approaching (a worker of whom it was said during the evening that ‘sy is ’n goeie 
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informant’).  I wondered where these workers were and who or what was protecting them 
while they passed their employers information.  We sat and waited some more.  After a 
while we heard some voices outside calling ‘amandla!’ and my hostess heard what she 
thought was a stone being thrown onto the roof.  At that point all the lights were switched 
off.  We went out to stand on the veranda to listen and watch in the dark, and the 
neighbour was told to put out his cigarette.  The dogs ran out into the darkness and were 
not called back.  I was now wondering seriously whether I should phone my family at home 
and tell them I loved them.  
We waited for some time in the pitch dark and quiet; but in the end nothing happened. We 
eventually went to bed and woke up to tell the tale.  But for the next three days until I left 
De Doorns I was full of anxiety and had difficulty eating and sleeping, because at night I was 
now attuned to every small sound coming from outside.  This small and ultimately 
uneventful experience showed me how traumatising violent conflict can be for a 
community, and when Tony Ehrenreich of COSATU made a statement that the valley was in 
a state of ‘low-level civil war’ I could see that this was not an overstatement. The wife of a 
farmer I interviewed said that the experience of the strike was ‘like the Zulu war’.  Four 
people were killed in the informal settlements and RDP housing areas around De Doorns in 
confrontations with the police and private ‘security companies’ hired by the farmers 
(Andrews, 2012), and the police made mass arrests and deportations of especially foreign 
workers (Hanekom, 2012).  Several farmers’ wives and children left the valley and went to 
stay elsewhere while the strike was going on (an option presumably not available to many 
workers’ families).  One farmer I interviewed reported having received death threats by 
phone, and another told me about an (unsuccessful) attempt on another farmer’s life by 
people who dropped rocks onto his car from a bridge.  A farmer was also arrested for 
shooting (ineffectually) at protestors but as far as I know the charges were later dropped.  
Workers who tried to get to work during the strike were reportedly beaten by others, and a 
journalist’s car was set alight. An armed helicopter belonging to the security company was 
doing patrol up and down the valley on the lookout for further fires, and the sound of it 
droning periodically in and out of earshot added another layer of menace to the whole 
(already surreal) experience. The following two retrospective accounts from Stofland 
192 
 
residents interviewed in August 2013 show something of the ordeal that protesting workers 
and residents experienced at the hands of the police during the strike:  
Xhosa-speaking South African man and woman (Interview 21)  
Nqaba: Ok so ok tata let’s continue, that was a big strike right *Man: mm mm+ and 
 then it  didn’t scare you, or what, like make you scared to think, ‘won’t the whites 
 turn against us or won’t the police turn against us?’ Things like that, weren’t you 
 scared? 
Man:  We were very scared because this thing that you are saying, because we had turned 
 back already [NN: uh huh] we had really turned back, we had turned back even the 
 police were just beating people up. [NN: uh] Yes, it was very scary  
Nqaba: You were scared 
Man:  Eh ((yes)) 
Nqaba: but you endured 
Man:  We endured 
Nqaba: Eke, what happened to end it? 
 ((two turns omitted)) 
Man:  It ended when everyone was being arrested on the street, to such an extent that 
 they said the men who are running away, they will be arrested in their houses, taken 
 out of their houses, arrested and put in the police van and locked away 
Nqaba: mm, mm 
Man:  Eh ((yes)) That’s how it ended. 
 
Strike organiser (interview 17) 
O:  certain things does make uh uh make me angry because, I, (.) like in the strike there 
 was so many things that we didn’t expect. *PK: okay,+ The police shooting us, walking 
 at night, and throwing tear gas, and our babies, some of our babies is still, till today, 
 ((taps table)) [PK: mm,] their breath is not right [PK: mmmm] because they are 
 coughing and stuff like that. [PK: okay] We, we we suffered a lot [PK: ja:::] because of 
 this but we didn’t, we didn’t, we didn’t strike to fight fight. [PK: okay] We were just 
 striking [PK: okay] for our rights. [PK: okay] And we were just asking, the 
 government, and our farmers, must help us. [P: mm] We were, it, the strike, (.) was 
 not supposed to go like it did. You know if the police didn’t shoot us like that, *PK: 
 mm:::] some of the people, would not have burn off vineyards [PK: kay] would not 
 have break in shops and stuff like that. [PK: okay] Because the police, first shoot at 
 [PK: (made you like rrrrr)] made us like we, like angry. [PK: okay] (.) This one day we 
 were just, we just wanted to walk down to the other people in Sandhills. We said to 
 the police ‘no we will just walk down.’ So the police said, ‘no, you will just, not go 
 there,’ and they didn’t even warn us they just started shooting. They didn’t care if 
 it’s women if it’s children, what what or what young people or what. [PK: kay ja] 
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 They were just shooting us. [PK: ja] I was shoot my leg was just like that. [PK: hm. 
 Shoh] My knee. Swollen up. And for nothing! Just for standing in the road. 
 
As we now know, (poor, black) De Doorns residents are no strangers to violent conflict with 
the police, and although this thesis does not focus on the psychological consequences of 
continuous violence, the pattern that is emerging is of a community that has been involved 
repeatedly in violent and traumatising conflict.  On the other hand, however, interviewees 
of Wilderman (2014) – mainly activists who participated in the strike in various organising 
capacities –spoke of the sense of exhilaration workers felt during the strike as they realised 
their own power to stand up against abuse and poverty wages on the farms.   
Social change and macroconditions enabling a farm workers’ protest  
Wilderman (2014) has posed the question of what made a widespread farm workers’ strike 
possible at the time that it happened, even though poor wages and working conditions have 
been present for a long time in this region.  His answer involves macro and micro factors.  
The macro factors include the shift towards a casualised and externalised work force – 
essentially those changes described in Chapter 2 above (see also Webb, 2017). Farm 
workers are overwhelmingly not part of formal trade unions, and trade unions did not 
initiate the strikes (Wesso, 2013), but the moving of workers off farms and the growth of 
the large informal and RDP housing areas around De Doorns and other farming towns has 
produced new spatial and thus social conditions, as workers now live in close proximity to 
each other rather than living spread out on isolated separate farms under the thumb of a 
farmer (Wilderman, 2014).  These changes are ‘leading to a breakdown or re-negotiation of 
two of the major impediments to overt, confrontational, and collective action, namely 
paternalis*m+...and farm worker isolation’ (Wilderman, 2014, abstract).  Trade unionists 
interviewed by Webb (2017) agree that the paternalism that does remain on the farms is 
the biggest challenge to organising workers, as farmers have an antagonistic approach to 
trade unions and often victimise or punish workers for being active in them.  Workers who 
live close together in Stofland were therefore able to discuss, organise, and generate mass 
support (see also Wesso, 2013).  Moreover, the geography of Stofland and Lubisi, which 
together only have two entrances linking them with town (one vehicle bridge and one 
pedestrian bridge over the freeway), also meant that strike organisers were relatively easily 
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able to enforce a stayaway by manning these bridges with people armed with knobkierries 
(Wilderman, 2014; also reported in interviews with farmer 1; Zimbabwean man in extract 17 
below; and South African man in extract 1 below).  It was thus farm workers living in the 
informal settlements and RDP housing, rather than those living on farms, who were the 
main driving force behind the strike, although farm-dwelling workers also participated 
(Wilderman, 2014).  A report addressing the ‘Future of agriculture and the rural economy’ 
after the strikes observed that  
It is inevitable that there will be very different perspectives as to the cause of the 
strikes.  What does seem clear, however, is that it was not only or primarily workers 
in full-time employment at the time that were involved, but workers who were 
seasonally employed on farms, or looking to find seasonal employment. It is also 
likely that many of those involved were and have remained unemployed. These were 
not therefore strikes in the traditional labour relations sense, as much as protest 
actions. They do not simply concern income and conditions of employment in the 
agricultural sector, but more broadly the rural economy and its social dimensions. 
(FARE Panel, 2012, p. 1) 
According to Wesso (2013), although most workers were not part of unions this does not 
mean that they were not organised.  Workers had been organising themselves into farm 
worker committees in the years and months before the strike and these committees played 
an important part in the initial strikes.  However, farmers refused to engage with these 
committees because they were not formal trade unions, and at that point COSATU and 
other formal unions stepped in both to negotiate on behalf of workers (who were not their 
members) and to direct the strike, thus wresting control of the process away from the farm 
worker committees, whose involvement and effectiveness then declined (Wesso, 2013).  
 
Microconditions setting off the strikes in the Hex Valley in late 2012 
According to Wilderman (2014) there are a number of more specific factors which came 
together in late 2012 to produce a sense among farm workers of the possibility of launching 
a strike.  First, shortly before the widespread farm strikes broke out in November, workers 
on a single farm called Keurboskloof in the Hex Valley had organised a strike in August and 
September 2012, with the help of, somewhat surprisingly, Zimbabwean members of PASSOP 
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(interview with Owen Maromo; see also Christie, 2012).  Workers at Keurboskloof were 
from Zimbabwe and Lesotho as well as South Africa, and they went on an unprotected strike 
when the new company that had leased the farm from its owner announced it would be 
lowering their wages to bring them into line with other wages in the Hex Valley (Wilderman, 
2014; Washinyira, 2012).  The company management held some discussion with workers 
and then announced that it would dismiss any workers who went on an unprotected strike 
again.  According to Wilderman (2014), Zimbabweans among the Keurboskloof workers then 
asked Owen Maromo of PASSOP, himself a Zimbabwean, for help with organising a strike, as 
they knew he had been an organiser with the MDC in Zimbabwe and also because PASSOP 
had been seen to be effective in advocating for the rights of the Zimbabweans in the camp 
after the 2009 eviction.  The Keurboskloof workers slept at the entrance to the farm and 
blocked it so that when the farm management attempted to bring in replacement workers 
early one morning, the vehicles transporting them were unable to get in (Maromo, cited in 
Wilderman, 2014).  At that point, ‘the farmer called us for negotiations when he saw he 
would not succeed’ (Maromo, cited in Wilderman, p. 33). Ultimately the Keurboskloof 
workers successfully achieved an unprecedented wage increase, in some cases up to R147 a 
day, which was far above the then-minimum wage of R69 a day and still significantly higher 
than the highest wages paid elsewhere in the valley.  According to Knoetze (cited in 
Wilderman, 2014), other farm workers were initially sceptical of the Keurboskloof strike and 
even ridiculed the workers participating in it, but once the raised wage was achieved, word 
spread quickly and it became a powerful example to others of what could be achieved by 
workers who stood up for their demands (Wilderman, 2014). 
The Keurboskloof strike was a watershed event not only as an instance of successful and 
peaceful worker organising and collective bargaining – according to Maromo in our 
interview, there had never been a successful wage strike in the Hex Valley like this before – 
but also in the sense that it involved workers of all different races and nationalities including 
Zimbabweans.  
The aftermath of the 2009 xenophobia and intergroup relations before the strike 
Some reasons why PASSOP members became involved in facilitating the Keurboskloof strike 
in the first place can themselves thus be traced back to the aftermath of the Zimbabweans’ 
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eviction in 2009.  Indeed, the eviction is one of the ‘micro-dynamics’ Wilderman (2014, p. 
34-35) identifies which made the strike possible:  
The micro-dynamics...include a local experience in De Doorns of service delivery 
protests and a large xenophobic attack in 2009 which led to both the engagement of 
outside organisations and the development of leadership, networks, and a set of 
available protest tactics; this infrastructure and these experiences, coupled with 
long-standing grievances, made it more likely that a spark of hope such as the 
Keurboschkloof strike might ignite into full blown fire.  
 
PASSOP gained wide visibility and a good reputation in the De Doorns farm worker 
community after the eviction through their effective fight for the rights of the Zimbabweans 
in the displaced persons’ camp, their winning of the repatriation gratuity at the end of the 
Zimbabweans’ stay, their continued work towards community cohesion in De Doorns in 
subsequent years (Wilderman, 2014),33 and the fact that South Africans could see that 
PASSOP was assisting at least as many South African workers as Zimbabweans during the 
Keurboskloof strike.34  In the aftermath of the events of November 2009, PASSOP and other 
organisations including the Black Sash and the Scalabrini Centre (for whom Robb and Davis, 
cited above, wrote their 2009 report on the xenophobic violence) undertook intervention 
work in De Doorns, which was 
aimed at both bringing people together across their differences and providing 
material support and advocacy for the Zimbabweans who had been attacked.  The 
state also engaged with a range of initiatives aimed at ending the conflict and 
preventing further conflict from emerging later...These interventions around the 
xenophobic attacks also helped to build bridges across the different groups of farm 
workers and community members; these bridges would be one important 
contributor to achieving the kind of large-scale protest that would later take 
                                                          
33 Also interview with Braam Hanekom, June 2013.  
34
 Further details of how the Keurboskloof strike helped lead to the emergence of a valley-wide and 
then a province-wide strike can be read in Wilderman (2014). Wesso (2013) explains the 
organisational processes of how non-unionised but self-organised workers formed the initial 
impetus behind the strike, and were then demobilised and sidelined in negotiations as trade unions 
and other representatives took over the bargaining processes (see also Christie, 2012).  
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place....In addition...interventions around the xenophobic attacks focused on the 
idea that Zimbabweans were not the enemy, which forced people to ask questions 
about who is the real enemy and who is responsible for the poverty and poor living 
conditions; in this way, these interventions pointed workers toward questions 
around working conditions and relationships to white farm owners (Wilderman, 
2014, p. 35-36, italics added). 
In this way, the eviction of the Zimbabweans in 2009 and PASSOP and other groups’ 
interventions thereafter seem to have had a direct effect not only on reducing conflict 
between the Zimbabwean and South African farm worker communities but also in helping 
to lay some of the conditions of possibility for the strike: ‘In these ways, organisations, the 
history of service delivery protests, and the xenophobic attacks (or rather, the responses to 
them) helped develop community leaders, networks, solidarity, and a set of tactics that 
could be built upon’ (Wilderman, 2014, p. 36). 
Wilderman thus suggests that after 2009 workers began to address the issue of farmers’ 
role in farm workers’ problems, pointing out that the ‘Zimbabweans are not the enemy’.  
We have seen, however, that South African workers already knew this in 2009, as the 
interviews in the previous results chapter showed how they construed farmers as being the 
main agents and the main source of trouble in the town even though their ‘remedial’ action 
was, somewhat inconsistently, directed towards the Zimbabweans.  Nevertheless, a number 
of different sources seem to agree that group-based divisions among workers had thus 
lessened in De Doorns by the time of the strike.  A similar report of moves towards 
community cohesion leading up to the strike is given by PASSOP itself:  
In the weeks before the mass strike, we held several meetings and events, including 
a healing ceremony to reflect on the death of some Zimbabweans after conflict 
erupted between the local Sotho and Zimbabweans about 4 years ago.35 The event 
included the slaughtering of a sheep and a feast for all Sotho, South Africans and 
Zimbabweans who attended.  Thousands attended the event and integration was 
largely achieved.  It is therefore our view that tensions between the Zimbabweans, 
                                                          
35 This refers to the killing of seven Zimbabweans earlier in 2009, mentioned in Chapter 2.  
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Sotho and South Africans were at an all time low when this mass strike began.  
(Hanekom, 2012, n. p.) 
In our interview, Maromo explained that although PASSOP had been instrumental in the 
Keurboskloof strike, it was never their intention to start a valley-wide strike.  Their plans 
were simply for their own farm.  But these intentions were superseded when other workers 
were influenced by the outcome of Keurboskloof and local councillors became involved.  
The Keurboskloof strike initially led to a number of other less successful single-farm strikes 
in the Hex Valley (Wilderman, 2014) which also involved cooperation between South African 
and foreign workers.  One of these took place at on a mushroom farm called Royal 
Mushrooms, where South African and Lesotho workers went on strike for higher pay in 
October 2012 (Hweshe, 2012a, 2012b).  A group of Sotho workers were walking from the 
informal settlements to join South African workers protesting outside the farm gates, and 
on the way thirty-five of them were arrested by the police, apparently without being told 
what they were being arrested for, though later, grounds of not having correct immigration 
documentation were given (Hweshe, 2012a).  It was alleged that their farmer had phoned 
the police to arrest the undocumented workers before payday once they went on strike 
(Hweshe, 2012b).  These Lesotho workers were locked up in the De Doorns police station, 
from where some were later sent to jail, some deported, and some released (Hweshe, 
2012b).  South African workers walked to the police station to show support for the arrested 
Lesotho workers (Hweshe, 2012a).  Although these Lesotho workers were unsuccessful in 
their actual strike, again this is evidence of collaboration between South African and foreign 
workers.  PASSOP further claimed that farmers were simply using the deportation tactic as a 
way of getting rid of foreign workers – some of whom had been working at the farm for 
several years – when they started to strike, though the police denied they had taken orders 
from any farmers (Hweshe, 2012b).  But PASSOP and FAWU (Food and Allied Workers 
Union, the COSATU-affiliated union nominally responsible for farm workers) identified 
numerous instances of such collusion, and FAWU suggested that it was not uncommon for 
farmers to employ undocumented foreign workers and then blow the whistle on them on 
payday, when they would be arrested by the police without being paid (Masemola, 2013; cf 
Johnston, 2007).  Although the Royal Mushrooms farmer himself was also fined for using 
undocumented workers (Hanekom, 2012), numerous arrests and deportations of foreign 
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workers during the rest of the strike36 led PASSOP and FAWU to claim that there was an 
alliance between farmers and the state to ‘punish’ foreign workers for striking, and South 
African workers for ‘not being xenophobic’:  
FAWU...has learned with disdain and disappointment that officials from the Home 
Affairs Department and the officers from the South African Police Services (SAPS) are 
on a concerted xenophobic which-hunt of farm workers [sic], who are mainly 
nationals from Zimbabwe and Lesotho, and in the process have ‘arrested’ more than 
140 in the town of Ceres and surrounding areas....We are aware of an emerging 
alliance between farmers; labour brokers, who some masquerade as supporters of 
farm workers struggles; and some in government, be they police officers, home 
affairs officials or councilors [sic]. 
 The purpose of this campaign is to mete out punishment to the farm workers, 
especially foreign nationals, for having engaged in historically unprecedented strike 
action in pursuit of their demands. Foreign nationals are punished for having part of 
the strike and local farm workers, punished differently, for not been xenophobic. 
This farm workers maximum unity [sic], and zero-xenophobia, surprised everyone, 
including FAWU (Masemola, 2012, n.p.).  
These reports could hardly paint a more different picture of the role of Zimbabwean (and 
other foreign) workers in farm workers’ protests compared to what was being said about 
them in 2009.  At that time, Zimbabweans were accused of not showing solidarity with 
South African workers, of accepting less than minimum wages, of being too compliant 
towards farmers, and of keeping themselves apart and not participating in community 
protests (Robb & Davis, 2009).  By 2012, FAWU went so far as to suspect that there was 
collusion between farmers and the various arms of the state to persecute foreign workers 
for joining in with the strike and pursuing their demands.  Yet another report of worker 
unity during the strike comes from Wilderman’s (2014) interviewees:  
By most reports, when the large-scale farm worker strike broke out in November of 
2012, participation ranged across the different groupings of migrants and locals. As 
one strike committee leader explained, “The people were all united—Zim, Sotho, 
                                                          
36
 Also reported in our interview with Braam Hanekom. 
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coloured, Xhosa speaking—everyone was united...I was willing to give my neighbour 
something he doesn’t have; the strike brought back the struggle culture *of+ the 
1980s and we were really united across the whole group” (Yanda, cited in 
Wilderman, 2014, p. 36).  
  
How the strike played out 
The strike continued through November and December 2012, was called off over Christmas, 
and started again in January 2013.  Strikes and protests spread to other Western Cape 
towns, with many workers deciding to join in when they saw footage of the protests on TV 
(Wilderman, 2014). In January, Nosey Pieterse of BAWUSA tried to get involved but was 
later accused by one of our interviewees of stealing a large sum of money that the 
Department of Labour had given BAWUSA to pay for food parcels for striking workers.  
COSATU tried to call off the strike several times, and was criticised for having a paternalistic 
attitude to workers by trying to contain, direct, control a strike which it did not have a 
mandate to do.  Eventually, with violence and destruction of property not ceasing, the 
government stepped in when Mildred Oliphant, the Minister of Labour, announced that the 
minimum wage for agriculture (which had been set only the previous year) would be raised 
to R105 a day, an increase of around 50% from the previous minimum of R69 but a 
compromise on the workers’ demands of R150.   
However, Wilderman (2014) notes that the workers’ use of disruptive tactics outside of the 
farms and on the streets (for example, blocking the N1 and in some cases shutting down the 
normal functioning of whole towns) meant that  
the collective action and confrontations were more with police than with farm 
owners themselves....While the reliance on these types of power were effective at 
getting government to act, there might have be *sic+ a “power mismatch” in the 
protests because many of the underlying power relationships are still defined 
between farm owner and farm worker on the farms...In other words, the use of 
disruptive power was less effective at changing many of the underlying power 
relationships defined by work and life on the farms.  As evidence of this, we see that 
most farm owners never truly felt compelled to act or aggressively seek resolution of 
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the protest, beyond hiring private security to protect their property.  In addition, in 
the aftermath of the strike, many worker interviewees suggest that the underlying 
relationship with the farm owner has not changed. (p. 101) 
Indeed, the raised wage was not an outcome of bargaining with farmers or forcing farmers 
into a position where they had to negotiate or capitulate to workers’ demands. The Hex 
River Table Grapes Association (HTA), representing farmers, repeatedly said during the 
strike that it was not an organisation that could bargain collectively on behalf of its member 
farmers or to impose a new wage on all of them, as farms are privately owned businesses, 
and that wage negotiations should be done on a farm-by-farm basis.  The consequences of 
farmers themselves not engaging with or capitulating to workers’ demands appeared later 
when workers we interviewed in Stofland in August 2013 reported that many things had got 
worse for them after the strike (see also Kleinbooi, 2013).  For example, on some farms the 
raised wage was offset by charging workers for previously ‘free’ services such as transport 
and rent; some workers were fired for having participated in the strike; and on some farms 
the number of seasonal workers hired back at the start of the 2013 season was only half of 
what it had been in spring 2012.  Some farmers apparently simply refused pay the raised 
wage, or only paid it until the end of the summer season and then went back to the old 
wage; other farmers applied for exemption from the new wage (see also Wilderman, 2014). 
However, some workers, including some Keurboskloof workers we interviewed, said that 
they were consistently being paid the new wage.   
However, overall this backlash from farmers meant that the raised wage ended up being a 
largely ‘empty victory’ (Kleinbooi, 2013, p. 3), and that the strike had been in some ways a 
failure, as farmers were basically able to outmanoeuvre workers on all the gains that they 
had made: ‘By relying on the government to force action through the sectoral 
determination process, farm workers never got the chance to bargain as equals with farm 
owners and reach agreement based on shared consent’ (Wilderman, 2014, p. 84). Overall, 
Wilderman’s participants had mixed views about the ultimate success of the strike, 
expressing pride in having carried it off, in standing up for themselves and in learning to 
organise, but also highly aware that it had many negative consequences for farm workers’ 




To return to the question of intergroup relations during the strike, was the xenophobia of 
2009 then resolved by the time of the strike?  The observations above from PASSOP, FAWU, 
and Wilderman (2014) paint a positive picture of intergroup relations among workers during 
the strike: successful efforts at community reconciliation after 2009, a much greater sense 
of unity among workers of different nationalities, notable participation by Zimbabwean 
organisers and workers in the strikes, and the absence of any xenophobic attack.  However, 
Wilderman (2014) also points to some of the more dilemmatic aspects of this picture of 
worker unity.  First, he notes that anti-Zimbabwean sentiment was not completely absent 
during the strike, and some workers he interviewed believed that ‘immigrants – 
Zimbabweans in particular – undermined the work stoppage by working during the strike 
and then undercutting workers’ wage demands’ (p. 82).  Indeed, ‘in a potentially scary sign’, 
these participants suggested that they were planning to ‘chase the Zimbabweans away’ 
again in the same way as they had tried to do in 2009 (p. 82). Although Wilderman notes 
that such claims did not appear in any interviews outside of De Doorns, ‘with most other 
workers indicating their excitement that they witnessed so much unity across the different 
groupings during the protests’ (p. 82), in our 2012 and 2013 interviews the familiar 
allegations of Zimbabweans’ undercutting wages and displacing South African workers 
appeared several times.  Some of our interviewees agreed that Zimbabweans had gone to 
stay on the farms and work during the strike, where they were protected by private security 
– although Owen Maromo pointed out that it was by no means only Zimbabwean or foreign 
workers who had done so, and that critics should simply say that ‘workers’ had continued 
working on the farms, rather than specifying their nationality or race.  Another group of 
workers I interviewed in November 2012 complained that the 2009 attack had actually had 
the unintended consequence of tipping the Zimbabweans into the lap of the farmers and 
into permanent, farm-dwelling positions, as many of those who were offered 
accommodation by farmers when they were evicted from the informal settlements simply 
ended up staying on there.  This was galling for South African workers as they felt it was 
unfair for Zimbabweans to be given permanent posts ahead of South Africans who had been 
reportedly working at the farms for longer.  Thus, for at least some workers, if anything the 
issue of South African workers feeling displaced by Zimbabweans had become even worse 
since 2009.  
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Wilderman (2014) also notes that some coercion of workers to stop work took place during 
the strike, and in this way implicitly questions the extent of a deep and shared commitment 
to the strike among all workers. For example, having reported how the geography of 
Stofland and its two entrances make it easy to close off the area and enforce a stay-away, 
Wilderman noted that men posted on these bridges would search workers’ bags to see 
whether there were indications, such as a packed lunch, that they were going to work. 
Participants we interviewed said that some of these men who carried knobkerries had 
beaten workers who had tried to get out to work.  Indeed, one of the farmers I interviewed 
in February 2013 said that he had been phoned by workers pleading for help to get out of 
Stofland and Lubisi.  Other reports of coercion to stay away included strikers going through 
the De Doorns townships and breaking down the empty shacks of people they suspected to 
have gone to work; and strike organisers using whistles to wake up township residents and 
get them out of their houses early in the morning to join marches (Wilderman, 2014).  
Farmer 1 also told us about this example of whistles, but said it showed that the strike 
organisers were treating the people ‘like a lot of sheep’.  These suggest that, at the 
individual level at least, there was not total unity of purpose among all farm workers during 
the strike.  Some South African workers we interviewed in November 2012 also expressed 
their disagreement with the violent way the strike was being carried out; and we will see 
that for Zimbabwean workers, with the exception of the Keurboskloof strike their decision 
to stay away from work was mainly informed by fear of such violence.   
This brings us to a third way that the reports of unity among groups of workers can be 
interrogated.  Such reports do not examine the discursive content or substance of this unity 
in any depth.  The claim by FAWU that workers were ‘united across the whole group’ 
suggests not only that workers acted together during the strike, but also were of one mind 
in their reasons for doing so.  What then of the ideological gulf between Zimbabwean and 
South African workers that was so evident in 2009?  At that time, these groups were largely 
playing according to different sets of ideological rules, rules which they read one another’s 
conduct as frequently violating.  Zimbabwean workers were operating according to the 
imperative of anti-xenophobia, in terms of which they themselves were innocent of any 
actual wrongdoing, and South African workers were responsible for most of their own 
problems as well as for the violence that they meted out to the Zimbabweans.  By contrast, 
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those South African workers who supported the eviction were playing according to the rules 
of black liberation and/or white responsibility, in terms of which the onus lay very much on 
Zimbabwean workers to show solidarity with and commitment to South African workers’ 
efforts to resist their white bosses.  Anti-xenophobia discourse suggests that the onus is on 
South Africans – farm workers, brokers, politicians, farmers, local authorities and so on – to 
abstain from or actively prevent and discourage violence against foreign nationals; whereas 
black or worker liberation discourse suggests that the onus lies on uncooperative sections of 
the workforce to act in solidarity in order to make gains and achieve demands.  Thus, we can 
ask: what was the discursive substance of this reported unity in 2012 and 2013?  Had 
Zimbabwean workers changed their earlier so-called stand-offish and superior attitudes, 
renounced their allegiance to farmers and decided to throw in their lot with South African 
workers?  Or was it South African workers who had realised the error of their formerly 
xenophobic and intolerant attitudes and become more accepting of the more hardworking 
Zimbabweans? Or were some concessions made on both sides? Or had these older 
disagreements dissolved and become non-issues by the time of the strike – perhaps 
replaced by other, newer ideological dilemmas?  Or alternatively, was the lack of anti-
Zimbabwean violence simply a reflection of how there was no incentive during the strike for 
those in the local power structures of De Doorns to incite xenophobic violence with 
impunity (c.f. Landau, 2015)?  
By way of an answer we can already make an observation about the way the resolution to 
the problem of ‘xenophobia’ in this community is being talked about by Wilderman’s (2014) 
participants and other observers.  The fact that ‘maximum unity’ is juxtaposed with, and 
treated as the solution to, ‘xenophobia’ suggests that the conflict of 2009 is, in fact, being 
treated as a problem of a lack of unity among the workforce, rather than as primarily a 
problem of the prejudices or resentments of South African farm workers.  This is not 
surprising, because Wilderman’s (2014) thesis approaches the strike from the perspective of 
a trade unionist interested in farm worker organisation, and presuming an imperative of 
worker resistance, whereas Misago (2009) approaches the 2009 conflict from the 
perspective of an organisation researching and combating xenophobic violence, and the fact 
that the De Doorns case took place in a farming community among workers in a labour force 
was treated as secondary to its similarity to other cases of xenophobic violence.  In these 
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ways, the literature, also, imports two different understandings of what the main problem 
in this community actually is, in ways which quite closely resemble those of the actual 
participants on opposite sides of this conflict.  
The 2012-2013 results chapter therefore examines the substance of South African and 
Zimbabwean workers’ reports of improved intergroup relations and lessened conflict 
between their groups since 2009, as well as their discussions of the Zimbabweans’ 
participation in the strike, and offers a slightly more complicated take on this narrative of 
conflict resolution.  While both South African and Zimbabwean workers did agree that the 
tone of their relationship had improved since 2009 and that there had been no further 
attacks on the Zimbabwean community since then, in our interviews these reports of 
improvement were not accompanied by a closing of the ideological gap between the two 
communities. Rather, members of both groups continued to assert and refute more or less 
the same allegations relating to the 2009 violence as they had done at that time.  With the 
partial exception of PASSOP organiser Owen Maromo – who was evidently trying to come 
up with novel ways of organising and speaking about farm worker intergroup relations that 
did not fall either into naively blaming South African workers for their own problems or 
xenophobically blaming Zimbabweans for them instead – neither side demonstrated having 
substantially changed their opinion or having taken up a revised account of the 2009 events. 
That is, South Africans did not express remorse or make apologies for the 2009 attack, and 
neither did Zimbabweans accept responsibility for the eviction by, for example, conceding 
that they were wrong to be aligned with farmers.  Rather, to the extent that participants 
reported an improvement in the relations between their groups since then, they both 
largely ascribed such improvements to changes and adjustments made by the other group, 
not themselves, and thus avoided actually conceding any wrongdoing or taking any 
responsibility for change after 2009.  For example, Zimbabweans mainly said the lack of 
violence was because South African workers had realised that the old allegations about low 
wages were false, whereas South Africans mainly said it was because the Zimbabweans had 
shown greater solidarity during the strike.  However, with the exception of PASSOP 
members, the Zimbabweans simultaneously admitted that the main reason they 
participated in the strike was because of the very real threat of violence from South African 
workers if they did not, rather than because they believed enthusiastically in the value of 
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the strike; and in this way suggested that the memory of the 2009 attack was exerting an 
influence on the decisions they made about participating in the strike and staying away from 
work.  In these ways, our interviews from 2012 and 2013 suggest that the absence of 
xenophobic violence against the Zimbabweans during the strike is not necessarily evidence 
of total unity among workers, nor is it a vindication of the anti-xenophobic imperative which 
implies that xenophobic South Africans are the ones to blame and on whom the onus to 
change falls.  Rather, traces of conflict and disagreement can still be found in the discourse 
of resolution (cf. Billig et al, 1988).   
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Chapter 9: Research methods for 2012 and 2013 fieldwork 
 
Deciding on research aims  
This chapter describes research methods for the 2012 and 2013 case study.  When I 
returned to De Doorns in November 2012 (for some of that time, with research assistant 
Mariza van Wyk), I was no longer new to the context as I had been in 2009.  There were 
many themes in the 2009 results which could have been followed up on and developed in a 
second round of fieldwork, but, a few days before I was due to go back to De Doorns, a new 
curveball appeared in the form of the farm workers’ strike.  This meant that the 
Zimbabwean community and xenophobia were actually no longer the town’s main priorities.  
People were now talking about the strike: why workers were striking, whether they 
themselves supported or opposed it, who (if anyone) they thought was leading it, what had 
happened to them during it, what they hoped or feared would come of it, and, later in the 
August 2013 interviews, what its consequences had been or would likely be.  The 
Zimbabweans did not feature spontaneously in most of these interviews, although in some 
they did; however, in response to our questions participants did have things to say about 
the Zimbabweans and about group relations.  Looking back I can see that I was probably not 
sufficiently prepared and committed to my initial research question, which was to find out 
whether ‘xenophobia’ was still an issue in De Doorns and whether the intergroup dynamics 
of 2009 had changed or not, and was too ready to rely on what people wanted to tell us, so 
that consequently, in some of the 2012-2013 interviews there is no discussion about the 
Zimbabwean community at all – as this was simply not a priority for many people during the 
strike.  In engaging with the interviews and writing the second results chapter, I therefore 
had to decide whether I wanted to focus on what had become of the Zimbabweans, even 
though some of my interviews had nothing to say on this, or to ditch this issue in favour of 
the strike as an event in its own right (or to do both, but this was impractical for length 
reasons).  In the end, I decided to keep the focus on intergroup relations involving the 
Zimbabwean community, because it seemed a more coherent way of developing the overall 




I spent only 4 days in De Doorns during the strike, and decided to leave when it got too 
hairy.  I returned a few times in 2013, once in February to interview all the farmers and 
again for four days between June and August.  In this fieldwork the sampling progressed in 
much the same way as in 2009.  Farmer 1 and Braam Hanekom of PASSOP were approached 
for another interview and agreed.  Farmer 2 and the HTA chairperson were also approached 
again but declined to be interviewed.  The rest of the sample was generated from scratch.  
The rest of the 2012 farmers’ sample snowballed from one farmer (Farmer 4) who was an 
acquaintance of a friend at UKZN.  The participants accessed by snowballing were farmers 4-
6 and the HTA executive director, the manager and water manager on farmer 1’s farm, and 
an administrative staff member on farmer 6’s farm.  The remainder of the participants were 
found by approaching people in the centre of town, the coloured location, Stofland and 
Lubisi.  I avoided Stofland and Lubisi during the strike, and visited these places only later in 
2013.  In the August fieldwork I was accompanied for three days by Nqaba Nkomana and 
Lionel Lottering as research assistants, who were mother-tongue Xhosa and Afrikaans 
speakers respectively.  The full sample of this second round of fieldwork is given in Table 2 
below. Out of the 33 interviews conducted, 13 have been quoted from in the 2012-2013 













1* Thursday 8 November 
2012 
5  Group of bystanders (mainly 
coloured farm workers) 
In the street, near N1, De 
Doorns Oos 
Philippa English/Afrikaans 
2* Thursday 8 November 
2012 
6 Group of coloured residents In the street, outside a 
home in De Doorns Oos 
Philippa English 
3 Thursday 8 November 
2012 
2 Young coloured woman and 
elderly man (possibly her 
father)  
At participants’ dining 
room table, De Doorns 
Oos 
Philippa English 
4 Friday 9 November  
2012 
1 Shop employee (coloured 
man) 
In a shop in De Doorns  Philippa English 
5* Saturday 10 November 
2012 
1 Farmer 1  Farmer’s sitting room Philippa English 
6* Saturday 10 November 
2012 
2 Two black (South African ?) 
farm workers  
On the side of the road in 
De Doorns town centre 
Philippa English 
7* Saturday 10 November 
2012 
1 Zimbabwean shop assistant 
(ex-farm worker) 
On the road outside the 
man’s work, De Doorns 
Philippa English 
8 Monday 12 November 
2012 
1 Central African business 
owner (man) 
On the road outside the 




9 Monday 12 November 1 East African business owner On the road outside the Philippa and English 
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2012 (man) man’s work, De Doorns Mariza 
10* Monday 12 November 
2012 





11 Monday 12 November 
2012 
1 Sub-manager on farmer 1’s 
farm  





12 Thursday 14 February 
2013 
1 Farmer 4  Farm office Philippa English 
13 Thursday 14 February 
2013 
1 Farmer 5, CEO of the HTA  Farm office Philippa English 
14 Thursday 14 February 
2013 
1 Farmer 6 In the garden at farmers’ 
home, with tea 
Philippa English 
15 Thursday 14 February 
2013 
1 Farmer 7  Farm office Philippa English 
16 Thursday 14 February 
2013 
1 Farmer 4’s office administer Farm office Philippa Afrikaans 
(questions asked 
in English) 
17* Saturday 22 June 2013 1 Farm worker, strike organiser 
& former ANC ward councillor 
Coffee shop in De Doorns Philippa English 





19* Saturday 8 August 
2013 
1 Owen Maromo, PASSOP At interviewee’s home, De 
Doorns Oos 
Philippa English 
20 Saturday 8 August 
2013 
1 Elderly coloured woman Outside home in Stofland Philippa English/Afrikaans 
21 Saturday 8 August 
2013 
2 Xhosa-speaking man and 
woman, farm workers  
Inside home in Stofland Nqaba and 
Philippa 
isiXhosa 
22 Thursday 8 August 
2013 
1 Young Xhosa-speaking 
woman, farm worker 





23* Thursday 8 August 
2013 
3 3 young Zimbabwean men, 
farm workers 
Outside a shop in Stofland Philippa and 
Nqaba 
English 
24* Thursday 8 August 
2013 
1 Xhosa-speaking man, farm 
worker 
In the street, Stofland Nqaba and 
Philippa 
isiXhosa 
25* Thursday 8 August 
2013 
2 Two Xhosa-speaking women 
farm workers 
In a room in Stofland Nqaba and 
Philippa 
isiXhosa 
26 Saturday 10 August 
2013 
1 Xhosa-speaking woman, farm 
worker 
In a shop in Stofland Nqaba and 
Philippa 
isiXhosa 
27 Saturday 10 August 
2013 
1 Xhosa-speaking man, farm 
worker 
In the ppt’s yard, Lubisi Nqaba and 
Philippa 
isiXhosa 
28 Saturday 10 August 
2013 
1 Xhosa-speaking man, labour 
broker 





29 Saturday 10 August 
2013 
1 Xhosa-speaking man, farm 
worker 







30* Saturday 10 August 
2013  
2 Two Xhosa-speaking men Inside a room, Lubisi Nqaba and 
Philippa 
isiXhosa 
31* Saturday 17 August 
2013 





32 Saturday 17 August 
2013 
2 Afrikaans-speaking farm 
supervisor and his daughter, a 
farm worker 





33* Saturday 17 August 
2013 
2 Afrikaans-speaking labour 
broker and his wife  
In the interviewee’s sitting 




Number of participants in 2012-2013:  51 
Total participants overall: 116 
Total interviews overall: 70
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Sampling from time 
In 2009, all the data was collected within two weeks. However, in 2012-2012, only eleven 
interviews were conducted in the four days I spent in De Doorns in early November, and the 
remainder were completed between February and August 2013.  By the time I eventually 
returned to Stofland and Lubisi for three days in August, however, it was almost the start of 
the next season, and as we interviewed workers it became clear that we were not merely 
finishing the sample I had left unfinished the previous November but generating a new kind 
of data in which people were now talking about the negative longer-term consequences of 
the strike that workers were starting to feel, such as mass retrenchments, having to pay for 
previously free services on farms, and some farmers’ failure to pay the increased minimum 
wage.  This was a powerful lesson about how the world moves on whether or not your 
research keeps up with it.  In these interviews, I remembered to ask South Africans about 
how things were going with the Zimbabweans, and in practice this usually took the form of a 
question about whether Zimbabweans had participated in the strike.  
Gaps and biases in the sample  
A weakness in the 2012-2013 sample is the small number of Zimbabwean workers 
interviewed.  There were only four interviews with a total of 6 Zimbabwean workers in this 
round of fieldwork, one of whom was also a PASSOP member, plus one other interview with 
the Director of PASSOP.  It was relatively difficult to find Zimbabweans after the strike 
because they were now a minority living in the informal settlements, unlike in 2009 when 
they were all living in the camp and thus more easily accessible.  This small sample makes it 
more difficult to draw strong conclusions from the second round of fieldwork about the 
Zimbabweans’ perspective on conflict resolution since 2009.  
A second important gap in the 2012-2013 dataset is that only one farmer out of the four 
who were interviewed was asked about the Zimbabweans and whether they played any role 
in the strike.  In interviews with the other four, whom I interviewed on one day in February 
2013, I only asked them about the strike.  The question of how farmers responded to the 
Zimbabweans’ participation in the strike is of course one of the crucial and now mostly 
unanswered questions in a project that has tried to show the texture of this three-way 
relationship and how it might have been altered (or not) by the strike.  
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A third gap (although this is not necessarily a weakness) is that I interviewed only one 
person who could be considered an influential community leader (interview 17).  This 
woman was a member of the Women on Farms Project and a former ANC ward councillor. 
However, since other strike research is based mainly on interviews with people influential in 
farm worker organisations (e.g. Wilderman, 2014; Webb, 2013), the focus here on people 
who were not community organisers is a plus.  
Interviewing and questions 
In 2012 and 2013, the emergence of the strike meant that I had to decide – both during data 
collection, and also in the analysis process afterwards – whether to bend the focus in this 
second case study towards the strike, which was now the town’s new priority, or to try and 
stick to my original intention of following up on intergroup relations involving the 
Zimbabweans, even if this was no longer the most pressing issue for participants.  Although 
we have seen that the Zimbabwean community did play a role in these strikes in a number 
of ways, much of the talk in our interviews now revolved around the demands and actions 
of protesting workers as a whole, and farmers’ (and sometimes the police’s) responses to 
these actions, rather than being about anything that the Zimbabweans had or had not done. 
I did not negotiate this unexpected change of focus particularly well, and in several cases 
simply did not ask interviewees anything about their relationship with Zimbabwean workers 
or the Zimbabweans’ role in the strike, so focussed were we all on the other priorities of the 
moment.  In this way, relying on the participants to take the initiative in what they wanted 
to talk about led to some reasonably serious omissions, and some weaknesses of the second 
case study that arose from these factors will be addressed in the next chapter.  In the 
process I learnt that interviewing people about an event on which everyone has an opinion 
which they are intent on conveying to you is different to interviewing people about a ‘non-
event’ where nothing may actually have happened – for example, the lack of xenophobic 
violence against the Zimbabweans during the strike – and which is not at the top of 
participants’ list of rhetorical priorities.   
However, another unexpected finding was that a different three-way configuring of 
intergroup relations emerged marginally in these interviews. This was a relationship 
between coloured and black workers and their different relationships to farmers.  This is 
important because it contextualises the South African-Zimbabwean division that was to the 
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fore in 2009 in terms of an older racial division between coloured and black workers (cf 
Ewert & Hamman, 1996). 
Analysis of the 2012-2013 interviews 
Just as in the interviewing process itself, in the analysis of the 2012-2013 interviews the 
main decision to make was thus whether to focus on the strike or on what had become of 
the Zimbabweans.  Initially I tried to do the former, and earlier versions of the 2012-2013 
results chapter involved farmers’ and workers’ different understandings of what the strike 
was about and their responses to it.  However, partly so as to follow the lesson I learnt in 
2009 about not only problematising events that involve violence, and partly because doing it 
this way seemed to fit best with the overall three-group social psychology theory I have 
been trying to develop, I decided ultimately to keep the focus on the Zimbabweans.  I 
looked for cases in the interviews where people were talking about the three-way 
relationship between the Zimbabwean and South African workers and farmers as in 2009, 
but this was muddied by a lot of talk about the strike itself, and hampered by a number of 
interviews where the Zimbabweans did not come up.  Also, there was not enough data from 
farmers to make up a whole section on farmers’ views on the Zimbabweans’ participation in 
the strike.  Further, because I was not primarily focussing on the strike itself, it was not 
appropriate to construct another chapter in the form of a conversation shaped around this 
major local controversy.  
 
Rather, the main focus is on the way Zimbabwean and South African workers talked about 
the 2009 violence, about the resolution of conflict since then, and about the Zimbabweans’ 
participation in the strike.  I realised that one significant thing about the strike interviews 
was the absence of any significant change in how either South African or Zimbabwean 
workers talked about the 2009 eviction.  When remembering it, neither Zimbabwean nor 
South African workers offered any significantly revised account of that event or the reasons 
for why it happened. Both South African and Zimbabwean workers continued to tell 
essentially the same story about 2009 and their own role in it, levelling and rebutting the 
same allegations about whether the Zimbabweans had or had not worked for lower wages 
and whether they had been taking South Africans’ jobs. This lack of any significantly new or 
revisionist retrospective interpretations of that conflict enables a critical reflection on the 
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extent of ‘conflict resolution’ between Zimbabwean and South African farm workers by the 





Chapter 10: Towards solidarity? Results of 2012-2013 fieldwork 
  
This chapter has two major themes which run through its four Parts.  The first theme 
concerns questions of ‘conflict resolution’ as described at the end of the previous chapter 
and asks to what extent participants saw the intergroup conflict of 2009 between 
Zimbabwean and South African workers and farmers as having been resolved by 2012.  The 
second theme considers other configurations of intergroup division and allegiance than the 
three-way one considered so far in this thesis, and especially the possibility that the ‘South 
African labouring community’ is itself an alliance among groups with somewhat different 
interests in change.  Part 1 starts by showing how South African farm workers were speaking 
about the Zimbabwean community in November 2012 during the early days of the farm 
workers’ strike.  Several groups of South Africans were still expressing the same grievances 
about Zimbabwean workers as we heard repeatedly in 2009 – concerns about working for 
lower wages, or even working during the strike, and displacing South Africans from their 
places on farms.  However, what is highlighted in this section is the kind of relationship with 
farmers that these South African speakers presumed to be desirable, and which they said 
the Zimbabweans were spoiling by doing these things.  For some workers, the Zimbabweans 
were a problem because they were disrupting the erstwhile paternalistic relationship South 
African workers claimed to have enjoyed with farmers in the past.  These speakers harked 
back to the old days when farmers and workers helped and looked out for each other.  For 
other workers, however, the Zimbabweans were a problem because they were undermining 
efforts to cultivate an adversarial relationship with farmers, by undermining South African 
workers’ bargaining efforts and contributing to the oversupply of work-seekers.  This is 
important not only because it contradicts the reports in the previous chapter of ‘maximum 
unity’ and ‘zero-xenophobia’ during the strike, but also because the apparently widespread 
opposition to the Zimbabweans among South African farm workers that was evident in 2009 
may conceal the fact that different workers have different reasons for wanting them to 
leave.   
Part 2 examines reports of resolved conflict and improved relations between the 
Zimbabwean and South African labouring communities, which come mostly from interviews 
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conducted later in 2013, in which participants retrospectively discussed the strike and the 
Zimbabweans’ participation in it.  In these interviews, both South African and Zimbabwean 
workers did say that there had been a general improvement in the relationship between 
their groups since 2009 and even during the strike.  However, they ascribed the lack of 
further overt xenophobic conflict to changes and adjustments that the other group, not 
their own, had made since then.  For instance, Part 2A shows how Zimbabwean workers 
reported a qualified improvement in their relations with their South African counterparts 
since 2009, saying that South Africans had become more tolerant and accepting of them 
because they had realised that the old allegations about low wages and job-taking were 
false, and/or that perpetrating violence had ultimately served no effective purposes for 
them.  In accounting for this improvement by referring to South Africans’ realisations and 
changed behaviour, then, they avoided accepting responsibility for any of the problems of 
2009, and continued to treat that violence as something South Africans were mainly guilty 
of, and South Africans as the group on whom the onus lay to effect change.  In this way, 
they continued to presume the imperative of anti-xenophobia.  The important exception 
here came from Zimbabwean members of PASSOP, who emphasised the importance of 
developing a shared class consciousness among workers across national boundaries while at 
the same time challenging the idea that all divisions within the workforce originated with 
the Zimbabweans themselves.  
Part 2B then shows that the discourse of South African workers about this partially resolved 
conflict was essentially a mirror image of the Zimbabweans’.  That is, when asked why there 
had been no conflict with the Zimbabweans during the strike, they mainly said that this was 
because the Zimbabweans had changed since 2009 and had shown greater solidarity with 
South Africans’ wage struggles, including visibly participating in the strike.  They did not say 
anything remotely resembling the Zimbabwean workers’ claims that they (South Africans) 
had realised that the allegations about low wages and job-taking in 2009 were false.  Rather, 
they continued to re-assert them.  In this way, South African workers continued to place the 
onus to change on the Zimbabweans, rather than themselves, and thus continued to play by 
the rules of black or worker liberation, in terms of which the Zimbabwean community 
needed to (and often did) ‘show solidarity’ in the strike.  This suggests that although both 
groups did report an improvement in the relationship between their groups, with the 
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exception of PASSOP members this did not appear to be accompanied by an actual closing 
of the ideological gap that was so evident in 2009, or the appearance of a common set of 
ideas about what constitutes right conduct for farm workers.  
This ideological gap is further illustrated by the way the Zimbabweans accounted for their 
own participation in the strike, shown in Part 2C.  As stated, when speaking in general terms 
about their relations with South Africans, Zimbabweans by and large said that things had 
improved because South Africans had become more tolerant and understanding.  When 
asked specifically about their own participation in the strike, however, they mostly said that 
they had participated because they were afraid of the violence that might be visited on them 
if they didn’t.  In this way, they simultaneously conceded and did not concede to the 
demands of striking South African workers: they grudgingly showed that they had learnt 
their lesson from 2009 about what happens to workers who do not show solidarity, and 
thus practically, conceded to these demands; but simultaneously they refused to accept the 
moral onus to change, as they presented these threats of violence during the strike as an 
illegitimate way of bullying and forcing workers, which did not affect their beliefs about 
what actually constitutes right conduct in any significant way.  
Part 2C contains an extract from farmer 1, the only farmer who was asked specifically about 
the Zimbabweans’ participation in the strike.  One of the crucial questions in this follow-up 
case study is the question of how farmers understood the Zimbabweans’ participation in the 
strike and whether this participation challenged their expectation of the Zimbabweans’ 
continued allegiance.  Farmer 1 knew that Zimbabwean workers and PASSOP had been 
involved in the Keurboskloof strike, which he referred to as a ‘riot’ and as the ‘first unrest 
this year’.  He made a display of incomprehension about why Zimbabweans would ‘riot’ like 
this when they had previously always had such good relations with farmers.  In this way, he 
took their participation in that strike as a possible interruption of their allegiance.  However, 
he then offered a speculative reason for the Keurboskloof strike, which amounted to a 
suspicion that Braam Hanekom, leader of PASSOP, was being paid by the ANC.  In this way, 
he partially ‘redeemed’ the Zimbabwean-farmer alliance from the threat of Zimbabweans’ 
evident resistance, by supplying a dubious external reason for why they might have been 
striking.   
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Part 3 turns back to the theme of a new configuration of intergroup allegiance and division 
than that which has been mainly considered so far.  The xenophobic violence of 2009 made 
salient the distinction among workers between South African citizens and Zimbabwean 
citizens, a distinction which we have examined at length and which at face value makes 
sense when viewing the 2009 violence as a case of ‘xenophobia’.  But as we saw, numerous 
references were also made in the 2009 interviews to identities other than national ones – 
workers were referred to as coloured, Xhosa, and Sotho as well as, and perhaps even more 
often than, ‘South African’.  As we also know, before the Zimbabweans arrived it was the 
coloured community who occupied the putatively ‘favoured’ position in the eyes of farmers 
relative to black South Africans, and thus, at an earlier time, it was racial rather than 
national divisions which were to the fore (cf Ewert & Hamman, 1996).  In 2009 these other 
identities appeared to have been subsumed under an apparently widespread and shared 
opposition to the Zimbabweans from all sectors of the South African workforce; there was 
no mention in those interviews of conflict between black and coloured workers, for 
example.  But in 2012, I heard for the first time a coloured South African man complaining 
about the Zimbabweans not mainly because they were non-citizens, but because they were 
black.  He lumped all black people together and blamed them for the rise of violent crime in 
the Hex Valley.  Black people were also collectively referred to as ‘die nasies’ (the nations) 
and ‘inkomers’ (in-migrants or outsiders), thus conflating racial and geographical identities 
in a way that may be unique to the Western Cape because of its peculiar history of racial 
influx control under the Coloured Labour Preference Policy (Goldin, 1984).  This interview 
shows that the distinction between who is a foreigner and who is a citizen is not the only or 
inevitable way of understanding group divisions within the workforce.  Thus, this chapter 
both extends the discussion about the dilemmas and limitations of the anti-xenophobia 
paradigm in questions of conflict resolution since 2009, and it also draws attention to the 
way configurations of intergroup allegiance and division can themselves shift and change 
strategically over time.  
Part 1: South African workers complain about Zimbabweans at the start of 
the farm workers’ strike  
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Contra the claims that there was ‘maximum unity’ and ‘zero xenophobia’ among workers 
during the strike, South African workers interviewed in the early days of the strike (8-11 
November 2012) mostly had the same kinds of grievances about the Zimbabwean 
community as we heard in the previous results chapter.  Once again undercutting of wages 
and displacement from farm jobs were to the fore, this time in the context of the strike.  
However, as these are not new observations, what will rather be emphasised in this section 
is the subtle differences in the kind of relationship with farmers that South African speakers 
constructed as being desirable, and which they said the Zimbabweans were spoiling – either 
a paternalistic relationship, or an adversarial one.   
Extract 1: Three black South African farm workers (interview 6, November 2012)  
1 Philippa: um, and the Zimbabweans, so three years ago they were living in that camp, 
2 Sonwabo:  yes 
3 Philippa:  now they back in:: [the townships, Stofland 
4 Sonwabo:                    [they back to the locations now ja 
5 Philippa:  okay and how are things::, (.) there d- 
6 Sonwabo:  Yeh things going all right there  
7 Philippa:  Except for the shops ((referring to looting of foreign-owned shops during the 
  strike))  
8 Sonwabo:  Ye, the- they don’t have a shops.  
((9 lines omitted)) 
17 Philippa:  And do the farmers still like them? ((small laugh))  
18 Sonwabo:  They like them very much *P: kay ((small laugh))+ Ja I can say that. I don’t   
19  want to but I can say that they are very cheap.  
20 Philippa:  ja:: okay  
21 Sonwabo:  So they take that advantage. [PK: okay.] That’s why the people starting to  
22  kick them out. Because they are very cheap.  
24 Philippa:  okay 
25 Bongani:  fifty Rand a day 
26 Philippa:  Ja:: this is what we hear 
27 Moses:  Us we want one fifty, (     ) ((few words in another language)) hundred (   )  
28  one fifty, (su) sixty Rand a day.  
29 Philippa:  mmm 
30 Sonwabo:  Ja like now, people they are we strike there, they are hear some people say 
31  some Zimbabweans they are working at the farm.  
32 Philippa:  O:::h shoh 
33 Sonwabo:  ja 
34 Philippa:  okay 
35 Sonwabo:  that’s why they are walking around (any) while you are finding on the, on the 
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36  work they beat him. 
37 Philippa:  ((breathes in)) hl:::::: shoh 
38 Sonwabo:  Ja 
  
Extract 2: Coloured workers in De Doorns Oos (interview 1, November 2012) 
1 Philippa: Do you think that farm workers could orga-, could bargain with the farmers  
2  without the organizers, or that-, or not, not, that’s not possible?  
3 Joe:   No, you see in some situations I can explain you like this. When a farm   
4  worker approaches his boss and to tells him about a more wage, he either  
5  tells you, ‘you take this, or you leave my farm’.  
6 Philippa:  Okay 
7 Andries:  You ha-, you don’t-, an-, what they say? ‘We don’t have a right.’ If you, if you  
8  don’t wanna work, you wanna strike about the wages, then the the boss tells 
9  you *P: go+ ‘go, I don’t have work for you’. 
10 Marcus:  ‘There’s other people that wants to work.’ 
11 Andries:  If you, like that you don’t have a right to strike.  
12 Philippa:  Oka:::y, [phoof! 
13 Joe:                [That’s where three years back the strike came about, that’s where 
14  the Zimbabweans people came in there, and offered the guy a lower rate [P: 
15  ja] and he can take them on.  
16 Andries:  It’s more about the xenophobia, it’s more about the Zimbabweans and other 
17  people from other countries coming into the country and taking [M2: Our  
18  jobs over+ the people, the citizens of this country’s jobs.  
19 Marcus:  But they jeopardize our living style here [M2: Yes, (you see?)], because why, 
20  they come here with the minimum wage of R20 a day. [M2: (R40)] We are  
21  struggling for a higher loan, a higher average pay [M2 & P: higher wage] but 
22  they come here, they say the larney (    ), (‘we wanna) work R20 a day’. *P:  
23  ja] Now what are the larneys, what is the boss gonna do? They gonna  
24  take a Zimbabwean.  
((5 lines omitted)) 
25 Philippa:  So are there, are there still Zimbabweans here?  
26 Joe, Marcus: yes, yes, they still here 
27 Philippa:  A lot or a few  
28 Joe:  There lots of them, there are lots of them 
29 Philippa:  Okay, where do they mainly live?  
30 Joe:  here (     ) 
31 Marcus:  Here, but since that strike, [P: ja] the last time, [P: ja] that xenophobia   
32  thing, they went to the farms, the, the boers took them there.  
33 Joe:  The farmers took them there 
((fifteen lines omitted)) 
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34 Marcus:  Across the (     ), there’s a farm here. *P: Okay+ There’s lots of them. *P: Shoh] 
35  (  ) today. They took in the Zimbabweans (     ) ((unclear - windy)). They wanna  
36  (spite) for us. They even give, they say, they gave the Zimbabweans R100 a  
37  day but why don’t you wanna give us that money? [Joe: Ja] 
38 Philippa:  Okay. But I thought you said that the Zimbabweans were working for twenty? 
39 Marcus:  Ja. They want to spite us  
40 Andries:  That was just an example that he made 
41 Joe:  It was just an example 
42 Marcus:  They wanna spite us.  
43 Philippa:  Oh, okay. The farmers?  
44 Marcus:  Ja.  
45 Joe:  The farmers they, offer R100.  
46  ((few unclear words))  
47 Marcus:  People that been working on the farm for maybe five years already, he never  
48  became permanent, a permanent farm worker.  That Zimbabweans can only 
49  go 3 months, 4 months, then they be-, they became permanent, [P: Yes, so-] 
50  which is wrong.  
((20 lines omitted)) 
51 Philippa:  Hmm. Some people, it seems like people, farm workers and coloured people 
52  feel like the Zimbabweans are taking our places.  
53 All:     Yes, yes  
54 Philippa:  Is that it 
55 Marcus:  That is part of why the xenophobia and stuff like that come  
56 Joe:  Xenophobia uh, violence broke out uh three years back  
57 Philippa:  Okay  
58 Marcus:  Yes, against them. Because they, they don’t care what you busy, doing or,  
59  busy talking about to the, to the white people, they just do their thing you  
60  see? And taking what we-  
61 Philippa:  Okay 
62 Andries:  They don’t care about our lifestyle here. *Marcus: Ja+ 
((eight lines omitted)) 
63 Philippa:  I mean, did you guys support that xenophobia that happened, (some,  
64  those times)?  
65 Marcus:  I can’t say I did, but- [P: okay] But so-so, I can’t say, I’m in between, you see? 
66  *P: okay, ja, shoh+ It’s not right what, what they doing to the people, but it’s 
67  the right thing according to me it’s right, because, we as citizens of this   
68  country have to get first choice [P: okay] in the matter.  
69 Philippa:  Okay, shoh, hmm  
70 Marcus:  I don’t know if it’s right by you, but I think it’s right that way.  
71 Philippa:  Okay. Sho, I don’t know uh-  
72 Joe:  No, it’s right, I agree with him. We agree with him. [P: Okay] I mean, we have, 
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73  we are the citizens of this town here, of De Doorns, why not, why, we should 
74  get the first preference of everything that goes on here. But here in this town 
75  you know, people come from outside to get jobs here first, [P: ja] but we that 
76  stay here don’t get the jobs first. 
 
Extract 3: 2nd group of coloured workers in De Doorns Oos (interview 2, Nov 2012) 
1 Bettie:  Because uh, you see the people who are coming in De Doorns now like the  
2  the Zimbabweans and Sotho’s, they were prepared to-, they were willing to  
3  work for that small amount before, [P: Mmm+ that’s why they chased the  
4  Zims, a few years back. They were prepared to work for that money. And we, 
5  the, the white people chose them, and they left us. Now they are fighting for 
6  (these things). 
7 Philippa:  Okay, shoh. Are they Zimbabwe-, the Zimbabweans are still here? 
8 All:   yes, yes 
9 Piet:   A lot of them 
10 Matthew: What we really wish for, né, our wish is that if the government had- because 
11  it’s mos because of the government of the day that these things are now   
12  going on, because they let in all these unnecessary people. [B: Mm]   
13  Understand? And our wish is, if, if the government can do that for us, that  
14  they must go back, there to where they come from. 
15 Philippa:  Okay.  They should go back to where they came from? 
16 Piet & Bettie: yes 
((two lines omitted)) 
17 Matthew:  And then we will be able to go on in peace with how we used to live here in 
18  De Doorns. [B: mm, peaceful life] And it was the best and the most lovely  
19  place. [P: hmm] All the years we stood under the authority ((gesag)) of the  
20  farmers.   
21 Philippa:  What’s the- 
22 Bettie:  ((translating)) He say that um it’s best for the foreigners to go back, [P: Okay] 
23  the Sotho’s and (Zims), go back because all the years we’ve been staying   
24  together, we didn’t have any problem, and we did listen to the white people. 
25  [P: Okay] Because (at) the end of the day some, there is some farmers, when 
26  you have a problem you can go to them, they (wish to) help you with a   
27  funeral or whatsoever. [P: Okay] But now it’s like, they destroying the farms, 
28  [P: okay] they were-, the farmers, they, they won’t trust us anymore. They  
29  won’t trust us anymore.  
((24 lines omitted)) 
30 Philippa:  So, alright. What do you guys think would be like a solution or a way   
31  forward? Can you translate?  
32 Bettie:  What is the, what do we think will be the solution going for-  
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33 Charl:  They must go back to their country.  
34 Matthew: No, what I say, they must go back.  
35 Piet:  Ja, They must all go back. [B: They must go back.] They must go back.  
36 Matthew: That’s the only way.  
37 Bettie:  They must go back.  
38 Philippa:  Shoh. Shoh shoh shoh.  
39 Piet:  And we can live in peace. [P: Okay] And work in peace.  
40 Philippa:  Okay. Hmm 
41 Matthew: That is all. 
 
These extracts contain very similar complaints about the Zimbabweans during the strike as 
were expressed by South African workers in 2009, especially that the Zimbabweans were 
undercutting wages and wage bargaining processes (extract 1, lines 18-19 & 30-31; extract 
2, lines 10-15, 20; extract 3, lines 1-5), and displacing South Africans from their rightful 
places in farm jobs (extract 2, lines 16-24 & 31-62; extract 3 lines 4-5).  Also present are 
recommendations for the Zimbabweans to leave the country (extract 3, lines 13-14, 34-40) 
and ambivalent agreements that evicting the Zimbabweans in 2009 was the right move 
(extract 2 lines 63-76).  In these ways, the speakers in these extracts appear to be in 
agreement in their opposition to the Zimbabweans.  
However, despite this apparent agreement it is possible to discern slightly different reasons 
that the speakers give for wanting the Zimbabweans to leave, reasons that revolve around 
different constructions of the ideal farmer-worker relationship.  Speakers in extracts 1 and 2 
appear to aspire to an adversarial relationship with farmers rather than a paternalistic one, 
and they speak numerous times about the difficulty of cultivating such a relationship: ‘When 
a farm worker approaches his boss and to tells him about a more wage, he either tells you, 
“you take this, or you leave my farm”’ (extract 2, line 5); ‘What they say? We don’t have a 
right...if you don’t wanna work, you wanna strike about the wages, then the the boss tells 
you “go, I don’t have work for you”’ (lines 7-9); ‘There’s other people that wants to work’ 
(line 10); ‘you don’t have a right to strike’ (line 11).  It is in the context of this construction of 
impotence in negotiating power that the Zimbabweans are then spontaneously mentioned 
as a group who contributes to this process by adding to the oversupply of willing workers: 
‘That’s where three years back the strike came about, that’s where the Zimbabweans 
people came in there, and offered the guy a lower rate and he can take them on’ (extract 2 
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lines 13-14).  Thus, while these speakers still construe their problem with the Zimbabweans 
in terms of a three-way relationship with farmers, we can observe more specifically that the 
Zimbabweans are a problem for them because they undermine the possibility of cultivating 
an adversarial relationship with farmers in which healthy wage bargaining takes place.  
By contrast, the speakers in extract 3 do not speak about their relationship with farmers in 
adversarial terms, and the Zimbabweans are not accused of undermining the development 
of an adversarial relationship.  Rather, they are accused of spoiling the formerly paternalistic 
relationship between workers and farmers.  First the speakers in extract 3 recall the events 
leading up to the 2009 violence in this way: ‘the white people chose them, and they left us’ 
(line 5).  This suggests a sense of abandonment or betrayal by a group who used to be a 
loyal partner.  Then after suggesting that the Zimbabweans should go back to where they 
came from, Matthew says ‘And then we will be able to go on in peace with how we used to 
live here in De Doorns....And it was the best and the most lovely place.  All the years we 
stood under the authority of the farmers’ (extract 3 lines 18-20, emphasis added).  No 
mention of wage bargaining is made here; rather Matthew suggests a nostalgic desire to 
return to a previous state of (supposed) tranquillity in which the hierarchy ordering workers’ 
and farmers’ interactions is stable and unchallenged.  Bettie then translates and elaborates: 
‘He say that um it’s best for the foreigners to go back, the Sotho’s and (Zims), go back, 
because all the years we’ve been staying together, we didn’t have any problem, and we did 
listen to the white people...Because (at) the end of the day some, there is some farmers, 
when you have a problem you can go to them, they (wish to) help you with a funeral or 
whatsoever’ (lines 22-26).  Here Bettie again harks back to the days of paternalism when 
workers related to farmers as obedient subjects (‘we did listen to the white people’), but 
could also expect ‘help’ from good farmers with unusual expenses like funerals (cf du Toit, 
1993).  The speakers in extract 3 also assume that there is a degree of trust between 
workers and farmers, as evidenced by their worry that striking workers are ‘destroying the 
farms’ - presumably a reference to the burning of vineyards which had happened a few days 
before these interviews - and thus also the trust between farmers and workers: ‘they won’t 
trust us anymore’ (lines 28-29).  Hence, in the closing lines of the extract, the workers 
suggest that the Zimbabweans should go back to where they came from so that ‘we can live 
in peace.  And work in peace’ (line 40).  This construction of farmers as benevolent dictators 
227 
 
and workers as their contented subjects, bound together by mutual trust and help, is quite 
different from extract 2, where workers seemed to be trying to find a way to challenge to 
the absoluteness of the farmers’ refusal to engage in wage bargaining.  Thus, the workers in 
these extracts illustrate two different ideal constructions of the farmer-worker relationship, 
and therefore also two different reasons for wanting the Zimbabweans to leave: for some, 
their leaving would purportedly allow a return to a peaceful but subservient relationship 
with farmers, whereas for others, their leaving would allow workers find an adversarial way 
of engaging with farmers, in which workers’ wage bargaining efforts have some purchase.  
These extracts thus gesture towards workers’ different interests in change. Some workers 
who have been invested in paternalistic farm communities may feel that they have a lot to 
lose by the unravelling of these relationships, and may thus have different reasons for 
wanting the Zimbabweans to leave compared to those workers who have either never been 
invested in paternalist relations with farmers or who no longer see that their interests are 
served by them (cf Wilderman, 2014).   
Another reading of these interview extracts is that they show the dilemma that is present 
for all workers about whether to see farmers as their adversaries or as their benevolent 
helpers.  Such an analysis is supported by Webb (2017) who shows how two different trade 
unions working with Western Cape farm workers, Sikhula Sonke (“We grow together”) and 
CSAAWU (Commercial Stevedoring, Agricultural and Allied Workers’ Union), have two 
different approaches to paternalism and how farmers should be engaged with. Sikhula 
Sonke tries to maintain good relations with farmers and warns that antagonising them leads 
to the erosion of paternalistic bonds which can mean significant loss of benefits for workers. 
In the first instance they will try to solve farm problems internally before referring cases to 
the CCMA.  Thus, ‘paternalism’ appears to be seen as something that, if handled correctly, 
can be used to workers’ advantage (see also White, 2010).  By contrast, CSAAWU, an 
independent, non-COSATU aligned union, is much more overtly confrontational and sees 
paternalism as an inherently violent, intimidating and silencing system which makes workers 
unable to express themselves or speak out about human rights abuses on farms.  CSAAWU 
sees Sikhula Sonke as apolitical and too focussed on individual farmers, instead of 
challenging the system as a whole (CSAAWU, 2012, cited in Webb, 2017).  Webb’s analysis 
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thus supports the view that workers (or at least, trade unionists) have different ideas about 
how workers’ own interests are served or not served by paternalism.  
However, more can be said about the identities the speakers in these extracts claim for 
themselves, and implicitly what it is about the Zimbabweans that offends or runs counter to 
this identity.  All the way through this thesis, I have been talking about ‘the South African 
farm worker community’ and contrasting this to ‘the Zimbabwean farm worker community’.  
In this way, a nationality-based distinction was presumed to be the most salient line of 
division among workers.  And this is indeed one way these workers talk about the conflict: 
‘It’s more about the xenophobia, it’s more about the Zimbabweans and other people from 
other countries coming into the country and taking...the people, the citizens of this country’s 
jobs’ (extract 2 lines 16-18, emphasis added).  The group repeats this claim to citizenship 
later on: ‘it’s the right thing according to me it’s right, because, we as citizens of this country 
have to get first choice’ (lines 67-68).  This is a textbook illustration of Neocosmos’s (2006) 
claim that South Africa has ‘ended up in the paradoxical position of justifying exclusion on 
democratic grounds’ (p. 72); or, as Palmary (2017) has it, that ‘the political transition that 
South Africa has undergone is used as a justification for excluding foreigners in the name of 
realizing freedom’ (n. p.).  New South African citizenship was supposed to be an inclusive 
category overcoming the racial divisions of the old South Africa, in terms of which only 
whites fully qualified for citizenship, and blacks were supposed to be citizens of the 
homelands.  Now, the Bantustans may have been ‘struck off the map’ (Neocosmos, 2006, p. 
19) thus dissolving pseudo-national divisions among black South Africans and also between 
whites and blacks, but the borders around this new ‘inclusive’ nation are simply extended to 
create a new line of division between who belongs and who does not, who is entitled to 
citizens’ benefits and who is not (see also Palmary, 2017).   
However, South African citizenship is not the only identity speakers claim for themselves in 
extract 2 – there are two others.  The first is a racial identity, where the interviewer herself 
suggests to the group that ‘it seems like people, farm workers and coloured people feel like 
the Zimbabweans are taking our places’ (lines 51-52).  To this there is enthusiastic 
agreement; although the fact that the speakers did not bring up coloured identity 
themselves limits what we can say about this in this instance. The second other identity that 
appears in the extract is as ‘citizens of this town’ rather than as citizens of the country. ‘We 
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are the citizens of this town here, of De Doorns, why not, why, we should get the first 
preference of everything that goes on here. But here in this town you know, people come 
from outside to get jobs here first’ (lines 73-75).  At first glance there may not seem to be 
anything significantly different between being a citizen of the country and a citizen of the 
town; Zimbabweans are outsiders either way, and the speakers might have meant the same 
thing by both.  But the trope of the ‘inkomer’ (literally ‘incomer’; in-migrant or outsider), 
while being widely used in the Hex Valley to denote all kinds of ‘outsiders’ and thus having a 
regional or geographical meaning, is also used in particular to refer to black people, who in 
the Western Cape are still often spoken about as if they are not ‘locals’ because of the 
history of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy and the claiming of the Western Cape as a 
‘white’ and ‘coloured’ province only (Goldin, 1984; cf Ewert & Hamman, 1996).  In this way, 
and also given the earlier reference to coloured identity, it is possible that national, racial 
and geographical or regional identities are all conflated in the claim to having first 
preference to jobs: ‘But here in this town you know, people come from outside to get jobs 
here first, but we that stay here don’t get the jobs first (extract 2 lines 74-76).  It may seem a 
speculative case to suggest that identities other than national ones are salient here, both 
because the participants did not make spontaneous reference to coloured identity and also 
because I might be overplaying the difference between being a citizen of the town and of 
the country.  However, in the last section of this chapter some further examples of a 
different configuration of intergroup division and allegiance will be given, in which the 
Zimbabweans were seen as problematic outsiders mainly because they were black (as 
opposed to coloured), and not because they were non-citizens (as opposed to South 
African).  In this way, the category ‘South African’ may not necessarily be ‘South African’ 
workers’ primary identity, and may actually obscure the alternative divisions and allegiances 
which have pertained, and which to some extent still pertain, in this community.   
Part 2: Narratives of conflict resolution between Zimbabwean and South 
African workers post-2009 
The above grievances and complaints about the Zimbabweans undercutting wages and 
displacing South Africans from jobs were by no means the only story we heard in the 2012 
and 2013 interviews, however.  Part 2 focuses on both Zimbabwean and South African 
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workers’ reports of an improvement in the relationship between their groups since 2009, 
and especially on how they each accounted for this improvement.  Such accounts mainly 
came from interviews in August 2013, several months after the strike had ended.  
Zimbabwean interviewees cited in Part 2A reported that there had been a qualified 
improvement in their relationship and a lessening of conflict since the eviction in 2009 
(although they also said that xenophobia had not entirely gone away).  When asked why 
there had been this improvement, they mainly said South Africans had realised that the old 
allegations about them working for lower wages and taking jobs had been false or 
misplaced, and had thus become more tolerant and accepting of Zimbabweans.  As 
mentioned, an important exception came from Owen Maromo of PASSOP, who said that 
Zimbabweans did need to do some adapting in order to try and join in with South African 
workers’ wage struggles and thus forge a class-based solidarity among workers that 
overcame racial and national lines.  However, he also pointed out that they have to try hard 
to do this, because of the exclusion and divisiveness they typically face from South African 
strike organisers.  
 
Extract 4: Zimbabwean ex-farm worker (interview 7, November 2012) 
1 Philippa:  Okay so, u:h, you weren’t here at the time of that, xenophobia three years  
2  ago 
3 Tom:  I was ((6 lines omitted)) But u::h, the only thing that had changed  
4  from that time until now, is the, there were, there seemed to be a bit more  
5  uh, acceptance or even I can say tolerance. [PK: okay] Towards, u::h  
6  Zimbabwean nationals who are, who are staying here in De Doorns (    ) 
7  working on the farms. [PK: okay] Mainly because the most of the, the   
8  community members had noticed that (basically) we come here we work,  
9  and then we go back to our families. [PK: mm] We we we, we have no   
10  intention of staying here permanently. We are taking their jobs and all (of  
11  this) 
12 Philippa:  okay 
13 Tom:  ja 
14 Philippa:  okay. So, do you feel like xenophobia’s still an issue? At all? 
15 Tom: I think so ja. *PK: okay+ Because there, there’s still some very strong   
16  sentiments within some members of the society because some of them,   
17  make threats like when they are done with doing the toyi-toyi then they   
18  gonna close the Somalian tuckshops and then they gonna, u:h go and out- 
19  take the Zimbabweans and take their stuff and all that stuff. [PK: mm] They  
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20  they they still, there are others who are against it there are others- it’s a   
21  mixed, u:h thing. 
 
Extract 5: Three Zimbabwean men in Stofland (interview 23, August 2013) 
1 Philippa:  Okay, uh, were you here, in 2009 uh I was here when the Zimbabweans were 
2  all living, in the camp, [?: ja] on the field, were you guys there? [?: ja] Wo::w  
3  okay [?: ((small laugh))] So, um, so my question is, uh, how things have   
4  changed since then.  Cos at the time everyone was accusing you guys of   
5  working for less than minimum wage and all that kind of stuff and obviously  
6  you guys said no we never were working for less than minimum wage, but  
7  now during the strike nobody seems to (.) have a problem with the   
8  Zimbabweans any more37 do you know:: why that is, or 
9 Sam:  ja 
((4 lines omitted)) 
10 Tafadzwa:  Ja, they accepted us in the community, hhayi it was a, it was a, it was a   
11  challenge, because most of the allegations, ah, they were false, [PK: ja] you 
12   see and that we took work from them [PK: ja] but, eh, there, the farmers, the 
13   work is plenty for everybody, everybody’s got work, they are still needing  
14  people there by the farms but, [PK: mm]  
15  (.) 
16 Philippa:  okay 
17 Tafadzwa:  ja 
18 Philippa:  So, do you know, mm, what it was that-, how, how did it change? Like, what 
19  made it change 
20 Tafadzwa:  Ja, what made the change is that eh we rent from these people, [PK: O:::h]  
21  where we stay we rent from them, they also get- they know that the money 
22  that they pay is very few so if they don’t accept us in the community, they are 
23  gonna lose also their bud[get you see 
24 Philippa:                                   [oka:::y okay their rent income  
 
Extract 6: Zimbabwean farm worker (interview 31, August 2013) 
1 Joe:  But now it’s different from what it was before in Stofland.  
4 PK:  Ok so that’s what I wanna know why, what why has there been that change because 
                                                          
37 It is worth pointing out that the interviewer’s opening observation that ‘during the strike nobody 
seems to have a problem with the Zimbabweans any more’ does not really match with what we have 
already heard South Africans saying in the previous section from November 2012.  However, since 
November I had interviewed Braam Hanekom of PASSOP in July 2013, and so had recently heard for 
the first time a semi-official statement that there had been no xenophobic attack on the 
Zimbabweans during the strikes.  Armed with this information of ‘no xenophobic violence’, I then 
returned to De Doorns to pursue why this was, although in doing so was possibly putting words into 
participants’ mouths, as in this extract.   
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5 it seems like there’s been nothing like that again, specially during the strike hey?  
6 There were no threats against any Zimbabweans,  
7 Joe:  n- 
8 PK:  Nothing happened to you guys, so, why, has it changed. 
9 Joe:  You see- 
10 PK:  Do you think it’s an improvement? Like 
11 Joe: Ja, now it’s an improvement. *PK: ok+ Because, you can move from here to Stofland, 
12 unlike the past time. [PK: mm] This, you know it was a problem, we could not, they,  
13 these people I think I would use this word they didn’t trust us. *PK: mm+ Okay, and  
14 we also we didn’t trust them. We were afraid of one another. Until they, reacted the  
15 way they did. Okay, so, and, as we were like the main cause, they say, we are taking  
16 their, their jobs. [PK: mm] That was the other reason said we were taking their jobs, 
17 we taking their wives, [PK: mm] which was not true. [PK: mm] Which was not true  
18 because, even now if we were taking their wives, still today we should be doing the 
19 same thing. [PK: ja] And they can still accommodate us in the same location in the  
20 same, houses we were staying before. ((short pause, phone buzzes)) You see [PK: Ja] 
21 So, during that time, ja they also didn’t understand us. But after we staying in the 
22 in the sports field, interacting with them, and some organisations coming, to,  
23 join us together then they started to understand that ‘ah no these people are just,  
24 here to work and, do their stuff, let’s not waste our time by, burning their houses,  
25  [PK: mm] stealing from them,’ *P: Shoh+ because they were getting jailed when they 
26  do, [PK: yeah] when they commit these crimes [PK: yeah ok] you see so it was, on,  
27 hard on their part because, if you get jailed, then, you are far you are away from  
28  your family your mother they- the family are starving. *PK: ja+ So, they’ve (desist)  
29 from doing that [PK: okay] and now, we are just working together.  
30 PK: Shoh, so that’s amazing. So what are some of the organisations that, that helped,  
31 that you mentioned 
32 Joe: Uh there was PASSOP, [PK: okay] led by Braam Hanekom, [PK: Yes I remember] and  
33 there was another one ((five lines omitted)) Scalabrini was coming PASSOP was  
34 coming, and, uh, there were this, Black Sash Human Rights [PK: okay, okay!] They  
35  were coming also to help us.   
 
Extract 7: Owen Maromo (interview 19, August 2013) 
1 PK: the farmers we interviewed ((in 2009)) also, were very f- like positive about the  
2 Zimbabweans you know they show up, they, they there for all the hours that they  
3 supposed [OM: ja] to do and this kind of stuff.  But now, has that changed, because  
4 now, I thought that Braam was  saying, that the Zimbabweans had joined in with the 
5 strike, so now, is that different because now, are the farmers, the Zimbabweans  
6 were not always at work? Or, has that, has that changed like,  
7 OM:  hh U::h hh the only change which is there, is that, maybe they if there is  
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8  something like a strike or something like that, (there’s) sort of, eh co-operation or  
9  unity, eh between the locals and eh the foreigners. 
10 PK:  oka::y [OM: But ih] and where does that come from? 
11OM: E::h, we tried, to mobilise our countryfellows, something like that to tell them how 
12 important, to unite with these people.  Because we see the problem was, eh the  
13 unity between themselves. Although we know that they don’t want us on that,  
14 although we know also that we don’t have any say, on that on those meetings or,  
15 those ih, plans or so something like that, but what we have to do is just to  
16 participate. (.) So that we protect a lot of lives.  
17 PK:  oka::::y   
 
These four interviewees all report a (qualified) improvement in relations between the 
Zimbabwean and South African labouring communities since 2009. According to Tom in 
extract 4, ‘there seemed to be a bit more uh, acceptance or even I can say 
tolerance...towards, u::h Zimbabwean nationals who are, who are staying here in De Doorns 
...*but+ there’s still some very strong sentiments within some members of the society...it’s a 
mixed thing’ (extract 1, lines 11-13, 22-24, 27-28).  According to Tafadzwa in extract 2, ‘Ja, 
they accepted us in the community, hhayi it was a challenge’ (extract 2, line 16); and 
according to Joe in extract 3, ‘Ja, now it’s an improvement...Because, you can move from 
here to Stofland, unlike the past time...and now, we are just working together’ (extract 3, 
lines 11-12, 29).  Finally, according to Owen Maromo, ‘the only change which is there, is 
that, maybe they if there is something like a strike or something like that, (there’s) sort of, 
eh co-operation or unity, eh between the locals and eh the foreigners’ (extract 4, lines 7-9).  
These are all reports of some positive change.  
However, notice the way the first three speakers account for this change.  They all reiterate 
that the allegations made against Zimbabwean workers in 2009 were false, and that South 
Africans had finally realised this to be the case.  With the exception of Owen in the last 
extract, they do not account for the change with reference to anything that they themselves 
did.  According to Tom in extract 1: ‘Mainly because the most of the, the community 
members had noticed that (basically) we come here we work, and then we go back to our 
families....we have no intention of staying here permanently.  We are taking their jobs and 
all (of this)’ (extract 1, lines 14-18, emphasis added).  In extract 2, Tafadzwa similarly states 
that the old allegations that Zimbabweans were taking South Africans’ jobs were false, and 
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that farmers are still in need of labour, and he accounts for South Africans’ acceptance of 
the Zimbabweans through reference to this self-evident fact: ‘They accepted us, hhayi, it 
was, it was a challenge, because most of the allegations, ah, they were false...you see and 
that we took work from them...the farmers, the work is plenty for everybody...they are still 
needing people there by the farms’ (extract 2, lines 16-20).  In this way he takes the same 
position on the question of job-taking as farmers and Zimbabweans did in 2009.  Finally, Joe 
in extract 3 similarly accounts for the more trusting relations between the groups first by 
rebutting the old allegations – ‘said we were taking their jobs, we taking their wives,...which 
was not true’ (lines 16-20) – and then goes on to say that South African workers had also 
come to realise this: ‘after we staying in the in the sports field, interacting with them, and 
some organisations coming, to, join us together then they started to understand that “ah no 
these people are just, here to work and, do their stuff, let’s not waste our time by, burning 
their houses, stealing from them,”...So, they’ve (desist) from doing that...and now, we are 
just working together’ (lines 20-29, emphasis added).  In all these accounts, the speakers 
both re-assert their position on the allegations of job-taking and low wages in 2009, and 
show that it was South Africans who changed by realising this and then becoming more 
tolerant.  In this way, the onus to change is placed on South Africans, rather than on 
Zimbabweans, who are still not said to have done anything wrong.  
More than just claiming South Africans realised that the allegations about low wages were 
unfounded, however, the speakers in extracts 2 and 3 point out that violence also had a cost 
to the perpetrators, which is part of the reason why it didn’t happen again.  Tafadzwa in 
extract 2 points to the cost of losing rent income from Zimbabwean tenants: ‘what made 
the change is that eh we rent from these people...where we stay we rent from them, they 
also get- they know that the money that they pay is very few so if they don’t accept us in the 
community, they are gonna lose also their budget’ (lines 26-29).38 Joe in extract 3 also 
points to the cost of violence in economic terms: ‘“let’s not waste our time by, burning their 
houses, stealing from them” because they were getting jailed when they do, when they 
                                                          
38
 Although this extract is a deviant case in that it implicated a different kind of economic 
relationship among informal settlement residents – that between landlords and tenants, rather than 
that between co-workers on the same farms – in terms of its rhetorical value it is not a deviant case 
because it also locates the reason for the change that led to the Zimbabweans being accepted with a 
change of mind of South African workers. 
235 
 
commit these crimes...you see so it was, on, hard on their part because, if you get jailed, 
then, you are far you are away from your family your mother they- the family are starving’ 
(line 26-29).  Thus, South Africans realising that there are costs and consequences of 
violence is given as another reason for the absence of any further xenophobic attack since 
2009.   
A slightly different view constituting a deviant case among the (admittedly already small) 
Zimbabwean sample comes from Owen Maromo of PASSOP, in extract 4 above.  First, 
Maromo’s account of what constitutes a positive change in the relationship between the 
two groups is slightly different to the others’: ‘maybe they if there is something like a strike 
or something like that, (there’s) sort of, eh co-operation or unity, eh between the locals and 
eh the foreigners’ (lines 7-9).  In this way, his idea of what constitutes positive change is not 
(only) greater tolerance from South African workers, but greater unity between the groups 
when there is a strike.  In this way, he does not only place the onus on the South African 
labouring community to change – he concedes that it was Zimbabweans who needed to 
change: ‘we tried, to mobilise our countryfellows...to tell them how important, to unite with 
these people. Because we see the problem was, eh the unity between themselves’ (extract 
4, lines 11-13).  However, in a rhetorical turnaround the responsibility for this disunity is laid 
at the feet of the South African work force and strike organisers: ‘Although we know that 
they don’t want us on that, although we know also that we don’t have any say, on that on 
those meetings or, those ih, plans or so something like that, but what we have to do is just 
to participate. So that we protect a lot of lives’ (lines 14-17, emphasis added). In this way, 
Maromo rebuts the implicit accusation that the source of divisions in the workforce is the 
Zimbabweans themselves, who keep themselves separate and are reluctant to act in 
solidarity with South African workers (Robb & Davis, 2009).  Rather, in this account 
Zimbabweans must swim against the tide of the exclusionary and divisive tactics used by 
South African workers and strike organisers.   
The final extract in this section, below, comes from Joe, the speaker in extract 3 above.  It is 
a deviant case because it suggests that despite the lack of overt xenophobic violence or 
conflict during the strike, and despite Joe’s above report of an overall improvement in the 
relationship between Zimbabwean and South African workers, racial and ethnic divisions 
among farm workers are still the norm:  
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Extract 8: Zimbabwean farm worker (interview 31) 
1 PK:  and what it’s it like, where you work? 
2 Joe:  Uh it’s, (.) of all the farms, this, I think we don’t have that there is no problem like uh 
3 to say ‘this is from Zimba- you are a Zimbabwean, I’m a-’ *P: okay+ ay so it’s, quiet  
4 and cool the most of the people there they are friendly. [P: okay] We are like, you  
5 have friends. [P: okay!] ja 
6 PK:  That’s nice uh do you think that’s, unusual for, De Doorns? O:r, *are there other far- 
7 Joe:                                [Very unusual 
8 PK:  okay 
9 Joe:  Very unusual. 
10 PK:  Okay wh- uh what’s it like elsewhere then 
11 Joe: (.) Elsewhere like, if, we hear from other farms, to say, a group of South Africans  
12  were saying they have a name for us like they call us Kwirikwiri *PK: mm+ it’s coming  
13  from those farms. [PK: mm] To say ‘these are Kwirikwiri, these are Sotho, these are 
14  coloureds.’ But on our farm ah no it’s different.  
15 PK:  Shoh that’s great.  Um, d- do- why do you think that is does that have something to 
16 do wi- ja why do you think that’s different on your farm 
17  (.)  
18 Joe: ah it’s different because of the, (.) eh m mainly it’s because of the manager.  
19 PK:  okay 
20 Joe: The manager of the farm he’s strict *PK: a:::h+ he’s saying ‘everyone is a human  
21 being, [PK: okay] You want money, this is a Zimbabwean he also wants money. [PK: 
22 okay+ I want my work to be done, if all of you combine, then, my work will be done.’  
23 *PK: kay+ And that’s his policy.  
24 PK:  Shoh  
 
In this account, divisions among Sotho, Zimbabwean and coloured workers, and derogatory 
name-calling of Zimbabweans (‘Kwirikwiri’), were still the norm on farms around De Doorns.  
But when asked why he thinks his farm is different in this respect, Joe ascribes it (rather 
unexpectedly) to the style of the farm manager: ‘mainly it’s because of the manager...The 
manager of the farm he’s strict he’s saying “everyone is a human being...You want money, 
this is a Zimbabwean he also wants money...I want my work to be done, if all of you 
combine, then, my work will be done”’ (lines 19-23).  Thus, the language of running a 
business (‘I want my work to be done’) is used to encourage cooperation and to discourage 
animosity among workers.  In this way the extract is also a deviant case compared to the 
discourse of farmers and Zimbabweans in Part 4 of the previous results chapter, where in 
almost every case, the language of capitalism and of running a business (the need to have 
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work done on time etc.) went hand in hand with a justification of ‘preferential’ treatment of 
Zimbabweans based on their superior work ethic and a denigration of South African 
workers, who were treated almost a lost cause, and written off for their chronic 
absenteeism and bad attitude.  Here, by contrast, the language of running a business is used 
to encourage unity among the workers and to affirm the contribution of all parties: ‘I want 
my work to be done, if all of you combine, then, my work will be done’ (rather than, ‘I want 
my work to be done, and if the South Africans don’t want to come to work I will use 
Zimbabweans to get it done instead’). The experienced result for this Zimbabwean man is an 
absence of conflict among fellow workers: ‘it’s quiet and cool the most of the people there 
they are friendly’ (line 3-4).  
So far in this section, we have heard Zimbabweans speak about the state of relations 
between themselves and South African workers during and after the farm workers’ strike, 
especially comparing to how things were in 2009.  They reported that problems of overt 
conflict and violence had gone away, and insofar as improvements were reported, these 
were mainly ascribed to changes in the thinking of South Africans – for example by 
becoming more tolerant and realising they had been mistaken in their earlier accusations.  
However, ongoing divisions and antagonism, albeit non-violent, were also still reported 
(extracts 4, 7 and 8).  Overall, with the partial exception of Owen Maromo who emphasised 
the need for unity among all parties, the Zimbabweans interviewed here continued to 
assume that they themselves were not responsible for the violence and hostility visited 
upon them, and thus the onus to change was not on themselves.  In the following section, 
Part 2B, we will see that South African workers also agreed that conflict with the 
Zimbabweans was less, but they gave opposite reasons for this.  They also continued to 
assert the same allegations about losing jobs to the Zimbabweans who were unfairly 
favoured by farmers as we heard in 2009, and they also continued to assume that it was the 
Zimbabweans rather than themselves who needed to change, and indeed, had done so by 
visibly participating in the strike.   
Part 2B: South African workers account for the absence of violence against 
the Zimbabweans during the strike  
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This section contains retrospective accounts from black South African workers in Stofland 
mainly in August 2013 containing reflections about the Zimbabwean community’s 
participation in the strike, about whether relations between the groups had improved since 
2009, and answers to the question of why there was no violence directed at the 
Zimbabweans during the strike.  There was a range of responses to these questions, with 
some interviewees reporting that there was cooperation between the groups because the 
Zimbabweans had had the same wage demands during the strike as everyone else; others 
reporting that the Zimbabweans were undermining the strike by going to stay on the farms 
and continuing to work; and others saying that not all Zimbabweans had participated in the 
strike in the same manner (Owen Maromo pointed out that while it was true that some 
Zimbabweans did stay on the farms during the strike, much of the farmers’ scab labour 
actually consisted of South Africans fetched from nearby towns such as Touws River).  
However, the analysis here specifically focuses on how, in a mirror image of the 
Zimbabweans’ discourse above, these workers ascribed any improvements in their 
relationship to the fact that the Zimbabweans, rather than themselves, had adjusted and 
changed since 2009.  In particular, they said that Zimbabweans had started to show greater 
solidarity when it came to wage bargaining processes.  They did not say anything remotely 
substantiating the Zimbabweans’ claim that they (South Africans) had realised that the 
allegations about the Zimbabweans working for low wages in 2009 were false.  Indeed, they 
all continued to re-assert them when remembering what the 2009 eviction had been about.  
In this way, South African workers also continued to operate within the same ideological 
imperative as they had done in 2009 – an imperative of black liberation and resistance – in 
terms of which the moral onus to change lay squarely on the Zimbabweans, rather than 
themselves.  
Extract 9: Xhosa-speaking farm worker (interview 24, translated from Xhosa, Aug 2013)  
1 Nqaba:  ok so another thing that I wanted to say, this thing that I just said that there  
2  are people who are Coloured né, [Ppt: yes] there were people from   
3  Zimbabwe so were they, in the strike, did they participate or what  
4 Dumisani:  yes, even them we were-  
5 Nqaba:  they didn’t, they didn’t I mean they were not forced to be if they didn’t want 
6  to or did they just come for themselves 
7 Dumisani:  No they came for themselves, still they also wanted money 
8 Philippa:  mm 
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((later in interview)) 
9 Nqaba:  So what do you think made them join the strike, isn’t it before you were   
10  accusing the people from Zimbabwe saying that they work for very little   
11  money, right 
12 Dumisani:  ja they work for very little  
15 Nqaba:  ja so you chased them away in two thousand and was this two thousand and- 
16 Philippa:  nine 
17 Nqaba:  ja you chased them away and then they left, and then now, so what made  
18  them join the strike? 
19 Dumisani:  Them? 
20 Nqaba:  uh huh 
21 Dumisani:  They saw that no man, we are complaining about this thing that when we  
22  want money from the boers, they work [NN: uh huh] but now I see that they 
23  are also part of this local thing now, they want money 
24 Nqaba:  okay, okay 
((five lines omitted as NN translates to PK)) 
25 Nqaba:  you don’t think that they were afraid that you were going to attack them  
26  again, chase them away 
27 Dumisani: Chase them away? 
28 Nqaba:  uh huh 
29 Dumisani:  uh-uh ((no)) I don’t know (        ) when we went to the meetings they went  
30  with us, the local ones, [NN: okay] there are the ones who stay on the  
31  farm. [NN: farm, uh-huh] They were the ones that continued working 
 
Extract 10: Two Xhosa-speaking men (interview 30, translated from Xhosa, Aug 2013)  
1 Nqaba:  ok, so um, and according to people that stay here there are foreigners,   
2  people from, people from, there are even coloured people and so on. So in  
3  the strike, did they all participate, did you all participate in the strike, or   
4  what? 
5 Siya:  The ones who took part for example it’s nearly all of us. *NN: ok+ And then  
6  others, even them, but then they tried to make us cry but it didn’t go   
7  anywhere, people like those from Zimbabwe, they were able to contact the  
8  farmers and the farmers took them and lived with them on the farms.  But  
9  the people that are of colour like the coloureds and others that are Bantu we  
10  were always together, mm. 
((5 lines omitted as Nqaba translates to Philippa)) 
11 Nqaba:  So do you think that in this one, in last year’s strike the reason there was no 
12  conflict was because the Zimbabweans that were here participated in the  
13  strike and so that is why nothing happened to them? Do you think that’s   
14  why? 
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15 Philippa:  (      ) 
16 Siya:  eh ((yes)), you see the one in 2009? 
17 Nqaba:  eh 
18 Siya:  The 2009 one was another problem, since as, since as, that one it was clear  
19  that we were no longer being employed in the farms, [NN: yes] us people  
20  from South Africa [NN: okay okay] we were not being employed. Because  
21  they were using the foreigners mostly, with aslams ((asylum papers))  
22  *NN: okay, okay+ that’s what caused us to get up and make them leave, if we 
23  are going to lose and they are going to be- *NN: okay+ that’s what made them  
24  leave but when they came back, they just did better things that showed that 
25  they were with us. 
26 Nqaba:  oh okay so by working with [Ppt: eh] you there was no conflict  
27 Siya:  No there was no conflict 
 
Extract 11: South African labour broker (interview 10, translated from Xhosa) 
1 Andile:  here [N: uh huh] there are people from South Africa [N: uh huh]   
2  there are people from Lesotho [N: uh huh] there people from Zimbabwe [N:  
3  uh huh] okay. The farmers what they do, they scare the people from Lesotho, 
4  and the people from Zimbabwe that they must work because they are  
5  foreigners, [N: uh] now we end up as people from South Africa wanting work 
6  because now their work is carrying on in the farms. [N: uh] Then we also   
7  reckon that now you won’t stay hungry, rather you get up as well and go and 
8  work.  I mean now I don’t believe that there will ever be another strike again 
9  [NN: okay] because now hunger is really tough on our stomachs 
10 Nqaba:  okay 
((23 lines omitted)) 
11 Nqaba:  ((translating PK’s question)) Oh she is saying now that it is surprising that,  
12  that time right, the South Africans didn’t attack the people from Zimbabwe  
13  they didn’t hit them during the time of the strike, why didn’t they if that was  
14  what they were doing on that other side. Why was that?  
15 Andile:  The difficult thing, we wouldn’t have been able to reach them because the  
16  police were holding us back, we couldn’t get to the farms you see 
17 Philippa:     Oh 
18 Andile:  We wouldn’t have been able to get to the farm *N: okay] to get the people  
19  that were working 
20 Nqaba:  Okay, okay okay. So, so, 
21 Philippa:  The police were keeping them out? 
22 Nqaba:  The police were keeping them out ja and also- 
23 Andile:  And the soldiers were also there 
((later in interview: PK asks again why was there no violence against the Zimbabweans)) 
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24 Andile:  The reason we didn’t end up attacking people *NN: uh+ was that there were 
25  Zimbabweans there supporting us here in the location [NN: okay] there were 
26  also Basothos also supporting us here in the location, [NN & PK: okay] there 
27  were those who escaped, who took chances to go to the farms to stay in the 
28  farms 
29 Nqaba:  okay 
((later in interview)) 
30 Andile:  Before the strike there was something that happened here at De Doorns 
31  between the amaXhosa and the Zimbabweans [NN: ja] (      ) 
32 Nqaba:  ja ja ja here at De Doorns ja 
33 Andile:  Okay, the thing that used to happen, when you came to the farm in search of 
34  a job, they say ‘aslam’, ((asylum papers)) when you don’t have an aslam and  
35  you have an ID they say ‘no we don’t want an ID we want an aslam’.  Then we 
36  fought as the different types of people. [NN: uh huh] After that they stopped, 
37  it ended in the farms and then we brought the Zimbabweans and we came to 
38  stay with them here in the location, [NN: okay] it never happened ever again 
39  so all of the time we work together like even now, [NN: okay] Zimbabwe   
40  Mosotho [NN: ja] whatever, we work together we stay in the same area 
 
Three aspects of these extracts are highlighted.  Firstly, contrary to the Zimbabweans’ 
reports that South Africans had realised the old allegations about them working for lower 
wages and taking South Africans’ jobs in 2009 were false, the South African workers here 
continue to re-tell this same story.  In extract 9, Dumisani says ‘ja they work for very little’ 
(line 12). Siya in extract 10 also recalls that ‘The 2009 one was another problem, since...that 
one it was clear that we were no longer being employed in the farms, us people from South 
Africa...Because they were using the foreigners mostly, with aslams’ (line 18-21).  He even 
says ‘that’s what caused us to get up and make them leave’ (line 22) – there is no suggestion 
here of a revised or repentant retrospective view of the eviction.  Andile in extract 11 also 
recalls about 2009 that ‘the thing that used to happen, when you came to the farm in search 
of a job, they say “aslam”, when you don’t have an aslam and you have an ID they say “no 
we don’t want an ID we want an aslam”.  Then we fought as the different types of people’ 
(lines 33-36).  Thus, no indication is given that South Africans have realised they were wrong 
in their allegations about 2009.  Rather, the old reasons for that attack are still being taken 
for granted.   
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Secondly, similar allegations about Zimbabweans being used by farmers to undermine the 
wage bargaining process are again being made here about the more recent strikes: 
Dumisani says about the Zimbabweans that ‘there are the ones who stay on the farm.  They 
were the ones that continued working’ (extract 9 lines 30-31).  In answer to the 
interviewer’s question about whether different groups in the work force all participated in 
the strike, Siya in extract 10 replies, ‘The ones who took part for example it’s nearly all of 
us...people like those from Zimbabwe, they were able to contact the farmers and the 
farmers took them and lived with them on the farms’ (lines 5-8).  Finally, Andile also recalls 
similar allegations of farmers using Zimbabweans to undermine the strike process: ‘The 
farmers what they do, they scare the people from Lesotho, and the people from Zimbabwe 
that they must work because they are foreigners, now we end up as people from South 
Africa wanting work because now their work is carrying on in the farms’ (extract 11, lines 3-
6).  Presumably this is a reference to the tactic used by farmers during the strike and 
reported by PASSOP in the previous chapter, of threatening to call the police to arrest 
undocumented foreign workers if they tried to go on strike.  Thus, these speakers all 
continue to offer familiar, un-revised accounts of the farmer-Zimbabwean relationship – in 
which Zimbabweans are either victims of farmers or collaborators with them, but either 
way, are making life difficult for South Africans – not only in 2009 but also during the strike 
in 2012-2013. 
Third, however, these speakers also give examples of greater solidarity shown by certain 
Zimbabwean workers during the strike, and a consequence of this change in attitude and 
behaviour on the part of the Zimbabweans was an improvement in the relationship 
between the two groups.  For example, when Nqaba in extract 9 asks ‘So what do you think 
made them join the strike, isn’t it before you were accusing the people from Zimbabwe 
saying that they work for very little’, Dumisani replies: ‘They saw that no man, we are 
complaining about this thing that when we want money from the boers, they work...but 
now I see that they are also part of this local thing now, they want money (extract 9, lines 
21-24, emphasis added). When Nqaba asks further ‘you don’t think that they were afraid 
that you were going to attack them again, chase them away?’, Dumisani replies, ‘uh-uh I 
don’t know (      ) when we went to the meetings they went with us, the local ones’.  Siya in 
extract 10 also gives an account of the Zimbabweans changing their attitudes and actions 
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post-2009 leading to an improvement in this relationship: he recalls that after the 
Zimbabweans came back to the informal settlements after the camp on the sports field was 
closed, ‘they just did better things that showed that they were with us’ (lines 24-25).  Finally, 
when pressed for a reason why violence towards the Zimbabweans did not happen during 
the strike even though some Zimbabweans had apparently been working on the farms (lines 
21-28), Andile in extract 10 gives a purely pragmatic answer at first: ‘The difficult thing, we 
wouldn’t have been able to reach them because the police were holding us back’ (lines 29-
33).  The second reason he gives is more similar to those of the previous extracts:  ‘The 
reason we didn’t end up attacking people...was that there were Zimbabweans there 
supporting us here in the location...there were also Basothos also supporting us here in the 
location’ (line 38-40).  He does not say, ‘the reason we didn’t end up attacking people was 
that we had realised that xenophobia was wrong’.  Thus, in these accounts the lack of anti-
Zimbabwean violence during the strike, and whatever improvement there has been in the 
relationship between the groups, is ascribed not to a profound change of mind by South 
African workers about the ethics of violence or the truth of the allegations about the 
Zimbabweans, but to changes in the actions and behaviour of the Zimbabwean community 
themselves.   
A final word can be said about how Andile in extract 10 describes the xenophobic attack of 
2009.  He explains, ‘before the strike there was something that happened here between the 
amaXhosa and the Zimbabweans’ and goes on to give reasons for the 2009 violence we 
have already heard at length (lines 30-31, 33-40). He concludes, ‘then we fought as the 
different types of people’.  Notably he does not say ‘there was something that happened 
here between the South Africans and the Zimbabweans’.  Thus coloured farm workers are 
excluded from that fighting.  This is a further suggestion that there are meaningful divisions 
among South African workers which may have been obscured by the analysis of the 2009 
interviews, which took all participants’ constructions of their opposition to the 
Zimbabweans (after they had already been evicted) at face value but was not well-placed to 
ask ‘material’ questions about who actually carried out the violence that led to the eviction.  
If we take Andile’s account seriously, it becomes a possibility that coloured workers were 
not involved in the actual eviction, but nevertheless supported it and thus their accounts of 
opposition to the Zimbabweans overlapped with those of Xhosa-speaking South Africans.  
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Indeed, below we will see that the opposition of some coloured workers to the 
Zimbabweans actually had less to do with the Zimbabweans undermining their bargaining 
power, and more to do with their being black and encroaching on an intergroup relationship 
which coloured workers nostalgically recalled existing in an idealised time before the end of 
the influx control laws.   
The last extract in this section about the Zimbabweans’ participation in the strike is a 
deviant case because these speakers did not give Zimbabwean workers any credit 
whatsoever for participating in the strike and did not report that things had improved since 
2009.  Rather, they continued to angrily rail against the Zimbabweans and said that the only 
Zimbabweans who stayed on in the locations and striked were those whom farmers did not 
have the time to come and fetch.   
Extract 14: Two farm workers (interview 25) 
1 Nqaba:  okay, and then, I wanted- something I wanted to ask during the strike, isn’t it 
2  here there are people from Zimbabwe né 
3 Thembi:  mm 
4 Nqaba:  then there are people of colour, like like coloureds 
5 Thembi:  Coloureds 
6 Nqaba:  so, in the strike, did they participate or- 
((4 lines omitted)) 
11 Thembi:  the coloured people they were fighting alongside us, the people from   
12  Zimbabwe they took their things and went to stay in the white people’s   
13  houses. They were kept there by the white people, in the stores, the ones  
14  that we all work in 
15 Nqaba:  In the farmers’ buildings? 
16 Thembi:  The time we are busy they are continuing with work  
17 Nqaba:  The same time we are here, the stores are full there 
18 Thembi:  Full, full 
19 Nokuthula: There at the ((farmer’s surname))s 
20 Thembi:  Full of these people 
21 Nqaba:  uh 
22 Philippa:  So the Zimbabweans went to stay on the farms 
23 Nqaba:  ja  
24 Philippa:  even this one ((looking at a Zimbabwean man walking nearby)) 
25 Thembi:  They were they were, the Zimbabwean that didn’t, that were there at the  
26  toyi-toyi are the ones that the white people didn’t have time for, or get the 
27  chance to come and get them  
28 Nqaba:  to come and take them, uh 
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29 Thembi:  to go and stay there with him but many of them, they were staying 
30 Nokuthula: at the farms 
31 Nqaba:  at the farms 
32 Thembi:  Like how they are still staying there even now, some of them never came  
33  back, like even now they can’t come and take other people here, they are all 
34  there.  And if it is said that the white person is short of labour they phone  
35  another person from Zimbabwe who is in Port Elizabeth, another person who 
36  is in Cape Town, and they go and fill in that space.  That is why the white   
37  people have no chance now to come and take us hungry people from here. 
((ten lines omitted in which NN translates to PK)) 
38 Thembi:  No the Zimbabweans have really shut down jobs for us here, straight. [NN:  
39  uh+ the Zimbabweans weren’t even concerned about the R150 that we were 
40  saying we want [NN: uh] whatever money they get, they take [NN: uh huh]  
41  because even that R64 they had no problem with it.  
 
This extract differs from the others in that the two speakers report absolutely no 
improvement in their relations with Zimbabwean workers.  They offer instances of how the 
Zimbabweans undermined the strike by working on the farms while it was going on (lines 
11-18) and were happy to carry on working for the old minimum wage (line 41).  They also 
speak about displacement: especially that South African workers are now excluded from the 
labour recruitment networks that farmers use, which are dominated by Zimbabweans (lines 
32-38), and that Zimbabweans have ‘shut down jobs for us here, straight’ (line 30).  Thembi 
does not even give any credit to those Zimbabweans who did stay behind and strike: ‘the 
Zimbabwean that didn’t, that were there at the toyi-toyi are the ones that the white people 
didn’t have time for, or get the chance to come and get them’ (lines 25-27).  In this way, the 
possibility that Zimbabweans exercised agency by participating in the strike voluntarily is 
negated.  This was the angriest account from South African workers we heard about the 
Zimbabweans’ (non)participation in the strike, and is included to show that not all South 
Africans felt that intergroup relations had improved since 2009, or that the Zimbabweans 
had demonstrated any meaningful solidarity during the strike.   
Part 2C: Zimbabwean workers speak about their own participation in the 
farm workers’ strikes  
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In this section we hear how Zimbabwean workers talked about their own participation in 
the strike.  The three participants cited here said they had joined in with the strike not 
because they believed in it as a means of addressing problems with wages and working 
conditions but because of the violence that was being visited on people who tried to go to 
work while it was on, and in one case, because they were afraid that something similar to 
the 2009 violence might happen again if they did not join in.  The Zimbabweans 
acknowledged that they were adjusting their actions (under duress) to accommodate the 
demands and wishes of striking South African workers, but they again refused to concede 
that there was a moral imperative on themselves to make an effort to visibly be part of the 
strike.  Rather, the violence that was used to threaten people away from work was 
presented as an illegitimate way of forcing people to comply. In this way, there appears to 
be something of a mismatch between the views of Zimbabwean and South African workers 
about the Zimbabweans’ motives for participating in the strike and what this participation is 
interpreted as demonstrating.  The Zimbabweans’ accounts in this section challenge the 
greater ‘solidarity’ that South Africans in the previous section read into the Zimbabweans’ 
participation in the strike. Again, the exception came from Owen Maromo of PASSOP, who 
made a distinction between the early strike at Keurboskloof, in which Zimbabwean workers 
participated willingly and strategically to achieve their own wage demands, and the later, 
widespread strikes in which Zimbabweans mainly participated because they were coerced.   
Extract 15: Three Zimbabwean men (interview 23, August 2013) 
1 Philippa:  So uh, what was it like when you were, did you like participate in the strike,  
2  for example when there were the huge crowds of people going along the N1, 
3  were you there, like 
4 Tafadzwa:  Ah no we didn’t like to participate in the strike *P: kay+ but just because of  
5  the situation that we stay in the same community, when we- if we were not  
6   gonna go and participate, they (were finally) gonna chase us away again you 
7  see, [P: oka::y, okay+ (   ) they gonna blame us that ‘you, you like small money’ 
8  what what what. [P: ok] Because just because of peer pressure. [?: Ja.] [P:  
9  kay] Ja we were not gonna go, how can I strike in my in South Africa, (I field a) 
10  strike in my country. *P: Ja+ I can’t ((small laugh))  
11 Philippa:  kay. So it was, it, did Zimbabwean people participate, but not really because 
12  they wanted to 
13 Tafadzwa:  Ja they did participate but not really. [?: mm] It was just because we were  




Extract 16: Zimbabwean farm worker (interview 31, August 2013) 
1 PK:  So, um, uh, maybe if we can talk about the strike, [Joe: yes] di- did on your farm did  
2 you guys participate in the strike? Did you stay away from work? 
3 Joe:  It was not a voluntary strike [PK: mm:::] you were forced to do it whether you  
4 wanted to or not you were forced to do it.   
5 PK:  Okay. Forced by whom, if you can say? 
((6 lines omitted – Joe names FAWU, COSATU and BAWUSA)) 
13 Joe: These were the three unions that were there during the time we were on that strike. 
14  [PK: okay] Yes. 
15 PK:  And what’s, how do they force you. Like, with, like, like what will happen if you  
16 wanted to not participate in the strike 
17 Joe: If you didn’t participate in the strike like you go and work *PK: ja+ they will beat you  
18  [PK: shoh] on your way to work. [PK: shoh] No trucks were coming in to fe- normally, 
19 the farmers provide transport [P: yeah] ja so they stopped those transport from  
20 coming in.  They said if your truck come in they will burn it. [PK: sh:::] There was a  
21 one truck which was burnt [PK: hl::::] on there in Stofland. [PK: okay] It was burnt so,  
22 PK:  the farmers didn’t- 
23 Joe: ja they didn’t want to send in *PK: ok+ trucks to be burnt. And there were people  
24 beaten there in Stofland. [PK: wow] Going to work. [PK: wow] So it was your choice  
25 whether you want to go, or, you stay safe at home. 
26 PK:  okay 
27 Joe: yes 
((3 pages omitted)) 
28 PK:  So, it’s not something that you supported, I mean 
29 Joe: No  
30 PK:  the strike 
31 Joe: No.    
32 PK:  Okay 
33 Joe: Because, (.) I think there should be some, other means and ways, [P: mm] of  
34 trying to solve a problem before you start marching or before you start destroying.  
 
Extract 17: Owen Maromo (interview 19, August 2013) 
1 Nqaba:  But now I’m interested, the the Zimbabwean workers joined the strike,   
2  during the-  
3 Owen:  This, this strikes last strikes [N: ja] they joined it, eh, but ih, the second strike, 
4  it was ni- like n::: they joined it, not because they like it. But ih because of [P: 
5  okay] the protection.  Their protection. 
((30 lines omitted)) 
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6 Philippa:  So, are you saying that the Zimbabweans, mostly joined in with the strike, not  
7  because they wanted to, but just because for their own safety 
8 Owen:  M- Mostly for their own safety.  They also want something good, in terms of 
9  money. [PK: okay] And I believe even if it is ih done in a good way- because  
10  even on that farm which, we have strike, eh, people, who work there they  
11  were not afraid of each other. [P: mm:::] The Zimbabweans there are a lot of 
12  Zimbabweans who work there. But they were cooperating in a good way   
13  because they want something good. [P: okay] But the thing is that, who is  
14  going to conduct that, even if he is a South African even if he is a    
15  Zimbabwean even he’s a Sotho. Who is to, who is going to lead that  
16   thing.  Must (lecture) everything to people. [P: okay] That they are same  
17  thing, on this thing. And they are fighting one thing.  They are fighting one  
18  person, on this thing.  But the thing is that somebody who is going to lead  
19  that thing, will act like, eh, there’s a difference between themselves. [P: okay] 
20  While almost the all of them they are workers. [PK: kay] That is the problem. 
21  And when he is even ih addressing them, he act like he’s addressing the   
22  South Africans. [P: hl::: okay] But the bad part of it is that, when (    ) maybe 
23  Zimbabweans decided to stand on the side, you see again after after talking 
24  about, or if, ((stammers)), they only complain when their plans failed. You  
25  see.  If their plans failed, they will start to put a blame, on::: Zimbabweans. 
[P: 26  Zimbabweans] Like last, what they were trying to do last time on the strike, 
27  then I stand up there I go on the podium and telled them that ‘no. It’s not like 
28  what’, because they were starting to blame ‘some Zimbabweans are going to 
29  work’ and so something like that. ((2 lines omitted)) I was not much   
30  interested on this strike because I have- don’t have anything to do on this  
31  strike.  But the thing is that, how many Zimbabweans are staying on the   
32  farms. And how many South Africans are staying on the farms.  And everyone 
33  was agreeing with me except these, those leaders of that strike. ((4 lines   
34  omitted)) Then I told ‘no no no it’s not like that. If you say people, just say  
35  people, there are people who are going to stay, there are people staying on 
36  the farms they are working while we are having strike’. [P: (     ) South   
37  Africans] Not to mention other tribe or so something like that. [P: u::h okay] 
38  ((9 lines omitted)) And they know because of that thing which Braam and me 
39  was doing, on the, because we were helping- now, right now we are helping 
40  more South Africans than Zimbabweans. So it’s like ih it will be difficult even 
41  for them to, start another sort of you know xenophobia or so, to go [P: mm] 
42  against ih, because now we have we have got a voice, and we have s:: some 




Three points about these extracts are highlighted.  First, all three speakers state their 
indifference to or disagreement with the purpose and value of the strike (in Maromo’s case, 
the widespread strikes post-Keurboskloof). Tafadzwa in extract 15 says ‘Ah no we didn’t like 
to participate in the strike’ (lines 4) and ‘Not that we were after the strike uh-uh ((no))’ (line 
14).  Similarly, when Joe is asked ‘So, it’s not something that you supported’, he replies: 
‘No...no...Because, I think there should be some, other means and ways, of trying to solve a 
problem before you start marching or before you start destroying’ (extract 16, line 69).  
Maromo’s answer in extract 17 is more nuanced. He makes a distinction between the 
Keurboskloof strike, in which he and other Zimbabwean workers did intentionally and 
voluntarily participate, and the later, widespread strikes which they were mainly coerced to 
join ‘for their protection’.  Of the Keurboskloof strike he says, ‘even on that farm which, we 
have strike, eh, people, who work there they were not afraid of each other.  The 
Zimbabweans there are a lot of Zimbabweans who work there. But they were cooperating in 
a good way because they want something good’. But of the later strikes, he says ‘I was not 
much interested on this strike because I have- don’t have anything to do on this strike’ (lines 
29-31), and that Zimbabweans participated ‘Mostly for their own safety.  [But] They also 
want something good, in terms of money’ (lines 8-9).  As we know, it was not PASSOP’s 
intention to start a valley-wide strike, and Maromo criticised some of the South African 
strike leaders or pseudo-leaders for being corrupt, divisive, un-tactical in the way they 
conducted the strike, and even, most shockingly, for supplying scab labour to farmers while 
the strike was going on.   
A second aspect of these extracts to highlight is the reasons the speakers give for their own 
participation in the strike despite not really believing in it.  They all state that they and other 
Zimbabweans were forced to join in order to avoid violence. In the first extract, Tafadzwa 
misunderstands the word ‘like’ in the interviewer’s question ‘did you like participate in the 
strike’ and replies: ‘Ah no we didn’t like to participate in the strike but just because of the 
situation that we stay in the same community, when we- if we were not gonna go and 
participate, they (were finally) gonna chase us away again you see...they gonna blame us 
that “you, you like small money”’ (lines 5-7).  Later he repeats: ‘It was just because we were 
forced’ (line 13).  Thus, the violence that is uppermost in his mind is not only generic 
violence directed at any and all workers who tried to work, but specifically the possibility of 
250 
 
a repeat of the eviction in 2009: ‘if we were not gonna go and participate, they (were finally) 
gonna chase us away again you see’ (lines 6-7).  Joe in extract 16 corrects the interviewer’s 
assumption that not participating in the strike was something workers could have chosen to 
do, with this reply: ‘It was not a voluntary strike you were forced to do it whether you 
wanted to or not you were forced to do it’ (lines 3-4).  When asked how workers were 
forced, he gives two ways: ‘they will beat you on your way to work’ (line 17-18) and also 
‘they said if your truck come in they will burn it. There was a one truck which was burnt on 
there in Stofland’ (lines 19-21).  In the third extract, Maromo does not give details about 
how violence was used but just reports that Zimbabwean workers participated for their own 
protection and safety (lines 5 and 8).  Thus, overall these extracts present the Zimbabweans 
mainly as unwilling participants coerced into joining the post-Keurboskloof strikes by threats 
of illegitimate violence.  
However, Maromo goes further and responds to the allegations of Zimbabweans’ non-
participation in the strike.  First, he establishes that Zimbabwean workers were, in fact, an 
important part of the impetus behind the initial strike at Keurboskloof: ‘there are a lot of 
Zimbabweans who work there. But they were cooperating in a good way because they want 
something good’ (lines 11-13).  Then he further counters the idea that Zimbabweans were 
undermining the later strikes, by showing that this was merely a bleat from South African 
strike leaders who (a) were divisive and exclusionist in their own approach, sowing divisions 
among workers themselves, and (b) who simply trot out these kinds of statements which 
make the Zimbabweans their scapegoat whenever their own plans fail for other reasons 
(lines 15-20 and 22-29).  In this way, similarly to how he did in extract 7 above, Maromo lays 
the blame for divisions among workers not with Zimbabweans, but in fact with the South 
African strike leaders themselves, who are obsessed with national and racial divisions (lines 
14-15, 18-22) and cannot seem to get beyond these to realise the importance of solidarity 
among all workers as workers (lines 16-20): ‘But the thing is that somebody who is going to 
lead that thing, will act like, eh, there’s a difference between themselves.  While almost the 
all of them they are workers. That is the problem. And when he is even ih addressing them, 
he act like he’s addressing the South Africans’.  Maromo also tells of his own struggle to 
counter these divisive tendencies by speaking up at meetings and countering the claim that 
it was particularly Zimbabweans who were working during the strike: ‘there I go on the 
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podium and telled them that “no...If you say people, just say people, there are people who 
are going to stay on the farms they are working while we are having strike...Not to mention 
other tribe”’ (lines 26-28, 34-37).  In this way, Owen Maromo, as a PASSOP member, 
represents one of the few voices we have encountered in this fieldwork who was 
deliberately and positively calling for unity among all groups of workers.  Although many 
South African workers used the discourse of unity and solidarity among the workforce, this 
was also used to justify the attempt to evict the Zimbabweans in 2009, and so the language 
of solidarity was ironically ultimately a way of further entrenching group divisions and 
mistrust.  Instead, Maromo reports that it was PASSOP’s work in De Doorns that was 
ultimately successful in building real solidarity: ‘And they know because of that thing which 
Braam and me was doing, on the, because we were helping- now, right now we are helping 
more South Africans than Zimbabweans. So...it will be difficult even for them to, start 
another sort of you know xenophobia or so, to go against ih, because now we have we have 
got a voice, and we have s:: some numbers’ (line 38-43).  
So far in Part 2, we have seen how Zimbabwean interviewees reported a qualified 
improvement in their relations with their South African counterparts generally since 2009 
and ascribed this to the South Africans’ becoming more tolerant and realising the error of 
their past beliefs (Part 2A).  In this way, they made it incumbent on South Africans, rather 
than themselves, to change; and their accounts also differed from those of South African 
workers, who placed the onus to change on the Zimbabweans (Part 2B).  When discussing 
their own participation in the more recent farm workers’ strike, Zimbabwean interviewees 
said that they had joined in because of fear of violent retribution if they did not, as well as, 
to a lesser extent, because they also had the same wage demands as all other workers (Part 
2C).  This participation was read by South Africans in Part 2B as a positive thing, as evidence 
of the Zimbabweans’ showing greater solidarity and doing ‘better things that showed that 
they were with us’, but from Zimbabwean workers’ own point of view – at least those few 
we interviewed – the violence and threats of violence used to keep people from going to 
work were presented as something illegitimate, something which they (and others) were yet 
again potential victims of.  In this way, they appear to have conceded physically but not 




Parts 1 and 2 of this chapter have examined the discursive substance or content of the 
‘unity’ that reportedly existed among workers during the strike.  It has complicated the 
accounts of ‘maximum unity and zero xenophobia’, and of workers being ‘united across the 
whole group’, in a number of ways.  First, similar constructions of the farmer-Zimbabwean 
relationship and its consequences for South African workers – the undermining of wage 
bargaining processes and displacement of South African workers – continued to circulate 
during and after the strike.  Second, South Africans’ accounts of the improvement in their 
relationship with Zimbabweans since 2009 do not appear to have been based on a sense of 
remorse or repentance about the eviction.  Thus, while this section has been based on very 
small samples and its conclusions are thus provisional, the lack of remorse for the 2009 
violence, as well as the Zimbabweans’ concession that they joined in with the strike under 
duress, suggest that not only that there had not been a significant closing of the ideological 
gap between these communities of workers in the three years since 2009, but also that the 
absence of violence against the Zimbabweans during the strike and the general lessening of 
conflict cannot be interpreted as a vindication of or triumph for the anti-xenophobic 
imperative among South African farm workers in De Doorns (cf Kerr & Durrheim, 2013).  
Importantly, the significant exception here was the leading organisers of PASSOP, who 
articulated a need for Zimbabweans and other foreign workers to become active 
participants alongside South African workers in their struggle for better wages and working 
conditions, not (only) as an expedient to prevent themselves being victims of violence again, 
but because they believed in principle in building a class-based solidarity among farm 
workers that crosses racial and national divisions.   
Part 3: Farmer 1 speaks about Zimbabweans’ role in the Keurboskloof strike 
One of the most important questions in a follow-up study about the three-way relationship 
between Zimbabwean and South African workers and farmers is about how farmers 
interpreted the Zimbabweans’ participation or non-participation in the strikes – especially 
given the ‘alliance’ that had pertained between these two groups in 2009 on the basis of the 
Zimbabweans being agreeable and reliable workers.  The following extract comes from an 
interview with farmer 1, one of the first interviews I undertook in this second round of 
fieldwork, shortly after the start of the strike in early November 2012.  He reflects on 
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Zimbabweans workers’ and PASSOP members’ involvement in the Keurboskloof strike, 
which at that stage was still relatively recent:  
Extract 18: Farmer 1 (November 2012) 
4 PK:  So, the Zimbabweans are still here.  Uh is that, the case? Are th- and,  
5 F1:  They started coming back, they, they,  
6 PK:  ((interrupts)) did they come back immediately the next season after they (.) after  
7 [that 2009 stuff  
8 F1:  [ja  
9 F1:  ja 
10 PK:  okay 
11 F1:  So they worked, last year there was a lot of them working, so, but for me for  
12 instance, we let, because, because to have the locals, to save the work for the locals, 
13 [P: mm::] we sent them back, to Zimbabwe or wherever for, the, winter season. [P: 
14 ja] And then, now is the time that they come back from wherever. Because it’s ki-,  
15 it’s kind of a migrating migrant work *P: yes sure+ so we trying to, go that way, to, to 
16 get the, community more stabilised for, not having the foreigners here all the time.  
17 PK:  Okay shoh hey hh 
18 F1:   So you see (why I’m/my) (     ) *P: Mmh] so  
19 PK:  that’s hard 
20 F1:  and they just, starting to come back, um, but there’s one guy, that’s their union, he 
21 actually started the first, he’s the guy that’s representing them, he, at that time with 
22 the unrest, he’s a white guy that’s  
23 PK:  Yes Braam, Braam Hanekom 
24 F1:  Braam, he actually, I I he started the first riot. Here this year. ((PK breathes in  
25 sharply)) So we thou- we actually suspect that the ANC bought him in. Because we 
26 don’t know that, we don’t know of any income that he gets, fro-, so, I don’t know  
27 who’s paying him or what is::: 
28 PK:  okay. Wow hey 
29 F1:  ja (.) Because 
30 PK:  He was always on the side of the Zimbabweans 
31 F1:  He is still.  
32 PK:  okay 
33 F1:  But now he’s, I mean we couldn’t understand it’s like, three weeks ago there wasn’t 
34 even, the f- just the first Zimbabweans came in, and we all, ‘welcome welcome’ you 
35 know ((PK laughs a bit)) ‘welcome back’ and then the next thing they started to  
36 riot because, (.) I don’t know what, because of what. *PK: oh+ So (Braam-) but then, 
37 he uh he’s two-faced (at the moment) so he [PK: okay] plays both sides. [PK: okay] 
38 So we not, we don’t know what’s happening.  




In this extract, Farmer 1 reports and tries to account for the fact of PASSOP and 
Zimbabwean workers’ involvement in the first ‘unrest’ of the season.  Two aspects of his 
reasoning are highlighted.  First, he makes a display of ignorance about what the strike at 
Keurboskloof was actually about.  This is done by referring to it as a ‘riot’ (lines 24 & 36) – 
suggesting mindless, disruptive violence (which is far from how participants in this strike 
themselves spoke about it – see Chapter 7 above) and also by explicitly saying that he could 
not understand why they would do this: ‘I mean we couldn’t understand it’s like, three 
weeks ago there wasn’t even, the f- just the first Zimbabweans came in, and we all, 
‘welcome welcome’ you know ‘welcome back’ and then the next thing they started to riot 
because, (.) I don’t know what, because of what’ (lines 34-36).  In this way, he shows that he 
does not recognise the value of or intention behind the Keurboskloof wage strike.  Of 
course, this arguably wilful failure to understand what seems to have been a fairly 
straightforward wage strike in response to changes made by the company that managed 
Keurboskloof is yet another way by which farmers can undermine the emergence of a 
healthily adversarial relationship between farmers and workers. Adversarial does not 
necessarily mean acrimonious or violent; indeed, Owen Maromo was insistent that what 
made the Keurboskloof strike different from the later strikes and protests, as well as more 
successful, was that it happened peacefully without any destruction of vineyards and also 
that it did not lead to a backlash from farmers because the state was not involved in 
negotiating or implementing the raised wage.  However, if farmers expect that a ‘good 
relationship’ with workers means that those workers will willingly do whatever farmers 
want of them and never demand higher wages or withhold their labour, as farmer 1 seems 
to have expected from the Zimbabweans, then it is not surprising if farmers are eventually 
disappointed in this expectation.  As du Toit (1993) pointed out long ago, farmers think that 
they are the only ones who can let go of their side of the paternalistic bargain without 
consequence, while not giving workers the same allowance.  In other words, in farmers’ 
eyes there is no such thing as legitimate collective bargaining, because it is always treated as 
a betrayal of their ‘benevolence’.   
Second, Farmer 1’s display of incomprehension simultaneously shows an expectation of 
continued allegiance or at least goodwill from the Zimbabweans. ‘Welcome welcome, 
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welcome back’ suggests a greeting between old friends who have been separated for a 
while, an expectation which was then unexpectedly disappointed by the Zimbabweans 
starting to riot.  ‘Their union’ (presumably PASSOP) being involved in the riot is read as 
evidence that Hanekom is ‘two-faced...so he plays both sides’ (line 37).  ‘Both sides’ 
suggests that Farmer 1 thinks there are only two sides: the farmers’ and Zimbabweans’ side, 
and everyone else’s side (likely including those who ‘riot’ and ‘the ANC’).  This shows that 
farmer 1 assumes that anyone who supported the Zimbabweans must also be on the side of 
farmers; he does not seem to consider that there may be Zimbabweans, or supporters of 
Zimbabweans, who are not on farmers’ side and do not care to be aligned with them.  
Hence, Hanekom being on the side of the Zimbabweans but also stoking the riot is an 
anomalous situation that farmer 1 is unable to account for with what he knows of these 
groups’ interests, and hence he supplies corruption as a possible external reason to explain 
this (line 25 – that Hanekom must have been bought by the ANC).  Supplying corruption as a 
reason for why the Zimbabweans were rioting negates or lessens the possible challenge that 
Zimbabwean workers themselves were offering to farmers and thus to their erstwhile 
alliance.  In this way, farmer 1 avoids the possibility that Zimbabwean workers and PASSOP 
members were exercising their own voluntary agency in resisting the management of 
Keurboskloof and striking for higher wages.  Again, this follows the usual farmer and DA-
aligned analysis of any protest or social upheaval as something orchestrated by the ANC to 
destabilise the Western Cape.   
Indeed, Webb (2013) observed after the strike that 
From the beginning, farmers and their associations attempted to divide the workers 
on the basis of their employment contracts by stating that permanent workers were 
adverse to labour militancy and had not joined the strikes —the implication being 
that permanent coloured workers were within the bonds of paternalism, while 
seasonal workers, primarily black workers from the Eastern Cape, Lesotho or 
Zimbabwe, were an unruly mob.  Ethnic corporatism is clearly alive and well. (p. 67)  
 
‘Ethnic corporatism’ is a reference to the title of Ewert and Hamman’s (1996) paper on the 
quasi-alliance between farmers and coloured workers that was used to exclude black 
workers from the ‘farm family’ in the early 1990s. While Webb did not research 
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Zimbabwean farm workers’ participation in the strike in any depth, if this passing 
observation is correct (see also Appendix 2 below) it suggests that for farmers during the 
strike, race-based distinctions among workers returned to the fore and displaced the earlier 
nationality-based distinction between Zimbabwean and South African workers that was so 
evident in farmers’ discourse in the 2009 interviews.  This suggests that perhaps the 
Zimbabwean-farmer alliance has been short-lived, and that, after Keurboskloof, farmers 
chose to abandon the Zimbabwean community in favour of trying to retain their ties with 
the coloured community, which may turn out to be the longer-lasting ‘quasi-alliance’ of the 
two.  Of course, many black workers we interviewed said that coloured workers also played 
a central role in the strike (see above); and farmers’ reports of race-based divisions in 
worker participation are more likely efforts to forge alliances with sections of the workforce 
than simply an accurate description of the intergroup dynamics in the Hex Valley.  Certainly, 
from my limited knowledge of Western Cape trade unions and farm worker organisations, 
my impression is that many of the most radical trade unionists are coloured people.  The 
final section of this results chapter, below, returns more directly to the question of race 
divisions in the work force, and the possibility that nationality-based identities are not the 
only or even the primary way that workers understand themselves and their relations with 
others.  
 
Part 4: ‘Die nasies’ (‘The nations’) 
This final section of this results chapter returns to a theme that was introduced at the 
beginning of the chapter and has appeared marginally throughout: the possibility that the 
‘South African labouring community’ that was to the fore in the 2009 findings may itself be 
thought of as a strategic and temporary alliance of groups with somewhat different 
interests, and is a label which hides other divisions which may be salient at other times.  In 
both the previous and the current results chapters, workers whom I have grouped together 
as ‘South African’ referred to themselves and others at least as often in terms of racial or 
ethno-linguistic group identities as in terms of their South African-ness per se.  For example, 
in the 2009 results chapter, Vuyo the labour broker compared the over-compliance of 
Zimbabwean workers to the resistance shown by Xhosa and Sotho workers (extract 11); 
Wendy and Marco expressed their dismay and anger that farmers were not looking out for 
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the welfare of their own people, the coloureds, but seemed to be very sympathetic to 
Zimbabweans (extract 6); and farmer 1 said that some of the ‘Xhosa group’ were the 
workers who caused trouble on his farm by not doing the work thoroughly enough but 
expecting full pay for it.  In this 2012-2013 results chapter, the workers in extracts 2 and 3 
made references to coloured as well as South African identity as a basis for deserving first 
preference to jobs and other benefits that the Zimbabweans were said to be unfairly taking 
away; Joe the Zimbabwean man in extract 8 said that on most farms the norm is for workers 
to say ‘these are coloured, these are Xhosa, these are Kwirikwiri’; and Andile in extract 11 
said that 2009 had been a conflict between the amaXhosa and the Zimbabweans.  When I 
was writing the findings section of the 2009 case study, however, an analytical distinction 
between the views of coloured and black workers did not seem to be empirically warranted, 
because the analysis focussed on the consequences of the Zimbabwean-farmer relationship 
that the speakers constructed, and these consequences – displacement from jobs on farms, 
and the undercutting of wages and bargaining processes – seemed equally prevalent among 
all those (‘South African’) interviewees who expressed opposition to the Zimbabweans and 
called for them to leave the area.  What is important, however, is that either way, in all 
these cases the Zimbabweans were presented as a discrete group separate from the 
speakers’ own group – either separate from coloureds, or separate from Xhosas, or separate 
from South Africans.  The last two extracts in this chapter are thus properly ‘deviant cases’, 
because they show a construction of racial rather than national divisions among workers in 
which the Zimbabweans were grouped together with all black people, and blamed for 
various problems in De Doorns.  
Extract 19: Coloured labour broker and wife (interview 33, translated from Afrikaans):  
1 Lionel:  Um, no one, no one is messing with the Zimbabweans any more, they are  
2  always here, and it’s now better than it was. Everyone, they work together,  
3  and they, they, they actually also striked together, not so? 
4 Sarel:  Ja 
5 Lionel:  Okay  
6 Philippa: So, why has that changed?  
7 Lionel: ((translating)) Why did it change? 
8 Sarel:  Like what? 
9 Philippa: Like- 
10 Lionel: Like in 2009 a lot of people were opposed to them. 
11 Sarel:  We are actually still always opposed to them, because they get better   
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12  advantages than what we do in this place. [P: mm] Look, before the Xhosas 
13  and the Zims and these types of nations, our place was (clear), [P: mm] was 
14  nice.  There weren’t so many murders and rapes and all these hundreds of  
15  things that happen here. [P: shoh] Understand?  
16 Philippa: ja 
17 Lionel: I understand what you’re saying  
18 Sarel:  Many of us have been murdered. [P: shoh] For example my brother-in-law  
19  was also murdered by their nation and they were never found. [P: shoh, I   
20  understand that+ That’s what happened. That’s why, we will (surely never be 
21  able to change it), because it’s mos the government that lets them in *L: I   
22  understand what you’re saying+ to this country 
23 Philippa: Hmm, ja. ((asks in English)) So, do people, especially coloured people, do   
24  coloured people feel that it was, things have, things were better in the old   
25  days? 
26 Sarel:  ((answers in Afrikaans)) Yes, a lot better. If I must now think, I grew up under 
27  that mountain. [L: mm] I used to walk far, that time when I was still young,  
28  the dances were there on the farms and I walked. I (used to show off that  
29  time). But today you can’t walk, you can’t walk. *P: mm+ You’ll be killed  
30 Lionel: So (    ) is dangerous now.  
31 Sarel:  Everything is dangerous now. No, in the old days it wasn’t like that. *P: Shoh+ I 
32  used to walk through the bush at night and I was never scared of a bush   
33  stirring. [L: Huh] But now never, never, I will never walk around 
 
 
Although this participant is not speaking about farm labour relations, the extract is 
important because it shows an alternative view of the significant lines of intergroup division 
in this community.  Here these lines are racial as opposed to national ones. The speaker’s 
own category, which is initially not explicitly named, is contrasted with ‘the Zims and the 
Xhosas and these types of nations’ (line 12-13).  Somewhat ironically, ‘nations’ is a racial 
reference to black people: Zimbabweans and Xhosa-speakers are individual ‘nations’ but 
grouped as part of the same broader category of blacks.  The use of ‘our’ in ‘our place’ (line 
13) seems to refer to coloured people specifically, which is confirmed when the interviewer 
suggests this in lines 23-24.  This racial distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is repeated when 
the speaker reports ‘Many of us have been murdered.  For example my brother-in-law was 
also murdered by their nation and they were never found’ (line 18-19).  ‘Their nation’ here is 
black people. This distinction between coloured and black people in a realm outside of farm 
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work is thus a deviant case compared to the way Zimbabweans have been constructed as a 
discrete group in almost all the previous extracts.   
However, South African citizenship as an identity category also makes an appearance in this 
extract; though it is ambiguously conflated with race.  Sarel himself introduces ‘the Xhosas’ 
who, along with the Zimbabweans, are given as an example of ‘these types of nations’ (line 
12-13).  After complaining about the increase in violent crime that these nations have 
caused, he then says ‘we will (surely never be able to change it), because it’s mos the 
government that lets them in...to this country’ (line 20-22).  This statement could be read as 
ambiguously including Xhosa speakers, implying that they are somehow not real citizens.  
Thus, similarly to the speakers in Part 1 of this chapter, he makes reference to a citizenship 
identity (distinguishing those who are entitled to be in this country from those who are not) 
as well as a racial one (‘us’ versus ‘their nation’). The ambiguity about whether or not Xhosa-
speakers are included in the category of citizens (people who have a right to be in this 
country), shows the conflation of racial, national and geographical identities which is the 
legacy of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy in the Western Cape.  In this view, all black 
people are outsiders who originate from somewhere else – indeed, at one time, the 
Transkei was nominally another country (Neocosmos, 2006; Goldin, 1984).  
This extract also gestures towards the possibility that different South African workers who 
appeared united in their opposition to the Zimbabweans in 2009 may actually have had 
different reasons for this opposition.  When Lionel asks about why things with the 
Zimbabweans appear to have got better since 2009, and Sarel does not initially understand 
the question (lines 1-10), Lionel clarifies ‘Like in 2009 a lot of people were opposed to them’ 
(line 10).  Sarel replies: ‘We are actually still always opposed to them, because they get 
better advantages than what we do in this place’. This suggests that as a coloured person he 
did oppose the Zimbabweans in 2009, but for very different reasons to those of, say, Vuyo 
the labour broker (quoted in the 2009 results above), who was himself Xhosa-speaking and 
thus would have fallen into the same general category of ‘nations’ whom Sarel here has 
such a problem with.  
The second extract in this section is also a deviant case, as it contains complaints about 
black in-migrants from coloured workers, but here Sotho people are mentioned. Unlike the 
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extract above where the racialised identity of the black inkomers was explicit (‘die nasies’) 
and the coloured identity of the speaker was implicit (and supplied by the interviewer), here 
the identity of the speakers as coloured is explicit, while the racial identity of the ‘inkomers’ 
is only implicit:  
Extract 20: 2nd group of coloured workers in De Doorns Oos (interview 2) 
1 Matthew:  These people, the inkomers are for us a threat.  How many murders have  
2  already happened here in this place, and were never solved ((agreement   
3  from all)) and murderers who were never found, in this place.   
4 ?:   Mm, and rape  
((six lines omitted as Bettie translates to PK, mentioning ‘Sothos’ specifically)) 
5 Bettie:  Our lives is in danger, there’s nothing we can do, (we just)- 
6 Philippa:  Okay. Are those, those Sotho people, or other people from outside, do they  
7  come here to work, or what 
8 Bettie:  They work, (they work) 
9 Philippa:   Okay  
10 Matthew: They come to work, but (        ), in the first place they have said to the farmers  
11  that they are prepared to work for that lower wage ((agreement from all)),  
12  while they said to the coloureds, to us coloureds, ‘there isn’t work for you’. *A 
13  & B: mm] Everywhere we coloureds are kept out ((uitverband)), but now they 
14  come first and they start this violence.  Understand? *P: ja+ What’s wrong is- 
15  but th- now we come last, last again. (They say) it’s us coloureds who do all 
16  this stuff. [P: ok] And we grew up in, in De Doorns, all the years we used to  
17  walk around safely, we walked far, [B: mm, ja+ but we can’t do that anymore. 
18  [B: M-m] [P: Okay] And our lives are threatened ((in bedreiging)) all the time. 
  
This extract suggests that different categories of black, in-migrant workers are 
interchangeable to coloureds. Here, ‘inkomers’ – including Sothos particularly – are blamed 
for two things: the increase in violent crime and a lack of safety in one’s own community 
(lines 1-3 and 17-18); and working for lower wages and displacing coloured people from jobs 
(lines 10-14).  When the interviewer treats Sotho people as an instance of ‘people from 
outside’ and asks ‘do they come here to work, or what’ (line 6), Matthew responds: ‘They 
come to work, but (        ), in the first place they have said to the farmers that they are 
prepared to work for that lower wage...while they said to the coloureds, to us coloureds, 
‘there isn’t work for you’. Everywhere we coloureds are kept out, but now they come first 
and they start this violence’. Thus, despite these complaints sounding almost exactly the 
same as some of those made by coloured people of the Zimbabweans in 2009, it is now 
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Sotho rather than Zimbabwean workers who they are attached to.  Also, this is in contrast to 
how Sotho workers were portrayed by Vuyo in extract 11 – as people who also resist 
farmers.  Thus, there is a sense that different categories of black people might be 
interchangeable: even the interviewer asks ‘those Sotho people, or other people from 
outside, do they come here to work, or what’ (lines 6-7, emphasis added) – suggesting that 
Sotho people might not be the only (black) outsiders the speakers are referring to.  The case 
for the interchangeability of categories of black workers in the eyes of coloureds is bolstered 
by the fact that almost identical complaints were made about the Zimbabweans in 2009.  
A third and final extract in this section comes from the same interview with the group of 
workers in Extract 3 of this chapter above (in fact it comes from the 24 lines omitted):   
Extract 21:  Second group of coloured workers in De Doorns Oos (interview 2) 
1 Philippa: when we were talking this morning, [M1: Ja] some, somebody was saying  
2  that sometimes on the farms like, it’s still like apartheid, cos the white people 
3  still want to keep the coloureds like, you know, like this ((makes a gesture of 
4  submission)) 
5 Bettie:  Ja. [M1: Ja!] [P: So-] On the farm is like that.  
6 Philippa: So it sounds like some fa-, some people have a good relationship with their  
7  farmers, other people, other people don’t have a good relationship with the 
8  farmers, or-  
9 Bettie:  Ja, it is like that. [P: Okay] But you do get some good farmers, then we,   
10  people make them bad, because we take advantage.  
11 Philippa: Okay! shoh. [B: ((inaudible))] So, do you think racism from the farmers is a  
12  problem, or not then? 
13 Bettie:  Not really. [P: Okay] A-, apartheid van die boere af is nie so erg soos die, as  
14  die swartes nie. [? & M1: Ja] The racism is worse between blacks and   
15  coloured than with the whites and coloured.  
16 Philippa: Oh, wow. Okay, okay. So, alright. What do you guys think would be like a   
17  solution or a way forward? Can you translate? 
18 Bettie:  ((translates)) Wat is die-, wat dink ons sal die oplossing wees voor-?  
19 Charl:  Hulle moet net teruggaan na hulle land- ((they must just go back to  
  their country)) 
 
This is the last case in the dataset where coloured-black divisions were to the fore.  In 
answer to the question of whether racism from farmers is a problem or not, Bettie says not 
really, and then spontaneously observes that ‘apartheid from the farmers is not as bad as 
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the blacks’ (line 13) which she self-translates as ‘The racism is worse between blacks and 
coloured than with the whites and coloured’ (line 14-15). Then when the interviewer asks 
‘what do you guys think would be like a solution or a way forward’, Charl answers ‘they 
must just go back to their country’. Since we had just been talking about black people and 
the racism between coloureds and blacks, it is possible that this is a generic reference to all 
black people which once again does not make distinctions between those black people who 
are non-citizens and those who are citizens (and thus presumably have no other country to 
go back to).   
Overall, there are enough instances of such division in the dataset to suggest that despite 
the apparent unity of the South African workforce in 2009 in their opposition to the 
Zimbabweans and in their support for the strike, and despite many workers reporting that 
coloured and black workers acted in a unified manner during the strike, this unity may in 
some cases obscure an older racial conflict which has not been entirely patched over.  It 
may also be that the coloured farm worker community has experienced a particular sense of 
loss and displacement associated with the ‘externalisation’ process, and so the arrival of 
migrant (and formerly migrant) workers whom they feel are replacing them on the farms is 
a particularly bitter pill to swallow (an observation also made by farmer 5).  There have been 
numerous extracts where an aggrieved, excluded or abandoned coloured identity is to the 
fore: ‘they are prepared to work for that lower wage, while they said to the coloureds, to us 
coloureds, “there isn’t work for you”. Everywhere we coloureds are kept out’ (extract 20, 
above); ‘the white people chose them, and they left us’ (extract 3, above); ‘there’s no work 
for me, for the coloureds, but for the Zimbabweans there is work’ (extract 6, chapter 7); 
‘now we come last, last again. (They say) it’s us coloureds who do all this stuff (extract 20, 
above).  This feeling of being excluded or abandoned by farmers might be different from the 
experiences of workers who were either never invested in paternalism and ‘farm families’, 
or who have already realised that these institutions do not serve their interests. As we saw 
in Part 1 of this chapter, some workers expressed a nostalgic desire to return to an ‘ideal’ 
time when workers’ relationships with their farmers were supposedly in a state of peaceful, 
albeit unequal, stability and mutual help and trust; whereas for others, including some 
coloured workers, the more urgent question was how to cultivate an adversarial 
relationship with farmers that enabled healthy wage bargaining.  For such workers, the 
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Zimbabwean-farmer relationship is still constructed as a form of displacement, but the tone 
and meaning of this displacement may be slightly different, more closely related to an unfair 
undercutting of the bargaining process than a deep personal experience of loss for oneself 
and one’s community.  This allows a retrospective case to be tentatively made that what 
appeared as unified opposition to the Zimbabweans among all ‘South African’ workers in 
2009 was actually a point of convergence between different but partially overlapping sets of 
interests in change in this community.  It may be that those coloured workers who felt 
particularly aggrieved that the Zimbabweans were usurping their places on the farms – but 
who may also sometimes treat them as interchangeable with other groups of migrant black 
people – were happy to support the eviction, even though for possibly different reasons to 
those both coloured and black workers who do not share the same investment in the 
institutions of paternalism and who obviously see a strong distinction between themselves 
and Zimbabweans.  In this sense, what appeared in 2009 as ‘the South African labouring 
community’ is now readable as itself a temporary and strategic intergroup alliance among 
groups with a variety of slightly different aims and interests in this changing socio-economic 
landscape (cf Sherif, 1966).  
Discussion: Complicating the three-group paradigm 
This chapter has complicated the three-group analysis that was used to make sense of the 
2009 attack on the Zimbabweans’ homes. As we can now see, there are not simply two 
groups making up the farm worker community in the Hex Valley – Zimbabweans and South 
Africans.  Although this nationality-based distinction was salient in 2009, and, importantly, 
the contents of what these identities meant was constructed and used strategically in 
mobilising people to carry out the eviction (cf Reicher, Hopkins & Condor, 1997; Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001), the discourse of De Doorns residents shows how many layers of identity are 
available to farm workers – racial, regional, national, class-based, and ethno-linguistic 
identities, inter alia.  Alliances and divisions can be formed on the basis of any of them.  
These identities reflect how different divisions have been institutionalised at different 
points in Southern Africa’s history.  Apartheid tried to racialise citizenship and nationalise 
ethnicity (Neocosmos, 2006), and the democratic South Africa overlaid these old divisions 
with a new non-racial division between citizens and non-citizens. This citizen/non-citizen 
distinction is thus only the most recent way of dividing up the Southern African population. 
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Claims to preferential treatment on the basis of being deserving citizens – with the 
Zimbabweans being problematised on the basis of their non-citizenship – were indeed made 
repeatedly by South African workers in the interviews.  However, this South African 
citizenship did not simply erase or eclipse all the older identities. Racial (black, coloured, 
white), ethno-linguistic (Xhosa, Sotho) and regional identities (‘people from here’, 
‘inkomers’) were also invoked at different times.  In 2009, the older racial divisions were 
subsumed by national ones, leading to a ‘xenophobic’ conflict that appeared not to 
implicate race per se.  However, this second empirical chapter has shown that such racial-
geographical divisions have not entirely disappeared.  For some coloured people the 
Zimbabweans were a problem primarily because they were black and not from the Western 
Cape – a complaint levelled similarly at all black people, apparently sometimes including 
Xhosa-speaking South Africans.   
Thus, despite the fact that there are so many groups referred to (farmers, coloured workers, 
Zimbabweans, Xhosa-speakers – or even five if one includes Sothos), there are grounds for 
maintaining that rather than a four- or five-group analysis, what we have are several lots of 
three-group scenarios, as different binaries are constructed among the work force 
(citizen/non-citizen, or black/coloured, or people from here/outsiders) which then have 
implications for relationships with farmers.   However, if we consider the accounts of 
workers in Wilderman’s (2014) research, and our own participants who spoke about the 
unity among groups of workers during the strike, this shows that an alliance among workers 
as workers has in some cases overcome racial, ethnic, geographical and nationality-based 
divisions.  As Reicher, Hopkins and Condor observed, ‘*t+he histories of most if not all groups 
are marked by coalition, schism and recombination’ (1997, p. 97).  Thus, one way of thinking 
about social change in this framework is as a series of shifting configurations of intergroup 
allegiance and division. These alliances may change when the surrounding circumstances 
change; or indeed it can work the other way round, that changes in intergroup allegiance 
can change the surrounding circumstances.   
Hence, it is not only paternalism discourse which can be likened to a palimpsest capturing 
layers of historical change (cf Ewert & du Toit, 2005; Billig, 1991), but all identity discourse, 
as references to racial, ethno-linguistic, and geographical or regional identities as well as 
citizenship reflect the legacy of the institutionalising of these identities at different points in 
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Southern Africa’s history (cf Neocosmos, 2006).  Moreover we can see how these identities 
are construed in such a way as to convey both ‘a model of *the speaker’s+ position in a set of 
social relations as well as the actions that are possible and proper (legitimate) given such a 
position’ (Drury & Reicher, 2000, p. 581).   
The dilemma of the anti-xenophobia position continues 
At the end of the 2009 results chapter, the dilemma of taking an anti-xenophobic stance 
when investigating the eviction of the Zimbabweans was discussed. Working within the anti-
xenophobia paradigm, Misago (2009) realised that a narrative of worker exploitation by 
farmers went hand in hand with a narrative of grievances against foreigners which 
legitimated xenophobic violence – violence which itself was taken for granted as a bad thing 
to be prevented and solved by South African local and national authorities.  Farmers, too, 
saw the xenophobia as a bad thing, and in this way, the anti-xenophobic approach aligned 
easily with farmers’ own analysis of that conflict.  But in Chapter 9, which described the 
events leading up to the farm workers’ strike in 2012, literature from a different perspective 
was used.  Wilderman (2014), working within a paradigm of trade unionism and assuming 
an imperative of worker resistance, assumed that the farm workers’ strike was a good thing, 
an expression of resistance to exploitation and oppression by farmers.  Of course, this view 
was completely opposed to that of farmers, who mainly saw the strike, like the xenophobia, 
as an illegitimate conflict stirred up by trouble-causing elements in the ANC who once again 
used and abused workers for their own political ends (although these views were not given 
in detail in the 2012 results chapter).  In this way, a worker liberation approach did not align 
easily with the views of farmers.   
This chapter has shown how both South African and Zimbabwean interviewees continued to 
play by more or less the same ideological rules as they had been using in 2009, with neither 
side significantly revising their own position or accepting the moral onus to change. Hence, 
the absence of xenophobic violence during the strike was not attributed by South Africans 
who supported the 2009 eviction to their own realisation about the error of their formerly 
xenophobic ways.  Rather, they ascribed it mainly to the Zimbabweans having shown that 
they were now participating in the strike.  The Zimbabweans themselves gave a more 
complex response, saying that in general their relationship with South Africans had 
improved because these South Africans had realised that their former allegations and 
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complaints about low wages were unfounded, but also that they had stayed away from 
work during the strike because of fear of violent retribution against those who did not do so.  
In this way they both conceded and did not concede to the moral ‘onus’ to change.  This 
presents yet further dilemmas for the anti-xenophobic position, because it suggests that the 
ideological underpinnings of violence against outsiders in this community have not been 
significantly challenged, even though there was no attack on the Zimbabweans during the 
strike.  It is not as simple as saying that tolerance or a commitment to peaceful problem-
solving won the day after 2009.  Rather, PASSOP has at times had to work with rather than 
against discourses of liberation and worker unity – the same discourses that in another 
context justified xenophobic violence – in order to ‘save a lot of lives’.  In this set of 
interviews, PASSOP is the one voice attempting to build a bridge or a via media between 
these two moral universes – the universe of anti-xenophobia and the universe of black or 
worker liberation – a bridge which enables them both to be critical of the xenophobia of 
South African workers and strike organisers when necessary, but also to pursue their own 
agenda of worker resistance, for example during the Keurboskloof strike in 2012.  
This dilemma is further illustrated by an observation from Wilderman (2014) in his thesis on 
the 2012-2013 strikes.  Wilderman complicated the positive story of the strike by 
acknowledging not only that it involved some coercion of workers and that xenophobic 
sentiments were still circulating, but that part of the organising impetus for the strike and 
the networks that made it possible were actually a consequence of, and drew on, the same 
community energy and networks that were implicated in the eviction of the Zimbabweans in 
2009:  
We should note that these networks were complicated in nature, not only in their 
methods of emergence and composition, but also, at different points, in their 
conflicting roles within these communities.  Prior to the farm worker protests of late 
2012 and early 2013, informal social networks, constituted slightly differently and 
with different understandings and explanations for their grievances, acted as 
mobilising structures to coordinate and execute xenophobic attacks. (p. 91)  
In this way, Wilderman (2014) gestures towards the possibility that the strikes and the 
xenophobia were actually an expression of the same impetus in this community. The 
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discourse of xenophobia and the discourse of resistance to farmers lie easily next to one 
another.  Arguably, both events were expressions of a conflict for workers about whether an 
oppositional or a paternalistic relationship with farmers is desirable.  But not only were the 
social networks that enabled both the strike and the xenophobia generically similar in their 
form (as Wilderman points out), but in fact some of the same individuals were part of the 
organising momentum behind both events.  One of our 2012 interviewees, a former ANC 
councillor who called herself a ‘community leader’, openly acknowledged having played an 
organising role in the strike as well as having been part of the mobilisation to evict the 
Zimbabweans in 2009 (she referred to the Zimbabweans as ‘xenophobians’). She did not 
appear to find any contradiction in these two events: 
Extract C: Community leader and strike organiser 
O:  I was involved there, by that xenophobians, but you know, that time 2009 ((1 line 
 omitted)) it was this uh xenophobians né, we, as farm workers, I can say we as farm 
 workers because, the farm workers said, on that time, the xenophobian people 
 came, and worked for less 
PK:  You mean the Zimbabwean people? 
O:   Ja this Zimbabwe people, came to work for less than we was working on that time 
 ((2 lines omitted)) And that was a problem for, for whole of the people who was 
 working on the farms.  And the people were speaking about that, uh uh uh, to the 
 government. But the government that thing, uh uh was just felling on, on uh deaf 
 ears.  Ja.  And, it’s like, the government here, and they see and they didn’t see and 
 they didn’t hear ((four lines omitted)) and um, like, the, I can say we call it, the 
 (municipal), the government, we call them to set uh uh uh a, like, Labour for 
 instance, Labour, we said to Labour, we are not happy. With this thing that this 
 people work for less money. [P: mm] And even some of the people haven’t got 
 papers and stuff like that they was just working.  Ok, and after that, they the people 
 in De Doorns was so (hectic), that all the people was moving to like, to the 
 soccer fields here, [P: okay] and all the people was staying in the, Zimbabwe 
 people, was staying in this field.  
 
Notice how this speaker constructs the Zimbabweans’ presence and alleged working for 
lower wages as an issue for the Department of Labour’s attention, and herself not as 
xenophobic for taking this issue up (although, strangely, the Zimbabweans are called 
‘xenophobians’), but as addressing a serious labour problem.  She also glosses over the 
violence of the actual eviction by saying that ‘the people in De Doorns was so (hectic), that 
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all the people was moving to the...soccer fields there’.  Later in the interview she had this to 
say about the strike:  
Extract D: Community leader and strike organiser 
PK:  What was your role in the strike were you an organiser o::r, h- how did it work 
O:  I was, yes I was part of the organisers. [P: kay + And I’m not scared of telling that. 
 I’m, I’m part and parcel of this strike.  *P: okay+ I was part and parcel of this strike 
 because, ((starts banging the table lightly)) you know what and I will tell it, in the 
 face of the, the farmers I will say it. [P: mm] (.) I was fourteen years old and I was 
 starting, working, (.) hard labour. [P: mmm] Very hard labour. On the farms. [P: mm] 
 And in, the kitchens. [P: mm] I was working in kitchens I was working on the farms, 
 my whole life. [P: mm. Hmh!] And the money was little. [P: mm] And I also want to 
 send my child to varsity. *P: mm+ I can’t even send my child to varsity ((banging on 
 table)) because I’m a seasonal worker now!  
 
Thus the dilemma of xenophobia in De Doorns continues.  The logic of resistance to farmers 
and the logic of xenophobia have become indistinguishable logics.  These extracts come 
from one individual who did not see anything wrong with trying to evict the Zimbabweans – 
indeed, who actually organised to have this ‘problem’ addressed – and who also later played 
an organising role in the strike, justifying both events with the language of exploitation, 
struggle and aspirations for a better life.  Thus, the language of xenophobia – or at least the 
language that justifies the eviction of a whole community of foreign workers – and the 
language of struggle to overcome poverty lie easily next to each other; here, and indeed all 
the way through the results chapters, they have been promulgated uncritically by the same 
person.  This presents a dilemma for proponents of the anti-xenophobic position who want 
to challenge xenophobia. When xenophobic violence against foreign workers is conflated 
with resistance to the exploitation of South African workers or workers in general, then 
proponents of anti-xenophobia will have to consider how their recommendations for 
change and intervention resonate with popular thinking. Challenging xenophobia may be an 
impotent strategy if it consists of ignoring the real racism in this unequal farming system, 
simplistically justifying the Zimbabwean-farmer relationship, or undermining the value of 
worker resistance.  At the same time, those workers and organisers who use the language 
and actions of xenophobia in their mobilizations should realise that the more they do this 
the more they are driving a wedge between sections of the workforce, creating divisions 
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and mistrust, and possibly legitimating worker alliances with farmers, if foreign workers see 
that help is to be found with farmers rather than with their fellow workers. Indeed, it is a 
tragic irony that the discourses of resistance, black liberation and worker solidarity have 
been turned into a tool for justifying violence against non-citizens.  PASSOP is one of the few 
voices in our data that has been trying to bridge the gap between the two paradigms, in 
order to de-link resistance from xenophobia and develop a sense of class solidarity among 
workers that overcomes national and racial divisions and xenophobia, while also taking 
seriously farm workers’ struggles to improve their own lot, and strategising concrete ways 




Chapter 11: The more things change the more they stay the same   
So far, this thesis has been making a claim about how socio-economic circumstances in the 
Hex Valley have been changing, and how groups’ constructions of their relations with others 
are oriented to different interests in these changes.  In this way, the whole thesis presumes 
a context of ongoing change – even in the relatively quiet times between moments of 
protest and upheaval – rather than a context of stasis or stability.  As seen in Chapter 3 
above, the literature on the social dynamics of Western Cape commercial agriculture over 
the last 25 years all offers a narrative of such change (e.g. du Toit, 1993; Ewert & Hamman, 
1996; du Toit & Ally, 2003; Ewert & du Toit, 2005; Kritzinger, Barrientos & Roussouw, 2004; 
Webb, 2017).  Two more recent theses (Webb, 2013; Wilderman, 2014) have also engaged 
with these changes, with Webb (2013) asking how, if at all, those few trade unions that do 
operate among Western Cape farm workers have been able to organise the temporary and 
seasonal workers that now make up the bulk of farm labour, and Wilderman (2014) arguing 
that the farm workers’ strikes were partly a product of those changes that lead to a greater 
reliance on externalised, non-farm dwelling workers whose relative independence from 
farmers and new living arrangements in informal settlements and townships enabled them 
to be the main driving force behind the strike.  However, at the same time, much of this 
literature also suggests that alongside these changes there are continuities, and that many 
of the problems of the past persist into the present despite legislation designed to promote 
change.  These include continuities with slavery, continued lack of effective collective 
bargaining power for workers, the persistance of suffocating paternalism, and de facto 
continued ‘farmers’ rule’ which dictates outcomes for workers (Pahle, 2015; Munakamwe & 
Jinnah, 2014; Webb, 2013; Ewert & Hamman, 2005; du Toit & Ally, 2003).   
In this short penultimate chapter, I will further develop the case for continuity in two ways. 
First, white commercial farmers continue to influence regional labour migration flows in the 
post-apartheid era as they did under apartheid.  Second, I will argue that there is continuity 
between the intergroup dynamics that pertained in 2009 between groups of workers, and 
between workers and farmers, and those that pertained under the CLPP during apartheid.  
The Coloured Labour Preference Policy divided workers by law along race and migrancy 
status lines, and employers’ preference for workers depended on the precarity of this status 
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(Goldin, 1984).  While Chapter 3 showed how the intergroup dynamics in De Doorns in 2009 
involving the Zimbabweans were in many ways an outcome of processes of change, in this 
chapter I will make the case that they can be read as but a variation on the hierarchies and 
stratifications produced in a partially migrant workforce whose members are differentially 
subject to legal, formal migration restrictions.   
Farmers influencing Southern African migration flows  
White commercial farmers have been influencing Southern African migration flows since 
before apartheid began (Johnston, 2007; Posel, 1991; Rutherford, 2008).  Posel (1991) 
shows that in the 1940s, before the National Party came to power, Afrikaner nationalists 
were divided along class lines about whether to pursue total apartheid – complete 
segregation of the races and white self-dependence – or ‘practical’ apartheid, in which 
white business would continue to make use of black labour.  Farmers and the South African 
Agricultural Union (SAAU) were part of the lobby in favour of the ‘practical apartheid’ which 
eventually prevailed:  
Thoroughly disillusioned with the policies of the current government, Afrikaner 
farmers therefore looked to Apartheid as a system whereby the state would intervene 
to ensure an equitable distribution of African labour between urban and rural areas, 
without farmers having to compete with the manufacturing sector for labour in an 
open market. (Posel, 1991, p. 54)  
Rutherford (2008) and Johnston (2007) show examples of how farmers continued to 
influence both the content and enforcement of migration legislation during and after 
apartheid.  For example, in the far Northern Transvaal, farmers’ demand for labour and the 
lack of a homeland in this part of South Africa led the apartheid government to create a 
‘special economic zone’ which made it easier for farmers to employ Zimbabwean migrants 
on South African farms by waiving some of the legal restrictions on cross-border movement 
(Rutherford, 2008).  Indeed, ‘there is a long history of the apartheid state tolerating illegal 
foreign workers on farms, to retain the political support of farmers facing labour shortages’ 
(Johnston, 2007, p. 518).  In her case study of Lesotho migrants working on asparagus farms 
in the eastern Free State in the early 1990s, Johnston (2007) shows how farmers themselves 
did not simply follow the law when it came to choosing and recruiting workers but made 
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calculated decisions about whether to use legal or illegal, direct or indirectly recruited 
migrant workers according to the risks and benefits that each kind of labour would afford.  
By the mid-1990s, when immigration legislation was still extremely exclusionary, exceptions 
were being made for migrant workers in mining and farming as a kind of hangover from 
apartheid (Johnston, 2007).  And when faced ‘with the later closure of legal recruitment 
channels in 1998, Free State farmers banded together to protest at the highest political level 
and were successful in keeping such channels open’ (Johnston, 2007, p. 517, citing Ulicki & 
Crush, 1998). 
In these ways, restricting or facilitating the movement of black workers in Southern Africa 
has long been either enforced or waived according to how it could best service the labour 
demands of white commercial farmers (Goldin, 1984; Posel, 1991).  Although the state is no 
longer engineering which workers are allocated to which industries in which places, we have 
seen how farmers continued to exert such influence not only by employing migrants, thus 
creating a demand for their labour and encouraging them to become established in the 
townships around De Doorns (albeit seasonally – see farmer 1, extract 33, chapter 7; cf 
farmer 2, extract 17, chapter 10), but more specifically by their efforts to open the short-
lived Home Affairs ‘satellite office’ in 2009 to process Zimbabwean migrants’ asylum 
applications in order to legalise their presence in the country.  Also, as farmer 1 explained 
above, the seasonal nature of farm work and there being fewer jobs available in winter 
means that Zimbabweans were being encouraged to leave the Hex Valley during the off-
season in order to ‘save the work for the locals’.  Meanwhile, as we have also seen, during 
the strike some farmers were accused of using the underhand tactic of employing 
undocumented migrant workers and then calling the police to have them arrested on 
payday, as a punishment for striking.  As the comparison with cases in the Free State and 
Northern Transvaal/Limpopo show, there is a continuity in the way farmers still influence 
migrant labour flows, even though where exactly these migrants come from may be 
changing over time.   
Stratified labour ‘preferences’ similar to those of the CLPP 
Another continuity or similarity with the apartheid past is evident in the intergroup 
dynamics that are produced by labour migration regimes that try to give legal preference to 
certain workers over others.  A working paper by Goldin (1984) shows how the intention of 
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the Coloured Labour Preference Policy was to cultivate an alliance between coloureds and 
whites, as it allowed only coloured people and a small minority of black people to live and 
work permanently in the Western Cape.  Other black workers were allowed to be present 
on year contracts from the homelands, in particular the Transkei and the Ciskei; while still 
others were present ‘illegally’.  However, Goldin’s (1984) interviews with white employers 
and representatives of the Cape Chamber of Commerce and Cape Chamber of Industry 
show that these employers knew that how much trouble-free labour they could get out of 
their workers was a direct consequence of how precarious their legal migrancy status was.  
Thus, the most preferred workers in a range of industries were the ‘unregistered blacks, the 
illegal ones, [who] provide many advantages.  They work like hell.  They’re not under 
contract and they know you can fire them at the drop of a hat’ (ibid., p. 25).  Next preferred 
were black workers on year contracts from the homelands, who ‘provide the most reliable 
source of legal labour for Cape employers and generally are preferred by employers who 
require obedient, unskilled and easily retrenched workers.  They are thus particularly 
suitable for seasonal employment such as construction and agriculture’ (p. 25).  As one 
employer remarked, ‘contract blacks give...less trouble than local blacks because they’re so 
scared of getting sent back to the Transkei or Ciskei and starving to death’ (p. 25).  Next 
desirable were those few ‘local’ black people who had permission to live permanently in the 
Western Cape, known as ‘section 10’ blacks.  They were seen as less disciplined and 
hardworking than contract blacks – but still better than coloured workers, whom employers 
saw as ‘troublesome, lazy, unmotivated,’ unwilling to do heavy manual work, and having ‘a 
high rate of absenteeism...unpunctuality [and] greater interest in time off than in working 
and earning’ (Goldin, 1984, p. 22).   
While this situation seems not to have been applicable to fruit and wine farming, where 
almost the entire labour force was coloured until at least the early 1990s (e.g. du Toit, 1993; 
Ewert & Hamman, 1996), a similar hierarchy of preference existed among workers in De 
Doorns by 2009 once the work force had become more heterogeneous.  The Zimbabweans, 
as non-citizens least-favoured by South African law, having the most precarious migrancy 
status, and needing permission of various kinds to work in South Africa, became 
simultaneously ‘favoured’ by farmers but also accused of (rather than sympathised with for) 
accepting less than the minimum wage.  There is an eery similarity between the way the 
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representatives of the Cape Chamber of Industry and the Cape Chamber of Commerce 
talked about ‘labour’ in the early 1980s and the way farmers in the Hex Valley were doing in 
2009 – as something that must revolve around, and be judged according to how best it 
fulfils, employers’ needs.  Recall farmer 2’s description of the Zimbabweans as ‘tremendous’ 
and as eager to continue to keep working through their lunch break, in contrast to the 
others – South Africans – who were now described as being chronically absent, drunk and 
slack.  Hence, both under apartheid and now, the regimes that were supposed to give 
‘preference’ initially to coloured workers over blacks and latterly to South African citizens 
over foreigners ended up having, in some ways, the opposite effect.  Ironically but not 
surprisingly, the least prioritised workers become the most preferred by employers. This is 




Chapter 12: Conclusions, cautions and recommendations for further 
research 
  
This thesis started out as an investigation into an episode of xenophobic violence in De 
Doorns in 2009, violence perpetrated by members of the South African informal settlement 
and farm labouring community, and directed at the Zimbabwean farm worker community. 
However, it has ended up as a historical study of changing intergroup allegiance and division 
in a racially unequal community; especially alliances between different sections of the 
workforce; between sections of the workforce and farmers; other workers’ attempts to 
break such alliances; and the ongoing dilemma for farm workers about whether their 
interests lie in cultivating an adversarial or a paternalistic relationship with farmers.  Group 
alliances have shifted partly as a response to changes in the surrounding socio-economic 
conditions (see Chapter 3 above).  Before the Zimbabweans it was the coloured, farm-
dwelling community who had a ‘shared consciousness’ with farmers about why black people 
should not be part of the ‘farm family’ (Ewert & Hamman, 1996); by 2009 it was evident that 
the Zimbabweans had acquired this shared consciousness about their own superior work 
ethic relative to South Africans and their consequent justified status as preferred workers.  
However, Zimbabweans’ acting in terms of this alliance led to a reaction from South African 
farm workers – the attempt to evict them – which in turn had consequences for the 
emergence of conditions of possibility for a farm workers’ strike in 2012 (Wilderman, 2014), 
for how the Zimbabweans chose strategically to participate in that strike (see Chapter 10 
above), and ultimately for the many negative consequences for workers that were the 
outcome of the strike (Wilderman, 2014).  Moreover, it seems that different sections of the 
South African labouring community may have been more or less united at different times in 
this history, as they appeared united in their desire for the Zimbabweans to leave in 2009 
but possibly had different reasons for this opposition, reflecting different interests in 
change.  From this brief history, we can see the reciprocal relationship between structure 
and agency: socio-economic circumstances change – often because of changes in distant 
systems which nevertheless have trickle-down effects onto this particular community – 
leading people to respond in new ways, but these responses can produce yet further 
changes in circumstances, necessitating further action, and so on (cf Drury & Reicher, 2000).   
276 
 
A social psychological account of xenophobia and racism  
One way of trying to explain the content of group discourse that has accompanied these 
conflicts is, of course, in terms of psychologised ‘xenophobia’ and ‘racism’.  Xenophobia and 
racism may be carried out by and directed to different groups, perhaps, but in general they 
would be seen by social psychologists as variations on the more general phenomenon of 
‘prejudice’ (Brown, 2011).  This kind of explanation immediately raises a number of 
problems, however.  First, it divides the Hex Valley community artificially into a series of 
pairs – South African-Zimbabwean, South African-farmer, Zimbabwean-farmer, coloured-
white, coloured-black, and so on.  We could say that the Zimbabwean community were 
victims of South African workers’ xenophobia; but we would also have to say that South 
African workers are victims of racism from farmers; we would have to puzzle over whether 
Zimbabweans as workers were also victims of racism from farmers, despite being favoured 
by them; and whether the Zimbabweans themselves were also ‘racist’ towards South 
African workers given their often derogatory attitudes towards them.  We would also have 
to ask whether there is racism in the relationship between coloured and black South 
Africans; and how to account for the fact that the Zimbabwean workers in extract 18 of 
Chapter 7 above appeared to love white South African farmers while appearing very critical 
of white Zimbabwean farmers.   
Thus, in addition to its many other weaknesses as an explanation for racism and group 
conflict (Wetherell, 2012; Bonilla-Silva, 1997; Leach, 2005; Reicher, 2007; Dixon, Levine, 
Reicher & Durrheim, 2012), the concept of psychological ‘prejudice’ turns out also to be an 
inherently binary construct, something that operates in the mind of one party and is 
directed towards another.  Analysing the intergroup scenario in the Hex Valley in terms of 
several sets of pairs would be clumsy and it would obscure how these relationships all 
operate simultaneously and with reference to one another – indeed, each pair derives its 
meaning precisely from the fact that there are other comparable relationships operating in 
parallel (Kerr, Durrheim & Dixon, 2016).  In both Zimbabweans’ and farmers’ accounts in the 
2009 results chapter above, the Zimbabweans’ value for farmers as ‘good workers’ always 
depended on a discursive comparison with a third party of relatively unreliable South 
Africans.  From South African workers’ perspective, their complaint was not with the 
Zimbabweans in isolation, but rather with how the Zimbabweans were being used as a tool 
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by farmers, and the consequences of this for themselves.  Hence, although the meaning of 
the farmer-Zimbabwean relationship, the South African-farmer relationship, and the South 
African-Zimbabwean relationship were construed very differently as legitimate or 
illegitimate according to different ideological imperatives, what is similar is that from all 
perspectives these pair-wise relationships were seen to derive their meaning from their 
location in a wider relational context (Kerr et al, 2016). 
A second problem with trying to understand group conflict in De Doorns in terms of 
‘prejudice’ means we would have to puzzle over the fact that farmers sometimes praised 
their workers’ positive characteristics highly – they did not always denigrate or insult them – 
and it is difficult to know whether to classify such speech as ‘racist’ or not (cf Dixon, Levine, 
Reicher & Durrheim, 2012).  For example, farmers had a lot of positive things to say about 
Zimbabwean workers in 2009, as well as a lot of negative things to say about South African 
workers (including coloureds) – their chronic drunkenness and unreliability, for example – 
despite having favoured the coloured community at other times (Ewert & Hamman, 1996).  
If we are thinking in terms of ‘prejudice’, these inconsistencies appear as anomalies that are 
difficult to know what to make of.   
A third problem with the prejudice account of the content of xenophobia and race discourse 
is that it cannot explain the changes and shifts in the configuration of intergroup allegiance 
over time that have been described above.  A psychologised ‘xenophobia’ or ‘racism’ 
account does not get adequately to grips with the context of socio-economic change in 
which groups are embedded and which their actions also help to reproduce or take forward. 
How can ‘racism’ explain the fact that farmers have not always displayed the same degree 
of hostility or affection towards different groups of workers?  How can we explain the 
observation that farmers in the early 1990s had a ‘loyal’ or ‘paternalistic’ relationship with 
their coloured workers, but by 2009 had apparently ditched them in favour of the 
Zimbabweans – but then later, during the strike, behaved again in such a way that one 
observer could see that ‘ethnic corporatism *was+ alive and well’ after all (Webb, 2017)?  To 
answer this, we have to consider both the material, circumstantial changes that form the 
socio-economic context in which groups interact, as well as how groups’ actions themselves 
can remake this context in unpredictable ways.   
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Thus, a more parsimonious explanation for why speakers construe their relationships with 
other groups as they do is to say that groups have different interests in the direction their 
society is changing towards, and that some of these interests are aligned with or opposed to 
those of other groups.  Hence, groups’ accounts of their relations with others are strategic 
in that they are geared towards rendering certain recommendations for or evaluations of 
change in their community sensible and defensible, while dismissing others as impractical or 
immoral.  This account has three main benefits, which address the problems with the 
‘prejudice’ account of xenophobia and racism raised above.  First, it has the benefit of being 
oriented from the start to the material contexts in which groups are operating and living 
and to the reality of social change in these contexts (Durrheim & Dixon, 2005b; cf Durrheim, 
2014; cf Leach, 2005).  Psychology and materiality are closely intertwined, and the danger of 
studying forms of prejudice or xenophobic or racist attitudes (even in a discursive way) by 
themselves – that is, without reference to actual living intergroup relationships – is that they 
become divorced from the context that produced them and which they in turn are part of 
reproducing (Durrheim & Dixon, 2005b).  As was argued in Chapter 4 above, social change is 
both a process and an outcome of intergroup interaction, in which groups read one 
another’s conduct as violating important ideological and historical imperatives – ‘[c]hange 
originates in an asymmetry between ingroup and outgroup perspectives’ (Drury & Reicher, 
2000, p. 596).  The discourse of groups in conflict about the nature of their relationships 
thus looks both forwards and backwards historically: speakers remember the past when 
talking about current intergroup relationships, and they invoke different historical and 
ideological imperatives from that past (Billig, 1991, Sherif, 1996), but they also make 
different recommendations for change according to their ‘future goals and designs’ (Sherif, 
1966).  In this way they become part of an ongoing process of socio-economic change, and 
thus, as Sherif observed, ‘history enters into the very definition of the problem of intergroup 
attitudes’.   
A second benefit of focussing on the rhetorical relationship between constructions of group 
relationships and recommendations for or evaluations of change is that this releases us 
from the constraints of the two-group paradigm but does not limit us to any particular 
number of groups (cf Kerr, Durrheim & Dixon, 2016).  Although Chapter 5 argued that in 
postcolonial contexts a three-group conceptual framework has many benefits, the overall 
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argument is not that we should always include a particular number of groups in our 
theoretical and methodological frameworks. A three-group paradigm for studying 
intergroup relations would quickly come to have as many limitations as a two-group one 
when applied in contexts where it did not really fit.  As we have seen, the intergroup 
scenario in De Doorns is itself more complicated than the three-group picture that was 
proposed in the 2009 findings, as older racial divisions within the South African workforce 
which were not to the fore in 2009 made an appearance later on during and after the strike.  
Indeed, group relations here consist of a series of interests which converge and diverge over 
time, and ‘groups’ themselves may exist only for as long as the varying interests within them 
are served by the same course of action (Reicher, Hopkins & Condor, 1997; cf Drury & 
Reicher, 2000).  As Reicher, Drury and Stott have argued in a slightly different context, 
crowds engaged in protest are typically made up of subsections with different interests who 
may develop a greater sense of unity through their experience of mistreatment by the 
police.  Hence, analysing groups’ accounts of their relations with one another in terms of 
interests in change is an acknowledgement of the way society as a whole is fractured into 
many kinds of groups and subgroups, who are caught up alongside each other in these 
processes of change, and whose interests may align for a while.  In De Doorns, developing 
this thesis from a single case study masters’ thesis into a longitudinal two-case-studies-plus-
historical-context PhD – while having shortcomings such as small samples for some groups 
and initial uncertainty about what I was really studying in 2012-2013 – has afforded a 
historical view of how intergroup allegiance in this community has shifted and reconfigured 
over time, both in response to changing historical circumstances and in ways that helped 
produce new change. Indeed, this process of shifting intergroup allegiance is an ongoing 
process which is not going to stop happening now that my thesis is finished.  
A third benefit of this approach is that it does not lock us into thinking about racist and 
xenophobic discourse in terms of insults and negativity only (Dixon, Levine, Reicher & 
Durrheim, 2012).  Dixon et al’s (2012) paper is called ‘Are negative evaluations the problem 
and is getting us to like one another more the solution?’. The authors argue that one of the 
weaknesses of the ‘prejudice’ paradigm is that it detracts attention from kinds of 
exploitative and oppressive relationships that are not necessarily characterised by negative 
or derogatory evaluations.  Indeed, ‘paternalism’, for example in gender relations, is one of 
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the classic examples they give of a kind of relationship that involves the unidirectional 
transfer of benefits while being characterised by affection and love between the parties.  As 
was argued at the end of the 2009 results chapter, the flattering way that farmers and 
Zimbabwean workers spoke about one another does not mean that all is necessarily well 
between them.  Although it has not been cited, elsewhere in his interview Tom from extract 
4 in Chapter 10 above described his experience of working on farms as ‘terrible’, with long, 
strenuous hours remunerated by pittance wages that were worsened by crooked labour 
brokers, and thus showed that being Zimbabwean did not mean that his experience of farm 
work was ultimately any more pleasant or any less exploitative than anyone else’s.  Thus, 
rather than wondering about whether the farmers were or were not being racist when they 
praised the Zimbabweans as ‘tremendous’ and ‘very nice people’ (cf Durrheim, Mtose & 
Brown, 2011), we can interrogate the functions that were achieved by this relationship in 
this particular economic and social system.  The Zimbabweans and the farmers singing one 
another’s praises in 2009 helped match willing workers with willing employers, and, 
importantly, was a resource for opposing the xenophobia that the Zimbabweans were 
victims of at the time, but it also helped to obscure the racial inequality of this system and 
the way black poverty – including the Zimbabweans’ own poverty – is normalised within it.   
Hence, obviously, to argue against conceptualising the events in De Doorns in terms of two-
group psychologised ‘xenophobia’ or ‘racism’ (as variations on ‘prejudice’) is not an 
argument that there is no racism and xenophobia in this system.  Even apart from obvious 
cases of abusive and exploitative treatment that black and coloured workers experience 
directly from the white farmers or managers they work under, and with a very few 
exceptions of farms that are owned collectively by workers, almost the entire commercial 
farming industry is still structured in such a way that white labour needs are serviced by 
black people earning poverty wages.  This means that even if all farmers were model 
employers abiding by the basic conditions of employment and treating their workers fairly 
within the guidelines of this system, the system would still be one of entrenched racial 
inequality.  Also, it is not an argument that there is no xenophobia, which is a good word for 
describing this genre of violence and the widespread antipathy towards foreign migrants 
that make it possible.  Indeed, xenophobia denialism – the inability to concede that South 
Africa is an extremely xenophobic country – has been an unhelpful response from the South 
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African government to the crisis of xenophobia (Crush & Ramachandran, 2014).  Chapter 2 
showed how the attack on the Zimbabwean community followed the pattern that numerous 
cases of xenophobic violence have followed, especially the corruption behind the ward 
councillor’s actions and the way he used the eviction for his own personal and political gain 
and those of others (labour brokers) with whom he was in cahoots.  However, what I have 
discovered is that xenophobia and racism intersect in this community.  The elephant in the 
room when studying xenophobia in De Doorns is that these events were all taking place 
within an overall racist and racially unequal system.  This is part of the dilemma, because to 
highlight an overall racist system under which all black workers suffer (South African and 
foreign alike) appears to be taking attention away from the crisis of xenophobia, and once 
again presenting perpetrators of xenophobia as victims ‘in ways that legitimate and justify 
the attacks’ on Zimbabweans (Misago, 2009).  The difficulty, then, is in how to balance a 
critical analysis of xenophobia with a critical analysis of a racist or at least racialised labour 
system, in such a way that neither is excused or minimised. 
The more things change the more they stay the same  
Having emphasised the ongoing reality of social change and the embeddedness of group 
relationships in this process of change, one of the apparently opposite discoveries I have 
made in the course of writing this thesis is a framework for thinking about the old and the 
new South Africa in terms of continuities between the two.  The political economy view saw 
apartheid as a form of capitalism and not only as a form of state (Legassick & Wolpe, 1976), 
and thus it encourages us to think of the transition as a transition between two forms of 
capitalism (Bernstein, 1996, 2013): one largely state-protected and the other not; one 
dependent on highly formalised migrant labour recruitment systems and the other on 
informal migrant labour flows (Munakamwe & Jinnah, 2014). This view leads us to expect 
continuities within the transition, rather than seeing continuities between the periods as an 
anomaly.  Borders have been reconfigured so that it is workers from Zimbabwe and Lesotho 
rather than the Transkei and Ciskei who now have to seek permission to be in the Hex Valley 
(cf Neocosmos, 2006), but similar intergroup dynamics in De Doorns were evident in 2009 to 
those produced in the Coloured Labour Preference period (Goldin, 1984), even though 
significant changes had occurred in the interim – the end of apartheid, the homelands 
ceasing to exist, the inclusion of farm workers in the new labour law regime, the arrival of a 
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new Zimbabwean migrant worker community, and so on.  In these ways, continuity in the 
form of the economy appears to have recreated similar structural positions which are simply 
filled by new groups, who speak about their relationships with one another in remarkably 
familiar ways.  This once again shows how psychology and materiality are closely 
intertwined.   
While this realisation has been new for me, in fact the argument of Neocosmos (2006) 
introduced at the beginning of this thesis – that South African went through a transition 
between ‘two forms of xenophobia’ – was partly already a critique of the political economy 
view.  Neocosmos argues that the dominance of the political economy critique of the 
migrant labour system as something bad that needed to be dismantled after apartheid 
meant that not enough attention was paid to forms and definitions of citizenship, which 
were largely inherited from the old regime and not critically interrogated.  Neocosmos thus 
emphasises the ‘centrality of citizenship in understanding the phenomenon of xenophobia’ 
(p. vi, emphasis added), and not only the centrality of economics.  Thus, despite many 
notable changes, we can think about the transition between the apartheid and post-
apartheid periods as involving continuities in both the form of economy – in which 
differentiated classes of migrant workers are once again produced – and in the form of the 
state – in which differentiated classes of citizens and non-citizens (and ‘infra-citizens’ – 
Monson, 2015) are produced.  Indeed, Sichone (2008) has argued that 
the South African system [of apartheid] came to an end just as the rest of the world 
was reinventing it in new forms.  Global apartheid, policed by the regime of visas and 
passports in a manner that African migrant workers who used to have to carry their 
vitupa and passbooks to gain access to employment would easily recognise as 
colonial, still does the job of keeping wealth and poverty apart. (n. p.)  
Continuity within change: Implications for social psychology 
To what extent do social psychologists study the presence of continuity in processes of 
change (cf Reicher & Haslam, 2013; Subasic, Reynolds, Reicher & Klandermans, 2012)?  One 
way that the question of continuity versus change has arisen is in a debate about the utility 
of the distinction between new and old-fashioned racism as ways of explaining how racial 
attitudes respond to socio-political change (Leach, 2005; Durrheim, 2014).  Leach (2005) 
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argues against the claim that there is a ‘new racism’ which can explain the persistence of 
racial inequality in post-racial regimes in the global North, suggesting that this new-old 
distinction is essentially empty:  
‘old-fashioned’ formal expression of racism was not especially popular before de jure 
racial equality and is not especially unpopular now.  I also show that there is nothing 
new about formal expressions that criticize cultural difference or deny societal 
discrimination.  Thus, there is greater historical continuity in racism than the notion 
of a ‘new racism’ allows (p. 432). 
 
Leach goes on to argue that  
 
a contemporary denial of racial discrimination does not indicate a dramatic change 
in the formal expression of racial ideology as is claimed by the ‘new racism’ notion. 
This is simply the continuation of a long-standing trend that is central to the 
operation of democracies that fail to live up to the principle of equality...This means 
that the ‘new racism’ of a denial of societal racial discrimination is likely to be as old 
as democracy itself (p. 440-441).  
 
However, Durrheim (2014) responds to Leach by asking how racism may, then, be said to 
change, even if not by a straightforward transition from old to new.  Do we conclude that 
there is simply no change?  Durrheim agrees with Leach that there are continuities between 
the pre- and post-Civil Rights eras and between apartheid and post-apartheid, but that 
changing expressions of racism are intimately tied up with the new lived realities that 
emerge in these contexts.  He thus argues for two ways that racism and racial attitudes can 
be seen as new.  First, a changed rhetorical context produced by major socio-political events 
such as the end of apartheid means a new set of norms that speakers must orient to in 
expressing their ‘attitudes’.   Hence, in Durrheim and Dixon’s (2005a) study of desegregation 
and white flight on a KwaZulu-Natal beach, the enactment of policies of desegregation 
meant that local controversies were now about how to implement desegregation rather 
than about the principle of segregation (apartheid).  White South African beachgoers had to 
adapt their reasoning for keeping themselves separate (if they did so) to a new political 
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climate in which desegregation and racial contact were a daily reality legitimated by a new 
political and social regime – something they did not have to do before apartheid ended.  
Thus, second, Durrheim (2014) argues that race attitudes can be seen as ‘new’ insofar as 
they are useful in rationalising new forms of conduct in a changed material context of how 
intergroup relations are organised.  In this way, Durrheim is arguing (against Leach) that 
changes in how racism was expressed before and after the end of apartheid did occur in 
response both to the new normative rhetorical context of black majority rule and to the 
lived reality of everyday desegregation and racial contact.   
However, Durrheim (2014) also sees that ultimately the self-segregation enacted by white 
South Africans fleeing KZN beaches ended up producing a ‘new’ form of segregation which 
was in some ways but a variation on that of the past: ‘When people began interacting with 
each other in ways that were rendered intelligible by these new attitudes, these emerging 
forms of prejudice began to constitute the “new South Africa” in ways that resembled the 
past’ (p. 222).  In this way, change sometimes brings us back, if not to exactly where we 
were before, then at least to social forms in which there is recognisable continuity with the 
past.  Subašid, Reynolds, Reicher and Klandermans (2012) have cautioned that there is a big 
difference between, on one hand, essentialising social continuity and stability by claiming 
that they are more natural to the human mind than change, and on the other showing how 
stability is maintained by powerful groups who have interests in the continuity of the status 
quo.  However, these are not the only ways that social stability can be said to occur.  Change 
itself involves continuity with the past, and is often made out of familiar elements (see also 
Stewart, Leach & Pratto, n.d.).  This claim resonates with the arguments of Billig: as 
discourse always contains the seeds of what came before, we should not expect ‘change’ to 
be something unrecognisable, but to contain recognisable traces of the past.  Thus, 
ultimately deciding whether something is evidence of change or of continuity depends on 
the scope of our overall frame of historical reference.  Like in climate science, perhaps the 
challenge is to decide whether observed changes are cyclical variations that are part of a 
longer, regular pattern or whether they constitute something decisively new.  While this 
thesis has shown how the intergroup dynamics in De Doorns were clearly located in a 
history of socio-economic and political change since the end of apartheid, it has also shown 
that there are recognisable continuities with the apartheid era, which can be explained by 
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the persistence of a fundamentally unreformed system of racialised capitalism in which a 
white-owned commercial agricultural industry is still being sustained by an often divided 
and partially migrant black labour force.   
Cautions and limitations 
Is it problematic to explain the way groups construe their relationships with others through 
references to their ‘interests’ in change? Discursive psychologists have hesitations about 
treating ‘interests’ as something outside of or pre-existing discourse which can explain the 
content of discourse, preferring to see interests as something that are visibly attended to by 
speakers in discourse (Whittle & Mueller, 2010; Edwards & Potter, 1992). Also, what is in 
farm workers’ interests is obviously a matter of debate among farm workers themselves: 
not all workers supported the strike and the eviction, and not all workers agree on what 
kind of ideal relationship with farmers should be cultivated (Webb, 2017).  In an ideal world, 
it would not be in the Zimbabweans’ (or any workers’) interests to work for farmers at 
poverty wages, even if these wages were above the minimum and even if they and the 
farmers liked each other as much as they claimed to do.  But out of the possible options that 
were available to them in a context of constraint, aligning themselves with farmers in order 
to get jobs is the one they chose.  Of course, one of the main points of this thesis is that 
groups’ sense of where their allegiance lies can shift over time (cf Subašid, Reynolds & 
Turner, 2008), and there was tentative evidence in the second results chapter of a shift in 
both farmers’ and Zimbabweans’ thinking about whether their interests were still aligned.  
Also, the claim that groups have interests in the direction their society is changing towards 
does not mean this in the sense of a rational actor model – that people have an absolute or 
God’s eye view of what results their actions will ultimately produce and whether these will 
be ‘in their interests’.  Speakers’ recommended courses of action can have unexpected 
consequences down the line, which may not turn out to be good for them.  But the results 
chapters have simply demonstrated, as Sherif (1966) observed, that people do have ‘future 
goals and designs’, and that the ways they talk about their relations with significant other 
groups are intimately rhetorically linked with such recommendations for change.   
Recommendations for further research 
The examples of literature going beyond the two-group paradigm used in Chapter 5 offer a 
number of different starting points for further social psychological research and theorising 
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on intergroup scenarios involving more than two groups.  Some researchers, like Billig 
(1976), may wish to focus on how powerful third parties can play a role in fuelling 
intergroup conflicts where they are apparently neither victims nor perpetrators of violence.  
Others, like Bonilla-Silva (2004), may wish to focus on the strategic functions that intergroup 
alliances between dominant and middle-status groups serve, and the differential 
consequences this alliance has for each group as well as for those excluded from the 
alliance.  Others, like Mamdani (2001) with his notion of ‘subject races’ and Adhikari (2005) 
in his study of coloured identity in South Africa, may wish to consider the dilemmas of 
solidarity, aspirations of assimilation, and dangers of becoming victims of a violent backlash 
for middle-status groups in post-colonial contexts. Others, like Bikmen (2011) was so close 
to doing, may wish to focus on the questions of solidarity and division between low-status 
and middle-status groups when the latter must decide whether they are going to throw in 
their lot with the former or preserve their good relationship with the dominant group.  
Others, like Drury, Reicher and Stott, may wish to investigate the processes by which group 
alliances and boundaries shift, producing two groups where there were previously more 
(Drury & Reicher, 2000; Drury, Reicher & Stott, 2003).  Speaking methodologically, Glasford 
and Calcagno (2012) and Dixon, Durrheim, Thomae, Tredoux, Kerr and Quayle (2015) show 
how a three-group scenario can be reflected in quantitative research designs.  Obviously, 
the most important thing is not to invent a new three-group framework which we now 
doggedly adhere to in place of the two-group one.  The most important thing is to employ a 
‘theoretical imagination’ (Silverman, 2005) and generate theories that speak to our 
contexts.  Power operates through co-opting, resistance, division and allegiance, and these 
produce kinds of intergroup psychological dynamics which are not well captured by the 
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Appendix 1: Transcribing conventions (adapted from Silverman, 2005) 
.hh   audible intake of breath (number of hs indicate length of breath) 
hh   audible exhalation (number of hs indicate length of breath) 
>okay okay<   words between > < signs were said quickly 
[um]   words or parts of words aligned in square brackets were said at the  
[o    ]kay  same time by different speakers 
You know=   Equals signs denote no discernible pause between the end of one   
=ja ja   utterance and the beginning of another 
absolutely  words or parts of words underlined were said with emphasis 
sh-, she  a dash denotes a word cut off abruptly 
I KNOW  words in capitals were said loudly 
°ja°   words between degree signs were said quietly 
oka:::y   colons denote that the previous vowel or consonant was extended. 
   The number of colons indicates the length of the extension. 
So, ↑ja ↓to a  arrows up and down denote rising or falling pitch respectively on  
   the following syllable.    
(.)    a pause  
((laughs))  words within double round brackets are transcriber’s comments or 
   descriptions rather than words said by the speaker 
(      )   empty round brackets denote an inaudible utterance 
(they abuse)  words in single round brackets denote the transcriber’s best guess at 
   an unclear utterance 
ja.   full stop denotes ending intonation, not to be taken as denoting  
   the actual end of a sentence 
okay,   comma denotes continuing intonation on the preceding word 
?    denotes rising, questioning intonation rather than an actual question 
!   denotes excitement in the preceding utterance  
meeting  words in italics are translations  
... An ellipsis shows that spoken words have been omitted from the 
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Date issued: 20 November 2009 
Issued by: Agri Wes-Cape 
For immediate release 
 
Agri Wes-Cape reaction to allegations in De Doorns 
 
 “The situation in De Doorns is disgusting and distasteful,” Agri Wes-Cape CEO, Carl 
Opperman said this morning.   
 
Farmers in the area have been blamed for employing illegal immigrants, paying workers 
below the minimum wage and employing workers without legal contracts, but no proof of 
these allegations are forthcoming. Agri Wes-Cape wants to make it very clear that farmers 
are allowed to legally employ workers in accordance with the country’s laws and the free 
market system we have in South Africa. Agri Wes-Cape farmers are also bound by a strict 
code of conduct and we have found no transgression of either the law or the code of 
conduct by any Agri Wes-Cape member in the Hex River Valley. 
 
The current situation seemingly resulted from reports of a fight between locals and 
foreigners last weekend and erupted into a xenophobic attack on foreign nationals that 
was further encouraged by instigators that alledgedly had political support.  The attacks 
on innocent people and the destruction of their personal belongings and property is 
inexcusable and could have been prevented if the police reacted immediately to the first 
complaints.  We insist that the police identify the real perpertrators and that immediate 
legal action be taken against them.  
 
Agri Wes-Cape believes that the local Municipality failed the residents of the informal 
settlements by not providing them with proper infrastructure and service delivery, which 
contributed to their disgruntled behaviour.   
 
Producers that are contributing in a major way to the economy, prosperity and 
employment in the area are being targeted and threatened to steer the attention away 
from the criminal element that apparently created this situation in the first place.  Nearly 
forteen thousand (14 000) workers are employed in the Hex River Valley during peak 
season time and in these challenging economic times producers need reliable, effective 
and productive workers. Producers in the area maintain a high value system on the farms 
and workers are employed accordingly. 
 
With regards the allegations that workers are paid less than minimum wage, Agri Wes-
Cape would like to challenge the organisations and individuals that are making these 
allegations to provide the Department of Labour with the neccesary proof so that those 
alledgedly responsible, can be investigated.  Farmers are not the only direct employers of 





Enquiries : Carl Opperman, Chief Executive Officer (082 944 0799) or Porchia Adams, Corporate 
Communications Manager (082 4412 510), Agri Wes-Cape 
Western Cape Government is doing everything to restore peace and order in De Doorns 
Date: 6 November 2012  
Body: The Western Cape Government is very concerned about the current illegal protest 
action ongoing in De Doorns. Three Western Cape Ministers are currently in De Doorns: Van 
Rensburg, Agriculture and Rural Development; Meyer, Cultural Affairs and Sport; and Plato, 
Community Safety. The Western Cape Government is urgently looking for ways in which to 
restore calm and order in the area. Intelligence estimates that approximate 8000 protestors 
are mobilising to march on De Doorns today. 
Van Rensburg said the Western Cape Government considers agriculture to be the backbone 
of the Provincial economy. The table grape season has recently started in De Doorns. There 
are approximately 16 000 farm worker job opportunities, of which 8000 are seasonal, 
available in the valley. Van Rensburg said the Western Cape Government will work very 
hard with the Police and all local authorities to normalize the situation. 
Van Rensburg said he is confident that it is not traditional Western Cape farm workers who 
are behind the illegal protest action. “We believe this to be politically motivated action, and 
not a labour protest. Van Rensburg said there are very good relations between farmers and 
farm workers in the area, and that he is saddened to learn of farm workers who are 
intimidated to partake in the protest. “It is at this stage very difficult to identify the leadership 
of the protest, and therefore impossible to engaged in dialogue with the protesters”. 
The Western Cape Government met with the police and farmer representatives this morning. 
At this meeting it was decided that dialogue with the protesters is the number one priority, 
and the local mayor, Basil Kivedo, will address the protestors later today. The police has 
requested for reinforcements as well as a helicopter to help with monitoring the situation. 
The Western Cape Government will also bring in the services of an experienced negotiator 
to assist in resolving the situation. Minister Meyer said a solution can be found through 
dialogue. He urged all to remain calm and for all people to refrain from breaking the law.  
The N1 highway is closed for all traffic outside Worcester and De Doorns, and an alternative 
rout via Ceres needs to be used at present. 





       
                




I am a student at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (Pietermaritzburg campus) and I am doing some 
research for my Psychology master’s project. I have come to De Doorns to interview various people 
who were involved or implicated in the ‘xenophobic’ violence and conflict here last month, or who 
represent the interests of involved people. This research is supervised by Prof. K. Durrheim from the 
School of Psychology at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. I would like to interview you for this 
project, and to obtain your written informed consent to be interviewed.  
 
My research assistant and I would like to ask for your opinions about the conflict last month, 
specifically your opinions about its causes, about the accusations that were made by various people 
and parties against other people and parties, about what has happened in the aftermath, and about 
what (if anything) can or should be done from now on.  
 
If you agree to speak to us, the interview will be recorded so that it can be transcribed (written 
down) and analysed later. We understand that this is a sensitive topic and therefore we are 
concerned about your remaining anonymous. If you would like to remain anonymous please tick the 
‘anonymous’ box on the next page. If you do, every care will be taken to ensure that you remain 
anonymous throughout the study. We will not ask for your name or identifying details. If these 
come up in the course of the conversation, they will be left out when we transcribe it and they will 
not appear in the written project. However, if you would like to speak in your official capacity 
and/or to be indentified and have your name mentioned, please indicate that on the next page. 
 
Pieces of the interview will be quoted in a research project which will be available to be read by the 
public. We may also write an article for a newspaper in which you may be quoted. Again, however, 
your name will not be used unless you give us permission to use it.  If you would like to read the 
results of the study, it will be completed by the end of 2010 and you are welcome to request a copy 
of the final thesis.  
 
If you agree at first but later (for example, during the interview, or afterwards when the interview is 
finished, or even later in the year) you decide you no longer want to be a participant, then you are 
welcome to tell us, either face to face, by phone, or in writing. If you decide this, we will delete your 
interview and leave it out of the study. [sentence deleted here] You are also free not to answer any 
questions in the interview that you do not want to answer (please just tell us), and you are free to 
end the interview early if you want to. You do not have to explain your reasons for doing so. 
 
If you have any more questions about the study, the interview, or this letter, please feel free to ask 
me.  If you would like further information about the research study after we have left, do contact 
either myself or my supervisor (Prof. Kevin Durrheim) (our details are on the following page). 
 
You are welcome not to participate, and if you do not want to, that is fine. If you are happy to 
participate, we thank you in advance for your time, and ask you to read and sign the form on the 
next page.   
 
School of Psychology 
P/Bag X01 Scottsville 
PIETERMARITZBURG, 3209 
South Africa 
Phone: +27 33 2605371 
Fax:     +27 33 2605809 
Philippa Kerr 
philkerr@hotmail.com 
082 710 4501 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Kevin Durrheim 
 





Consent to participate in University of KwaZulu-Natal research project: 
 
-If you do not wish to participate in the study, please do not sign this form 
 
-Note that signing the form does not mean that you are committing yourself to participating. It 
means that you understand that this is voluntary and that you can leave the study whenever you 
want to, if you want to. 
 
 
I (the participant) agree to participate in an interview for this piece of research. I know that I will 
remain anonymous throughout the study if I have said that I want to be anonymous. I also agree to 
the interview being audio recorded so that it can be accurately transcribed and to ensure an 
accurate analysis of the discussion. I know that I can stop the interview at any time and that I can 
ask for my interview to be withdrawn even after the interview is finished. 
 
I would like to remain anonymous  
  OR 
I would like to speak in my official capacity which will make me identifiable   
(Name of participant: _________________________________________) 
 
Signature of participant: _________________________________________ 
 
Signature of researcher:________________________________________ 
                            





       
                
        7 Desember 2009 
 
RE: Toestemming om deel te neem aan navorsingsprojek 
 
 
Ek is ‘n student by die Universiteit van KwaZulu-Natal (Pietermaritzburg kampus) en ek is besig om 
navorsing te doen vir my meestersgraad projek in Sielkunde. Ek het De Doorns toe gekom om 
onderhoude te voer met verskeie mense wat betrokke was by, of verbind was met, die ‘xenofobiese’ 
geweld en konflik wat verlede maand hier plaasgevind het, of wat die belange van die mense wat 
daarby betrokke was verteenwoordig. Die navorsing word gedoen onder toesig van Prof. Kevin 
Durrheim van die Skool van Sielkunde by die Universiteit van KwaZulu-Natal. Ek wil graag ‘n 
onderhoud met jou voer vir hierdie projek. Ek mag egter slegs ‘n onderhoud met jou voer as ek jou 
ingeligte toestemming op skrif het. 
 
My navorsingsassistent en ek wil jou graag vir jou opinies oor verlede maand se konflik vra, veral jou 
opinies oor die oorsake, oor die aantygings wat deur verskeie mense en partye gemaak is teen 
ander mense en partye, oor wat sedertdien gebeur het, en oor wat (indien enigiets) nou kan of 
moet gedoen word. 
 
As jy instem om met ons te praat sal die onderhoud opgeneem word sodat dit getranskribeer 
(neergeskryf) en later geanaliseer kan word. Ons verstaan dat dit ‘n sensitiewe onderwerp is en 
daarom is ons besorgd oor jou anonimiteit. As jy anoniem wil bly, maak asseblief ‘n merkie in die 
‘anoniem’ boksie op die volgende bladsy. As jy dit doen, sal elke voorsorg getref word om seker te 
maak dat jy dwarsdeur die studie anoniem bly. Ons sal jou nie vir jou naam of inligting wat jou mag 
identifiseer vra nie. As dit in die loop van die gesprek genoem word sal dit uitgelaat word wanneer 
ons die onderhoud transkribeer en dit sal nie in die geskrewe projek verskyn nie. Maar as jy in jou 
offisiële kapasiteit wil praat en/of geïdentifiseer wil word en wil hê dat jou naam genoem word, dui 
dit asseblief aan op die volgende bladsy. 
 
Dele van die onderhoud sal aangehaal word in ‘n navorsingsprojek wat beskikbaar sal wees vir die 
publiek om te lees. Ons mag ook ‘n artikel vir ‘n koerant skryf waarin jy aangehaal mag word. Jou 
naam sal egter nie bekend gemaak word nie, tensy jy ons toestemming daarvoor gegee het. As jy die 
resultate van die studie wil lees sal dit teen die einde van 2010 voltooi wees en jy is welkom om ‘n 
kopie van die finale projek te versoek. 
 
As jy oorspronklik instem maar later (byvoorbeeld gedurende die onderhoud, of na die tyd wanneer 
die onderhoud afgehandel is) besluit jy wil nie meer deelneem aan die projek nie, dan is jy welkom 
om ons in kennis te stel, of in persoon, of per telefoon, of op skrif. Indien jy so besluit sal ons jou 
onderhoud uithaal en nie in die studie gebruik nie. Jy hoef ook nie vrae in die onderhoud te 
beantwoord wat jy nie wil antwoord nie (sê ons net asseblief) en jy is vry om die onderhoud vroeër 
te eindig as jy wil. Jy hoef nie jou redes daarvoor te gee nie. 
 
As jy enige verdere vrae oor die studie, die onderhoud, of hierdie brief het, voel asseblief vry om my 
te vra. As jy verdere inligting oor die navorsingstudie wil hê nadat ons weg is, kontak my of Prof. 
Kevin Durrheim (ons kontakinformasie is op die volgende bladsy).  
 
School of Psychology 
P/Bag X01 Scottsville 
PIETERMARITZBURG, 3209 
South Africa 
Phone: +27 33 2605371 
Fax:     +27 33 2605809 
Jy is welkom om nie deel te neem nie, en as jy nie wil nie, is dit in die hak. As jy gelukkig is om deel 






082 710 4501 
 
Prof. Kevin Durrheim 





Toestemming om deel te neem in Universiteit van KwaZulu-Natal navorsingsprojek: 
 
 
- As jy nie wil deelneem aan hierdie studie nie, moet asseblief nie hierdie vorm onderteken nie.  
 
- Neem kennis dat die ondertekening van hierdie vorm nie beteken dat jy jouself verbind om deel te 
neem nie. Dit beteken wel dat jy verstaan dat deelname vrywilliglik is en dat jy die studie enige tyd 
kan verlaat indien jy sou wou.  
 
Ek (die deelnemer) stem in om deel te neem aan ‘n onderhoud. Ek weet dat ek regdeur die studie 
anoniem gaan bly, tensy ek toestemming gegee het dat my naam gebruik mag word. Ek stem ook in 
dat die onderhoud opgeneem mag word sodat dit akkuraat getranskribeer kan word om ‘n akkurate 
analise van die gesprek te verseker. Ek weet dat ek die onderhoud enige tyd kan stop en dat ek kan 
vra dat my onderhoud onttrek word, selfs na die onderhoud voltooi is.   
 
 
Ek wil anoniem bly   
 OF 




Handtekening van deelnemer: ______________________________ 
 
Handtekening van navorser: ________________________________ 
 





School of Applied Human Sciences 
Postal Address: Private Bag X01, Scottsville, Pietermaritzburg3209, South Africa 
Telephone: +27 (0)33 260 5853     Facsimile: +27 (0)33 260 5809      Email: khanyilet@ukzn.ac.za     Website: psychology.ukzn.ac.za 
   Founding Campuses:             Edgewood               Howard College                Medical School                Pietermaritzburg            Westville 
 
 




I am Philippa Kerr, a PhD student at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Pietermaritzburg. I am doing research 
about (a) how things have changed in De Doorns since the Zimbabwean community was evicted from the 
informal settlements in 2009, and whether those problems have been solved or not; (b) the current protests 
and what these are about; and (c) the history of De Doorns and how this town has changed in the time you 
have lived here.  
The interview might take between 20 minutes and an hour, but can be flexible according to how long you 
are happy to speak for.  If you agree to be interviewed, the conversation will be recorded with a tape 
recorder.  This is so that I have a record of what we talked about. This recording will not be played in public; 
however, I may quote your words in publications, newspaper articles or at conferences. If you are speaking 
in your personal capacity, I will not use your name or other identifying details.  If you are speaking in an 
official capacity and are happy to be identified as such, please indicate this on the next page.  
Although we do not expect there to be any risks involved in being interviewed for this project, you might 
experience the remembering of violent events as upsetting.  In this project we will not provide counselling 
for this, but if you would like to speak to someone in this regard you can contact FAMSA in Worcester, 023 
347 5231. 
Please feel free to say no if you don’t want to be interviewed.  If you agree but later decide that you don’t 
want me to use your interview, you can contact me and I will be obliged not to use it.  
This research is being done for my PhD project. It has been approved by the university’s Research Ethics 
Committee.  If you have any further questions about this research, you can contact me, Philippa Kerr, at 
kerrp@ukzn.ac.za or 082 710 4501, or my supervisor, Professor Kevin Durrheim on 033 260 5348 or 
durrheim@ukzn.ac.za. If you feel you have been badly treated in this research and want to contact the 
Research Ethics Committee (independent from the researchers), you can contact Phume Ximba on 033 260 
3587 or ximbap@ukzn.ac.za. 
Please turn over 
  
School of Applied Human Sciences 
Postal Address: Private Bag X01, Scottsville, Pietermaritzburg3209, South Africa 
Telephone: +27 (0)33 260 5853     Facsimile: +27 (0)33 260 5809      Email: khanyilet@ukzn.ac.za     Website: psychology.ukzn.ac.za 
   Founding Campuses:             Edgewood               Howard College                Medical School                Pietermaritzburg            Westville 
If you agree to be interviewed, please sign below. Please be reminded that you are not signing to commit to 
the interview, but to show that you understand the above information. You can still withdraw at any time.  
Thank you very much for your time. If you have any questions, please feel free to ask them. 
 
Participant’s signature:_____________________   Date_____________________ 
Please tick if you are happy to be identified in your official capacity: ____ 
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   Founding Campuses:             Edgewood               Howard College                Medical School                Pietermaritzburg            Westville 







My naam is Philippa Kerr, ek is ‘n PhD student by die Universiteit van Kwazulu-Natal in Pietermaritzburg. Ek 
doen navorsing oor (a) hoe dinge in De Doorns verander het sedert die Zimbabwe-gemeenskap in 2009 uit 
die informele nedersettings gesit is, en of daardie probleme sedertien opgelos is of nie; (b) die huidige 
optogte en waaroor dit gaan; en (c) die geskiedenis van De Doorns en hoe die dorp verander het in die tyd 
wat u hier gewoon het. 
 
Die onderhoud sal ongeveer 20 minute tot ‘n uur duur, maar dit hang van u af hoe lank u met ons wil gesels. 
Indien u instem om met ons te gesels, sal die gesprek opgeneem word op ‘n bandopnemer. Ons doen dit 
sodat ons ‘n rekord het van wat gesê is. Hierdie opname sal nie in die publiek gespeel word nie, maar ek mag 
dalk u woorde aanhaal in publikasies, koerantartikels of by konferensies. Indien u vanuit u ‘n persoonlike 
hoedanigheid inligting verskaf, sal ek nie u naam of ander persoonlike besonderhede gebruik nie. Indien u 
vanuit ‘n amptelike hoedanigheid inligting verskaf en instem om so geïdentifiseer te word, dui asseblief so 
aan op die volgende bladsy. 
 
Alhoewel ons nie verwag dat daar enige gevare verbonde is aan u deelname aan die onderhoud nie, is daar 
die moontlikheid dat herinneringe aan gewelddadige gebeure vir u ontstellend mag wees. Ons verskaf nie 
berading vir dit in hierdie studie nie, maar indien u met iemand wil praat oor hierdie gebeure, kan u vir 
FAMSA in Worcester skakel by 023 347 5231. 
 
Dit staan u vry om nee te sê vir die onderhoud. Indien u nou instem, maar later besluit dat u nie wil hê ek 
moet die onderhoud gebruik nie, kan u my kontak en ek sal nie verplig wees om dit te gebruik nie. 
 
Hierdie navorsing word onderneem vir my PhD projek. Dit is deur die universiteit se Etiese Komitee vir 
Navorsing goedgekeur. Indien u enige verdere vra het oor die navorsing, kan u my, Philippa Kerr kontak by 
kerrp@ukzn.ac.za of by 082 710 4501, of my promotor, Professor Kevin Durrheim by 033 260 5348 of 
durrheim@ukzn.ac.za. Indien u voel dat u sleg behandel is in hierdie navorsing en die Etiese Komitee vir 
Navorsing wil skakel (onafhanklik van die navorsers), kan u vir Phume Ximba skakel by 033 260 3587 of by 
ximbap@ukzn.ac.za 
 
Blaai asseblief om 
School of Applied Human Sciences 
Postal Address: Private Bag X01, Scottsville, Pietermaritzburg3209, South Africa 
Telephone: +27 (0)33 260 5853     Facsimile: +27 (0)33 260 5809      Email: khanyilet@ukzn.ac.za     Website: psychology.ukzn.ac.za 
   Founding Campuses:             Edgewood               Howard College                Medical School                Pietermaritzburg            Westville 
Indien u instem tot die onderhoud, teken asseblief hieronder. Let asseblief daarop dat u nie teken om deel 
te neem aan die onderhoud nie, maar om te wys dat u die voorafgaande inligting verstaan. U kan steeds 
enigetyd u deelname onttrek. 
 
Baie dankie vir u tyd. Voel vry om enige vrae te vra wat u mag hê 
 
Deelnemer se handtekening: _____________________  Datum: ________________ 
Dui asseblief aan of u in ‘n amptelike hoedanigheidgeïdentifiseer wil word: _________ 





List of acronyms 
 
ACMS – African Centre for Migration and Society  
ANC – African National Congress 
CLPP – Coloured Labour Preference Policy 
COSATU – Congress of South African Trade Unions  
CSAAWU – Commercial Stevedoring, Agricultural and Allied Workers Union 
DA – Democratic Alliance  
ESIM – Elaborated social identity model of crowd interaction 
ESTA – Extension of Security of Tenure Act  
FAWU – Food and Allied Workers Union 
HTA – Hexvallei Tafeldruiwe Assosiasie (Hex Valley Table Grapes Association) 
PASSOP – People Against Suffering, Oppression and Poverty (Refugee rights activist group) 
RDP – Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP houses are low-cost government 
houses) 
 
